JUDGMENT- N.P. CHAPALGAONKAR, J.:---Mandakini w/o. Purshottam Tapaswi leased out a premises situated on Municipal Plot No. 5-25-75 at Tilak Path, Aurangabad, to the petitioner Ramchandra s/o. Vasudeo Patankar on a monthly rent of Rs. 350/-. Petitioner Ramchandra had advanced Rs. 10,000/- for some construction on the said premises and it was accordingly constructed. An application was moved by the landlady under section 15 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction Lease) Control Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as "Hyderabad Rent Act" for the purpose of brevity) before the Rent Controller at Aurangabad for eviction of the petitioner--tenant on the ground that tenant has committed default in the payment of rent, landlady requires the suit premises for expansion of her business titled as Tapaswi Travels and on the ground that tenant had claimed permanent tenancy. Landlady had issued two notices on 19th October, 1985 and on 8th February, 1986 terminating the tenancy and the tenant had replied said notices on 27th February, 1986 in which he had denied having committed the default in the payment of rent and also the fact that the premises is required reasonably and bona fide by the landlady. It was further contended in the said reply:--- "You are also called upon to note that my client is a lawful permanent tenant with bona fide claim of permanent tenancy paying the regular rent though it is exhorbitant at the contractual rate." Landlady had filed copies of the notices sent to the tenant along with the reply received and a contract of tenancy reduced in writing in Marathi. In the written statement, answering the said application for eviction, tenant contended that there is no ground for terminating the tenancy denying that he is a defaulter and also denied that the premises is required by the landlady bona fide. He had also contended that the reply sent by him be taken as a part of the writtem statement. According to the defendant, the agreement entered into was in English and a copy of English agreement was filed by the tenant along with the written statement. 2. Originally, the learned Rent Controller had framed seven issues and twice it was submitted by the defendant--tenant that some more issues are necessary. As many as 41 issues were suggested by the defendant--tenant. 2. Originally, the learned Rent Controller had framed seven issues and twice it was submitted by the defendant--tenant that some more issues are necessary. As many as 41 issues were suggested by the defendant--tenant. Since this application was rejected, in a challenge before the District Judge, Aurangabad, in Rent Appeal No. 5 of 1988, learned District Judge directed the Rent Controller to decide the matter on the basis of issues already framed and also considering the issues as suggested by the defendant in his application. Thereafter, learned Rent Controller fixed the matter for evidence on 4th November, 1988. Again this order was challenged in Rent Appeal No. 56 of 1988 by the tenant. The learned District Judge took the view that Rent Controller has not committed any error in directing the parties to lead evidence and the trial Court was given a discretion to consider the issues suggested by the parties and that can be exercised even while passing the judgment in the case. The learned District Judge was pleased to dismiss the appeal and directed the Rent Controller to decide the case giving priority and taking the day-to-day hearing. He was further directed to dispose of the case on or before 28th February, 1989. This appellate order was challenged before this Court in Civil Revision Application No. 217 of 1989. This Court was pleased to observe that there is no substance in the revision application. However, the judgment of this Court records that the learned Counsel on behalf of the landlady consented to the additional issues also. The revision was disposed of with a direction that the learned Rent Controller shall decide the matter within a period of three weeks. Thereafter, the matter was heard by the Additional Rent Controller, Aurangabad, and the Additional Rent Controller was pleased to record findings that plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant-tenant is a wilful defaulter and the suit premises is not required for personal use of the landlady for expansion of the business. He was also pleased to record a finding that the plaintiff will not be put to a greater hardship than the defendant if the eviction petition is dismissed. He did not consider the effect of the pleadings regarding permanent tenancy and was pleased to reject the application for eviction vide his order dated 18th April, 1990 in File No. 86 of ARC/68. 3. He did not consider the effect of the pleadings regarding permanent tenancy and was pleased to reject the application for eviction vide his order dated 18th April, 1990 in File No. 86 of ARC/68. 3. This order came to be challenged in Rent Appeal No. 24 of 1990 filed by the landlady Mandakini and the learned District Judge was pleased to confirm the finding recorded in respect of the default in the payment of rent and bona fide requirement of the landlady. However, he found that the landlady is entitled to evict the defendant-tenant on the ground that the later has claimed the right of permanent tenancy in respect of the said premises and the claim is not bona fide. This order of the learned District Judge, Aurangabad, dated 18th April, 1991 has been challenged in this revision application under section 26 of the Hyderabad Rent Act. 4. I heard Shri R.K. Odhekar and Shri R.S. Parundekar, learned Counsel appearing for petitioner-tenent, and Shri K.S. Naik, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-landlady. 