JUDGMENT- Smt. SUJATA MANOHAR, J.:---The appeal is from an order in the Chamber Summons No. 1110 of 1987 declining the application of the appellants who are original plaintiffs to amend the plaint by deleting the name of Ramesh Pallod as the sole proprietor of Bharat Agencies, the 3rd defendant, or in the alternative, by substituting the name of Kashinath Pallod for the name of Ramesh Pallod as the sole proprietor of Bharat Agencies. 2. The appellants, who are the original plaintiffs have filed a summary suit being Summary Suit No. 909 of 1986 against (1) Messrs. Fuel Injections Limited, (2) Vijay D. Char, and (3) "Ramesh It. Pallod of Bombay Indian Inhabitant carrying on business in the name and style of Bharat Agencies as the sole proprietor thereof ....". The suit is on 49 bills of exchange, all dated 26th February, 1983. The bills of exchange were drawn by Fuel Injections Limited. The bills of exchange were drawn on Messrs. Bharat Agencies and Messrs. Bharat Agencies had accepted these bills of exchange. On behalf of Bharat Agencies the bills of exchange are signed by "per pro. The Bharat Agencies (Bombay Branch) R. Pallod". The plaint in this summary suit on the bills of exchange clearly shows that the 3rd defendant was sued as the acceptor of the bills of exchange. The bills of exchange clearly show that the party concerned was Bharat Agencies. The entire suit is on the basis that Ramesh Pallod was the sole proprietor of Bharat Agencies. The suit has been filed on 30th January, 1986. The suit was within time because the due date of payment of the bills of exchange was 26th May, 1983. 3. Prior to the filing of the suit, the plaintiffs addressed a letter dated 7th December, 1985 to the bankers of Bharat Agencies, viz., Bank of Maharashtra, enquiring as to the nature of the firm Bharat Agencies and the names of the owners of the said firm. In reply, the Bank of Maharashtra, by its letter dated 16th December, 1985, informed the appellants bank that Messrs. Bharat Agencies was a proprietory concern and the name of the proprietor was Ramesh Pallod. In view of this letter, in the title of the plaint Ramesh Pallod is described as "carrying on business in the name and style of Bharat Agencies as the sole proprietor". 4. Bharat Agencies was a proprietory concern and the name of the proprietor was Ramesh Pallod. In view of this letter, in the title of the plaint Ramesh Pallod is described as "carrying on business in the name and style of Bharat Agencies as the sole proprietor". 4. The appellants thereafter took out a summons for judgment in the summary suit against defendant Nos. 1 and 3. In the affidavit-in-reply dated 25th September, 1986 filed by Ramesh Pallod on behalf of defendant Nos. 1 and 3, he stated that he was not the sole proprietor of Messrs. Bharat Agencies. He stated that his brother Kashinath Pallod was the sole proprietor. The summons for judgment, however, was made absolute against defendant Nos. 1 and 3 by the learned Single Judge who heard the summons for judgment by his order dated 12th January, 1987. Ramesh Pallod filed a review petition being Review Petition No. 8 of 1987 on the ground that he was not the sole proprietor of Messrs. Bharat Agencies and that no decree should have been passed against him. The learned Judge, by his order dated 28th July, 1987, dismissed the review petition. In the review petition, he has commented upon the failure on the part of the advocate of defendant No. 3 to inform the plaintiffs that his client was not the sole proprietor of Bharat Agencies. He has also commented on the other conduct of Ramesh Pallod showing that he had throughout dealt on behalf of Messrs. Bharat Agencies with the plaintiffs bank and for various reasons which are set out in the said order, the learned Judge dismissed the review petition. Ramesh Pallod, thereupon, came in appeal. At this stage, an affidavit was tendered from Kashinath Pallod along with documents showing that he was the sole proprietor of Bharat Agencies. Thereupon, on 7th December, 1987, by consent, the appeal was allowed. Two days thereafter, on 9th December, 1987, the appellants took out the present chamber summons for amendment of the plaint. The appellants asked for an amendment to delete the name of Ramesh Pallod from the cause title and to substitute the name of Kashinath Pallod carrying on business in the name and style of Messrs. Bharat Agencies as the sole proprietor thereof and for consequential amendments. The appellants asked for an amendment to delete the name of Ramesh Pallod from the cause title and to substitute the name of Kashinath Pallod carrying on business in the name and style of Messrs. Bharat Agencies as the sole proprietor thereof and for consequential amendments. In the alternative, the appellants prayed that they should be allowed to amend the title of the plaint by deleting the words "Ramesh Pallod of Bombay Indian Inhabitant carrying on business in the name and style of". In other words, Bharat Agencies was sought to be shown as defendant No. 3 and consequential amendments were sought. This alternative amendment was sought in view of the provisions of Order XXX, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure which permits any person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name to be sued in such name or style as if it were a firm name. This chamber summons has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. Hence, the appellants have filed the present appeal. 