JUDGMENT 1. - Doongar Singh, the appellant-husking of Smt. Gopal Kanwar (deceased, victim in the incident) has preferred this criminal appeal questioning of the judgment rendered by the Trial Court convicting him under Sections 302 and 498A, IPC, with the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed therefor. 2. Briefly, the facts as unfolded by the prosecution are that both, the appellant & his wife (deceased) had been living in one room in front thereof there was an open land; the place of their residence is situated at plot No. 5, Dewan Ji Ki Kothi, Kama House Ajmer Road, Jaipur wherefrom the deceased was taken in a state of having burnt injuries to the hospital at 11.30 p.m. on 15.2.1991. The deceased died on 16.2.1991 at 11 a.m. in S.M.S. Hospital without giving any dying declaration. The proceedings under Section 174,Cr.P.C. were initiated under Mrig No. 5/91 on 16.2.1991 and there upon investigation commenced. Site plan was prepared stating the situation of the rooms and the house-hold articles lying in the room. Autopsy on the person of the deceased was conducted. The appellant had also burn injuries on his person and, therefore, he was also medically examined. In the proceedings under Section 174 Cr.P.C., statement of Amar Singh (neighbour) and other persons was recorded. Amar Singh in his statement recorded during proceedings u/ Section 174 Cr.P.C stated that Doongar Singh was standing under intoxication having a slat ( a thin strip of wood) (` Phauta' as called in local language) in his hand near the deceased who was burning. On the basis of statements recorded in investigation of proceedings u/ Section 174, Cr. P.C. it appeared to the Police that the appellant had burnt his wife after pouring kerosene oil on her body. In these circumstances after making investigation in proceedings under Section 174, Cr.P.C., a written report (Ex. P.9) was presented by the Circle Officer, at Police Station Sadar and thereupon F.I.R. No. 31/91 (Ex.P10) was chalked out for offence punishable under Section 302, IPC, on 2.2.1991 at 12.30 p.m. against the present appellant. The appellant was arrested on 3.3.1991 at 6.15 p.m. vide arrest memo (Ex. P. 12). 3. The challan was submitted in Court on 31.3.1991. After committee proceedings, the case came to be transferred to the Trial Court. The appellant was arrested on 3.3.1991 at 6.15 p.m. vide arrest memo (Ex. P. 12). 3. The challan was submitted in Court on 31.3.1991. After committee proceedings, the case came to be transferred to the Trial Court. The appellant was charged with offences punishable under Section 498-A IPC, and 302, IPC.The charges levelled against the appellant were that, on 15.2.1991 in the night at 11/ 11.15 p.m. at plot No 5, behind Kama House Deewan Ji Ki Kothi, Ajmer Road, Jaipur coal-treated mentally & physically his wife, Smt Gopal Kanwar and further, committed her murder by pouring kerosene oil on her person. The appellant denied to the charges and pleaded not guilty and so, claimed trial. 4. In all ten prosecution witnesses were examined. The appellant was examined under Section 313, Cr. P.C. In his explanation the appellant deposed that he had asked the neighbours to call for motor vehicle; that, he was also admitted in the hospital as he had burn injuries; that he had also sprinkled water, that he did not inflict stick below that he torn clothes thereby he was also burnt and he used slat (strip of wood) so as to remove clothes & not to inflict her, that the version of inflicting Dada was wrong that he put a blanket over the body of the deceased. The appellant admitted that his wife had burnt. In last question answer, he deposed that he had slept after taking his meals his wife was preparing and cooking meals for herself when he opened his eyes, he found his wife being burnt and then he torn her cloth and by using slat, removed her cloth; and that he poured water and put blanket over the body of the deceased. He denied to have burnt her by stating, why did he burn his wife, because he had no quarrel with her. 5. After hearing both the parties, the learned Trial Court found the following circumstances proved and thereby it held the appellant guilty of the offences punishable under Section 498-A and 302 IPC and sentenced him therefor. Hence this appeal. He denied to have burnt her by stating, why did he burn his wife, because he had no quarrel with her. 5. After hearing both the parties, the learned Trial Court found the following circumstances proved and thereby it held the appellant guilty of the offences punishable under Section 498-A and 302 IPC and sentenced him therefor. Hence this appeal. Those circumstances are that : (1) On the night of the incident, the accused was with his wife; (2) The incident