ORDER Gulab C. Gupta, J.-- 1. The applicant was admittedly a Government servant having retired from the said service on 31st May, 1985. He purchased the suit-shop by a registered sale-deed dated 27.6.1985 and started proceedings under section 23-A of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before the Rent Controlling Authority, Guna for obtaining vacant possession thereof. The non-applicant/tenant took an objection that since the applicant had become the landlord in relation to the tenanted premises after his retirement, he does not fall in any of the categories of 'landlord' specified in section-23-J of the Act and, therefore, proceedings initiated by him were ab initio void. It was particularly submitted that a retired Government Servant, in order to be treated as a landlord within the meaning of section 23-J (i) of the Act, must be the landlord on the date of his retirement. The learned Rent Controlling Authority dismissed the objection necessitating the present revision under section 23-E of the Act. The learned Single Judge (Hon. S.K Dubey, J.), who heard the revision finally, was faced with a factual situation, wherein Hon. K.L. Shrivastava, J. in Badri Prasad v. Chimanlal (1987 M.P.R.C.J. 66), Hon. Qureshi, J. in Ramesh Chandra Madhav Ram [1987 (1) MPWN 51], Hon. Dr. T.N. Singh, J. in Madanlal v. Mithoolal ( 1987 MPLJ 695 ), Hon. K.L. Shrivastava, J. in Omprakash v. Moolchand (1989 MPRCJ 1) and Hon. B.B. Shrivastava, J. in Sitaram Sharma v. R.C.A. ( 1990 (1) MPWN 49 ), had taken the view that such a landlord was not a landlord within the meaning of section 23-J (i) of the Act and was not entitled to resort to speedy remedy under Chapter-III A of the Act. It appears that earlier Hon. Dubey, J. in Gopaldas v. Smt. Prabha [1991 (1) MPWN 76] had taken a similar view, but Hon. K.M. Agrawal, J. in Veerangana Laxmi Bai v. Brijendra (1985 MPRCJ 178), Hon. Awasthy, J. in H.W. Hamiltan v. Albert Joseph (C.R. No. 206/1989 decided on 25.1.1989), Hon. B.M. Lal, J. in Sunil Kumar v. K.R. Naidu (C.R. No. 151/1988 decided on 5.7.1989) and Hon. D.M. Dharmadhikaree, J. in Baijnath Prasad v. Dayashankar ( 1991 JLJ 189 = AIR 1991 MP 132 ) had taken the contrary view and held that such a person was covered by the definition of 'landlord' under section 23-J (i) of the Act. Faced with these two divergent views, particularly the view of Hon. Dharmadhikaree, J. who had distinguished the Supreme Court case in Mrs. Winifred Ross ( AIR 1984 SC 458 ) and the Division Bench view of this Court in B. Johnson's case ( 1985 JLJ 793 = AIR 1986 MP 72 ) thought it fit to refer the revision for decision of a larger Bench. On such a reference being made, the revision had been placed before us for consideration. 2. As regards facts of the case, it is admitted that applicant Roshanlal was a Government servant and had retired from service on 31st May, 1985. It is also admitted that he purchased the suit-shop after his retirement by a registered sale-deed dated 27.6.1985 and thereafter initiated present proceedings for obtaining vacant possession of the same before the Rent Controller. The tenant, who is applicant in this case, raised the objection that since the non-applicant landlord was not a landlord on the date of his retirement from Government service, he could not invoke the special provision under Chapter-III-A of the Act. The question requiring consideration is " whether the aforesaid objection can be legally sustained?" Since both the parties have placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in Mrs. Winifred Ross's case ( AIR 1984 SC 458 ), it would be proper to refer to the same, before deciding the controversy. . 3. Mrs. Winifred Ross was a case under Bombay Rents, Hotel & Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and interpreted section 13-A1 of the said Act, which dealt with a retired member of the Armed Forces. The said provision was inserted into the said Act by way of an amendment in the year 1975. One T.H. Ross was a member of Indian Army and had retired from service in 1967. The house in dispute originally belonged to his mother-in-law, who gifted the same to his wife Mrs. Winifred Ross on 9.1(1976. Later on, the property was gifted to Shri Ross. On 4.6.1977, he terminated the tenancy and filed the suit before the Additional Judge for eviction. The suit was decreed and the judgment was affirmed in appeal. Thereafter, the tenant challenged the legality of the decree by filing a writ petition in the Bombay High Court. During the pendency of the writ petition, Shri Ross died and his wife Mrs. On 4.6.1977, he terminated the tenancy and filed the suit before the Additional Judge for eviction. The suit was decreed and the judgment was affirmed in appeal. Thereafter, the tenant challenged the legality of the decree by filing a writ petition in the Bombay High Court. During the pendency of the writ petition, Shri Ross died and his wife Mrs. Winifred Ross was substituted as his legal representative. The Bombay High Court held that Shri Ross was not entitled to file the suit under section 13-A1 of the Act, as he had acquired the premises long after