5. Shri Odhekar firstly contended that the learned Rent Controller has committed an error which goes to the root of the case in not deciding all the fortyone issues, and recording finding in respect of only four issues and, therefore, unless all the issues are decided, there cannot be a valid judgment. He further contended that it was admitted by Sadanand who deposed on behalf of landlady Mandakini, that the premises in question had gone to the share of Sunanda Medha Ratnaparkhi even before the filing of the present application for eviction. Therefore, Mandakini was not a landlady within the definition of section 2(c) of the Hyderabad Rent Act and even assuming that she was a landlady within the meaning of this definition, she was not competent to file an application for eviction because of the provisions under sub-section (8) of section 15 of the said Act. He further contended that a mere plea of permanent tenancy by itself will not be a ground for eviction of the tenant unless it is shown that plea was not bona fide one. In this respect, he further contended that it was for the landlady to allege and prove that the claim of permanent tenancy made by the defendant-tenant is not bona fide one. In this respect, he further contended that it was for the landlady to allege and prove that the claim of permanent tenancy made by the defendant-tenant is not bona fide one. Shri Odhekar also made a submission that the application for amendment of the written statement which was filed by the petitioner in this Court on 24th June, 1993 deserves to be allowed since Sadanand had admitted that the suit premises had gone to the share of Medha and since this fact was not known to the defendant-tenant, this is a subsequent event of which a note will have to be taken and for this purpose the amendment deserves to be allowed. I heared the parties on this Civil Application No. 2250 of 1993 for amendment and I am deciding this Civil Application along with this Civil Revision Application. 6. Shri K.S. Naik, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent - landlady, submitted that since there is an admission on the part of the tenant in the written statement, that Mandakini is the landlady of the tenanted premises and he is a tenant, now he cannot be allowed to contend that Mandakini is not a landlady. Whatever transactions were there in the family, the nature of the relationship would not alter between Mandakini - landlady and Ramchandra - tenant which is of lessor and lessee. He further contended that whatever issues are necessary for the decision have been considered by the courts below and the non-consideration of any of the issues not required for the decision of the suit would not render any order invalid. He further contended that Mandakini was competent to file an application under section 15 of the Hyderabad Rent Act since she was not merely a rent collector. He further contended that since contentions raised in the amendment application have no bearing on the case, the amendment need not be allowed and the matter which is already protracted be not allowed to further linger in the courts of law. Shri Naik further contended that the finding recorded by both the courts below that the tenant is not a wilful defaulter and the premises in question is not required reasonably and bona fide by the landlady Mandakini are perverse and requires to be reconsidered. 7. Shri Naik further contended that the finding recorded by both the courts below that the tenant is not a wilful defaulter and the premises in question is not required reasonably and bona fide by the landlady Mandakini are perverse and requires to be reconsidered. 7. So far as the findings recorded on the issue of default as well as bona fide requirement of the landlady, I do not find that there is any material placed before this Court which would persuade me to interfere in these concurrent findings of facts recorded by learned Rent Controller and confirmed by learned District Judge in appeal. The findings are recorded on the consideration of evidence led by the parties and, therefore, there is no merit in the submission made by Shri Naik that these findings are perverse and need to be reconsidered. The only points which are required to be considered by this Court are : (A) Whether in an enquiry under the Hyderabad Rent Act, it would be always obligatory on the part of the Rent Controller to decide all the issues framed or he is required to decide only those issues which are necessary for the decision of the dispute before him? (B) Whether Mandakini was competent to file application for eviction under section 15 of the Hyderabad Rent Act in view of provisions of section 15(8) of the said Act? (C) Whether raising a plea of permanent tenancy by the defendant is not a bona fide one and, therefore, the order of eviction passed by the learned District Judge deserves to be confirmed? 