D. G. KARIA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who is the distant relative of the respondent claims to be a lawful tenant in respect of the agricultural land Survey No. 123/3 admeasuring A 0-21 Gs. and S. No. 124 admeasuring A. 1-24 Gs. situated in the sim of village Damol in Petlad Taluka of Kheda District. It is the case of the petitioner that he had been cultivating said land from 1956-1957 to 1977-1978 on crop share basis. In the year 1960 the proceedings under Section 32g of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (for short Tenancy Act ) were initiated wherein the petitioner had made a statement that the petitioner cultivated said land as a relative of the respondent and that he was not the tenant of the land in question. According to the petitioner such a statement was given at the instance of respondent and on his assurance that the petitioner would be continued in possession of the land and whenever respondent had an occasion to sell the land the petitioner would be given the first preference to purchase the same. In view of the petitioners aforesaid statement the Mamlatdar dropped 32g proceedings. ( 2 ) THE petitioner contended that even after the aforesaid inquiry and dropping of the proceedings by the Mamlatdar under the provisions of Section 32 of the Tenancy Act the petitioner continued to be in possession and cultivation of the land and his name was also continued in relevant record of right as lawful tenant of the land. Thereafter in the year 1977 R. T. S. team visited the village Demol to ascertain concealed tenancy in respect to the agricultural lands possession and cultivation of which was with others than the landlord. R. T. S. team reopened case in respect of such fields by issuing notice to the concerned parties and thereafter made necessary inquiry under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act. Accordingly in such inquiry in 1977 the petitioner was issued notice as he was in possession of the land in question. In the said inquiry by R. T. S. team the petitioner at the instance of the respondent reiterated his statement that he was not the tenant of the land in question. As a consequence of such statement the proceedings initiated by R. T. S. team came to be dropped. In the said inquiry by R. T. S. team the petitioner at the instance of the respondent reiterated his statement that he was not the tenant of the land in question. As a consequence of such statement the proceedings initiated by R. T. S. team came to be dropped. The Additional Mamlatdar and A. L. T III Petlad by his order dt. 7/07/1977 therefore held that the petitioner was not the tenant in respect of the land in question. He therefore ordered to drop the said proceedings. ( 3 ) IT appears that thereafter the respondent made attempts to dispose of the property by way of sale to third party in disregard to his past assurance given to the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that in the year 1977 after the aforesaid inquiry under Section 32g of the Tenancy Act the petitioner was dispossessed of the land in question by the respondent without following due process of law and the procedure as laid down under Section 15 of the Tenancy Act. In the year 1977 the name of the petitioner was struck off from the relevant record of rights. It is the grievance of the petitioner that the aforesaid order passed by the Mamlatdar and A. L. T. on 25/07/1977 was not communicated to the petitioner. The petitioner came to know about the said order on 15/06/1981 The petitioner thereafter having obtained certified copy thereof preferred Tenancy Appeal No. 112 of 1981 before the Assistant Collector Petlad. The Assistant Collector Petlad by his judgment and order dt. 25/01/1982 dismissed the said appeal on the basis of the statements of the petitioner that he was not the tenant of the land in question. ( 4 ) THE petitioner feeling aggrieved by the said order of the Assistant Collector Petlad filed Revision Application under Section 76 of the Tenancy Act before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal rejected said Revision Application being Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 432/82 by its decision dt. 16/03/1984 holding that the Tribunal in exercise of its powers under Section 76 of the Tenancy Act cannot disturb concurrent finding of facts recorded by both the courts below. This decision rendered in Revision Application confirming judgments of the courts below is now sought to be set aside by the petitioner- tenant in the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This decision rendered in Revision Application confirming judgments of the courts below is now sought to be set aside by the petitioner- tenant in the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 5 ) MR. N. S. Desai learned Advocate for the petitioner contended that the petitioner tenant was in possession and cultivation of the land in question right from 1956-57 till 1977-78 and the relevant record of rights are in support of the said position. The proceedings under Section 32g of the Tenancy Act came to be dropped on the basis of the statements which were given by the petitioner at the instance and assurance