A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) IF misconduct of theft of articles of insignificant value has been held proved, should such misconduct be visited with severe penalty ? In such cases, if the lower courts have, in their discretion, thought it fit not to impose severe punishment, would it be proper for the High Court to interfere in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India ? Is it open to the employer not to implement the judgment and order and/or award without obtaining stay or interim relief from the appellate forum or the High Court, as the case may be ? These and other questions as regards the obligation of employer for compliance with the directions given by labour courts, industrial courts and industrial tribunals arise in this petition. These questions may be examined in the background of the facts that follow. ( 2 ) THE petitioner Mill Company is a unit of National Textile Corporation (Gujarat) ltd. . It has filed this petition challenging the legality and validity of the judgment and order dated May 27, 1992 passed by the labour court in T- application No. 766/83, and confirmed by the Industrial Court, Ahmedabad, in Appeals (IC) Ho. 48/92 and 42/92 decided on August 12, 1992. By the aforesaid orders it is directed that the workman be reinstated in service on his original post with continuity of service, but without backwagcs. ( 3 ) THE respondent workman was working as Wireman (technician) in the electricity department of the petitioner Mill Company for last about twelve years prior to his dismissal from service on July 23,1983. It was alleged against the workman that he was on duly on March 30th, 1983 in the third shift of the mill company. In the morning of march 31, 1983 when he was going out of the mill premises his person was checked. It was found that he was possessing copper wire and two used minor black electrical implements called overload relay. On the allegation of committing theft of the aforesaid articles he was ordered to be suspended on April 1, 1983 and he remained under suspension upto July 23, 1983 i. e. , the date on which he was ordered to be dismissed from service. On the allegation of committing theft of the aforesaid articles he was ordered to be suspended on April 1, 1983 and he remained under suspension upto July 23, 1983 i. e. , the date on which he was ordered to be dismissed from service. In the departmental inquiry held against him, the misconduct alleged against the workman was held proved and he was ordered to be dismissed from service. ( 4 ) THE workman filed T-application No. 766/83 before the Labour Court, ahmcdabad, under the provisions of section 79 (1) of the Bombay Industrial Relations act, 1946, praying that the order of dismissal be quashed and set aside and he be reinstated in service with full backwagcs. The workman could not have been kept under this being the clear position of the Standing Order, the workman was kept under suspension for a period of more than four days. Despite this being the clear position of the standing Order, the workman was kept under suspension from April 1,1983 upto July 23, 1983. The Labour Court also found that it was not shown whether the finding arrived at by the inquiry officer was served upon the workman or not; that the workman was not informed that he was held guilty of the misconduct of theft; and that he was not afforded an opportunity of being heard as regards the imposition of punishment upon him. The labour court also recorded the finding that his past service record was not taken into consideration while imposing punishment upon him. As regards the value of the goods alleged to have been stolen, the labour court found that there was no evidence on record to show as to what was the value of the goods alleged to have been stolen by the workman, and no police case was even filed against the workman for the alleged offence of theft. ( 5 ) IN view of the aforesaid finding the labour court came to the conclusion that the order of dismissal from service was not justified. The labour court in para 13 of its judgment and order observed that the order of dismissal from service was passed without affording an opportunity of being heard to the workman as provided under the appropriate provisions of the Standing Orders. The labour court in para 13 of its judgment and order observed that the order of dismissal from service was passed without affording an opportunity of being heard to the workman as provided under the appropriate provisions of the Standing Orders. In above view of the matter the labour court came to the conclusion that the punishment of dismissal from service imposed upon the workman was excessive. The labour court also observed that even if the misconduct of theft was proved, the workman may be reinstated in service, but no backwages be paid to him. Thus in the opinion of the labour court the imposition of punishment of not awarding backwagcs was just and proper. This order was passed by the labour court on May 27th, 1992. ( 6 ) THE petitioner Mill Company felt aggrieved by the order passed by the Labour court and preferred appeal No. 48/92 before the Industrial Court, Ahmedabad. The respondent workman also felt aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the Labour court and preferred appeal (IC) No. 42/92. Both the appeals have been heard together by the industrial court. In para 9 of the judgment the Industrial Court has observed that there was no evidence to show as to what was the value of the goods alleged to have been stolen by the workman. The Industrial Court considered it to be an important circumstance and observed that if the value of the goods is negligible such misconduct cannot be visited with the extreme penalty of dismissal from service. In the opinion of the industrial court, as per the provisions of Standing