GITESH RANJAN BHATTACHLUJEE, J. ( 1 ) A petition of complaint was filed by the Food Inspector before the Court below against the present petitioner under S. 16 (1) (a) (i)/7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The petitioner as accused appeared before the learned Magistrate in the said case on 14th July, 1986 and was released on bail. Such a complaint filed before the Magistrate comes within the ambit of the provisions of Ss. 244, 245 and 246, Cr. P. C. at the relevant stage. Section 244 (1), Cr. P. C. provides that when in any warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate, the Magistrate shall proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. As the provisions of S. 245, Cr. P. C. are of vital importance in this case the said section, as it stands amended by the West Bengal Amendment Act of 1988, is reproduced below:245. When accused shall be discharged 1. If, upon taking all the evidence referred to in S. 244, the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him. 2. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case if, for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless. 3. If all the evidence referred to in S. 244 are not produced in support of the prosecution within 4 years from the date of appearance of the accused, the Magistrate shall discharge the accused unless the prosecution satisfies the Magistrate that upon the evidence already produced and for special reasons there is ground for presuming that it shall not be in the interest of justice to discharge the accused. Section 24. 6 (1) provides that if, when such evidence has been taken, or at any previous stage of the case, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under the chapter to which the said section appertains which he is competent to try and could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame charge against the accused. In this case the petitioner filed an application before the learned Magistrate on 17th June, 1992 for his discharge under S. 245 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as all the prosecution witnesses as referred to in S. 244 were not produced within 4 years from the date of appearance of the petitioner. The learned Magistrate however by his impugned order dated the 2nd September, 1992 rejected the petition. Thereafter the petitioner has come up before this Court by his revisional application. ( 2 ) THE point that has fallen for consideration of this Court at the first instance is whether the Magistrate can continue the proceeding even after 4 years from the date of appearance of the accused without framing charge unless the prosecution satisfies him before the expiry of the said period of 4 years under Sub-so (3) of S. 245 that upon the evidence already produced and for special reasons there is ground for presuming that it shall not be in the interest of justice to discharge the accused. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that the Magistrate is under a statutory obligation to discharge the accused under S. 245 (3), Cr. P. C. on the expiry of the said period of 4 years if all the evidence referred to in S. 244 are not produced in the meantime, and that, if not done earlier, the Magistrate is not entitled after the expiry of the said period of 4 years to consider whether upon the evidence already produced and for special reasons there is ground for presuming that it shall not be in the interest of justice to discharge the accused. It is submitted by the learned Advocate of the petitioner that this interpretation is warranted by the logic of the similar interpretation which S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. as amended by the West Bengal Amendment Act has received from this Court. The West Bengal amendment of S. 167, Cr. It is submitted by the learned Advocate of the petitioner that this interpretation is warranted by the logic of the similar interpretation which S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. as amended by the West Bengal Amendment Act has received from this Court. The West Bengal amendment of S. 167, Cr. P. C. prescribes specific periods, for different types of cases anti provides that if the police investigation in respect of any such case is not concluded within the prescribed period applicable to such a case the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence and shall discharge the accused unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interests of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the periodts mentioned in this sub-section is necessary , (emphasis supplied ). It has been interpreted by this High Court that the prayer or continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period must be made by the Investigating Officer to the Magistrate before the expiry of the prescribed period seeking permission for special reasons and in the interest of justice to continue the investigation beyond the prescribed period and the Magistrate may on such ground grant such permission, if at all, before the expiry of the prescribed period and not after such expiry (vide, Ali Hossain V. State of West Bengal, Ramkumar v. State, Jay Shankar Jha v. State, Rambriksh v. State and Pappa Rao v. State. ( 3 ) THE reason that weighed with the court in giving the interpretation that any prayer for continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period and any permission in that respect must be made and given respectively before the expiry of the said period will be found in the following observation of a Division Bench of this Court in Ramkumarv. State. (supra): In such a case, S. 167 (5) by its plain language, gives a mandate to the Magistrate to make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer can satisfy the Magistrate that