of the respondent. The petitioner being in possession of the land on 1/04/1957 i. e. Tillers day should be deemed to have purchased the land and the purchase price should have been fixed accordingly. The Mamlatdar and A. L. T. had dropped the proceedings stating that the petitioner was not the tenant because of his statements. In submission of Mr. Desai authorities below did not appreciate the circumstances under which the statement was made by the petitioner. ( 6 ) SECTION 32 of the Tenancy Act declares the tenant as a deemed purchaser of the land which he held as a tenant on 1/04/1957 i. e. the Tillers Day. Every tenant is deemed to have purchased the land from the landlord on 1/04/1957 free of all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day. The person who becomes deemed purchaser should be a permanent tenant and should cultivate the land personally and if he is not a permanent tenant he should be the person who cultivates the land. Section 32g of the Tenancy Act provides that after Tillers Day the Agriculture Lands Tribunal shall publish or cause to be published a public notice in the prescribed form calling upon the tenants who under Section 32 are deemed to have purchased the lands and landlords of such lands and all other persons interested therein to appear before it on the date specified in the notice. The Tribunal shall also issue a notice individually to each such tenant landlord and other persons. Under sub-Clause (2) the Tribunal shall record in the prescribed manner the statement of the tenant whether he is or is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. The Tribunal shall also issue a notice individually to each such tenant landlord and other persons. Under sub-Clause (2) the Tribunal shall record in the prescribed manner the statement of the tenant whether he is or is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. If he fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land the Tribunal shall by an order in writing declare that such tenant is not willing to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective but in the event of tenant being willing to purchase the land the Tribunal shall follow to determine the purchase price of such land In the instant case the proceedings under Section 32g of the Tenancy Act as a result of the statement by the petitioner were dropped However it is not the finding of the Mamlatdar and A. L. T. that the petitioner was not in possession of the land on 1/04/1957 nor that he did not cultivate the land on that day The fact that R. T. S. Team issued notice to the petitioner in the year 1977 and as it is evident from relevant record of rights the petitioner continued to be in possession and cultivation of the land in question from 1956-57 till 1977 when R. T. S. Team issued notice to the petitioner; otherwise no such notice would have been issued to the petitioner if he did not cultivate the land or was dispossessed of the land as a result of 32g proceedings in respect of land in question And his name would have been struck off from the record of rights as the tenant if he did not continue to hold and cultivate the land till 1977 The fact that such notice was issued by R. T. S. team to the petitioner-tenant in the year 1977 does show that he continued to possess and cultivate the said land In light of this position the authorities below and the Tribunal did not examine and appreciate the statements of the petitioner inasmuch as statements were made at the instance of respondent and on the assurance that the land would be sold to him The petitioner was found in possession and cultivation of the land subsequent to his making statement in the year 1960 shows that the statement was not correct and genuine inasmuch as it was at the instance and on assurance of respondent who was his remote relative ( 7 ) MR. G. R. Shaikh learned Advocate appearing for the respondent submitted that concurrent finding of fact recorded by the court below and confirmed by the Tribunal cannot be said to be perverse nor there is any jurisdictional error Therefore this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot entertain the present petition. In support of his submission Mr. Shaikh relied upon the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram AIR 1987 Supreme Court p. 117. In support of his submission Mr. Shaikh relied upon the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram AIR 1987 Supreme Court p. 117. It is true that under Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court has supervisory powers It is well settled that the High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of fact of an Appropriate Court if there was no evidence to justify such a conclusion and if no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the Courts below have come or in other words a finding which was perverse in law It is also well settled that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court could go into the question of facts or look into the evidence if justice so requires it If there is evidence on record on which a finding can be arrived at and if the court has not misdirected itself either on law or on fact then in exercise of powers under