took place at 10 O'clock in the night; (3) The house-hold articles were lying systematically in the room of the accused and there were no signs of having prepared or cooked any meals, in as much as the stove was lying well managed duly covered with large metal dish; (4) The accused had drunken wine on the incident night and an empty quarter phial of whisky was found below the cot; (5) The kerosene oil container-out of which kerosene oil was poured and smelt-was found lying behind the door of the latrine; (6) The accused had beaten his wife with a slat (a thin strip of wood) thereby six bruises with blueness besides a lacerated wound were found on tier person-which could not have been caused by use of that slat by the accused so as to remove the clothes from her body, rather they were caused by beating on the part of the accused; (7) Outside the room where Gopal Kanwar was burnt, there was a water tank but the accused never tried to pour water taking from the tank so as to extinguish fire; (8)The neighbour woman residing backside of the room, had tried to extinguish the fire by pouring water from her house's roof; (9)The accused had never cried for any help; (10) The accused & Mst. Gopal Kanwar both were taken to the hospital in ambulance by the police. 6. It is no doubt true and correct that the appellant and the deceased being husband & wife were together at the place of incident on the day of the incident at the time when the deceased burning outside their room which attracted the witnesses residing nearby the place of occurrence, and the witnesses reached the spot thereafter found the appellant standing nearby the burning deceased, having a slat in his hand. It may, therefore, be reasonable to infer that the appellant was present at the time and place of occurrence but this circumstance alone is not sufficient to conclude that it was the appellant who fired or burnt the deceased and he did so with the intention of killing the deceased. 7. When we scan the circumstances (7) and (3) contemporaneously (quoted above), we find that once it is the prosecution case under circumstance (7) the Smt. Copal Kanwar (deceased ) was burning outside the room, then it may be reasonable to infer that the house hold articles were found lying systematically in the room of the accused where both the accused and the deceased were living to get her having there provision of preparing and cooking meals on a stove.Once the incident of fire took place outside the room, the articles inside the room would definitely be found systematically and well managed. Thus, circumstance (3) is no more link to chain of circumstances connecting with the impugned crime. 8. As regards circumstance (4) as to the intoxication of the accused, we find no direct or indirect evidence of the prosecution so as to infer the intoxication of the accused on the day or night of the incident. Admittedly, the accused was also admitted in burn unit of the hospital alongwith the deceased and he was also medically examined by Dr. B.R. Khatri (P.W.5) vide injury report (Ex. P.4). Neither Ex. P.4 nor doctor's statement does state the position of intoxication of the accused, who was examined at 12 O'clock in the night. None of the witnesses who gathered and reached at the spot after hearing sound of the fire and flames, has stated that the amused was under drunken state of affairs. Mere finding of an empty phial of quarter of whisky does not establish the state of intoxication of the accused. None of the witnesses have alleged to have seen the accused consuming wine during the incident of the fire or before it. Rather, Amarsingh (PW 8) though turned hostile but from his statement it is borne out that he never seen the accused having consumed wine. Amar Singh is a neighbour residing nearby the room of the accused that too in front of they place of occurrence. Rather, Amarsingh (PW 8) though turned hostile but from his statement it is borne out that he never seen the accused having consumed wine. Amar Singh is a neighbour residing nearby the room of the accused that too in front of they place of occurrence. Other witnesses from locality reside backside of the mom of the accused that too at the first & subsequent floors in the building. Moreover, circumstance (4) is also not sufficient to conclude that it was the appellant who burnt the deceased with the intention of killing her. 9. As regards circumstance (5), it is also admitted that the accused and the deceased were having accommodation of single room wherein they used it not only for their bed room, drawing room but also for preparation and cooking of their meals,and in other words, the room was being used for all purposes. In these circumstances, it may there fore, he reasonable