continuation of investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary for special reasons and in the interest of justice. The power that has been given to the Magistrate to permit continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months clearly envisages that it has to be exercised before the expiry of six months. The power that has been given to the Magistrate to permit continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months clearly envisages that it has to be exercised before the expiry of six months. That on the expiry of the said period the Magistrate cannot entertain any prayer to extend the period of investigation will be evident from the words the continuation of the investigation and beyond the period of six months is necessary appearing in sub-s. (5) Continuation of the investigationt in S. 167 (5) may be read in contradistinction to further investigation appearing in S. 167 (6 ). When so read continuation of the investigation pre-supposes an investigation which is in progress. Once the period of six months expires, the Magistrate by stopping the investigation brings an end to the investigation by the operation of sub-s. (5) of S. 167. If any prayer of the Investigating Officer is entertained after the expiry of said period and allowed, the investigation thereby will be re-opened and it will be further investigationt as envisaged under sub-so (6) of S. 167 and not continuation of investigation. Then again, to record a satisfaction that the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessaryt the Magistrate necessarily has to obtain the satisfaction before the expiry. It must therefore be held that any direction for continuation of the investigation given under S. 167 (5) after the statutory period will be without jurisdiction. We thus see that the interpretation with Section 167 (5), Cr. P. C. has received from this court has been extracted from the language and expression used by the legislature in the said section. The legislature in the said section clearly provided for stopping of investigation into offence if the investigation was not concluded within the specified period and had at the same time authorised the Magistrate to consider the question of continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period if the Investigating Officer could satisfy him that such continuation of investigation beyond the prescribed period was necessary for special reasons and in the interest of justice. In the perspective of the legislative concern, clearly expressed by the language used, that either the investigation into the offence has to be stopped on the expiry of the specified period or the continuation of the investigation beyond the specific period on special grounds has to be permitted to he Magistrate, this court has interpreted that the permission for continuation of the investigation will have to be sought and obtained before the expiry of the prescribed period. Before we bodily lift the interpretation ascribed to S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. , in the context of the language used therein and before we apply such interpretation to S. 245 (3), Cr. P. C. we will have to ascertain whether the language used in the said two sections are similar or identical so as to admit of one and the same interpretation for both the sections or whether there is difference in language and context of the two sections necessitating independent interpretation in each case suited to its own context. Section 245 (3) does not at all speak of stopping or continuation of proceeding whereas S. 167 (5) speaks of stopping of investigation into the offence or continuation thereof. This visible difference between the texts of the two sections is itself a sharp pointer to the difference in the import of the two sections. ( 4 ) EVEN in the matter of interpretation of S. 167 (5) the following observations of the Supreme Court in Hasainara Khatun V. State of Bihar, in connection with the provisions of the said S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. deserve notice: It is clear from this provision that if in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate must make an order stopping further investigation into the offence, unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice; the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary. With a view to securing compliance with this provision we directed that if in a case triable by a Magistrate in a summons case it is found that investigation has been going for a period of more than six months without satisfying the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice, the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary, the State Government will release the under trial prisoners, unless the necessary orders of the Magistrate are obtained within a period of one month. The reason for giving this direction was that in such a case the Magistrate is bound to make an order stopping further investigation and in that event, only two courses would be open: either the police must immediately proceed to file a charge-sheet if the investigation conducted till then warrants such a course, or if no case for proceeding against the under-trial prisoners is disclosed by the investigation, the under trial prisoner must be released forthwith from detention. (emphasis supplied ). By all means, these observations clearly indicate that the permission to continue the investigation beyond the prescribed period may be obtained in appropriate cases even after the expiry of such period. In Pappa Rao v. State (supra) a Division Bench of this court composed of Anil K. Sen and G. N. Ray, JJ. (as Their Lordships then were) observed this in connection with the S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. : Though