he had retired from service of the Army and that his requirement was also not bona fide. It was this judgment, which was under consideration of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, while interpreting section 13-A1 of the said Act in the context of statement of objects and reasons, held that, "Having regard to the object and purposes of the Act and in particular section 13-A1, it is difficult to hold that section 13-A1 can be availed of by an ex-member of the Armed Forces to recover from a tenant possession of a building which he acquires after his retirement." According to the Supreme Court, "acceptance of this argument will expose the very section 13-A1 of the Act to a successful challenge on the ground of violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution for if that were so, a retired military officer, who has no house of his own can purchase any building in the occupation of a tenant after his retirement, successfully evict a tenant living in it on the ground that he needs it for his use, then sell it for a fancy price and again because he has no house of his own, he can again acquire another building and deal with it in the same way." The Supreme Court further held that, "the High Court found that S. 13-A1 of the Act did not govern the case of a person who had retired long hack from the Armed Forces and was gainfully employed elsewhere and while so employed had let out his premises with open eyes. We fully endorse this view." In spite of the aforesaid, the Supreme Court hastened to clarify as under:- "We, therefore, wish to clarify that in this case we express no opinion on the question whether a member or a retired member of the armed forces who acquires title to a building which is already in the occupation of a tenant by inheritance, partition, transferor otherwise and thus becomes the landlord, of the building while he is a member of the armed forces, can avail of the " remedy against such tenant under section 13-A1 of the Act." The Court, however, went further and held that even on the basis of section 13 (1) (g) of the Act, the plaintiff is not entitled to succeed, in view of the clear finding recorded by the High Court that the plaintiff was not really in need of the building. Section 23-1 of our Act is not pari-materia to the aforesaid provision of the Bombay Act and hence the said judgment would normally not have been relevant for our purpose, but a Division Bench of this Court in B. Johnson v. C.S. Naidu ( 1985 JLJ 793 ) considered Constitutional validity of provisions in Chapter-III-A of the Act, which includes section 23-1 and used the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court to uphold the same. The relevant portion of the Division Bench judgment is as under:- "An incidental argument advanced in connection with classification of landlords may also be mentioned. It was urged that a retired servant of the Government etc. acquiring a house after his retirement and inducting a tenant thereafter may also claim to be within the ambit of clause (i) or (ii) of section 23-1, as the case may. It was argued that acquisition of a house after retirement does not justify his classification under this head. This point need not detain us since the answer is given by the Supreme Court in Winifred Ross v. Fonseca. A similar provision in the Bombay Act was read down as conferring benefit only on those retired persons who were landlords while in service and avail the benefit after retirement in respect of a tenancy subsisting during h is service. This point need not detain us since the answer is given by the Supreme Court in Winifred Ross v. Fonseca. A similar provision in the Bombay Act was read down as conferring benefit only on those retired persons who were landlords while in service and avail the benefit after retirement in respect of a tenancy subsisting during h is service. Section 23-1 of the M.P. Act has to he construed accordingly and then there is no discrimination." (para-14)" It would, therefore, appear that what was being considered by the Division Bench in B. Johnson's case, was the validity of classification of landlords and argument was made that the classification would be invalid, if it included a retired Government servant acquiring house after his retirement and inducting a tenant thereafter. It was submitted as an incidental argument and was rejected on the strength of decision in Winifred Ross's case. 4. Decision of this Court, taking the view that a retired Government servant, acquiring accommodation after his retirement, is not landlord u/s. 23-J (i) of the Act, rely on the Supreme Court decision in Winifred Ross's case and the aforesaid observations of the Division Bench in B. Johnson's case. Hon'ble Judges, taking the contrary view, particularly, Dharmadhikaree, J. in Baijnath Prasad's case, are of the opinion that B. Johnson's case does not finally decide the aforesaid legal question. According to Dharmadhikaree, J., the Supreme Court judgment in Winifred Ross does not deal with a provision parallel to section 13-Al of the Bombay Act. According to the learned Judge, section 20-A (a) of