to infer that the appellant had no other accommodation except to keep sundry items, likes weeping room stick, fuels, kerosene oil container outside their lonely room because in common parlance, it is very well known that these sundry articles are usually kept outside the room, inasmuch as able things are always kept in hidden place in the accommodation of residence. Thus no adverse inference can be drawn against the accused connecting him with the crime only because, the empty container having smell of kerosene oil was found behind the door of the latrine. That apart, none of the prosecution witnesses have deposed that they have seen the accused-appellant pouring or sprinkling kerosene oil over the person or the body of the deceased out of that kerosene oil container which was found lying behind the door of the latrine. 10. Circumstance (10) in our considered view, after taking into consideration the explanation and admission wrung out of his statement under Section 313, Cr. P.C. so also injury report etc., cannot be held to be significant main link of circumstantial evidence to connect the appellant with the impugned crime, rather it gives out presumption in favour of the appellant to fortify his explanation. Thus, circumstance (10) does only establish the presence of the appellant in the it impugned burning and this circumstances does not point to the incrimination of the appellant for bunting the deceased in other is, it does not point to the guilt with reasonable definiteness. Thus, circumstance (10) does only establish the presence of the appellant in the it impugned burning and this circumstances does not point to the incrimination of the appellant for bunting the deceased in other is, it does not point to the guilt with reasonable definiteness. 11. The entire edifice of the prosecution rests only on circumstantial pieces of evidence. Those circumstances as quoted above and as relied upon by the Trial Court-upon which, fate of the accused hinges,are, in brief that, (1) With a slat, the accused had beaten the deceased causing six injuries of bruises with blueness; (2) The accused never tried to pour water so as to extinguish the fire on the person of the deceased despite there being water tank near the place of occurrence; (3)The accused had never cried for any help ; (4) An empty phial of whisky wine was found below the cot of the accused by which it could be inferred that he was in intoxication (5)An empty container of kerosene oil was found behind the door of latrine; (6) The accused was last seen with his wife (deceased); (7)The house-hold articles were found systematically and well managed, in the room. 12. The circumstances briefly stated by us,supra, at Nos (4),(5),(6) & (7) have already been dealt with by us in earlier paragraphs of this judgment and were held to be no sufficient circumstances as link to the circumstances counting with the crime or raising reasonable hypothesis to guilt of the accused. 13. Since the entire case rests on circumstantial evidence it is necessary to refer to the principles which should guide the Court in considering the conviction of an accused resting on circumstantial evidence. It is cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that circumstantial evidence must be fully established from which there should be inevitable conclusion ' guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt and the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, ruling out any hypothesis of innocence of the accused. There must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground fora conclusion consistent with the it innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 14. There must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground fora conclusion consistent with the it innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 14. In Srarad B. Chand v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1984SC 1622) their Lordships of the Apex Court while considering the absence of explanation or a false explanation of the accused for the circumstances and the facts proved against hint struck a note of caution that before a false explanation is used as additional link in the chain of evidence led by the prosecution against the accused, the Court should satisfy itself that (1) various links in the chain of evidence led by the prosecution have been satisfactorily proved; (2) the circumstances point to the guilt of accused with reasonable definiteness; and (3) the circumstances are in proximity to the time and situation where all these conditions are fulfilled only then a Court can use a false explanation or a false defence of accused as an additional link to lend an assurance to the Court and not of her wise.There is yet another basic rule of criminal jurisprudence that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in a cause of circumstantial evidence, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the Court should adopt the latter view favourable to the accused. 