it is somewhat debatable as to whether every breach of the provision would render the subsequent proceeding void or not, it has now been held by this court that leave to continue the investigation beyond 180 days from the date of arrest in summons case should be taken before the expiry of the said period. It has further been held that no Magistrate can proceed to try an accessed on a charge-sheet submitted as a result of investigation continued in breach of this provision. That is the view expressed by this court in the decisions relied on by Mr. Singh. It has further been held that no Magistrate can proceed to try an accessed on a charge-sheet submitted as a result of investigation continued in breach of this provision. That is the view expressed by this court in the decisions relied on by Mr. Singh. We are bound by these decisions, however much we may entertain some doubt on the point as to why the Magistrate cannot condone the bleach in a case where sufficient grounds have been made out for continuance of the investigation even beyond 180 days only because leave to continue the investigation had not been taken before the expiry of the period. Terms of sub-s. (5) of S. 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may not be read to be so mandatory as to rule out all scope for such condonation amounting to grant of leave retrospectively. We would however proceed on the view earlier taken by this court namely, if the investigation is not completed within 180 days from the date of arrest, no court can take cognizance on a charge-sheet submitted as result of any investigation continued beyond 180 days from the date of arrest. T The above quotation from the Division Bench decision of this court as well as the earlier quotation from the Supreme Court decision would at any rate convince anyone that even the language of S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. is not that imperative as to lead to one and only interpretation that the requisite permission for continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period under S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. must be obtained before the expiry of the prescribed period or not at all. On the other hand, the said, observations s quoted above from the Division Bench decision and the Supreme Court decision rather show that the language of Section 167, Cr. P. C. also admits of contrary interpretation that the permission for continuation of the investigation under S. 167 (5) may be obtained in appropriate cases even after the expiry of the prescribed period. ( 5 ) BUT however the law in this State is now settled, so far as the decisions of this Court are concerned, that the permission for continuation of the investigation must be obtained before the expiry of prescribed period. ( 5 ) BUT however the law in this State is now settled, so far as the decisions of this Court are concerned, that the permission for continuation of the investigation must be obtained before the expiry of prescribed period. This aspect of the matter that even the language of S. 167 (5) is not necessarily productive of only one interpretation is highlighted above by me with the aid of the opinion of high authorities, only for the purpose of projecting the necessity of being cautious before indiscriminately applying the ultimate interpretation received by Section 167 (5), from this court to S. 245 (3) without taking into consideration the difference in the language and context of the two sections. As we have already seen, apart from discharge, the legislative emphasis in S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. is on stopping of investigation after the expiry of the prescribed period or continuation of the same on special grounds, but S. 245 (3), Cr. P. C. does not speak anything about stopping or continuation of the proceeding. It speaks of discharge of the accused. Therefore what over may be the effect of the order which the Court may pass in a particular case under sub-so (3) of S. 245, Cr. P. C. what the Court has to consider in that connection is whether an order of discharge of the accused should be passed, and not, unlike S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. , whether the proceeding should be stopped or continued. In terms of the said sub S. (3) of S. 245 the question whether the accused should be discharged or not crops up only if all the evidence referred to in S. 244 are not produced in 1 support of the prosecution within 4 years from the date of appearance of the accused. In considering the question whether an order of discharge should be passed or not under the said sub-s. (3) of S. 245 the Magistrate has to take notice of the evidence already produced till the expiry of the period of 4 years. Therefore the question cannot be taken up for consideration before the expiry of the period of 4 years because the prosecution can legitimately claim opportunity to produce evidence till the expiry of the said period of 4 years. ( 6 ) SECTION 167 (5), Cr. P. C. applies to the stage of police investigation. Therefore the question cannot be taken up for consideration before the expiry of the period of 4 years because the prosecution can legitimately claim opportunity to produce evidence till the expiry of the said period of 4 years. ( 6 ) SECTION 167 (5), Cr. P. C. applies to the stage of police investigation. It is for the police to consider and decide as to in what manner the investigation in a particular case at a particular stage has to be conducted and guided and in what line the investigation has to proceed on the basis of the clue and materials available upon that stage. In the matter of investigation it is for the police to decide the course of action and the Court or the Magistrate has very little