5. The respondents contend that the learned Judge has rightly dismissed the chamber summons because on the day on which the chamber summons for amendment was taken out, the claim against Kashinath Pallod was barred by the law of limitation since he was a new party being added for the first time to the suit and the period of limitation had expired. We have, therefore, to consider whether this is a case where the appellants are seeking to amend the plaint containing a misdescription of defendant No. 3 so that by the amendment the misdescription is being rectified and no new party is being added or whether by this amendment a new party is being sued for the first time. 6. Looking to the nature of the claim in the suit, it is quite clear that the intention of the appellants was throughout to sue Bharat Agencies who are the drawees and acceptors of the bills of exchange. This is apparent from various paragraphs in the plaint also. For example, in paragraph 3 it is stated that defendant No. 3 is the sole proprietor of the firm carrying on business in the name and style of Bharat Agencies. Therefore, defendant No. 3 is not being sued in his personal capacity. He is being sued as the sole proprietor of Bharat Agencies. For example, in paragraph 3 it is stated that defendant No. 3 is the sole proprietor of the firm carrying on business in the name and style of Bharat Agencies. Therefore, defendant No. 3 is not being sued in his personal capacity. He is being sued as the sole proprietor of Bharat Agencies. In paragraph 6 also, there is a clear reference to the fact that the 49 bills of exchange are drawn on defendant No. 3. The bills are drawn on Bharat Agencies. Therefore, the reference to defendant No. 3 is clearly a reference to Bharat Agencies. In the next line, it is stated that the said bills of exchange were duly accepted by defendant No. 3. This would also refer only to Bharat Agencies. It would be wrong to interpret this as referring to Ramesh Pallod. The bills of exchange are accepted on behalf of Bharat Agencies by Ramesh Pallod and this is preceded by the words "per pro". There is no dispute that the words "per pro", as defined, mean that the person signing has signed as an agent under a power of attorney. The words are "per procuration" meaning", as agent under a power of attorney" (See Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, page 1207). This does not mean that the suit is instituted against Ramesh Pallod in his personal capacity. 7. It was sought to be contended by the respondents that the appellants were clearly put to notice by reason of this endorsement that Ramesh Pallod was not the sole proprietor and he was acting only as the agent of Messrs. Bharat Agencies. The appellants, however, appear to have made the mistake of describing Ramesh Pallod as the sole proprietor because of the letter given to them by the Bank of Maharashtra dated 16th December, 1985 informing them that Ramesh Pallod was the sole proprietor of Messrs. Bharat Agencies. It is true that one year later the Bank of Maharashtra, by its letters dated 6th November, 1986 and 29th November, 1986, corrected itself by informing the appellants that Kashinath Pallod was the sole proprietor. But in these circumstances, it cannot be said that the appellant bank filed the summary suit personally against Ramesh Pallod. The suit is clearly against Bharat Agencies. But in these circumstances, it cannot be said that the appellant bank filed the summary suit personally against Ramesh Pallod. The suit is clearly against Bharat Agencies. Even in paragraph 7 of the plaint it is stated that the defendant No. 3 dishonoured the said bills of exchange by non-payment thereof on their due dates. This can have no reference to Ramesh Pallod in his personal capacity. It is Bharat Agencies who were required to honour the bills and who have failed to honour the bills by non-payment thereof on due dates. Looking to the claim in the suit and the documents, it is a clear case where the intention of the plaintiff, i.e., appellant bank throughout has been to sue Bharat Agencies. 8. If this is so, then the provisions of section 21(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not attracted. Under section 21(1) of the Limitation Act, where, after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party. This, however, is not a case of a new party or a new defendant being substituted or added. Bharat Agencies is on record. By the amendment, the appellants are merely seeking to correct a misdescription. 