15. Now the quest ion arises is whether the Trial Court has correctly adopted or applied these principles in convicting and sentencing the appellant. 16. The circumstances stated by us at S. Nos. (2) and (3) speaks by the prosecution as the suspicious conduct of the accused before and after the occurrence led to an illation of his guilt. The circumstantial evidence largely loons on the versions given out by Reena Agrawal and Fair Mohd. whose testimonies for establishing the circumstances for connecting the accused with the crime, have been relied upon by the Trial Court. Upon a careful scrutiny of the conclusions drawn by the Trial Court, we find that the conclusions based on the circumstances stated by it raises merely a strong suspicion against the appellant and the Trial Court has held the appellant guilty merely on a grave suspicion. Upon a careful scrutiny of the conclusions drawn by the Trial Court, we find that the conclusions based on the circumstances stated by it raises merely a strong suspicion against the appellant and the Trial Court has held the appellant guilty merely on a grave suspicion. But, such conclusions based on grave suspicion are perverse and improper in view of the cardinal principles of criminal .jurisprudence as laid down in Pabitar Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1972 SC p. 1899) , Anamely that although there may he grave suspicion against an accused person, still the prosecution is bound to establish facts from which the Court can reasonably arrive at a conclusion that the offence was committed by the accused. Thus it is settled law that the suspicion howsoever grave may be, cannot take the place of legal proof. 17. We have carefully gone through the evidence on record and considered the circumstances and facts of the case. Here, first we may point out that the circumstances relied upon and stated by the learned Trial Court for holding the appellant guilty, as to his state of intoxication, his alleged suspicious conduct of not pouring water and extinguishing the fire on the person of the deceased, and that of not crying for help, so also as to find of an empty phial of whisky wine below his cot, and further as to find of an empty container of kerosene oil behind the door of the latrine, all have not been put to the appellant in his state men at under Section 313, Cr. P.C. Thus these circumstances even otherwise legally could not be used as against the appellant connecting him with the crime. They must be completely excluded from consideration because the appellant did not have any chance to explain these circumstances. (See Sharad B. Chandel v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1954 SC 1622) . Moreover none of the prosecution witnesses deposed to these circumstances, as discussed above. 18. In our opinion, there are glaring circumstances which are fatal to the prosecution case. They must be completely excluded from consideration because the appellant did not have any chance to explain these circumstances. (See Sharad B. Chandel v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1954 SC 1622) . Moreover none of the prosecution witnesses deposed to these circumstances, as discussed above. 18. In our opinion, there are glaring circumstances which are fatal to the prosecution case. The prosecution has produced evidence only to the effect that there was an incident of burning wherein the deceased sustained burn injuries-thereby she died; that the appellant was with the deceased; that the waterway sprinkled by Reena Agrawal and Faiz Mohd.; and that the appellant was having a slat in his hands while standing nearby the deceased and further that, the slat in the hand of the appellant was used in beating the deceased. 19. The deceased after having been brought to the hospital was firstly medically examined vide injury report (Ex. P.3), but this injury report does not says anything about the six injuries of bruises besides one lacerated wound. These injuries of six bruises and lacerated wound wen only found during autopsy on the body of the deceased. This Casts a serious doubt on the prosecution verson of sustaining six injuries. Had these injuries of bruises were on the person of the deceased then why it escaped notice of the doctor who prepared injury report which does not establish the injuries of six bruises and one lacerated wound. Thus the circumstance of sustaining injuries of bruises in the beating alleged to have been caused by the accused with a