scope to interfere with the course of investigation police or with the manner in which the investigation has to be conducted by the police. Rather the judicial decisions have consistently deprecated any undue interference with the course of investigation by Magistrates or Courts. The course of police investigation into any offence has also very often to be kept secret in the interest of the investigation and any undue publicity of the steps of the investigation may frustrate the purpose and efficacy of investigation which is highly undesirable. That is why the law has made the case diary of police maintained during an investigation to some extent a privileged document to which access is not ordinarily available to others. In this background, it is the Investigating Officer who is the best person to know at what stage the investigation is at an particular time and to anticipate what further time may be necessary to complete the investigation and accordingly it is for him to apply before the Magistrate in appropriate cases under S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. for permission to continue the investigation beyond the prescribed period of special reasons and in the interest of justice and the Magistrate may on consideration of the prayer of the 1. 0. and the relevant materials and circumstances placed before him permit, in a fit case, continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period. But in a complaint case governed by the warrant procedure, at the stage of Ss. 244, 245 and 246, Cr. P. C. the circumstances are different. 0. and the relevant materials and circumstances placed before him permit, in a fit case, continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period. But in a complaint case governed by the warrant procedure, at the stage of Ss. 244, 245 and 246, Cr. P. C. the circumstances are different. Here the court has a prominent role to see that the proceeding continues expeditiously. Under sub-so (2) of S. 244 the Magistrate is empowered to issue, on the application of the prosecution summons to the witnesses and obviously to take such further steps as may be warranted by law to ensure attendance of the witnesses in court. While under S. 167 (5) the permission to continue the investigation is dependent on two factors, namely, special reasons and interest of justice, under S. 245 (3) the is a third and additional factor, namely, 'the evidence already producedt. This additional factor also shows the clear necessity of a different approach for S. 245 (3) from the approach warranted for S. 167 (5 ). Since S. 245 (3) prescribes a time period of four years for adducing all the evidence at the stage of S. 244 and since in considering he question whether the accused should or should not be discharged under S. 245 (3), the evidence already produced has to be looked into, the necessary corollary is that the prosecution must get the full span of four years before it is called upon to satisfy the Magistrate inter alia upon the evidence already produced that for special reasons and in the interest of justice the accused should not be discharged, and consequently the question whether an accused should or should not be discharged under S. 245 (3) has to be taken up for consideration only on or after the expiry of the prescribed period and not before that. ( 7 ) IN this connection, it is also to be noticed that S. 244 or for that matter S. 245 speaks of evidence before charge. The law has not prescribed, notwithstanding the import of the necessity of speedy trial emanating from Article 21, any specific period for conclusion of the trial after framing of charge and that has been left to the domain of general consideration, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, coming within the sweep of Article, 21 so far speedy trial is concerned. Once charge has been framed against an accused the question of discharge under S. 245 thereafter will not arise. In this connection S. 246 (1) has some significance. Section 246 (1), Cr. P. C. runs thus Section 246 (1)-If, when such evidence has been taken, or at any previous stage of the case, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try, and which, in, his opinion, could be adequately p4nished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (emphasis supplied ). This therefore, clearly shows that the Magistrate may frame charge in appropriate cases even before the completion of all the evidence referred to in S. 244, because S. 246 (1) clearly mandates that charge may be framed even at any previous stage of the case. Therefore even where out of the total evidence proposed to be produced the evidence already adduced make out a clear case for framing charge the Magistrate may, in an appropriate case, frame such charge under S. 245 (1), Cr. P. C. , although all the evidence have not yet been produced. Under sub-s. (5) of S. 246 after framing of charge the accused gets an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses already examined by the prosecution before charge. Sub-section (6) of S. 246 provides an opportunity to the prosecution thereafter to examine the remaining witnesses for the prosecution who were not earlier examined before framing of charge. There is no doubt that it is somewhat an extraordinary course to take up the consideration of framing of charge before all the prosecution evidence as adduced but even then the power of the Magistrate is there to consider the question of framing of charge and also to frame charge in appropriate cases before the prosecution have examined all their witnesses at pre-charge stage and once charge is framed the question of discharge of the concerned accused under Section 245, Cr. P. C. does not arise. Since under S. 245 (3) the question is a single and composite