8. Section 24 of the Hyderabad Rent Act lays down a procedure to be followed by the Rent Controller at the time of enquiries under the Act. It reads as under: "For making enquiries under this Act, the Controller shall follow as nearly as possible, the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, for the regular trial of suits, the substance only of the evidence and findings being recorded as in unappealable cases and shall record in brief the reasons for his findings." Relying on this provision, Shri Odhekar submitted that all the issues framed by the Court will have to be decided for a valid judgment. 9. 9. Order XIV, Rule 1, sub-rule (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 lays down that each material proposition affirmed by one party and denied by the other shall form the subject of a distinct issue. Therefore, the issue required to be decided by a Judge trying a dispute should be in respect of a material proposition affirmed by a party and denied by other. A party may contend many things in the pleadings which may be denied by other party. But the Court is not required to frame issues in respect of all the contentions unless they are material for the decision of the dispute. In the instant case, wherein the material issues should not have been more than three or four, defendant - petitioner insisted that 41 issues be framed and decided which was not at all justified and required. In an application filed for eviction of a tenant, the Rent Controller is required to decide whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed and whether there was any ground as specified in the relevant statute justifying the grant of eviction applied for. Except this, no other things need be decided by the Rent Controller. If the contention is outside the purview of an enquiry of the dispute, it is not necessary for the Court to frame the issue or decide it. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of Order XIV C.P.C. 1908, defines material propositions to be those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence. Unless it is shown that any of the issues prayed or framed was in respect of a material proposition within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 referred above, it would not be necessary for the Judge to decide that issue. Section 24 of the Hyderabad Rent Act gives a direction that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall be followed as nearly as possible by the Rent Controller for making enquiries under the Act. The Rent Controller is not a Civil Court having unlimited jurisdiction. The scope of enquiry before the Rent Controller under the Rent Act is limited one and issues that may arise should be in respect of the material proposition which falls within his jurisdiction. The Rent Controller is not a Civil Court having unlimited jurisdiction. The scope of enquiry before the Rent Controller under the Rent Act is limited one and issues that may arise should be in respect of the material proposition which falls within his jurisdiction. Secondly, even assuming that an issue was framed by the Judge, the decision cannot be found fault with merely on the ground that an issue was not decided unless it is shown that the decision on that issue was necessary for the determination of the dispute. If at the time of delivery of the judgment the learned Judge finds that the decision on that issue is not necessary, he may refrain from recording a finding on that issue. In the instant case, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner was not able to point out as to what prejudice was caused to the petitioner by not deciding any of those 41 issues and how those arise from the material propositions raised in the pleadings. In the instant case, the learned trial Judge has recorded findings on two grounds which are pressed in service by the landlady for the eviction of the tenant and the learned Appellate Judge has confirmed those findings and has also recorded a finding in respect of the third ground i.e. plea of permanent tenancy raised by the defendant. Issue No. 7 was in respect of the plea of permanent tenancy and though this was not decided by the learned trial Judge, the omission is corrected by the Appellate Court and the Appellate Court decided the issue. Therefore, it cannot be said that any of the courts below erred in not deciding all the issues and they were necessary for the decision of the case. 10. The second point which arise for consideration of this Court is whether landlady - Mandakini was competent to file this application under section 15 of the Hyderabad Rent Act. Plaintiff - applicant pleaded in para 1 of the application that she is the owner of the suit premises and defendant is the tenant. This part of pleading of landlady was admitted by defendant - tenant in his written statement. Plaintiff - applicant pleaded in para 1 of the application that she is the owner of the suit premises and defendant is the tenant. This part of pleading of landlady was admitted by defendant - tenant in his written statement. It is subseqnently at the time of recording of the evidence, Sadanand who deposed on behalf of the landlady - Mandakini, told the Court that in a partition in the family, suit premises have gone to the share of Medha Ratnaparkhe, daughter of Mandakini. Shri Odhekar submits that since it was admitted, though at a late stage, that Mandakini has not remained owner of the premises on the date of filing of the application, she was not competent to file this application; whereas it is the submission of Shri Naik that since an admission was given in