slat, falls to the ground and it is preposterous false, inasmuch as it does not connect the appellant with the offence of murder because, the impugned death had caused as a result of burn injuries and not by infliction of beating with a slat. 20. As regards circumstance; as to the alleged suspicious conduct of the appellant for not pouring water and extinguishing the fire on the body of the deceased, and as regards explanation of the accused, suffice is to refer to the injury report of the appellant and to his explanation which court of be held as false one. The doctor who prepared injury report (Ex. The doctor who prepared injury report (Ex. P.4) of the appellant on 15.2.1991 in the night itself, proved that 1 to 3rd degree hum injuries with bleeding were also found on the person of the appellant including at left hand, as a whole, back lower chest, abdomen, its right lateral side, front of chest, scalp. In his opinion, injuries were dry flame burns. Dr. B. R. Khatri (P.W. 5) deposed as under: "MAINA USHI DIN RAAT KO SADA 12 BAZA MUL. DUNGER SINGH HAZIR ADALAT KA BIJEI MUAINA KIYA THA. USKA BHEI SHARIR PAR PRATHAM, DITIYA VA TRITIYA DIGREE KA BURN PAYA GAYATHAT. DUNGER KA KHOPRI KA SAMNA KA KUCHH BAL JALA HUA THA. CHAHARA KA KUCHH BAL JALA HUA THAJO DARI KA THA. CHATHI KA SAMANA KA KUCHH HISSA JALA HUA THA, KUCHH JHAGA NAHI JALA HUA THA. DAYE HATH KUCHH-KUCHH JHAGAYA JALA HUA THA. JISMAI HATHALI BHI SHAMILTHI. BHAYA HATH PURAKAPURAHIJALAHUATHA.CHATI KA NICHA KA HISSA AUR PAT KA PHECHA KA H ISSA JALA HUA THA. PAIT KA BHAI TIIARAF SAID MAI BAGAL KA HISSAJALA HUATHAJO AGHA KITARAF AATA HAI. YEH DRYFLAME BARS THA. AUR GHAVO KA BHAARNA TAK RAI SURAKSHIT RAKHI GAYT THT. CHOT PRATIVADN PRDARSH. P.4...." 21. The nature of burn injuries found on the person of the appellant belies the prosecution allegation that he did not pour water or make any effort to extinguish the fire on the deceased. Injuries of the appellant fortifies his explanation as to his efforts to save his wife with a slat so as to remove her cloth and during that process he sustained these burn injuries. This circumstance raises and leaves are as on able ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the appellant. 22. Reena Agrawal (PW6) in her examination-in-chief at the first instance deposed that she saw that man was beating with Danda to woman and there was weak light, but in next breath, she deposed that she could not give out as to whether the person who was beating with Danda the burning woman, was having any relations with woman. She having seen the appellant deposed that he appeared to be similar or same of that person. She then deposed that, but she could not say correctly. Immediately after giving of aforesaid version, her statement was deferred and she was cross examined after fortnight. She having seen the appellant deposed that he appeared to be similar or same of that person. She then deposed that, but she could not say correctly. Immediately after giving of aforesaid version, her statement was deferred and she was cross examined after fortnight. In her cross-examination she admitted that her statement was recorded by the police after 10- 12 days of the incident. Her police statement has not been exhibited and marked as exhibit. She upon questioning deposed in cross-examination that he was beating. The question put was, whether the accused was extinguishing the fire with Danda or he was extinguishing it.She also deposed in cross-examination that he did not see that both the husband and wife were burning and that he could have saved the deceased because there was water tank. She then added that the accused had not sprinkled the water upon the deceased. The aforesaid version given out by her during cross-examination has not been put to the accused in his statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C. hence the Trial Court could have completely excluded the aforesaid testimony of the witness (PW6) from consideration. 23. The only version which was put to the appellant under Section 313,Cr.P.C., given out by Reena Agrawal (PW6) was that when she heard voice/noise of Bashir Mohd. she went along with a bucket of water to the roof and the water of bucket was poured at the body of person who was burning that Amar Singh had reached there and he saw that the accused was beating the lady with" danda"and that Reena Agrawal had informed the police and ambulance, on phone, thereafter, the police had reached. Thus, the version of the witness which was not put to the accused in his statement, cannot be used against him. 24. Second witness is Faiz Mohd. (PW7). He in his examination-in-chief in categorical tenor deposed that at that time, the accused was either beating the lady with Danda or was trying