JUDGMENT Binod Kumar Roy, J. In terms of the Order dated 12.4.1093, I proceed to dispose of this Civil Revision application preferred by the tenant- petitioner against an order rejecting his prayer for extending the time granted for filing his written statement after condoning delay. 2. Relevant facts arc in a narrow compass. Opposite Party no.1 filed the suit in question for eviction of the petitioner on the ground of personal necessity. After the service of summons, the petitioner filed an affidavit and prayed for grant of leave to contest the suit. By order dated 9.11.1992 leave was granted to the petitioner directing him to file a written statement by 23.11.1992. The written statement was, however, not filed, rather the petitioner filed on 23.11.1992 a petition seeking extension of time on the ground of death of his lawyer, Shri Shamhhu Prasad. The petitioner subsequently on that very day filed a petition praying to adopt his earlier affidavit as written statement. Opposite Party no.1 filed rejoinders to these petitions. The petitioner, thereafter, filed his written statement on 2.12.1992. On 7.12.1992, the petitioner filed yet another petition to condone the delay occurred in filing of his written statement. To this petition also, Opposite Party no.1 filed a rejoinder on 6.1.1993. All these three petitions were heard together and disposed of by the order dated 19.1.193. The subsequent petition dated 23.11.1992 filed by the petitioner to adopt his earlier affidavit as written statement was allowed. However, his two petitions were rejected holding that section 14 (7) of the Act is only applicable after the commencement of the hearing of the suit and hence he is not entitled to the procedure of the Small Cause Court Act or of t he Code of Civil Procedure. 3. Mr. Sukumar Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the Rule, suhmilled as follows : (i) The court below has committed a jurisdictional error in not invoking section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure conferring jurisdiction in it to enlarge the time granted by it on 9.11.1992 specially when the petitioner had filed the petition before the expiry of the time on the ground of death of his counsel Mr. Shamhhu Prasad, which was not disbelived and that his filing of the written statement on 2.12.1992 dearly showed his bonafide and due diligence. Shamhhu Prasad, which was not disbelived and that his filing of the written statement on 2.12.1992 dearly showed his bonafide and due diligence. (ii) In his written statement, the petitioner had replied paragraph wise of the claim and allegations made against him in the plaint of opposite party no.1 and if the impugned order is allowed to stand it would cause an irreparable injury and failure of justice. 4. Mr. Sachidanand Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Opposite Party no. l, on the other hand, submitted as follows : (i) The Petitioner incorrectly stated that Shri Shambhu Prasad was his Lawyer. His counsel were Sarvshri Braj Mohan Prasad and Laxaman Sah, who had accepted his Vakalatnama, which is apparent from its certified copy appended as Annexure 'A’ Name of Shri Shamhhu Prasad had not appeared even in the body of the Vakalatnama of the petitioner, who was not a Senior Advocate within the meaning of the Advocates' Act, read with Bar Council of India Rules. Accordingly, the reason given for extension of the statutory peremptory time was misconceived. (ii) In terms of first part of section 14 (6) of the Act, the petitioner filed the requisite court-fee to treat his earlier affidavit filed under section 14(4) of the Act as his written statement, which was allowed by the other part of the order dated 14.1.1993 and, accordingly, this Civil Revision application is miscol1ceiwd and fit to be dismissed. (iii) In view of section 13 of the Act, the provisions of section 14 of the Act have an overriding effect against any other provision of any other law and, accordingly, the court below could not extend the fifteen days' time even assuming that Shri Shamhhu Prasad was the counsel of the petitioner. 5. In reply, Mr. Sukumar Sinha reiterated his submissions apart from pointing 'out that there was no question of waiver/estoppel/abandonment by the petitioner of his right to file written statement and that subsequent petition filed by him was merely by way of alternative remedy. It is only before this Court that Opposite party no.1 is disputing the fact regarding Shri Shambhu Prasad as the Counsel of the petitioner, which is not permissible. 6. Firstly, I take up the question seriously pressed by the learned counsel for the Opposite Party no. I as to whether Mr. Shambhu Prasad was the counsel for the petitioner or not. 6. Firstly, I take up the question seriously pressed by the learned counsel for the Opposite Party no. I as to whether Mr. Shambhu Prasad was the counsel for the petitioner or not. Perusal of the impuged order docs not show that it was contended in the court below during the hearing of the petitions in question that Shri Shambhl' Prasad, Advocate, was not the counsel of the defendant no.1. It is common knowledge that apart from the Advocates, whose names appear in the body of the Vakalatnama, a litigant also engages another Advocate for conducting his proceedings. Since the fact asserted by the petitioner that Shri Shambhu Prasad was also engaged by him as his lawyer, was not disputed during hearing of the petitions in the Court below. I do not attach importance to the stand taken in the show-cause tiled by Opposite Party no.1 in this Civil Revision application in this regard. Death of Counsel of a litigant is a very important factor in the conduct of the proceedings in the court. 