one as to whether the accused should be discharged or not and nothing more, it is also not necessary, although punishable, for the prosecution to apply before hand to the Magistrate praying that the accused may not be discharged under S. 245 (3 ). Since under S. 245 (3) the question is a single and composite one as to whether the accused should be discharged or not and nothing more, it is also not necessary, although punishable, for the prosecution to apply before hand to the Magistrate praying that the accused may not be discharged under S. 245 (3 ). Even at the time when the Magistrate takes up the matter for passing an order under S. 245 (3) the prosecution may, upon the evidence already adduced canvass before the Magistrate that the accused should not be discharged under S. 245 (3) for special reasons and in the interest of justice. The irresistible conclusion therefore is that the question whether the accused should be discharged or not under S. 245 (3) has to be taken up for consideration only on of after the expiry of the prescribed period and not before that and since the question is a composite one as to whether the accused should be discharged or not the prosecution is entitled to urge at the time when the matter is taken up for passing an order under S. 245 (3), that upon the evidence already produced and for special reasons the accused should not be discharged under S. 245 (3) in the interest of justice. ( 8 ) THE above conclusion will be reinforced if the matter is viewed from another angle. In S. 167 (5) the law expressly says of passing an order stopping further investigation into the offence, but as I have already pointed out, in S. 245 (3) there is no provision for making any order stopping the further proceeding in the case. This omission is not accidental but is rather deliberate and well intended. In Section 167 (5) the legislature has in unequivocal terms expressed its intention that the further investigation into the offence has to be stopped. In view of the language of S. 167 (5) it has been held by this court in Dilip Kumar Das V. State of West Bengal, as follows:"it may be noticed that S. 167 (5) does not admit of any individualised approach. Its application, where it applies, is rather total and composite. In view of the language of S. 167 (5) it has been held by this court in Dilip Kumar Das V. State of West Bengal, as follows:"it may be noticed that S. 167 (5) does not admit of any individualised approach. Its application, where it applies, is rather total and composite. What it provides for is stopping of investigation not in respect of any particular accused but in respect of the offence itself, the benefit of which ensures to all the accused whether in custody or on bail, whether recently arrested or arrested long back, whether identified or unidentified, whether known or unknown yet, whether apprehended or absconding. It is not that under S. 167 (5) investigation can be stopped in respect of the particular accused from the date of whose appearance or arrest, as the case may, the prescribed period has already elapsed and at the same time allow the investigation to continue in respect of the other accused from the date of whose appearance or arrest the prescribed period has not yet elapsed. If the investigation is stopped under S. 167 (5), the whole of the investigation is brought to a grinding halt not only in respect of all accused but also in respect of the offence or offences which was or were the subject matter of the investigation. Again, in para 8 (ibid) it has been observed that: It may be noticed that when the period prescribed in the said sub-section in reference to any particular offence expires on the basis of computation from the date of appearance or arrest of an accused, that is, the accused who was arrested or who appeared first in point of time, the Magistrate is required to stop further investigation into the offence, which means there will not be any further investigation not only in respect of the offence but also in respect of any accused in connection with that offence unless, of course, there are special reasons for allowing the continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period. " ( 9 ) IT will thus be evident that in view of the particular language used in S. 167 (5) it has to be held that on the expiry of the prescribed period the entire investigation in respect of the offence has to be stopped, the benefit of which ensures in favour of all accused. " ( 9 ) IT will thus be evident that in view of the particular language used in S. 167 (5) it has to be held that on the expiry of the prescribed period the entire investigation in respect of the offence has to be stopped, the benefit of which ensures in favour of all accused. But in S. 245 (3) it is not stated that the proceeding has to be stopped, far less the proceeding in respect of all the accused has to be stopped. The period of four years mentioned in S. 245 (3) commences in view of S. 244, Cr. P. C. from the time when the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate. Now, where there are more accused than one in a particular case it is quite possible that they may not all appear or be brought before the Magistrate on one and the same date. It is quite possible that different accused persons may appear before the Magistrate for the first time on different dates in the same case. The question therefore naturally will arise as to from whose date of appearance the period of four years is to be calculated. Obviously in such case the period in respect of each accused has to be calculated from the date of appearance of that particular accused for the purpose of calculating whether the period of four years has expired so as to warrant action under Section 245 (3), Cr. P. C. in