B. C. PATEL, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revision Application is preferred against the order of conviction and sentence recorded by Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Botad in Criminal Case No. 15 of 1983 on 18-1-1985 by which the petitioner has been convicted and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 2,000. 00 for an offence punishable under Sec. 7 (1) read with sec. 16 (l) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which is confirmed by Additional Sessions Judge, bhavnagar in Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 1985 on 30/06/1986. ( 2 ) SUCCINCTLY stated, the facts of the case as it emerges from the record of this case are as under : respondent No. 2, Food Inspector (hereinafter referred to as the Food Inspector), on 21-9-1983, took sample of chilli powder weighing 600 grams for analysis under the Act, which on analysis by the Public Analyst, was found to be adulterated, i. e. , not according to the standard. There was presence of coaltar dye. On receipt of the report of the Public Analyst, after obtaining consent of appropriate authority required under the Act, Food Inspector filed a complaint before Judicial Magistrate, first Class, Botad on 27-7-1983. Learned Magistrate framed charge vide Exh. 36 on 1-9-1984 to which the accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the learned magistrate, after recodrding further evidence, according to the procedure, heard the submissions by the learned Advocates and after considering the Statement of the accused under Sec. 313 and on appreciation of evidence, convicted and sentenced the accused-petitioner herein, as aforesaid. The matter was carried in appeal. Having failed, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of this revision Application. ( 3 ) MR. Shah, learned Advocate for the appellant further contended that there is a breach of provisions contained in Sec. 11 (l) (c) of the Act. Section 11 (l) (c) of the Act reads as under :"11 (1) (c) : (i) send one of the parts for analysis to the Public Analyst under intimation to the Local (Health) Authority, and (ii) send the remaining two parts to the Local (Health) Authority for the purposes of sub-sec. (2) of this section and sub-sees. (2-A) and (2-E) of Sec. 13. "mr. (2) of this section and sub-sees. (2-A) and (2-E) of Sec. 13. "mr. Shah submitted that there is nothing to indicate that there is any intimation forwarded to the Local Health Authority while forwarding the sample to Public analyst, and therefore, there is violation. Mr. Shah, learned. Advocate placed reliance on the decision in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Raghmath Hindurao gajbar, reported in 1984 (1) FAC 226. The question before the Court in that case was, whether the requirements that one of the three samples should be sent to the Public Analyst is coupled with the requirement that the intimation of the same should be sent to the Local Health Authority and that whether this requirement is of a mandatory character. If it is mandatory requirement, then noncompliance with the same will render the prosecution invalid or. not ? In that case, in para 12 of the judgment, the Court held that :"12. The reason why I feel that the provision must be held to be mandatory is that the ultimate result of conviction of the accused is of very grave, serious and stiff character. If it is found, as a result of the analysis that the sample contained more water than normally expected, the accused has to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of minimum six months in addition to the minimum fine of Rs. 1000. 00. If this is the position of law, then it will be reasonable to assume that the legislature expected the officer concerned to comply with each of the formalities prescribed by the statute very strictly. This necessarily means that the provision is mandatory in character. It cannot be lightly assumed that the legislature wanted the citizen to be sentenced to stiff penalty in a light-hearted manner. If such stiff penalty is the ultimate result, the manner in which the stiff penalty should be imposed has to be prescribed and once the legislature prescribes such manner, the same has got to be observed strictly by the person who has been entrusted with the duty of implementation of the law by paying attention to each of the mandatory requirements prescribed by the law. I do not think that the Court would be justified in taking the view that the legislature has made the provisions for intimation to Local Authority of certain facts an empty formality. I do not think that the Court would be justified in taking the view that the legislature has made the provisions for intimation to Local Authority of certain facts an empty formality. The Act provides that before invoking the penal provision, certain requirements have got to be complied with. After compliance with those requirements, the citizen may be sent to jail, but it cannot have been intended by the legislature that similar result would not follow even if the requirement was not complied with by the authorities concerned. "reading this, it appears that the learned Judge held that the provision is mandatory on account of the ultimate result of stiff penalty. The same question has been considered by the Kerala High Court in the case of T. V. Hameed and Ors. , reported in 1986 (1) FAC 201. In its judgment, the Kerala high Court also considered the aforesaid decision rendered by the Bombay High Court. The Court observed in para 8 of the judgment as under :"8. If that view is accepted each and every provision in the Prevention of Food adulteration Act and Rules will have to be treated as mandatory and absence of proof of observance must be found fatal. But unfortunately, that view is not favoured by this