7. The fact that the written statement was also tiled by the petitioner on 2.12.1992 showed his bonafide. 8. The Court below has failed to consider that the delay in filing of the written statement could have been compensated by awarding cost to the plaintiff. 9. The question as to whether the court has power to extend the 15 days time provided in section 14(6) of the Act in filing the written statement or not in a suit like the present came up for consideration before this court in Ajit Kumar Sinha vs. Anil Kumar Yadav & Ors., reported in 1985 B.B.C.J. 113 : 1984 PLI R 904. This court, after referring to Order VIII Rule I and section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 14(7) of the Act answered the question in affirmative. 10. This court, after referring to Order VIII Rule I and section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 14(7) of the Act answered the question in affirmative. 10. Section 14(6) of the Act runs as follows: "When leave is granted to the tenant to contest the suit, the latter may, within fifteen days from the date of the order, pray after filing the requisite court-fee required for a written statement that the affidavit may be treated as the written statement or if he chooses to file a separate written statement he may do so within fifteen days of the grant of leave to contest the suit and if he docs not file the written statement within the period he shall not be allowed to do so later. The court shall thereafter commence the hearing of the suit as early as possible." Perusal of the aforementioned provision does not show that the Legislature has put any bar on the court not to extend the 15 days time in appropriate case and that section 13 dose not stand as a bar. 11. The judgment of the learned Single Judge in Ajit Kumar Sinha, (Supra) is binding on me. Il was not the submission' of the learned counsel for the Opposite Party No.1 that said judgment is erroneous and this case should he referred to a Division Bench. I, accordingly, hold that the court can extend the fifteen days' period as contemplated in section 14(6) in appropriate cases. 12. I am further of the view that the application filed later on by the Petitioner for treating the affidavit as written statement was only by way of alternative. 13. A copy of the affidavit and the written statement have been shown to me by the learned counsel for the parties, perusal of which shows that the petitioner has answered the statement made in the plaint in accordance with law. Learned counsel for the Opposite Party No.1 was not prepared to take a stand before me that the Opposite Party No.1 shall not press the doctrine of trasverse in the absence of the written statement in question. This finding of mine, however, is being made only for a limited purpose only and shall not be construed to mean that I have accepted the case of the petitioner on merits which has to be considered and determined at the trial. This finding of mine, however, is being made only for a limited purpose only and shall not be construed to mean that I have accepted the case of the petitioner on merits which has to be considered and determined at the trial. In this view of the matter, there would be a failure of justice, if the impugned order is allowed to stand, besides there would be also an irreparable injury to the petitioner. 14. For the reasons aforementioned, I accept the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and reject that of the learned counsel for the Opposite Party no. 1. 15. In the result, the impugned order is set aside. The applications tiled by the petitioner are, accordingly, allowed, however, on a condition that the petitioner must deposit a sum of Rs. 150/- in the court below within one month from today to the credit of the Opposite Party. no.1, which he will be entitled to withdraw irrespective of the result of the suit. This Civil Revision application is allowed but in the peculiar facts and circumstances, I make no order as to cost of this Civil Revision application. 16. Since the suit in question, which requires expeditious disposal, has remained pending so far, in the interest of justice, I direct the court below to proceed with its hearing in accordance with law after giving one opportunity to the parties to file their documents on which they intend to rely and their list of witnesses whom they want to examine and dispose it of expeditiously curbing all unreasonable adjournments which may he made by one or the to her party" strictly adhering to Order XVIII and section 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 17. The Rule is made absolute on the aforementioned terms.