respect of that accused. ( 10 ) WHILE under S. 167 (5) for reasons discussed in the decision in Dilip Kumar Das (supra) there cannot be any individualized approach under S. 245 (3), Cr. P. C. such individualized approach is not barred or ruled out and may rather be aptly necessary at times. In Santosh Dey v. Archana Guha, it has been observed thus by this court: I have given my anxious consideration to all aspects of the matter and I am of the view that there cannot be any set formula which may be of universal application in all cases. In Santosh Dey v. Archana Guha, it has been observed thus by this court: I have given my anxious consideration to all aspects of the matter and I am of the view that there cannot be any set formula which may be of universal application in all cases. There may be cases where the facts and circumstances may demand in the interest of justice a unified and convergent approach in considering the prayer of the different accused persons for discharge under sub-S. (3) of S. 245 while there may also be cases where the facts and circumstances may require individualized and diversified approach in the interest of justice yielding different results in respect of the different accused persons in the same case in the matter of invoking the benefit of the said sub-so (3) of S. 245. It all depends upon a number of variable factors which may differ from case to case. The common factor in all cases, however, is the interest of justice and that must be the end product of all equations. Then again, elsewhere in the same decision in Santosh Dey (supra) it has been observed thus: The decision of the Supreme Court in A. R. Antulay, in my opinion, provides sufficient guidelines for considering what circumstances may constitute special reasons for presuming, in the background of the particular facts and circumstances of a case, that it shall not be in the interest of justice to discharge the accused under S. 245 (3), Cr. P. C. If it appears that the accused was responsible for the delay obviously he cannot take advantage of his own wrong. Again, if it is found that the complainant was responsible for the delay either because he was not diligent or because he was negligent or was intentionally prolonging the trial for the purpose of harassing the accused, obviously he cannot claim that the accused should be denied his right of discharge under the sub-so (3 ). There may also be cases where neither the complainant nor the accused may be responsible for the delay, but the delay might have been caused due to circumstances beyond the control of the complainant or due to the system itself which to borrow the language of Supreme Court may be called systemic delay. There may also be cases where neither the complainant nor the accused may be responsible for the delay, but the delay might have been caused due to circumstances beyond the control of the complainant or due to the system itself which to borrow the language of Supreme Court may be called systemic delay. If the delay in any particular case is found to be systemic for which the complainant cannot be made responsible or the delay caused by any other reason for which neither the complainant nor the accused is responsible, certainly that fact will ordinarily constitute valid ground for allowing the proceedings to continue inspite of the fact that four years have already elapsed since the appearance of the accused. Different considerations even in such a case may however arise where the offence is a minor one, not being an economic offence and delay is not caused by the accused. Different considerations may also arise where the accused has already suffered prolonged detention or is rotting in custody for a shockingly long period or has been suffering some substantial unfavourable consequence due to the pendency of the proceedings such as suspension or dismissal from service, denial or withholding of increment or promotion in service, etc. There is no doubt that all the circumstances cannot be foreseen and therefore cannot be exhaustively enumerated. What has been mentioned above is only illustrative and then again, these circumstances wherever they exist are also required to be taken into consideration not in any isolated way but along with the other peculiarities of the cause, if any. It will thus be seen that in considering the question whether any order of discharge in respect of a particular accused in a given case is warranted under S. 245 (3), Cr. P. C. a good number of individual factors applicable only to the particular accused may have to be taken into consideration along with the relevant general factors yielding different results for different accused persons in the same case. P. C. a good number of individual factors applicable only to the particular accused may have to be taken into consideration along with the relevant general factors yielding different results for different accused persons in the same case. Again where there are more accused than one and where they first appeared before the Magistrate on different dates the Magistrate may have to or may be called upon to consider whether discharge under S. 245 (3) is warranted in respect of any particular accused in respect of whom four years have already elapsed from the date of his appearance while the period of four years have not yet expired in respect of the other accused persons reckoned from the respective dates of their appearance. Any order in such a situation as to whether the particular accused under consideration should or should not be discharged under sub-so (3) of S. 245, obviously will be confined in its effect only to that accused and will not perforce apply to the other accused persons in respect of whom the period of four years from the respective dates of their appearance