A. PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) THE appellants Joge Gopal Joge and Balkrushna Nag Gokul (hereinafter referred to as the accused) call in question legality of their conviction for offence punishable under section 302 read with section 34 and section 380 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, I. P. C.) and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life for the former and three years for the latter, as awarded by the learned Sessions Judge, Sambalpur. ( 2 ) THE appellants faced trial for allegedly having intentionally caused death of Puran Bahadur (hereinafter referred as deceasedt) who was working was as the Night Watchman of G. M. College, Sambalpur, for commission of theft of cash box, torch light and bunch of keys of the said College, and wrist watch of the deceased, in furtherance of their common intention. Information was lodged at the Town Police station, Sambalpur, on 6/10/1989 at about 1. 15 a. m. to the effect that in the mid-night of 5/6-10. 1989 Tunu Munda, P. W. 2, the Night Watchman of the college came to the residence of Sambhu Prasad Misra, P. W. I, the in charge Principal along with Debadhi Sahu, the bearer of the college and informed him that the deceased was lying in front of the stair case on the ground floor with blood near his body. P. W. 1 lodged information having ascertained from Tunu, P. W. 2, that on 5/10/1989 at about 9. 30 p. m. he handed over the keys of the college gate to the deceased when he came to the college after taking meal and Tunu went to his house to take his meals. When he returned after about half an hour, he found the gate was locked from inside. He called for the deceased loudly and repeatedly; but since there was no response, being suspicious that some foul acts have been done, he collected the duplicate key from Narottam Sahu (P. W. 3) and opened the door in his presence. Both of them entered inside the premises and found the door of the academic section open, and the deceased lying with blood near his body. Tunu Munda went to the residence of the Office Superintendent Dayanidhi Bohidar (P. W. 5) and informed him about the occurrence. Both of them entered inside the premises and found the door of the academic section open, and the deceased lying with blood near his body. Tunu Munda went to the residence of the Office Superintendent Dayanidhi Bohidar (P. W. 5) and informed him about the occurrence. At his instance Tunu Munda came to the residence of the informant, and informed him about the occurrence. On getting information, P. W. 1 called his Stenographer and other employees of the college, namely, Bharat Chandra Sutar (P. W. 6), Dayanidhi Bohidar (P. W. 5) and several others who have not been examined as witnesses. They went to the spot and found that deceased was lying dead with serve bleeding injuries on his head. During investigation, the investigating officer (P. W. 25) visited the spot, prepared the spot nmp (Ext 20), gave requisition to the Scientific Officer and police dog was brought to help him in investigation; inquest of the dead body was done; certain bloodstained hair, blood-stained cigarette tips and three teeth bone pieces were seized from the spot; the dead-body was sent for post-mortem examination. Certain other articles were also seized. The investigating officer arrested the accused Joge on 25/10/1989 and interrogated him. While in custody, the said accused gave information to show the place where he broke the box and threw the documents and led the police to an open place near the Town Planning Office locally known as TCircus Padia and pointed out the tom pieces of college admission forms, L. I. C. pass books and revenue stamps. Those were, seized by the investigating officer. He further disclosed before the investigating officer to give recovery of bunch of keys concealed by him and so saying he led the investigating to a ditch filled with water in an open field near the Headquarters Hospital, Sambalpur and pointed out the same to the investigating officer who recovered the bunch of keys from the water. The accused Balakrushna was arrested on 14/11/1989 and while in custody he gave information to the investigating officer about places where he had thrown the torch light of the deceased and sold his wrist watch. He led the investigating officer to Jhara suguda and pointed out the accused Safiqula who was also tried for commission of offence under section 411 of I. P. C. Accused Joge made judicial confession before the Magistrate (P. W. 19) as per Ext. He led the investigating officer to Jhara suguda and pointed out the accused Safiqula who was also tried for commission of offence under section 411 of I. P. C. Accused Joge made judicial confession before the Magistrate (P. W. 19) as per Ext. 15. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted and the accusedper sons faced trial. ( 3 ) IN order to further its case prosecution examined 26 witnesses. At this juncture it is relevant to mention that one Mithilesh claimed to be a witness to an extra-judicial confession made by accused Joge. The learned trial Judge analysed the evidence of the witnesses and examined several factors, which according to prosecution were incriminating so far as accused Joge and Balakrushna are concerned. In relation to Joge, the following circumstances were submitted to be incriminating:1. Giving recovery of documents while in police custody; 2. Giving information leading to the recovery of bunch of stolen keys; 3. Judicial confession; and 4. Extra-Judicial confession. So far as accused Balakrushna is concerned, the following were stated to be incriminating circumstances: 1. Giving information to the police leading to the recovery of stolen torch light; 2. Giving information to the police leading to the recovery of stolen wrist watch; and 3. Judicial confession of the co-accused Joge Gopal. 4. The learned Sessions Judge held that the first two circumstances so far as accused Joge is concerned were proved beyond shadow of doubt. He held that the evidence of Mithilesh Devi was not sufficient to prove alleged extra-judicial confession. However, he held that the judicial confession has been proved through the evidence of P. W. 19, the Judicial Magistrate First Class before whom the confession was made. So far as accused Balakrushna is concerned, it was observed that all the circumstances were proved. Accordingly they were found guilty and convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. ( 4 ) SHRI S. K. Das, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, strenuously urged that the learned Sessions Judge has fallen into grave error in placing reliance on the circumstances to conclude that they formed a complete chain of circumstances to sustain the conviction of the appellants. He has categorised the alleged judicial confession to be insufficient to fasten the guilt on the accused-appellants. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, supported the judgment and conviction and sentence. He has categorised the alleged judicial confession to be insufficient to fasten the guilt on the accused-appellants. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, supported the judgment and conviction and sentence. ( 5 ) WE shall first deal with the judicial confession stated to have been made before P. W. 19. The statement itself is marked as Ext. 15. On a bare reading thereof we find that the accused Joge who made that alleged confession has clearly denied any role to have been played by him in the murder of the deceased. He has pointed out the accusing finger at the co-accused Balakrushna. At this juncture it is relevant to refer to provision of section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short, the Act ). It deals with consideration of proved confession affecting persons making it and others jointly under trial for same offence. The requirement of the said provision is that before it is made to operate against the co-accused, it must be shown that there was confession proper and not a mere circumstance or information which could be an incriminating one. Secondly, it being confession of the maker, it is not to be treated as evidence within the meaning of section 3 of the Act against the non-maker co-accused and lastly its use depends on finding other evidence so as to connect the co-accused with the crime and that too as a corroborative piece. It is only when other evidence tendered against the co-accused unmistakably points to his guilt, then the confession duly proved can be used against such co-accused if it appears to affect him as lending support or assurance to such other evidence. To attract the provision of section 30, it should for all purposes be a confession, that is a statement containing the admission of guilt and not merely a statement raising inference with regard to such guilt. Evidence of co-accused cannot be considered under section 30 of the Act, where he was not tried jointly with the accused and where he did not make a statement incriminating himself along with the accused. Confession of a co-accused, as indicated above, does not come within the definition of evidence contained in section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. Confession of a co-accused, as indicated above, does not come within the definition of evidence contained in section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is only when a person admits guilt to the fullest extent and exposes himself to the pains and penalties provided for his guilt, there is a guarantee for his truth, and the legislature provides that his statement may be considered against his fellow accused charged with the same crime. The test is to see whether it is sufficient by itself to justify the conviction of the person making it of the offence for which he is being jointly tried with the other person or persons against whom it is tendered. The proper way to approach a case of this kind is to first marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and then seen whether if it is believed, a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of-course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain the conviction. In such an event, the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to it he other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing that without the aid of the confession, he could not be prepared to accept The object of the provision is that when an accused unreservedly confesses his own guilt and at the same time implicates another person who is jointly tried with him for the same offence, his confession may be taken into consideration against such other person as well as against him-self because the admission of his own guilt operates as a sort of sanction, which to some extent, takes the place of the sanction of an oath and so affords some guarantee that the whole statement is a true one. The section is an exception to the rule that the confession of one person is entirely inadmissible against another. The section is an exception to the rule that the confession of one person is entirely inadmissible against another. A confession must implicate the maker substantially to the same extent as the other accused person against whom it is sought to be taken into consideration. The correct appreciation is to see whether the confessing accused has tarred himself and the person or persons he implicates with one and the same brush. Statements made by an accused, which implicate his fellows, and exculpate himself are not regarded as evidence in terms of section 30. This position was high-lighted by the apex Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh1 and by us in Gunanidhi Maharana and three others v. State. In the instant case, a bare reading of Ext. 15 clearly shows that there was no self implication by accused Joge. In fact, he has tried to extricate himself by saying that he was a mere by-stander, a mute witness to the occurrence and was not a participant. The learned Sessions Judge was, therefore, not justified in holding that there was judicial confession to be used against the accused appellants. ( 6 ) THE other circumstances indicated by the learned Sessions Judge to find both the accused persons guilty is the alleged recovery on the basis of information given. In Bhaga Gouda Vainrav. State and Brahmananda v. State, it was observed by this Court that the document relating to the statement made by the accused should be brought on record and where it is not so done, it cannot be held to be sufficient to establish the guilt. In Baladev Khes and another v. State of Orissa, it was observed that the information leading to discovery has to be proved but not the opinion formed by the investigating officer. In other words, the exact information given by the accused while in police custody which led to the recovery of the articles is to be proved. This has not been done in the instant case. Information leading to discovery is merely a link in the chain of circumstances. That by itself is not sufficient to secure a conviction. Where other links are missing, the entire chain cannot be said to be complete. This has not been done in the instant case. Information leading to discovery is merely a link in the chain of circumstances. That by itself is not sufficient to secure a conviction. Where other links are missing, the entire chain cannot be said to be complete. In that view of the matter also the conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge about the guilt of the accused cannot be maintained and it would be unsafe to maintain the conviction and consequently the sentence, which are set aside. The appeal is allowed. The accused be set at libertyforthwith unless they are required to be in custody in connection with, any other case. Appeal allowed. .