the pleadings that Mandakini is landlady and Ramchandra is her tenant, defendant - tenant cannot now be allowed to retract. Whether Mandakini was lawful owner of the suit premises or not need not be considered in this proceeding under the Hyderabad Rent Act. The definition given in the said Act of the term `Landlord is much wider than the term `owner. The term `Landlord has been defined in section 2(c) as follows : "`Landlord includes a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive rent of a house, whether on his own account or on behalf of or for the benefit of another person or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive rent or be entitled to receive rent if the house were let to a tenant." Therefore, the requirement of the law for a person to be a Landlord" is merely he should be entitled to receive the rent. This entitlement may be for any reason whatsoever. He may be owner, he may be allowed to take the benefit of rent by consent of the real owner or he may be recovering the rent without any right. But if the said landlord has given premises on rent and the tenant has paid the rent to such a landlord, the tenant is not entitled to dispute the status of the said person as a landlord. Even assuming that Medha has become owner because of some partition in the family, the property remain in the domain of Mandakini. But if the said landlord has given premises on rent and the tenant has paid the rent to such a landlord, the tenant is not entitled to dispute the status of the said person as a landlord. Even assuming that Medha has become owner because of some partition in the family, the property remain in the domain of Mandakini. Mandakini leased it out and defendant Ramchandra has taken the property on lease from Mandakini. The relationship between lessor and lessee is complete and Ramchandra - defendant/tenant would not now be entitled to challenge the entitlement of Mandakini as a landlady. 11. Sub-section (8) of section 15 of the Hyderabad Rent Act reads as under : "Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, no person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building merely as an agent of the landlord shall except, with the previous written consent of the landlord, be entitled to apply for the eviction of a tenant." Relying on this provision, Shri Odhekar submitted that no person who is receiving or is entitled to receive rent of a building merely as an agent of the landlord shall be entitled to apply for eviction of the tenant without previous written consent of the landlord. According to him, though Mandakini was receiving the rent, she was receiving the rent on behalf of the real owner i.e. Medha and, therefore, in the absence of any written consent and authorization by Medha, Mandakini was not competent to file an application under section 15 of the Hyderabad Rent Act. The submission of Shri Odhekar has no basis in the facts. It is not the case of either of the parties that Mandakini was receiving rent merely as an agent of Medha. Receiving rent in ones own right is something distinct than receiving rent as an agent of somebody. It has come in the deposition of Sadanand who was looking after the property that he was collecting rent and he was giving receipts on behalf of Mandakini. Then Sadanand can well be termed as agent of Mandakini and had he filed the present application, the argument would have considerable point. It has come in the deposition of Sadanand who was looking after the property that he was collecting rent and he was giving receipts on behalf of Mandakini. Then Sadanand can well be termed as agent of Mandakini and had he filed the present application, the argument would have considerable point. In view of the admission on behalf of the defendant that Mandakini was the lessor and he was lessee, in view of admission by him that Mandakini was owner of the property and in view of further admission that he had entered into an agreement in writing in respect of the lease with Mandakini on 5th April, 1978, it is conclusively proved that Mandakini was the landlady of the suit premises within the meaning of section 2(c) and since she was not receiving rent merely as an agent of some other person, she was competent to file an application for eviction under section 15. Objection raised by the petitioner in this respect is devoid of any merit. 12. The question whether a tenancy is permanent tenancy or not, will have to be determined on the facts of each case. No yardstick of universal application can be laid down and several factors will have to be considered by the Court and its cumulative effect will have to be considered. Neither of them by itself will be sufficient to lead the Court to a particular conclusion. The amount of premium paid, the fact that the land was used for building purpose, the fact that the major amount for the construction was given by the lessor to the lessee, the wording in the lease, such as, ` , are few considerations which weigh in the mind of the Court in determining this question. Marathi lease deed which is produced by the landlady was not shown to the witness and was not proved but the English document which has been filed by the defendant is proved. It is dated 5th April, 1978. The second clause of the said agreement speaks about the monthly rent in respect of the premises. The purpose of the lease has also been specified in clause number 3 which