9. In this connection, the appellants have drawn our attention to a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of (Motilal v. Chandmal)1, reported in A.I.R. 1924 Bom. 155. In that case, the description of the defendant as given in the suit originally was "Chandmal Hindumal as manager and owner of the shop "Manmal Chandmal". However, Chandmal Hindumal had died prior to the filing of the suit. Subsequent to the filing of the suit, an application was made to bring two other persons on record as the heirs of Chandmal Hindumal. The Court held that the suit against the heirs was not barred by limitation. The Court said that though not in form, but in substance, the plaintiff sued the firm of Manmal Chandmal. If the plaintiff had simply described the defendant as "the firm of Manmal Chandmal" without mentioning the names of the owners or partners, the description would have been sufficient having regard to the provisions of Order XXX of the Civil Procedure Code. If the plaintiff had simply described the defendant as "the firm of Manmal Chandmal" without mentioning the names of the owners or partners, the description would have been sufficient having regard to the provisions of Order XXX of the Civil Procedure Code. In that view, the further description of the defendant Chandmal Hindumal as "the manager and owner of the firm" should be treated as a mere surplusage. Since the firm was being sued, the heirs could be brought on record. A similar view has been expressed in the case of (Municipal Commissioners v. Gangamani Chaudhurani)2, reported in A.I.R. 1940 Cal. 153. 10. In the case of (National Industries v. Sassoon Rice Mills Ltd.)3, reported in A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 381, the defendants were "Sassoon Rice Mills Limited". The plaintiffs sought an amendment by deleting the words "Limited" and "Company" from the plaint on the ground that they had committed an error in describing the defendants as Sassoon Rice Mills Limited and the proper defendants were Sassoons Rice Mills. The defendants opposed the application for amendment on the ground that it would introduce a new defendant because Sassoon Rice Mills was a totally different concern from Sassoon Rice Mills Limited. The Calcutta High Court negatived the contention and held that by reason of the amendment no new party was being introduced. It was a case of Misnomer or misdescription of the defendant. It said that there was no doubt about the defendant whom the plaintiffs intended to sue. It was, therefore, a case of misdescription and misnomer of the defendant. A reference can also be made in this connection to (Deolal and others v. Tularam Ramsukh)4, reported in A.I.R. 1928 Nagpur 319; (Subbiah Ambalal Servai v. Unnamalai Achi and others)5, reported in A.I.R. 1941 Madras 609; and (The Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board and others v. The Firm of M/s. Patel and Patel)6, reported in A.I.R. 1977 A.P. 172. 11. The respondents, however, relied upon a decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of (Madhosingh v. Union of India)7, reported in A.I.R. 1955 Rajasthan 57. In that case, a suit was filed against the manager or agent of the railway and the amendment was sought to remove the name of the manager and Union of India was sought to be made a party. In that case, a suit was filed against the manager or agent of the railway and the amendment was sought to remove the name of the manager and Union of India was sought to be made a party. The Court examined the pleadings which were before it and it said that ordinarily a misdescription of the name of the defendant could have been amended. But in the case before it the suit was clearly being brought personally against the manager of the railway and the plaintiff sought to recover from him certain amount by way of damages in respect of an accident which had been caused by a train of which he was a manager. The Court said this was not a case of misdescription. 12. The respondents also relied upon the case of (Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd. v. Ghulam Rasul Nagishbandi)8, reported in A.I.R. 1958 J K 20. In that case, the Court, on facts, came to the conclusion that it was not a case of misdescription of the defendant but it was a clear case where one defendant was sought to be substituted by another. In such a situation, the provisions of the Limitation Act would come into operation and if the substitution is after the period of limitation, the Court would be justified in holding the suit to be barred against him. 13. Both these cases are decided on the appreciation of facts which were before the Court. In the present case, looking to the nature of the suit, which is a suit on bills of exchange where the acceptor is made a party, this is a clear case where the acceptor is misdescribed. By seeking to delete the name of Ramesh Pallod who was sued as carrying on business in the name and style of Bharat Agencies and substituting the name of his brother as the person carrying on the business in the name and style of Bharat Agencies, a wrong description is sought to be corrected. The plaintiffs carried the impression that the person who carried on business in the name and style of Bharat Agencies was Ramesh Pallod and not Kashinath Pallod. The bills of exchange, however, are drawn in the name of Bharat Agencies simpliciter and they have also been accepted on behalf of Bharat Agencies. Therefore, the defendant sued by the appellants is Bharat Agencies. The bills of exchange, however, are drawn in the name of Bharat Agencies simpliciter and they have also been accepted on behalf of Bharat Agencies. Therefore, the defendant sued by the appellants is Bharat Agencies. In these circumstances, in our view, this is a fit case where amendment should have been permitted; and the provisions of section 21(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not apply. 