the M.P. Act, which is now repealed, was in pari-materia with section 13-A1 of the Bombay Act and since the legal question decided therein did not concern the controversy under consideration, the said judgment is not relevant for our purposes. Apparently, therefore, the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court and the Division Bench have received different interpretations from different Hon'ble Judges of this Court. Sec. 23-J of our Act only defines the word "landlord", who is given the right to invoke special procedure provided under section 23-A and other provisions of the Act for obtaining possession of his accommodation, if the same was required by him bona fide for his residence or business. Sec. 23-J of our Act only defines the word "landlord", who is given the right to invoke special procedure provided under section 23-A and other provisions of the Act for obtaining possession of his accommodation, if the same was required by him bona fide for his residence or business. Under these provisions, the Rent Controlling Authority is required to consider the demand of such a landlord in the manner provided in sections 23-B, 23-C & 23-D and pass final order thereupon, if a proper case for the purpose was made out. The decision of the Rent Controlling Authority was subject to revision in the High Court under section 23-E of the Act. As against this, section 13-A (1) of the Bombay Act provides for a certificate to be signed by the Head of Army Service or Commanding Officer to indicate that the applicant was a Member of Armed Forces, needed the house for his own use and had no other alternative accommodation of his own in the city. On such a certificate being filed in the Court, the Court was obliged to pass a decree for eviction of the tenant. Then, this provision was not available for evicting the tenant for any purpose, except for the purpose of residence of the retired serviceman or the members of his family. Apparently, therefore, the two provisions are different in material particulars. They differ not only in the purpose, but also in procedure. For this reason alone, the decision in Winifred Ross's case could not govern the interpretation of section 23-1 read with section 23-A of our Act. It will, therefore, require consideration if the Division Bench hearing B. Johnson's case had held otherwise. As noticed earlier, the matter under consideration of the Division Bench in B.Johnson's case related to the Constitutional validity of classification and the point was decided incidentally. The classification of various categories of landlords, as available in section 23-J of the Act, was held valid by the Division Bench, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava (AIR 1984 Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Section 967) and Kewalsingh v. Lajwanti ( AIR 1980 SC 161 ). Under the circumstances, the observations of this Court as quoted above could not govern interpretation of section 23-J (i) of the Act. Under the circumstances, the observations of this Court as quoted above could not govern interpretation of section 23-J (i) of the Act. We are, therefore, in agreement with the observations of Dharmadhikaree, J. in Baijnath Prasad's case that the observations of the Division Bench, when understood in the light of ratio of Supreme Court decision in Winifred Ross's case does not decide the issue now under consideration. 5. What should then be the correct interpretation of the provision? The purpose of any interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the legislature and in so doing, it is a very useful rule to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used and to the grammatical construction unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature. In Jugal Kishore Saraf v. Raw Colton Industries Ltd. ( AIR 1955 SC 376 ) and Mahadeolal v. Administrator General of West Bengal ( AIR 1960 SC 936 ), it was clarified that the cardinal rule of construction of any statute is to read the statute liberally, i.e., by giving the words their ordinary, natural and grammetical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same, but if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. This rule seems to have undergone some change and is not valid when it tends to defeat the intention of the legislature as in Brijlal Munnalal v. State of M.P. ( AIR 1970 SC 129 ); results in manifest absurdity, hardship or injustice or when the context otherwise' requires, as in Reserve bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. ( AIR 1987 SC 1023 at p. 1042) and Kehar Singh and others v. State (Delhi Administration) ( AIR 1988 SC 1883 ). The Supreme Court in Winifred Ross's case has refused to give liberal construction to the aforesaid provision, as the same may create any conflict with Article-14 of the Constitution. Under the circumstances, there is no reason for this Court to apply any other principle of interpretation. 6. The language of the provision is wide enough to include a retired Government servant, who acquires accommodation after his retirement. Under the circumstances, there is no reason for this Court to apply any other principle of interpretation. 