says that the tenant is permitted to carry on his activities of sales and service of Fuel Injection Equipment with Electric Motive-Power and Sale of spare parts related to diesel Engine and sale of Agro Impliments. The purpose of the lease has also been specified in clause number 3 which says that the tenant is permitted to carry on his activities of sales and service of Fuel Injection Equipment with Electric Motive-Power and Sale of spare parts related to diesel Engine and sale of Agro Impliments. Therefore, it follows that the landlord has not allowed to use the premises for any purpose whatsoever. Clause 4 permits the assignment of the tenancy rights of the premises and the mortgage of the plant and machinery of the tenant to the Maharashtra State Finance Corporation for the loan raised by the tenant from the Corporation. The condition is distinguishable from the conditions usually found in the permanent lease which says that the tenancy can be assigned to anybody. This permission granted appears to allow the tenant to raise loan from financial institution. Clause 7 of the agreement specifically lays down that the tenant will not let or sublet the said premises to anyone whosoever. It has come in the evidence that an amount of Rs. 10,000/- was advanced by the tenant to the landlord for the construction of the said premises and the amount has been adjusted towards the rent. The lease deed does not say that the tenant will enjoy the property for generations. As already observed, the cumulative effect of all the circumstances brought on record by the evidence of the parties and particularly the terms of lease, it will have to be inferred that the intention of the parties was not to create a permanent tenancy. The advance was to be adjusted towards rent. These circumstances go to show that the lease was not a permanent one. The question is whether this plea raised by the defendant was bona fide one. 13. Shri Odhekar, learned Counsel for petitioner - tenant, submitted that mere raising the plea of permanent tenancy will not subject the tenant to order of eviction. It will have to be shown that the plea was not bona fide and since it is a ground for eviction, landlord will have to prove that the plea of permanent tenancy was raised and it was not bona fide. As was observed by the Supreme Court in the the case of (Hamidullah (dead) by his L. Rs. It will have to be shown that the plea was not bona fide and since it is a ground for eviction, landlord will have to prove that the plea of permanent tenancy was raised and it was not bona fide. As was observed by the Supreme Court in the the case of (Hamidullah (dead) by his L. Rs. others v. Abdullah others)1, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 410, the plea of permanent tenancy will have to be proved by the tenant who raises that plea. It would be sufficient for the landlord to show that the plea of permanent tenancy has been raised. In the instant case, it is admitted by the tenant that he has raised plea of permanent tenancy. Now, it would be for the tenant to prove that the permanent tenancy was there and if he fails to prove, he will have at least to prove that he bona fide believes that the tenancy is permanent one and the circumstance warranted such a plea. Though raising a plea of permanent tenancy which is not bona fide is ground available for the landlord to evict the tenant, it would be unjust to expect the landlord to prove that the plea raised by the tenant is not bona fide by leading positive evidence. If the tenant honestly believes that he is a permanent tenant, it is for him to prove that before the Rent Controller though whether a plea is bona fide or not can be inferred from the circumstance. If a party has to contend that plea is bona fide, he will have to say so and prove it. 14. Relying on Clause 22 of section 33 of the General Clauses Act which reads that a thing shall be deemed to be done in good faith whether it is in fact done honestly and whether it is done negligently or not, Shri Odhekar submitted that absence of the malice is sufficient proof of the good faith and it is for the landlord to allege that plea was mala fide. There is hardly any merit in the submission of Shri Odhekar. There is hardly any merit in the submission of Shri Odhekar. A plea shall be deemed to be advanced in good faith i.e. bona fide when, in fact, it is advanced honestly, if we take some guidance from Clause 22 relied by Shri Odhekar and it would be for the party who has raised the plea to say that he has raised it honestly. In the instant case, tenant did not bother to enter into witness box and has given a Pursish that he does not wish to lead any oral evidence. It was for the petitioner to enter into witness box and substantiate his claim that the plea of permanent tenancy was raised bona fide. 15. In the case of (Chandmal s/o. Sumermal Surana v. Firm Ram Chandra Vishwanath)2, (1991)3 Supreme Court Cases 130, in the additional written statement, it was claimed by the defendant firm that they are occupying house in question as a permanent tenant. Both the courts held that plea of permanent tenancy is not bona fide and granted the order of eviction. High Court had reversed the order. Supreme Court reversing the order of the High Court and confirming the order of the District Court quoted with the approval following observations of the District Court : "Tenant - respondent has put