Article 226 of 227 of the Constitution the High Court should not interfere with such findings It is true that the High Court should normally decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to look into the fact in the absence of clear and cut down reason where the question depends upon the appreciation of evidence Keeping this settled position in mind in the present case the Tribunal without examining plea of the petitioner that his statement was got recorded by the respondent through him in a peculiar circumstances and on assurance of selling the land to him What is held by the Tribunal is that in exercise of its limited jurisdiction under Article 76 of the Tenancy Act the Tribunal cannot disturb concurrent finding of facts recorded by the courts below Clause (c) of sub-Section (1) of Section 76 of the Tenancy Act provides that the Tribunal has to see that if there has been failure to take evidence or error in appreciating important evidence which may have resulted in the miscarriage of justice Mr. Shaikh placed reliance upon the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Shaikh placed reliance upon the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and Others AIR 1984 Supreme Court page 38 That case is also on the point of Article 227 relating to supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court It is held in that case that error of law cannot be corrected nor the High Court can review or re-weigh evidence upon which determination of the inferior Courts or Tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision The said principle is explained in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao (supra ). ( 8 ) BOMBAY Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 has been brought in operation on account of disputes between landlords and tenants and also for ascertaining full and efficient use of the land for agriculture; and to see that landlord will not use the device to evict tenant for some reasons or other The provision of the Act is also to further the interest of tenants who may be ousted by landlords in their own interest A reference to Section 15 of the Tenancy Act be made in order to ascertain the situation where the petitioner had made a statement that he was not a tenant of the land and if such statement was genuine or was at the instance of the respondent-landlord Under Section 15 of the Tenancy Act a tenant may terminate tenancy in respect of any land by surrendering his interest therein in favour of the landlord such surrender shall be in writing and should be verified before the Mamlatdar in a prescribed manner Where a tenant surrenders his tenancy the landlord sh-all be entitled to retain the land so surrendered The Mamlatdar in this connection shall hold an inquiry and decide whether the landlord is entitled to retain whole or any portion of the land so surrendered and specify the extent and price in that behalf The landlord should also get an order for possession under Section 29 (2) of the Tenancy Act The landlord shall obtain possession of the land held by any tenant only under the order of the Mamlatdar For obtaining such order he shall have to make an application in prescribed form within a period of two years from the date on which he becomes entitled to obtain possession of the land Now the legislature by enacting this provision in the tenancy Act has safeguarded the interest of the tenant who may be ousted by an unscrupulous landlord In the present case the petitioner-tenant is shown to be in occupation and cultivation of the land in question in the year 1978 When the tenant was in possession of the suit land no proceedings under Section 15 or Section 29 (2) of the Act were initiated nor the possession was taken in presence of the Mamlatdar. ( 9 ) UNDOUBTEDLY the record of rights shows that the petitioner was the tenant of the land from 1956-57 till 1977-78 when he was dispossessed of the land without due process of law These basic aspects of the case have not been taken into consideration by the courts below and and by the Tribunal The statement of the petitioner merely is to the effect that he was not a tenant of the land in question If it were really so he would not have occupied or cultivated the land till 1977-78 when he was dispossessed without due process of law and his name would not have been reflected in relevant record of rights From this angle courts below should have examined the statement of the petitioner-tenant and would have recorded its findings whether the statement which was so got recorded by the respondent was genuine and effective. The proceedings under Section 32g of the Bombay Tenancy Act came to be dropped as a result of such statement of the petitioner and its veracity was not examined by the Mamlatdar and A. L. T. and also by R. T. S. team. The authorities below did not address themselves as to why the petitioner continued to be in possession and cultivation of the land if he was not a tenant of the land as per his statement. The possession of the petitioner in respect of the land in question was not taken by the respondent in accordance with law. However such statement will not stop operation of social legislation which is for the