Orders, an employee cannot be kept under suspension for a period of more than four days. In the instant case the workman was kept under suspension from April 1, 1983 to July 23, 1983. Therefore it was considered to be in the nature of punishment imposed upon the workman and the period of suspension in excess of four days was treated as punishment already undergone by the workman. The industrial court confirmed the finding arrived at by the labour court dial if the workman is ordered to be reinstated in service without backwages it would be adequate punishment. In short the industrial court agreed with the finding of the labour court and dismis3ed the appeal filed by the petitioner mill company. The industrial court confirmed the finding arrived at by the labour court dial if the workman is ordered to be reinstated in service without backwages it would be adequate punishment. In short the industrial court agreed with the finding of the labour court and dismis3ed the appeal filed by the petitioner mill company. ( 7 ) THE industrial court also ordered that the appeal filed by the workman against the order of the labour court wherein he prayed for setting aside the order denying him full backwages for the intervening period be also dismissed. Both the appeals were heard together by the industrial court and have been disposed of by common judgment and order dated August 12,1992. ( 8 ) THE petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the labour court and confirmed by the industrial court by filling this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The petition is filed on June 7, 1993. It came up for preliminary hearing on June 9, 1993. Since the labour court had passed order on May 27, 1982 and the industrial court confirmed the same on August 12, 1992, this Court enquired from the petitioner Mill Company as to whether the order as regards reinstatment of the workman was complied with or not. It was stated that the said direction was not complied with. In reply to the question as to whether any order slaying the reinstatement was obtained from the appellate forum, it was stated by the learned counsel that he was not in a position to show that during the pendency of the appeal before the industrial court the order passed by the labour court was stayed. This Court thought that it will be better if the petitioner complied with the direction given by the labour court and confirmed by the industrial court. Therefore, in order to enable the petitioner to comply with the said direction or to take appropriate decision in that behalf the petition was ordered to be adjourned to June 25,1993. It was clarified that compliance with the order passed by the labour court and confirmed by the industrial court would not preclude the petitioner from taking any of the contention which may otherwise be available to the petitioner as regards the legality and validity of the impugned order. It was clarified that compliance with the order passed by the labour court and confirmed by the industrial court would not preclude the petitioner from taking any of the contention which may otherwise be available to the petitioner as regards the legality and validity of the impugned order. It was also clarified that compliance with the order passed by the labour court will not in any way come in the way of the petitioner even with regard to the consideration of interim relief. On the next date of hearing, i. e. June 28, 1993 it was declared that the order passed by the labour court was not complied with. Moreover it was stated that the petitioner Mill company was of the opinion that it would not comply with the direction regarding reinstatement since it had filed the present petition, and if the direction regarding reinstatement is complied with, the petition will become merely an academic exercise. This Court directed to issue notice to respondent workman making it returnable on July 20, 1993. One Mr. R. D. Raval, union-representative, has appeared on behat of the respondent workman. ( 9 ) ON behalf of the petitioner Mill Company it is submitted that the labour court as well as the industrial court have found that the workman was guilty of the misconduct of theft which is very serious. It is further submitted that in case of misconduct of theft the workman should not have been ordered to be reinstated in service. However, one cannot ignore the well recognised principle that the law does not take account of trivialities [de minimis non curat lex]. This is the basic principle underlying the provisions of section 95 of the Indian Penal Code. Thus since the days of RAJ, this principle has been well entrenched in the Indian legal system. ( 10 ) IN the instant case the labour court and the industrial court have found that the seriousness or otherwise of the misconduct of theft has to be adjudged by taking into consideration the value of the goods alleged to have been stolen. In this case, as far as the value of the goods stolen is concerned, it has been found that there was no evidence regarding value of goods. Not even police case for alleged offence of theft was filed. Therefore the Industrial Court has rightly observed that the goods stolen were of insignificant value. In this case, as far as the value of the goods stolen is concerned, it has been found that there was no evidence regarding value of goods. Not even police case for alleged offence of theft was filed. Therefore the Industrial Court has rightly observed that the goods stolen were of insignificant value. This is an important circumstance which has weighed with the labour court as well as the industrial court. Over and above this circumstance the courts below have taken into consideration the fact that the workman remained under suspension for a period of about four months, while as per the provisions of Standing Orders he could not have