court and the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions. It is true that there is no other available decision concerning Sec. 11 (l) (c) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration act, presumably for the reason that nobody must have thought it fit to raise such a hyper-technical contention. Decided cases show that various provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Rule are only directory in nature and their non-observance of absence of strict or timely compliance will not be fatal. Guidelines to decide whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory were also given by various decisions. The appellate decision in this case referred to by me earlier has also given such guidelines. It is not necessary for me to extract all those decisions here. In my opinion, the provision of, Sec. 11 (1) (c) (i) is evidently only a directory one. There are a host of decisions which say that the provisions of Sec. 10 (7) are only directory and that the non-observance of these provisions will not be fatal. It is not necessary for me to extract all those decisions here. In my opinion, the provision of, Sec. 11 (1) (c) (i) is evidently only a directory one. There are a host of decisions which say that the provisions of Sec. 10 (7) are only directory and that the non-observance of these provisions will not be fatal. Rule 9a of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules made on the basis of Sec. 13 (2) directing the Local (Health) Authority to send copy of the report of the Public Analyst to the accused was considered in the decision in Tulsiram v. State of M. P. , 1984 (2) FAC 146, and it was found to be not a mandatory provision. It was held therein : "the expression immediately in Rule 9a is intended to convey a sense of continuity rather than urgency. What must be done is to foiward the report to the person from whom the sample was taken at the earliest opportunity, so as to facilitate the exercise of the statutory right under Sec. 13 (2) in good and sufficient time before the prosecution commences leading evidence. Non-compliance with Rule 9a is not fatal. It is a question of prejudice. "compliance of that rule is having some bearing on the right of the accused to have a second opinion from the Central Food Laboratory. Even in such a case it was held that proof of prejudice is required to make absence of strict compliance fatal. Compliance of sec. 13 (2-B) came up for consideration before a single Bench of this Court in the decision of Mani v. Food Inspector, 1984 KLJ 752 . What was observed therein is : when the accused exercises his right under Sec. 13 (2) for a fresh analysis by the Central Pood Laboratory, he has himself a duty to alert the Court of its responsibilities to satisfy whether there was any tampering of the packet and seal of the sample and to insist the Court to make record of its verification. The accused cannot at a later stage of the trial or in appeal or revision contend that there is no record by the Court for the purpose. The accused cannot at a later stage of the trial or in appeal or revision contend that there is no record by the Court for the purpose. A tecbanical lapse of court, even if there is any, of a formal record of verification of the sample by the Court, cannot be taken advantage by a part who never objected to the defect of the packet of the sample before it was dispatched and who waited till the receipt of the report by the Central Food Laboratory. If the Central food Laboratory obtained sample with seals intact and unbroken, and the letter which was sent by the Court also referred to the details on the sample packet, regarding the seal etc. it can safely be concluded that the endorsement made on the application by the accused was by the Court and the Court had applied its mind as contemplated under Sec. 13 (2-B) of the Act either. " in the instant case, it is clear from the evidence that the sample which was forwarded in a sealed condition has reached the hands of Public analyst without any tampering. If that be so, mere not informing the Local authority would not be a reasonable proposition to doubt the collection of the sample and analysis of the same by the Public Analyst. It is also required to be noted that two samples have been forwarded to the Local health Authority. Mr. Shah, learned Advocate could not point out any prejudice having been caused to the accused in the Food Inspector having not informed the Local Authority. One must come out with a case that prejudice is caused. Failing this, if the provision is directory, it is difficult to say that benefit must be given to the accused. Here, one thing which is required to be noted is that the accused had also a right to forward sample to the Central Food Laboratory under Sec. 13 (2) of the Act and it was open for him to exercise that option and get the sample analysed by the Public Analyst so as to controvert the report of Public Analyst. This is not done in the instant case. This is not done in the instant case. I am completely in agreement with the view taken by the Kerala High Court in the case of T. V. Hameed (supra) that Sec. 11 (l) (c) (i) is only directory and if it has been substantially complied with and if no prejudice has resulted, then the consequential order must follow. As I have come to the conclusion that Sec. 11 (l) (c) (i) is directory, the contention raised by the learned Advocate Mr. Shah stands rejected. In the result, the Revision Application stands rejected. Rule discharged. Bail-bond stands cancelled. The applicant is ordered to surrender. At the request of learned Advocate Mr. Shah, four weeks time is granted to the applicant to surrender. Appropriate process shall be issued by the Court below if the accused does not surrender within the aforesaid time. .