might not have yet elapsed thereby rendering the question of their discharge under S. 245 (3) premature yet. ( 11 ) AGAIN when an investigation has been stopped under sub-so (5) of S. 167 by the Magistrate, the Sessions Judge may, be in a fit case, under sub-so (6) of S. 167 vacate such order and direct further investigation to be made into the offence. This power of the Sessions Judge is quite different from a revisional power. No such corresponding power however has been given by the legislature to the Sessions Judge authorising him to direct continuation of proceeding under S. 244 which indicates that the legislature did not contemplate passing of an order stopping the proceeding under sub-so (3) of S. 245. This power of the Sessions Judge is quite different from a revisional power. No such corresponding power however has been given by the legislature to the Sessions Judge authorising him to direct continuation of proceeding under S. 244 which indicates that the legislature did not contemplate passing of an order stopping the proceeding under sub-so (3) of S. 245. ( 12 ) THEREFORE looking from any angle of view it has to be concluded that under S. 245 (3) there is no scope of considering whether the proceeding itself as a whole should be stopped or not, but the consideration is rather confined only to the question whether the particular accused in respect of whom four years have already elapsed from date of his appearance should be discharged or not under the said sub-so (3) and the court may have to consider the question separately at different times in respect of each different accused as to what order is required to be passed under S. 245 (3) in the case of that particular accused in whose case the period of four years have already elapsed. ( 13 ) THE conclusion also crystallizes to this that the question of passing an appropriate order under S. 243 (3) in respect of any accused has to be taken up by the Magistrate only on or after the expiry of the prescribed period in respect of such accused and not before that and since the question is a composite one as to whether the accused should be discharged or not the prosecution is entitled to urge at the time when the matter is taken up for order under S. 245 (3) on or after the expiry of the prescribed period, that upon the evidence already produced and for special reasons the accused should not be discharged under S. 245 (3) in the interest of justice. In any particular case the question of passing an appropriate order under S. 245 (3) may have to be considered by the Magistrate on different occasions in respect of different accused persons separately where the accused persons appeared for the first time before the Magistrate on different dates. In any particular case the question of passing an appropriate order under S. 245 (3) may have to be considered by the Magistrate on different occasions in respect of different accused persons separately where the accused persons appeared for the first time before the Magistrate on different dates. It may also so happen in the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case that while one accused may be discharged under S. 245 (3), in the case of another accused in the same proceeding an order of discharge may be considered unwarranted in the interest of justice under the said sub-so (3) of S. 245. Therefore the question of stopping the proceeding as a whole does not arise and the only order which the Magistrate may pass in respect of each accused under S. 245 (3) is whether that particular accused is discharged or not under sub-so (3) of S. 245, Cr. P. C. ( 14 ) THE next point argued on behalf of the petitioner is that in this case the complaint has been filed with the consent endorsed by Local (Health) Authority and Health Officer on the petition of complaint but under the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 there is no post of Health Officer and therefore any Health Officer is not competent to accord any consent under S. 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and as such the petition of complaint is bad and any cognizance taken thereon is also bad. Section 20 (1) of the said Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 inter alia provides that no prosecution for an offence under the Act, not being an offence under S. 14 or S. 14-A shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government. Under notification No. Health PH/1605/ 3f-32/85 dated the 3lstjuly, 1985, the Governor in exercise of the power conferred by sub-so (1) of S. 20 of the said Act authorised, for the purpose of, the said sub-section certain officers mentioned therein. Health Officer, Calcutta Corporation was also mentioned there. The petition of complaint in the present case was filed in April, 1986. Health Officer, Calcutta Corporation was also mentioned there. The petition of complaint in the present case was filed in April, 1986. Consequently the consent granted by the Health Officer, Calcutta Corporation for filing of the present complaint was consistent with the said notification. By subsequent notification No. Health/php/609/3f-32/85 dated the 4th June, 1986, such authorisation in respect of the areas compromised within the jurisdiction of Calcutta Municipal Corporation was made In favour of the Chief Municipal Health Officer, Calcutta Municipal Corporation. It has been argued on behalf of the petitioner that at the time when the present complaint was filed there was no officer of the Calcutta Corporation recognized by the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 as Health Officer and as such the authorisation by the 1985 notification in favour of the nonexistent Health Officer of Calcutta Corporation was bad in law. In this connection, my attention has also been drawn