6. The language of the provision is wide enough to include a retired Government servant, who acquires accommodation after his retirement. The words, "a retired servant of any Government including a retired member of Defence Services" are capable of only one interpretation and that every retired Government servant is a landlord within the meaning of this provision and, therefore, entitled to invoke special jurisdiction under section 23-A of the Act. There is no justification for inserting any other word in the aforesaid provision and insertion of any word is otherwise not the purpose of judicial interpretation. In fact, it has been observed in large number of cases including Union of India v. Sankalchand ( AIR 1977 SC 2328 ), A.B. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another ( AIR 1984 SC 718 ) and State Bank of Travancore v. Mohd. Mohammed Khan ( AIR 1981 SC 1744 ) that a construction, which requires for its support addition or substitution of words should be avoided. The aforesaid proposition also finds support in Maxwell, 12th Edition P.33. Justice G.P. Singh, in his 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation', 4th Edition at P.39 has also quoted several decisions, supporting the aforesaid view. Under the circumstances, as long as it would be possible, this Court would not like to add any word in the aforesaid provision and would read the same as it is. The said provision, when read as it is, would also include a retired Government servant, who becomes a landlord after his retirement. This conclusion is further justified on the basis of the proviso to sec. 23-A, which is the section permitting such a landlord to resort to the speedy remedy. The proviso lays down that where a landlord has acquired any accommodation or any interest therein by transfer, no application for eviction of tenant of such accommodation shall be maintainable at the instance of such person unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of such acquisition. This provision, when considered in the context of definition of 'landlord' would only mean that a retired Government servant becoming a landlord after his retirement by way of transfer in his favour of the accommodation occupied by a tenant would not be able to seek speedy remedy, unless a period of one year has elapsed. This provision, when considered in the context of definition of 'landlord' would only mean that a retired Government servant becoming a landlord after his retirement by way of transfer in his favour of the accommodation occupied by a tenant would not be able to seek speedy remedy, unless a period of one year has elapsed. This is also the view of Dharmadhikaree, J. in Baijnath Prasad's case, with which we find ourselves in full agreement. 7. It may, therefore, be considered whether the aforesaid interpretation is in accord with the object and purpose of the Act. As regards the object, Chapter III-A was inserted into the Act by the Amending Act of 1983, which had the following as its statement of objects and reasons: "to provide a special forum for expeditious disposal of eviction proceedings filed by landlords in general on the ground of bona fide need". As far as sec. 23-J is concerned, it was inserted by the Amendment Act of 1985 together with section 11-A in the Principal Act, to clarify that special procedure under Chapter III-A was available only to landlords specified in sec. 23-J. Statement of objects and reasons of this Amendment Act mentioned that the new forum provided by the Amendment Act of 1983 was being misused by certain landlords to evict tenants. It was, therefore, proposed to restrict the application of the provision relating to new forum only to the specified categories of landlords, like retired Government servants, etc. The statement of objects and reasons would, therefore, indicate that before insertion of section 23-J, every landlord was entitled to get an eviction order on the ground of bona fide need, but since the said provision was being misused, the benefit of the said procedure was confined to the categories specified in section 23-J of the Act. As regards the categories mentioned in section 23-J, the statement of objects and reasons cannot be read as limiting the benefit of new procedure to any particular class or part of those caregories. Almost everyone included in the said category had the benefit of new forum before this enactment and the ambit and scope of the said right was not curtailed by the amendment. The amendment only limited the benefit of summary procedure to persons mentioned in sec. Almost everyone included in the said category had the benefit of new forum before this enactment and the ambit and scope of the said right was not curtailed by the amendment. The amendment only limited the benefit of summary procedure to persons mentioned in sec. 23-J. Under the circumstances, the natural and grammatical meaning given to the word "retired" would not go contrary to the objects and reasons of the Amending Act. The purpose of this amendment was not to create a category within the