been kept under suspension for more than four days. It is also found that the workman was not heard before imposing the punishment of dismissal from service. In view of these circumstances and in view of the fact that the workman had already undergone the pangs of departmental inquiry and that of the proceedings before the court, the courts below thought it fit to exercise discretion as regards imposition of penalty. Therefore the labour court directed that the workman be reinstated in service without backwages. The industrial court also found that the discretion exercised by the labour court was just and proper and it was not required to be interfered with. In this background the question arises, should this court exercise its power under Article 227 of the constitution of India and interfere with the discrction exercised by the labour court and confirmed by the industrial court ? ( 11 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner Mill Company belonged to a public sector undertaking, i. e. National Textile Corporation (Gujarat) limited. Therefore it is submitted that the misconduct of theft should have been viewed seriously. In support of this contention reliance is placed upon certain observations made by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. N. M. Desai, reported in 1985 GLH 446 . In that case Division Bench of this High Court inter alia observed that misconduct of misappropriation of public money is serious one. The circumstances that the workman is a man with wife and children and that these are hard days are not relevant for taking a lenient view. In that case Division Bench of this High Court inter alia observed that misconduct of misappropriation of public money is serious one. The circumstances that the workman is a man with wife and children and that these are hard days are not relevant for taking a lenient view. It is further observed that services with such Corporations are not pasture grounds always open for people and such corporations are not brought about for the purpose of furnishing employment to the unemployed in the society. It is also observed that all cases are required to be examined on their own merits. Interests not of certain persons likely to be adversely affected are alone to be seen, but interests of such public administrations are also required to be closely examined and given a due thought. ( 12 ) WE are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations made by the division Bench of this Court. However, in the instant case the aforesaid observations are not applicable at all. In this case neither the labour court nor the industrial court has taken lenient view on the ground that these are hard days or that the workman is a man with wife and children and therefore he should be treated leniently. In this case the lower courts have found that the value of the goods alleged to have been stolen was negligible, for which even police case was not filed; and that the workman was suspended for a period of about four months. This has been considered as punishment by both the courts. Moreover, the workman was not afforded an opportunity of being heard before imposing the punishment. These are the circumstances which have weighed with the lower courts. On the basis of these circumstances the lower courts have exercised discretion as regards imposition of punishment. Therefore reliance placed on the aforesaid decision is of no help to the petitioner. ( 13 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has relied upon decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Binny Ltd. vs. Workman, reported in AIR 1973 SC 1403 . In that case the workman had obtained leave on the representation that he wanted to go to his native place to settle a land dispute with his brother-in-law. However, instead of going to his village he remained in Bangalore City and joined hunger strike. In that case the workman had obtained leave on the representation that he wanted to go to his native place to settle a land dispute with his brother-in-law. However, instead of going to his village he remained in Bangalore City and joined hunger strike. As he joined hunger strike he was admitted in hospital. When these facts came to light the management issued notice and held inquiry against him for the misconduct In that context it was found that the management had lost confidence and therefore it was held that the order of reinstatement should not have been passed. This case has no relevance to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. In the instant case the question of loss of confidence docs not arise at all. It was not the plea of the petitioner before the labour court or before the industrial court that the workman lacked in integrity and on that count the management has lost confidence in the workman. Be if noted that the workman is holding the post of wireman (technician ). This post can never be said to be a post of confidence. Had this contention been raised before the labour court, the factual aspect relating to this question could have been brought on record and would have been easily shown that the post of wireman (technician) held by respondent workman could never be said to be a post of confidence. Since the question is sought to be raised for the first time in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and since the question of loss of confidence depends upon examination of facts also, it cannot be accepted and the same is rejected as being without substance. ( 14 ) THE question of exercise of discretion by the labour court and the industrial court may be examined from the stand point of the provisions of sections 78, 79 and 84 of the bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. It is true that there is no express provision like section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which