to S. 14 of the said Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 where in clause (h) the Chief Municipal Health Officer has been mentioned as one of the officers of the Corporation but in that section no Health Officer has been mentioned. Sub-section (1) of S. 14 of the CMC Act, 1980 provides that save as otherwise provided in the Act, the Corporation shall have the following officerst. There are also provisions in the said s. 14 as to how and by whom those officers are to be appointed. Section 17 of the said Act provides that the posts of officers and employees of the Corporation, other than those referred to in sub-so (1) of S. 14 shall constitute the establishment of the Corporation. Section 18 mentions the appointing authorities in respect of the posts of officers and employees constituting the establishment of the Corporation. Section 14, S. 17 and S. 18 when read together will clearly show that besides the officers mentioned in S. 14 the Corporation also will have other officers and employees in the establishment of the Corporation. It is not denied or disputed that besides the Chief Municipal Health Officer mentioned in S. 14 (1) the Corporation has also other officers designated as Health Officer. It is not denied or disputed that besides the Chief Municipal Health Officer mentioned in S. 14 (1) the Corporation has also other officers designated as Health Officer. Such Health Officers are officers in the establishment of the Corporation coming within the ambit of S. 17 of the CMC Act, 1980 and therefore there is no substance in the argument that the Health Officer has no recognized status under the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 and as such there could not have been any valid authorisation in favour of such officer. under S. 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. I find that at the relevant time Health Officer, Calcutta Corporation was properly authorised under S. 20 Of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and as such there is nothing wrong with the petition of complaint which has been filed with the consent of such Health Officer. ( 15 ) NOW I come to the final phase. In the present case the Food Inspector filed the petition of complaint against the petitioner accused not for selling adulterated food namely topioca wafers but for selling misbranded topioca wafers. The nature of misbranding is mentioned in the opinion of the public analyst which is Annexure-B to this revisional application. The sample examined by the public analyst did not contain declaration regarding the address of the manufacturer and batch and Code No. anywhere in the polythene packet and hence the public analyst opined that it was misbranded. The tests held by the public analyst, such as, test for coal tar dye, chromatographic test and the microscopic examination did not show that the sample was in any way adulterated. Misbranding of an article of Food has been defined in clause (ix) of S. 2 of the Prevention of food Adulteration Act. This clause (ix) enumerates several types of misbranding covered by sub clauses (a) to (k ). The misbranding in this case comes within the said sub-clauses (a) to (k) as the label does not contain the address of the manufacturer and the batch or Code No. There was however no mis-representation or false labelling or false declaration. This clause (ix) enumerates several types of misbranding covered by sub clauses (a) to (k ). The misbranding in this case comes within the said sub-clauses (a) to (k) as the label does not contain the address of the manufacturer and the batch or Code No. There was however no mis-representation or false labelling or false declaration. There is no doubt that any sort of misbranding of food is prohibited under S. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and is punishable under S. 16 (1) (a) (i), but even then the nature of the alleged misbranding deserves consideration in the present case in deciding whether the long pendency of the proceeding in the Court below by itself warrants any order in favour of the petitioner at this stage. The petition of complaint was filed as far back as in April, 1986, more than 7 years back. Even then the prosecution could not complete Tits evidence before charge. It also does not appear that the petitioner accused was in any way responsible for this long pendency of the proceeding. On the other hand, from the order of the court below dated the 2nd September, 1992 it appears that for quite sometimes the proceeding remained stayed on the prayer of the prosecution. In the circumstances, when the petitioner accused was not in any way responsible for this long pendency of the proceeding in the court below for more than 7 years and when the offence alleged against the present petitioner is not of selling adulterated food but of selling topioca wafers in a misbranded packet and the nature of misbranding is rather only of technical nature, there being no misrepresentation, false declaration or false labelling, it will be an abuse of the process of the court now, having regard of the trifling nature of the alleged offence, to also the proceeding to continue yet when more than 7 years already elapsed. Therefore having regard to the long pendency of the proceeding in the court below without making much head-way and having regard to the technical and nominal nature of the alleged offence I hold that it will be a denial of the petitioners right to speedy trial emanating from Art. 21 of the Constitution of India to allow further continuation of the proceeding in the court below. The proceeding in the court below is accordingly quashed. The proceeding in the court below is accordingly quashed. The revision application stands disposed of accordingly. Petition disposed accordingly.