category of retired Government servant, which would necessarily be the effect, if it is held that all Govt. servants are not entitled to invoke this jurisdiction. In this view of the matter, we find nothing repugnant to the context or the object of the provision and hence there is no reason for us not to give full effect to the language. While to holding, we are aware that the necessity of harmonising the subject of the enactment which the legislature has in view, arises only when there is doubt about the meaning of the words used in the statute and not otherwise. We have, however, resorted to the aforesaid exercise only to fortify our conclusion about it. 8. It may, therefore, be considered whether the a foresaid broad interpretation would permit some 'landlords to misuse the provision and thereby create a situation where they would be able to unjustifiably evict a tenant in a summary manner. The example given by the Supreme Court in Winifred Ross's case does not, in our opnion, justify such a conclusion. If there be a retired Govt. servant, who may be able to engage in the business of evicting tenants, he would not succeed in carrying on his business as there would be no bona fide need to evict the tenant in such a case. In spite of it, it is true that a tenant facing litigation before the Rent Controlling Authority, is at a disadvantageous position, when compared to a tenant facing similar action in a civil Court. Civil Court procedure is long and cumbersome and is really the reason for enacting Chapter III-A. That, however, does not justify the conclusion that every tenant has a right to be evicted only by a civil Court and that too, by the existing long and cumbersome process. Civil Court procedure is long and cumbersome and is really the reason for enacting Chapter III-A. That, however, does not justify the conclusion that every tenant has a right to be evicted only by a civil Court and that too, by the existing long and cumbersome process. It is well settled that no litigant has any vested right to choose a forum. Even the Division Bench deciding B. Johnson's case has rejected such a claim and observed that providing forum for obtaining relief is the privilege of the legislature. Under the circumstances, the argument proceeds on a wrong assumption that tenants have a vested right to get the lis decided by the Civil Court and that too, in accordance with the existing procedure. Imagine a situation where the procedure in civil Courts is itself changed and made similar to the procedure prescribed under Chapter III-A of the Act. Surely, no one would then be heard to say that the amendment was unconstitutional or contrary to objects and purpose of the Act. Under the circumstances, it is not proper to compare two procedures and condemn the speedy procedure on an erroneous assumption that tenants have acquired right to delay decision of cases in a long drawn battle conducted according to the cumbersome procedure now available in civil Court" for the purpose. Then, the so-called consequence of the broad view that we have taken is also without any justification. It is not possible to accept that simply because the lis between the landlord and tenant could be decided at an early date through the procedure in Chapter III-A, it would cause hardship to the tenants':" Hardship is caused by long drawn procedure, which delays final decision and not by a procedure, which prompts early decision. There is, therefore, no justification for the plea that the broad interpretation giving right to a retired Government servant, who becomes landlord after his retirement, to resort to the speedy remedy under Chapter III-A of the Act, would be hard or unjust. There is, therefore, no justification for the plea that the broad interpretation giving right to a retired Government servant, who becomes landlord after his retirement, to resort to the speedy remedy under Chapter III-A of the Act, would be hard or unjust. For reasons aforesaid, we overrule decisions in Badri Prasad v. Chimanlal (1987 MPRCJ 65), Ramesh Chandra v. Madhav Ram (1987 (I) MPWN 51), Madanlal v. Mithoolal ( 1987 MPLJ 695 ), Omprakash v. Moolchand (1989 MPRCJ 1), Seeta Ram Sharma v. R.C.A. [ 1990 (1) MPWN 49 ] and Gopaldas v. Smt. Prabha 11991 (I) MPWN 76] and hold that they do not lay down the correct law. We, however, affirm decision in Veerangana Laxmi Bai v. Brijendra (1985 MPRCJ 178), H.W. Hamiltan v. Albert Joseph (C.R. No. 206/89 decided on 25.1.1989 by Hon. Awasthy, J.), Sunil Kumar v. K.R. Naidu (C.R. No. 151/88 decided on 5.7.1989 by Hon. Lal, J.) and Baijnath Prasad v. Daya Shankar ( 1991 JLJ 189 = AIR 1991 MP 132 ) and held that they interpret the provision correctly and lay down the correct law on the subject. 9. In view of the discussion aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the landlord had lawfully invoked jurisdiction of the Rent Controlling Authority and, therefore, the decision of the Rent Controlling Authority does not sufer from any defect whatsoever. The revision fails and is dismissed, but in the context of facts and circumstances of the case, without any order as to costs.