confers power on labour court and other forums created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to interfere with the order of punishment of discharge or dismissal. It is true that there is no express provision like section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which confers power on labour court and other forums created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to interfere with the order of punishment of discharge or dismissal. As provided under section 11-A of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 if the court is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions as it may think fit or it may give such other relief to the workman including award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. However, absence of such specific provision does not mean that the labour court and/or industrial court established under Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 has no such power. ( 15 ) THE question came up for consideration before Division Bench of this High Court (coram: A. M. Ahmadi, J (as he then was) and R. J. Shah J), in the case of Ahmedabad New textile Mills vs. Textile Labour Association, reported in 29 (2) GLR 1324. Therein it was contended that once the misconduct mentioned in the standing order is proved or held established, the labour court or industrial court cannot interfere with the order of punishment. After examining the scheme and the relevant provisions of the Bombay industrial Relations Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the Division Bench of this court referred to the provisions of section 78 (1) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and observed that under the provisions of section 78 (1) of B. I. R. Act the labour court is empowered to decide a dispute regarding the propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer acting or purporting to act under the Standing Orders. Both the tests of legality and propriety have to be satisfied to defeat any action initiated under section 79 read with the relevant clause of section 78 (1 ). In para 6 of the judgment it is inter alia observed as follows :"even if an order is legal, that by itself is not enough. It must also be shown to be proper. In para 6 of the judgment it is inter alia observed as follows :"even if an order is legal, that by itself is not enough. It must also be shown to be proper. If an order is not in confirmily with the provisions of the Act or the rules or Standing Orders or is violative of the principles of natural justice and fair play or the like, it can be interfered with by the Labour Court as being illegal. But even if the order is legal, it can still be questioned on the ground that the same lacks in propriety. "after discussing the law on the point, in para 10 of the judgment the Division Bench has further observed as follows:"what emerges from the above discussion is that the Labour Court is invested with wide jurisdiction to examine the propriety and legality of the employers order under the Standing Orders. The order passed by the employer must be shown to be not only in confirmity with law but also in confirmily with justness and reasonableness. If the order passed by the employer is so disproportionately harsh as to shock judicial conscience, the Labour Court or the Industrial Court, as the case may be, would be entitled to interfere with the said order. "the court further observed that if the submission that the labour court or industrial court could not interfere with the punishment imposed by the employer is accepted, it would tantamount to investing the employer with the power to visit the extreme penalty of dismissal from service even for a minor misconduct. The court further observed that having regard to the language of the statute, the context in which the expression appears and the underlying object of the benevolent legislation, the contention that the labour court and industrial court could not interfere with the order of punishment can not be acceded to. In view of this settled legal position, it is evident that the labour court and the industrial court had discretion to interfere with the order of punishment even when the alleged misconduct of theft was held proved. In our opinion the discretion exercised by the labour court as confirmed by the industrial court cannot be said to be in any way unjust or arbitrary so as to call for interference in exercise of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In our opinion the discretion exercised by the labour court as confirmed by the industrial court cannot be said to be in any way unjust or arbitrary so as to call for interference in exercise of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 16 ) THE conduct of the petitioner Mill Company may be examined. The labour court decided the case against the petitioner on May 27, 1992. Without obtaining any order staying the direction as regards reinstatement in service, the Mill Company proceeded further with the appeal filed by it before the industrial court. The industrial court dismissed the appeal by the judgment and order dalpd August 12,1992 and confirmed the direction given by the labour court. The petition has been filed in this Court on June 7, 1993. As indicated hereinabove, this Court thought it proper that the order passed by the properly constituted courts should be complied with by the petitioner. While making this observation we made it clear that compliance of the order passed by the labour court "will not preclude the petitioner from taking any of the contentions which may otherwise be available to the petitioner as regards the legality and validity of the impugned order". It was also clarified that compliance with the order passed by the labour court will not in any way come in the way of the petitioner even with regard to consideration