A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) NOTICE. Mr. H. K. Rathod who appears by caveat waives service of notice on behlaf of respondent. ( 2 ) THE petitioner - Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation - challenges the legality and validity of the award dated December 12, 1992 passed by the Labour Court, Valsad. The Labour Court quashed and set aside the order dated November 13, 1984 discharging the respondent workman from service and directed the petitioner to reinstate the workman on his original post with continuity of service and with backwages to be calculated from november 30, 1984. The Labour Court also awarded Rs. 100/- as and by way of cost. The direction given by the Labour Court was to be complied with within thirty days from the date of publication of the award in the official gazette which is January 25, 1993. The petition is filed on July 20, 1993 without complying with the direction given by the labour Court. ( 3 ) THE respondent workman applied for the post of watchman on June 5, 1982. He was called for interview on March 20, 1982 by letter dated March 16, 1982. From that day onwards he was appointed as reliever watchman. He worked as watchman from March 20, 1982 till May 30, 1983 in the Divisional Office of the petitioner Corporation at valsad. Thereafter he was transferred at Valsad Depot and there he worked from June 1, 1983 to November 30, 1984. From November 30, 1984 he had been discharged from service. The workman raised industrial dispute and the appropriate Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court. The Labour Court, on appreciation of evidence led by the parties, came to the conclusion that even if it is assumed that the workman was being engaged by issuing orders of appointment for limited period of thirty days, he did serve from March 20, 1982 till November 30, 1984 as reliever watchman at the Divisional office, Valsad and at Valsad Depot of the petitioner Corporation. Thus the Labour Court found that the workman had put in two years and 8 months of service continuously. For attracting the provisions of section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the act") the workman should have continuously served for a period of one year, i. e. 240 days. Thus the Labour Court found that the workman had put in two years and 8 months of service continuously. For attracting the provisions of section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the act") the workman should have continuously served for a period of one year, i. e. 240 days. The Labour Court, on facts, found that the provisions of section 25f of the Act were attracted. Admittedly before putting an end to the service of the respondent-workman the provisions of section 25f of the Act have not been complied with. No notice has been issued, no retrenchment compensation has been paid to the workman. In view of this finding and in view of the overall facts and circumstances of the case the Labour Court held that the order of discharge from service was illegal and void and the workman was entitled to be reinstated in service on his original post with continuity of service and with full backwages. ( 4 ) IN view of the fact that services of the workman have been discontinued without following the provisions of section 25f of the Act, the reasoning given and the finding arrived at by the Labour Court cannot be said to be in any way unjust or arbitrary so as to call for interference in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. No illegality or unreasonableness has been pointed out in the award passed by the Labour court. In our opinion the award passed by the Labour Court and the directions given therein are in conformity with the principles laid down by this High Court and the supreme Court in various decisions on the question of discharge/dismissal of workman in contravention of the provisions of Section 25 F of the Act. In this view of the matter no intcrcference with the impugned award is called for. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent submitted that the award is dated December 28, 1992. It has been published in the official gazette on January 25, 1993. Therefore as per the direction given by the Labour Court it was required to be implemented within a period of thirty days from the date of publication of the award, meaning thereby, latest by february 25, 1993 the award should have been implemented. The petition is filed on July 20, 1993 and till today the award is not implemented. Therefore as per the direction given by the Labour Court it was required to be implemented within a period of thirty days from the date of publication of the award, meaning thereby, latest by february 25, 1993 the award should have been implemented. The petition is filed on July 20, 1993 and till today the award is not implemented. Niether the workman has been reinstated in service nor has he been paid backwages. In view of the aforesaid background it was submitted that the petition should not be entertained and the petitioner should not be heard at all unless the petitioner Corporation complies with the award. It is also submitted that in view of the provisions of section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the petitioner has committed breach of the award and, therefore, the petitioner corporation and responsible officere of the Corporation are liable to be punished. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that under no provision of law the petitioner could have granted stay to itself and avoided implementation of the award except at the risk of facing contempt of court proceedings. It is is also submitted that in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Saijpur Bogha Nagar Palika Octroi Karmachari Mandal vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, reported in 32 (2) GLR 956, the workman is also entitled to claim interest on the amount of backwages which have not been paid so far. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that even if this Court comes to the conclusion that such direction may not be given in this petition, the Court may give suitable directions to the Labour Court and the Industrial Court for clearly stating the rate of wages at which the amount of wages are to be calculated and paid and applying the principles laid down by this Court in the case of Saijpur Bogha Nagar Palika Octroi karmachari Mandal (supra) make specific order as regards payment of interest. ( 6 ) THERE is much substance in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent workman that an employer who has not implemented the award should not be given protection of extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 6 ) THERE is much substance in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent workman that an employer who has not implemented the award should not be given protection of extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. One who wishes to avail of the benefit of discretionary remedy provided under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India , must show by express conduct that he was ready to abide by rule of law and he never desired to contravene any of the provisions of law. In the instant case the petitioner was bound to implement the award within thirty days from 25-1-1993 (the date of publication of the award), i. e. latest by February 25, 1993. Statutory duty is cast upon the parties to the award to abide by the direction that may be given in the award. Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 inter alia provides that whosoever commits breach of any of the direction given in binding award is liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of the bombay High Court in the case of State vs. Caulfield Holland Ltd. , reported in AIR 1954 bombay 70, for attracting the provisions of section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 it is not necessary for the prosecution to show that the breach committed was wilful or actuated by mens rea. Once it is shown that binding award is not complied with by the accused and breach of the award is committed, the liability under section 29 of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 arises and such a person is required to be held guilty of the offence charged, no matter whether breach of the binding award or order committed was wilful or that it was actuated by mens rea or not. Thus from the point of view of settled legal position the conclusion is inescapable that prima facie the petitioner has committed breach of the award inasmuch as it has not reinstated the workman within thirty days from the date of publication of the award nor has it paid the amount of backwages to the workman. Thus from the point of view of settled legal position the conclusion is inescapable that prima facie the petitioner has committed breach of the award inasmuch as it has not reinstated the workman within thirty days from the date of publication of the award nor has it paid the amount of backwages to the workman. Be it noted that whether contravention is wilful or whether there was any mens rea or not is immaterial. Therefore even if it is assumed for a moment that the petitioner corporation had some good reason for not complying with the award then also it cannot be treated as good defence by the Court if and when criminal case is instituted against it. ( 7 ) SIMPLY because an employer wishes to file petition or he has filed petition is no ground for not implementing the direction given in the award. If the employer wishes to obtain interim relief of stay of the operation of the direction given in the award he must approach the High Court immediately and seek appropriate interim relief. It may be noted that while considering the question of grant or refusal of interim relief it is certainly a relevant circumstance as to whether interim relief has been prayed for as expeditiously as possible. In Order 41 Rule 5 (3) (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure such provision has been expressly made. There is no reason why this principle should not be applied in cases where the award passed by the Labour Court is challenged in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, it may be noted that in Order 41 Rule 5 of C. P. Code it is also provided that mere filing of appeal does not amount to stay of the impugned judgment and decree. Similar is the position in relation to the award passed by the Labour Court. Therefore mere filing of the petition or that the petition is contemplated to be filed is no ground for not implementing the award. By adopting such, course the employer exposes himself to the actions of contempt of Court. Similar is the position in relation to the award passed by the Labour Court. Therefore mere filing of the petition or that the petition is contemplated to be filed is no ground for not implementing the award. By adopting such, course the employer exposes himself to the actions of contempt of Court. It may be noted that as laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Shaikh mohammedbhikhan Hussainbhai vs. Manager, Chandrabhanu Cinema, reported in 1986 (1) GLR 1 , Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal exercising powers under the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 are "courts" for the purposes of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts act, 1971. Moreover in view of the provisions of section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947 an employer does not get himself relieved of the obligation to pay the amount of backwages from the date when the award became enforceable, even though, the workman may not have been reinstated. Apart from the fact that the employer exposes himself to criminal action and the actions for contempt of court , he is not relieved of his obligation to pay the amount of wages from the date when the award became enforceable. In such a situation the workman can legitimately file application for recovery of the amount due and payable to him under the provisions of Section 33-C of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 and claim that he has been wrongly denied the wages due to him. ( 8 ) IN the instant case, since we are rejecting the petition we do not think it proper to give any direction as regards the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. This is a petition filed by the employer, i. e. State Road Transport Corporation. In this petition it would not be proper to give any direction as regards initiation of criminal proceedings or initiation of actions for contempt of Court. As far as payment of interest is concerned, the law is well settled by this Court in the case of Saijpur Bogha nagar Palika Octroi Karmachari Mandal vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, reported in 32 (2) GLR 956. As far as payment of interest is concerned, the law is well settled by this Court in the case of Saijpur Bogha nagar Palika Octroi Karmachari Mandal vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, reported in 32 (2) GLR 956. in view of this binding decision it is the duty of the Labour court, Industrial Court or Industrial Tribunal , as the case may be, to give specific direction to the effect that in case the amount of backwages is not paid within seven or ten days from the date on which the award became inforceable, the amount of backwages will be paid together with interest at the rate to be mentioned in the direction. We fail to understand why the law laid down by this Court is not taken into consideration by the forums exercising powers under the appropriate labour legislation. We hope and trust that all concerned will see to it that the law laid down by this Court is enforced properly. ( 9 ) AS far as this case is concerned, we have made it clear that even if the workman is not reinstated as per the direction given by the Labour Court, he would be entitled to claim full wages from the date when the award became enforceable. As indicated hereinabove, if the amount is not paid accordingly, the workman would also be entitled to enforce his claim either by resorting to the provisions of section 33-C of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 or by taking any appropriate action as he may be advised. ( 10 ) THERE is no substance in the petition. Nothing is pointed out to us which may call for interference in exercise of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Hence rejected. Notice discharged. .