S. C. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application by convict-appellant invoking power of the Court under section 389 (1) Cr. P. C. to direct opposite party not to take any coercive action against appellant till disposal of the application. ( 2 ) CONVICT appellants employee of the Orissa Forest Corporation Limited a Government Company. Appellant is thus, a public servant. Company has a Saw Mill where convict appellant was working as an Accounts Assistant. There was a Manager of the Saw Mill. Both the Manager and appellant were prosecuted under section 5 (1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 punishable under section 5 (2) of the Act read with section 34 I. P. C. and under sections 409/34 I. P. C. , or having committed criminal misconduct in fraudulently and dishonestly misappropriating a sum of Rs. 13,846. 84 paise from funds of the Company. Learned Special Judge (Vigilance) Sambalpur acquitted the Saw Mill Manager but convicted appellant sentencing him to undergo R. 1. for three years on each count with a direction that the sentences arc to run concurrently. On conviction by judgment dated 26. 7. 1993, appellant was released on bail by the trial court till 16. 8. 1993 to enable him to obtain an order under section 389 (1) Cr. P. C. as provided in section 389 (3) Cr. P. C. Appellant preferred appeal and applied for being released on bail. This Court by order dated 12. 8. 1993, rdeased the appellant on bail of Rs. 10,000/- with two sureties each for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Special Judge (Vigilance), Sambalpur. Thereafter; appellant received an office order dated 25. 9. 1993 of the Company appointing Enquiring Officer and Marshaling officer to proceed with the disciplinary proceeding against him initiated on 6. 8. 1990. Convict appellant has, therefore, prayed for directing the prosecutor not to take any coercive action till disposal of the criminal appeal invoking power of this Court under section 389 held with section 401, Cr. P. C. ( 3 ) NEITHER under section 389 Cr. P. C. nor under section 401 Cr. P. C. this Court can direct a disciplinary proceeding to be stayed, though this Court could have power under Article 226 ofthe Constitution of India to grant the relief if such power is invoked. P. C. ( 3 ) NEITHER under section 389 Cr. P. C. nor under section 401 Cr. P. C. this Court can direct a disciplinary proceeding to be stayed, though this Court could have power under Article 226 ofthe Constitution of India to grant the relief if such power is invoked. Besides, said power can be exercised by a Division bench as per the Rules of the Court and not by a Single Judge. In a pending criminal appeal such power cannot be exercised. Therefore, the relief sought for is not available to appellant. However, power under section 389 Cr. P. C. having been invoked, this court has discretion to suspend the sentence or the impugned judgment in appeal in deserving cases. ( 4 ) SECTION 389 (1) Cr. P. C. reads as follows: Sec. 389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal, release of appellant on bail: - (1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appeared against be suspended and also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond. This is similar to section 426 Cr. P. C. 1898. It is clear from plain language of the provision extracted that in case accused is in confinement, this Court can direct his release on bail on his own bond. It is doubtful whether accused who has been released on bail for a temporary period under section 389 (3) Cr. P. C. after his conviction can be directed to be released or bile under section 389 (1) Cr. P. C. since he is not in confinement. ( 5 ) IN the decision reported in Umakanta Palatasingh and another v. State of Orissa, where release on bail in appeal was prayed for has been observed: Standard of grant of pre-trial bail and bail after conviction stand on different footing. While legislature does not re-requirement, that is that for reason to quire recording of reasons for grant of be recorded in writing footing. While legislature does not require recording of reasons for grant of pre-trial bail, post conviction bail during pendency of appeal under section 389 Cr. P. C. requires the Court to record reasons in writing. While legislature does not re-requirement, that is that for reason to quire recording of reasons for grant of be recorded in writing footing. While legislature does not require recording of reasons for grant of pre-trial bail, post conviction bail during pendency of appeal under section 389 Cr. P. C. requires the Court to record reasons in writing. T Therefore, apart from the precondition of the appellant being in confinement, further precondition that the reason for releasing the accused on bail is to be recorded in writing. In this case, however, accused having been already released on bail correctness of the order releasing on bail is academic. ( 6 ) MR. B. S. Misra, learned counsel for appellant submitted that the impugned judgment which is appealed against ought to be suspended so that appellant would not be in double jeopardy to face the disciplinary proceeding during pendency of the appeal on the self same allegations when there is every chance of his being acquitted in appeal. ( 7 ) IN the decision of this court reported in (R. K. De v. State of Orissa) it was observed: The correct view seems to be that suspension of execution of the sentence though within the power of the appellate court is to be ordered only in exceptional circumstances where special cause exists and not invariably whenever the appellant is released on bail. With such observation, earlier order of suspension of execution of the sentence pending disposal of appeal was recalled on the finding that there are no special circumstances for suspension of execution of the sentence of the accused convicted for 3 years under section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1) (c) and 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The aforesaid extracted observation was referred to by this Court in the decision reported in (Nilambar Das v. State of Orissa) and it was observed: In my view, the aforesaid observation is the correct interpretation of sub-section (1) or S. 389 of the Code (S. 426 of the Old Code), but there is an additional requirement, that is that for reason to be recorded in writing. T ( 8 ) READING the three decisions of this Court, it is clear that appellate court has discretion not only to release the accused on bail but also to suspend sentence or the impugned judgment in which the accused is convicted. T ( 8 ) READING the three decisions of this Court, it is clear that appellate court has discretion not only to release the accused on bail but also to suspend sentence or the impugned judgment in which the accused is convicted. In a given case Court may order suspension of sentence without releasing the accused on bail or he may be released on bail without order suspension of execution of sentence or both may be granted or refused. In either case, reason is to be recorded in writing. Added to it, language of section 389 (1) Cr. P. C. makes it clear that a convict who has preferred appeal can be released on bail by the appellant court when he is under confinement. If be has been released on bail by the trial Court under section 389 (3) Cr. P. C. , it is doubtful whether he