of interim relief. Despite this clarificatory order and time having been granted to the Mill Company to comply with the order passed by the lower courts, the Mill Company took conscious decision not to comply with the order passed by the lower courts. ( 17 ) IN view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Central co-operative Consumers Stores Ltd. vs. Labour Court, H. P. at Shimla, reported in JT 1993 (3) SC 532, we thought it fit to give an opportunity to the petitioner to explain as to why the orders passed by the labour court and confirmed by the industrial court were not complied With. The petitioner Mill Company has filed affidavit of one Mr. M. S. Trivedi who is working as Assistant Labour Officer and holding officiating charge of Labour officer-cum-Factory Manager. The petitioner Mill Company has filed affidavit of one Mr. M. S. Trivedi who is working as Assistant Labour Officer and holding officiating charge of Labour officer-cum-Factory Manager. In para 3 of the affidavit it is stated as follows ;"i may mention here that since the management of the petitioner Mills had decided to challenge the impugned orders of the labour court and the industrial court in this Honble Court. It was thought fit and proper to seek stay thereof from this Honble Court and in the mean time not to reinstate the respondent in service since it was felt that by complying with the order of the labour court as confirmed by the industrial court, this writ petition itself would be rendered practically infructuous for all intent and purpose and would be valid for academic purpose only. "the aforesaid explanation has no merits. Assuming for a moment that the officers of the Mill Company might be labouring under some misconception, the same should have stood disspelled when this Court passed order dated June 9, 1993 and clarified that compliance with the order of the labour court as confirmed by the industrial court will not any way preclude the petitioner from taking any of the contentions which may otherwise be available to the petitioner as regards the legality and validity of the impugned order and also as regards consideration of interim relief. There is no explanation as to why even after the aforesaid observations and clarification made by this Court the officers of the petitioner Mill Company persisted in their obstinate and adamant attitude. ( 18 ) IN the case of the Central Co-operative Consumers Store Ltd. , (supra) it was found that after a period of about seven years from the date of dismissal from service the workman, a sales girl, was ordered to be reinstated in service. The order was carried in appeal before the superior forum and upto the Supreme Court. The Petitioner-Society did not succeed even before the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court the petitioner tried to place blame of inordinate delay on adjudicating process. The order was carried in appeal before the superior forum and upto the Supreme Court. The Petitioner-Society did not succeed even before the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court the petitioner tried to place blame of inordinate delay on adjudicating process. The Supreme Court has observed that the obstinacy without the least regard of the financial implications could only be indulged by a public body like the petitioner as those who are entrusted to look after public bodies affairs do not have any personal involvement and the money that they squander in such litigation is not their own. In para 5 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed that the public money was wasted. Thereafter the Supreme Court made suitable observations indicating that steps, if any, be taken to recover the amount from the personal salary of the officers of the society who were responsible for the endless litigation. ( 19 ) AS observed hereinabove, we see no satisfactory explanation whatsoever which would justify the conduct of the petitioner Mill Company for not complying with the order passed by the labour court and confirmed by the industrial court, much more so after this court passed order dated June 9th, 1993 and clarified the position. We leave it to the concerned authorities of the petitioner Mill Company to consider the question as to what steps, if any, may be taken against the officers responsible for such attitude. ( 20 ) IT should have been realised by the officers of the petitioner Mill Company that compliance with the order that may be passed by the Labour Court or Industrial Court or industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, does not depend upon what they think proper. As provided under section 86 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 decision, award or order of a Labour Court is not to be called in question in any proceeding in any Civil or criminal Court. Thus finality is attached to the judgments and orders of the labour court and industrial court. Such judgment and orders cannot be questioned in any other proceedings except by the way of petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court. It is well settled principle of law that mere filing of appeal or petition does not mean that the operation and implementation of the impugned order and judgment get stayed. Such judgment and orders cannot be questioned in any other proceedings except by the way of petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court. It is well settled principle of law that mere filing of appeal or petition does not mean that the operation and implementation of the impugned order and judgment get stayed. Specific provisions to this effect is to be found in Order 41 Rule 5 of code of Civil Procedure. On the same line such provision is required to be understood by necessary implication even with regard to the proceedings under Bombay Industrial relations Act, 1946. On filling