14. It is urged on behalf of the respondents that in the present case the intention was to sue Ramesh Pallod and not Bharat Agencies. The fact that Ramesh Pallod is described as "carrying on business in the name and style of Bharat Agencies" is only descriptive of Ramesh Pallod. We do not find any substance in this contention. It is urged on behalf of the respondents that although the Bank of Maharashtra, who are the bankers of Bharat Agencies, had informed the appellants by their letter of 7th December, 1985 that Ramesh Pallod was the sole proprietor of Bharat Agencies, the same bank subsequently wrote letters of 6th November, 1986 and 26th November, 1986 informing the appellants that Kashinath Pallod was the sole proprietor of Bharat Agencies. It is urged by the respondents that despite these letters and despite the affidavit-in-reply dated 25th September, 1986 filed by Ramesh Pallod in the summons for judgment setting out that he was not the sole proprietor of Bharat Agencies, the appellants sought to proceed with the summons for judgment and they obtained a decree against defendant Nos. 1 and 3. This would show that there was a clear intention on the part of the appellants to sue Ramesh Pallod and not Bharat Agencies. This argument also does not carry any weight. Throughout this period, apart from the fact that Ramesh Pallod had denied being the sole proprietor, Kashinath Pallod had not come forward to say that he was the sole proprietor. Kashinath Pallod had not filed any affidavit to the effect that he was the sole proprietor. The appellants had two contradictory letters from the Bank of Maharashtra. Hence, if they chose to proceed with the summons for judgment, no adverse inference can be drawn against them. Kashinath Pallod had not filed any affidavit to the effect that he was the sole proprietor. The appellants had two contradictory letters from the Bank of Maharashtra. Hence, if they chose to proceed with the summons for judgment, no adverse inference can be drawn against them. Even in the review petition which was filled by Ramesh Pallod and opposed by the appellants, the learned Judge has commented upon the fact that Kashinath Pallod had himself not filed any affidavit to say that he was the sole proprietor. It was only at the stage of appeal from the order in the review petition that Kashinath Pallod filed an affidavit dated 16th November, 1987 and annexed documents to this affidavit to show that he was, in fact, the sole proprietor of Bharat Agencies. Immediately the appellants agreed to the appeal being allowed by consent and within two days took out a chamber summons for amendment. In these circumstances, the contention of the respondents that the appellants had intended to sue Ramesh Pallod is without any basis. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellants had shown lack of good faith in any manner in applying for the present amendment. 15. Even under section 21 of the Limitation Act, there is a Proviso which says that where the Court is satisfied that the omission to include a new plaintiff or defendant was due to a mistake made in good faith it may direct that the suit as regards such plaintiff or defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date. Looking to the circumstances set out above, this is also a fit case where, in any event, power can be exercised under the Proviso to section 21(1) of the Limitation Act and a direction can be given that the suit against Bharat Agencies shall be deemed to have been instituted on the original date of the suit, viz., 30th January, 1986. 16. In the premises, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of 25th January, 1988 is set aside. The chamber summons is made absolute in terms of prayer (b) as the appellants desire that they should be permitted to make amendments as per Schedule `B to the chamber summons. Chamber summons is also made absolute in terms of prayer (c). Appeal is allowed with costs. Amendments to be carried out within two weeks from today. The chamber summons is made absolute in terms of prayer (b) as the appellants desire that they should be permitted to make amendments as per Schedule `B to the chamber summons. Chamber summons is also made absolute in terms of prayer (c). Appeal is allowed with costs. Amendments to be carried out within two weeks from today. Liberty to take out a fresh summons for judgment after the amendments are carried out. 17. The respondents apply for stay of the operation of this order for a period of four weeks. Application rejected. Appeal allowed.