to extinguish the fire of the body with Danda. His statement was also deferred and he was cross-examined after fortnight.He admitted in cross-examination that on the day of incident he had reached there first and that he did not know as to whether any family feud had taken place in between the husband and the wife. He also admitted that the deceased had never complained him of her life against the accused. He also admitted that the deceased had never complained him of her life against the accused. As would be evident from his examination- in-chief, he never deposed that he saw the accused beating the lady with Danda. He stated that the accused was either beating the lady with Danda or was trying to extinguish the fire of the lady with Danda. 25. Amar Singh was produced in witness box as PW8 but the prosecution has declared him as hostile. He corroborated the version of Faiz Mohd. (PW7) that upon his hulla to the effect that he should come out as there were flames of the fire, he came out and saw that wife of the accused was burning and the accused was having Danda in his hand. But Amar Singh (PW8) deposed that he could not definitely saw that Doongar Singh was inflicting blow with Danda upon his lady/ wife or was extinguishing the flames of the fire with Danda. He during cross-examination by the learned Public Prosecutor deposed that it is correct that as Reena Agrawal used to throw dust so also banana's peels to the house of Doonger Singh, they had quarrels with each others, and that, the deceased was stubborn and quarrel some lady. He also admitted that the accused him self had taken the wife in police motor vehicle to the hospital and he had also informed his wife's sister about the incident of burn. 26. The prosecution witnesses have merely deposed that they have seen the deceased burning and the accused was beating her with Danda and thereupon, Reena Agrawal had sprinkled water from the roof over the body of the burning lady. None of the prosecution witnesses has, however, deposed that he had seen the accused pouring kerosene oil over the body of the deceased and then lighting the match-stick so as to burn her. Reena Agrawal (PW 6) deposed that there was weak light source. In these circumstances, once he deposed to have seen the deceased burning, from her roof, then how could she recognise or identify in weak source of light, the accused having a slat in his hand and having been inflicting that slat to the deceased. On the other hand, Faiz Mohd. (PW 7) deposed in cross examination that there was good source of light to identify the person. Therefore, there is contradictory version of the prosecution witnesses. On the other hand, Faiz Mohd. (PW 7) deposed in cross examination that there was good source of light to identify the person. Therefore, there is contradictory version of the prosecution witnesses. In the absence of cogent evidence that P W s. 6 & 7 by reason of the visibility of the light at the place of occurrence and proximity to the appellant had a clear vision of the action of the accused, it would be hazardous to draw the inference that the appellant had burnt his wife. It is not the prosecution case that there had a proximate cause of any feud in between the husband or/and the wife which could have resulted/culminated into the impugned incident of burn. Contrarily, Faiz Mohd. (PW 7) admitted that the deceased never complained of ill or maltreatment on the part of the appellant with her, and further Amar Singh (PW 8) admitted that the deceased was stubborn and fretful lady. There is no evidence that the accused was smelt with kerosene oil. Had the accused burnt his wife by pouring kerosene oil over the body of the deceased then the accused, would have smelt with oil. But the prosecution failed to produce such evidence to show that it was the accused who poured kerosene oil out of the container found behind the door of the latrine, then he lighted the matches and burnt his wife. 27. The circumstances established by the prosecution and relied upon by the learned Trial Court to hold the accused-appellant guilty, are not sufficient to conclusively point to to appellant as the perpetrator of the crime or the rule out the hypothesis of his innocence. For the reasons stated above, we are unable to subscribe to the conclusion of the Court Below that the appellant is guilty of the offence with which he now stands convicted, since our opinion, such a conclusion is perverse and improper. 28. In the result, we set aside the conviction under Sections 302 & 498-A IPC, and the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed therefor and allow the appeal. The appellant is in Jail. He be released forthwith if not wanted in other criminal case.Appeal Allowed. *******