of appeal or a petition under Article 227 of the constitution of India a party is not entitled to claim that it is believed from its obligation to implement the direction given in the impugned judgment and order or award. The employer has no power to grant stay to itself. If that be so, it would amount to staying that so long as the appellate forum or the High Court is not moved and the appellate forum or the High Court docs not pass any interim order, the direction given in the impugned judgment and order or award would remain stayed at the discretion of the employer. This would be contrary to the provisions of section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which provides that an award shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under section 17 of I. D. Act. It must be realised that the labour court, industrial court and industrial tribunal are "courts" for the purpose of section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. This point is now concluded by Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Shaikh Mohammedbhikhan Hussainbhai vs. Manager, chandrabhanu Cinema, reported in 1986 (1) GLR pg. l. The apprehension that on account of the compliance of the order appeal or petition may become infructuous and may remain valid only for academic purpose is no ground for not complying with the judgment and order or award passed by the labour court or industrial court, as the case may be. l. The apprehension that on account of the compliance of the order appeal or petition may become infructuous and may remain valid only for academic purpose is no ground for not complying with the judgment and order or award passed by the labour court or industrial court, as the case may be. Non-compliance of the judgment and orders or awards passed by the labour courts, industrial courts and industrial tribunals on such flimsy grounds would certainly expose the employer concerned to appropriate actions under the provisions of the Contempt of courts Act, 1971. . ( 21 ) IT should be realised that in view of section 120a of the Bombay Industrial relations Act, 1946 the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are in no way affected. Once an order of reinstatement is passed by the Labour Court under Bombay industrial Relations Act, 1946 the workman would be entitled/to claim reinstatement as per the judgment and order and if he is not reinstated he would be entitled to claim full wages from the date on which he ought to have been reinstated as per judgment and award. He can very well invoke the provisions of section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947 and claim recovery of the money which he would have otherwise been paid had the judgment and order passed by the Labour Court been implemented. It should have also been realised by the Officers of the Mill Company that non-compliance of the binding award is an offence under section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both. In this connection reference may be made to a Division Bench judgment of Bombay High court in the case of State vs. Coal field Holland Ltd. , reported in AIR 1954 Bombay 70. For attracting the provisions of section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 it is not necessary for the prosecution to show that the breach committed was "wilful" or actuated by mens rea. Once it is shown that binding award is not complied with by the accused and breach of the award is committed, the liability under section 29 of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947 arises and such a person is required to be held guilty of the offence charged. Once it is shown that binding award is not complied with by the accused and breach of the award is committed, the liability under section 29 of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947 arises and such a person is required to be held guilty of the offence charged. No matter whether breach of the binding award or order committed was wilful or that it was actuated by mens rea or not. ( 22 ) OFFICERS of the petitioner Company who are managing the affairs of the institution which is "state" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India should have been aware of the consequences of their action. By not implementing the judgment and order passed by the Labour Court and confirmed by the Industrial Court, on the pretext that they wanted to obtain orders from this Court, They were exposing themselves to the actions for contempt of court. By not complying with the order of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court they were not doing any good to the petitioner Company. Even if the workman is not reinstated the workman would be entitled to claim full wages from the date ought to have been reinstated as per judgment and order passed by the Labour Court. Moreover, the petitioner Company as well as the officers responsible for taking such decision may also be exposed to the penal consequences as provided under section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was certainly not open to management of petitioner-Company to grant stay to itself on the pretext that it wanted to challenge the legality and validity of the order passed by the labour court before the appellate forum and thereafter by filing petition before this Court. Such plea cannot be treated as reason. It is nothing but a pretext for not complying with the orders passed by properly constituted forum/court under the appropriate provisions of the concerned labour legislation. We hope and trust that the appropriate authority of the petitioner Mill Company will take these observations into consideration with due seriousness and will see to it that such lapse does not occur in future. ( 23 ) NO other contention has been raised. There is no substance in the petition. Hence rejected. Notice discharged. .