can be released on bail under section 389 (1) Cr, P. C. while continuing on bail without surrendering to custody because bail can be granted to a person who is in custody. It is only in case of anticipatory bail, Parliament envisages a person not in custody to be granted bail to be released in the event of his arrest. ( 9 ) MR. B. S. Misra, learned counsel appellant relied upon a Division Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in 1990 Cri. L. J. 167 (Sundararamireddi v. State) and submitted that appellant being in employment would be thrown out of employment in case operation of the impugned judgment is not suspended. This is an exceptional circumstance. In the aforesaid Division Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court correctness of an earlier Single Judge decision was being considered. Question for consideration of the Division Bench was whether the appellate court while exercising its power under section 389 (1) Cr. P. C. could suspend the execution of the sentence as well as the conviction pending in appeal preferred by a convicted person. Such question arose when several public servants be longing to the Irrigation Department and also some contractors were convicted for various offence of misconduct. Public servants involved in those cases were suspended from service and as per interim directions of the High Court in writ petitions filed by them they were re-instated in service and as such they continued in service. Public servants involved in those cases were suspended from service and as per interim directions of the High Court in writ petitions filed by them they were re-instated in service and as such they continued in service. A Single Judge held that appellate court can suspend only the sentence but not the judgment under which the accused was convicted on the finding than where a Government servant is convicted by a court the normal course followed are that he should be removed from service and only when he is a acquitted in appeal, he would be entitled to be reinstated with retrospective effect and that therefore, there was no justification for suspending the judgment. Another learned Single Judge could not agree and referred the matter to Division Bench. Division Bench observed: There may be quite a few such cases, which may include the discharge from service of a public servant or where applications have to be filed for pass -. port etc. No doubt, the suspension of conviction as such cannot ordinarily be ordered in a routine manner. A greater scrutiny has to be applied by the Appellate Court, and in exceptional cases or appropriate cases only where the Court is satisfied prima facie that the facts and circumstances warrant granting of such relief pending the appeal, it should be, granted in the interests of justice. There are cases where even the entire findings in the judgment of a Criminal Court are to be accepted, particularly in a case of circumstantial evidence; a prima facie case may not be made out at all. In such cases, there can be no harm if the Courts exercises its discretiont Taking the aforesaid view of the matter Division Bench agreed with the learned referringt Judge and observed: T1since the petitioners were in service on the date of conviction, they can be continued in service. Therefore, the order of suspension of the operation of the judgment, that is to say, the conviction passed in the above Cr1. M. Ps. need not be disturbed. 1. There is no force in the contention of Mr. Misra. In the decision reported in 37 (1971) Cri. 402 (supra) the convict was a public servant as is clear from his conviction under sections 5 (1) (c) and (1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. M. Ps. need not be disturbed. 1. There is no force in the contention of Mr. Misra. In the decision reported in 37 (1971) Cri. 402 (supra) the convict was a public servant as is clear from his conviction under sections 5 (1) (c) and (1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It was held that there are no special or exceptional circumstances for suspending execution of sentence and therefore, suspending the order of conviction appealed against was recalled. Decision of this Court is to be preferred to the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court though both were decided on facts of each case. Besides, in this case there is no interim direction in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Even if there would have been any, the same would have operated and operation of impugned judgment was not required to be suspended. To work out interim order in writ jurisdiction, accused could have been released on bail. Therefore, further exceptional circumstances are be found out to pass an order of suspension of judgment. 2. While considering the exceptional circumstances it is to be kept in mind that offence is a wrong to society and conviction is a stigma on the wrong doer. When corruption is rampant in society conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act being an antisocial act and being a moral turpitude of the convict care should be taken so that society is protected. If a convict is allowed not to suffer consequences of the judgment, each convict shall try to avoid the same by preferring an appeal, which does not operate as stay automatically. Besides, recognising that many persons who pollute the society do not come within the scope of the Prevention of Corruption Act had to replace the Act by a new legislation to expand the scope. Besides, recognising that many persons who pollute the society do not come within the scope of the Prevention of Corruption Act had to replace the Act by a new legislation to expand the scope. Stigma that continued on conviction of accused is removed from the date of conviction and not from the date of acquittal in appeal as has been held in the decision reported in (Vidya Charan Sukla v. Purshottam Lal Kaushik), where it has been held that when once the conviction and sentence are set aside in an appeal, the acquittal dates back to the date of conviction and it is wiped off from that date, and consequently it must be legally presumed that the conviction was not subsisting on the date the nomination paper was filed. ( 10 ) REMOVAL from employment of an employee on his conviction for an offence is not automatic. It is within the discretion of the removing authority to pass an order of removal on basis of conviction. Where on self same facts a person is prosecuted and also proceeded against departmentally for disciplinary action, the disciplinary authority may consider not to precede further awaiting decision of the Criminal Court in appeal. If such disciplinary authority proceeds with the proceeding, this Court can exercise of writ jurisdiction or the tribunal constituted under the Administrative Tribunal Act may pass appropriate order. That however, would not be an exceptional circumstance in which the impugned judgment is to be suspended. This is not an exceptional circumstance. Therefore, my refusal to exercise discretion under section 389 (1) Cr. P. C. in this case should not weigh with the disciplinary authority to consider the question independently if appellant approaches that authority which shall deal with the matter of staying further proceeding, on its own merits. ( 11 ) IN result, there is no merit in this application which is accordingly, dismissed Application dismissed. .