forth the claim of permanent tenancy to defeat the landlord - appellants right to claim possession of the premises and had there been any substance in the claim, the tenant - respondent would have produced evidence in support of it. Complete absence of evidence indicated that the claim is fake and not putforth bona fide." Same is the case of the dispute raised in this revision application. Tenant has not submitted any evidence in support of the claim of permanent tenancy made by him. 16. If the plea is raised bona fide and in good faith, even if he fails to prove it, it may not form valid ground for eviction. Here, none of the circumstance was sufficient to hold that tenancy in question was a permanent tenancy and the tenant did not enter into witness box to state that he honestly believed that the tenancy is permanent one. In the circumstances, there was no conclusion which the learned District Judge could have drawn than to hold that the plea is not bona fide. In the circumstances, there was no conclusion which the learned District Judge could have drawn than to hold that the plea is not bona fide. The word "bona fide" was interpreted to mean absence of intent to deceive and done in good faith or genuinely, by the learned Single Judge of Punjab High Court in (Smt. Subhadra Devi others v. Sunder Dass Tek Chand another)3, A.I.R. 1965 Punjab 188. If absence of intent to deceive or the good faith is to be proved, it will have to be proved by the party who alleges to have done it bona fide. Petitioner did not bother even to enter into the witness box, and therefore, the finding recorded by the learned District Judge that the plea of permanent tenancy raised by the defendant - tenant is not bona fide need not be interfered under the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and will have to be confirmed. 17. When the matter was being taken up for hearing, an application was moved by the petitioner/defendant/tenant for the amendment of the plaint. By this application, he had sought to raise a plea that Megha became the landlady of the defendant and it is she who could have issued notices and could have filed application before the Rent Controller in her capacity as landlady and Mandakini has no right to file the application. The evidence which was there was read over to this Court and this Court has recorded a finding that even assuming that the property in dispute has gone to Medha in partition, Mandakini having let out the premises to the petitioner and petitioner having accepted the lessor and lessee relations between Mandakini and himself, Mandakini was competent to file the petition and, therefore, the amendment is unnecessary and will have to be rejected having no bearing on the case. It is further important to note that the deposition of Sadanand was recorded in the trial Court sometime in the year 1989 and thereafter till the matter was taken up for hearing, defendant did not bother to submit this application. This is nothing but a device to prolong the litigation and is not bona fide. Had the amendment sought any bearing on the case, this Court would have considered granting the application. In the absence of it, it will have to be rejected. This is nothing but a device to prolong the litigation and is not bona fide. Had the amendment sought any bearing on the case, this Court would have considered granting the application. In the absence of it, it will have to be rejected. Therefore, Civil Application No. 2251 of 1993 stands rejected. 18. Petitioner has also filed another Civil Application bearing No. 2250 of 1993 pointing out that the landlord - respondent has not pleaded that the claim of permanant tenancy made by the tenant is not a bona fide one. The pleadings of the landlady read as under : "Surprisingly, for the first time, the defendant has gone to the extent of claiming permanent tenancy and this itself is a ground for the possession of suit premises from the defendant. ... ... ... It is submitted that the defendant in order to harass and trouble the plaintiff, is taking all these wrong and incorrect pleas." Therefore, in effect, it was pleaded by the landlady that the plaint is not bona fide one. The learned District Judge has recorded finding that the pleading is not bona fide. Therefore, merely because the word "bona fide" was not mentioned in the application, it cannot be held that it is not the case of the landlady that the case of permanent tenancy is not bona fide. If it is alleged that the claim is made to harass the landlady, it follows that she asserted that the claim is not bona fide. Therefore, the Civil Application No. 2250 of 1993 will have to be rejected and is rejected accordingly. 19. In the result, Civil Revision Application is dismissed. The judgment and order passed by learned District Judge, Aurangabad, in Rent Appeal No. 24 of 1990 on 18th April, 1991, directing eviction of the tenant from the suit premises, is hereby confirmed. There shall be no order as to costs of this revision application and in both Civil Applications. 20. At this stage, Shri R.S. Parundekar, learned Counsel appearing for petitioner/defendant/tenant, prays for the stay of the order of this Court and continuation of the interim relief granted by this Court on 11th June, 1991, for a period of eight weeks from today. Prayer granted. Interim relief to continue for a period of eight weeks from today only. Application dismissed.