benefit of the tenants and which is to safeguard their interest. Therefore even if the petitioner-tenant says that he was not tenant of the land in question the situation should have been examined in accordance with the scheme of the Act. Fact that the petitioner held and cultivated the land had initiated an inquiry under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act. However termination of the Tenancy and dispossession of the land were not in accordance with law. It therefore follows that the alleged statement of the tenant in the present case was not genuine inasmuch as he continued to cultivate the land till 1977-78. The possession of the tenant in respect to the land in question was not taken according to law and in accordance with the provisions of the Tenancy Act. ( 10 ) MR. It therefore follows that the alleged statement of the tenant in the present case was not genuine inasmuch as he continued to cultivate the land till 1977-78. The possession of the tenant in respect to the land in question was not taken according to law and in accordance with the provisions of the Tenancy Act. ( 10 ) MR. Shaikh next submitted that admission of the petitioner was substantive evidence. In support of his aforesaid submission he invited my attention to the case of Thiru John v. Subramhmanyam v. The Returning Officer and Others Am 1977 Supreme Court page 1724 wherein the Supreme Court has held that it is well settled that a partys admission as defined in Sections 17 to 20 fulfilling the requirements of Section 21 of Evidence Act is substantive evidence proprio vigore. An admission if clearly and unequivocally made is the best evidence against the party making it and though not conclusive shifts the onus on to the maker on the principle that what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so and until the presumption is rebutted the fact admitted must be taken to be established. In the instant case the petitioner no doubt has made a statement that he was not a tenant of the land in question. And eventually as a result of such statement of the petitioner-tenant the proceedings under Section 32 of the Act were dropped. The petitioner however continued to be in occupation and cultivation of the land in question. His name was also shown in relevant record of right as tilling the land. Therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the statement was clear and unequivocable so as to treat it to be conclusive. The case of the petitioner that his statement was at the instance of the landlord was not examined having regard to the scheme of the Act. The respondent-landlord has however not discharged onus to disprove the plea that the statement by the tenant was not at his instance and that he did not assure the petitioner to give preference at the time of sale of the land. In the facts of the case the authority relied upon by Mr. Shaikh does not help the respondent. ( 11 ) MR. In the facts of the case the authority relied upon by Mr. Shaikh does not help the respondent. ( 11 ) MR. Shaikh also placed reliance on the case of Sita Ram Bhau v. Ramchandra Nago Patil (dead) by L. R. s and Another AIR 1977 Supreme Court page 1712 The Supreme Court while construing provisions of Section 145 of the Evidence Act held that an admission is relevant and it has to be proved before it becomes evidence. The provisions in the Evidence Act that admission is not conclusive proof are to be considered in regard to two features of evidence. First what weight is to be attached to an admission ? In order to attach weight it. has to be found out whether the admission is clear unambiguous and is a relevant piece of evidence. Second even if the admission is proved in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act and if it is to be used against the party who has made it it is sound that if a witness is under cross-examination on oath he should be given an opportunity if the documents are to be used against him to tender his explanation and to clear up the point of ambiguity or dispute. This is a general salutary and intelligible rule. However in the present case the proceedings were dropped only on account of the statement having been made by the petitioner tenant. It was not tested to be clear unambiguous or being relevant piece of evidence. There was no such occasion. The petitioner was not cross-examined nor was offered any opportunity inasmuch as the courts below and the tribunal have not at all examined the issue from this angle. I am therefore of the opinion that ratio laid down in Sita Ram Bhau Patils case (supra) cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case. ( 12 ) MR. Shaikh then submitted that on account of previous statement made by the petitioner he cannot initiate proceedings claiming to be tenant of the land in question and that there was a bar of res judicata. In my view having regard to the facts of the case principles of res judicata would not be applicable in this case. Shaikh then submitted that on account of previous statement made by the petitioner he cannot initiate proceedings claiming to be tenant of the land in question and that there was a bar of res judicata. In my view having regard to the facts of the case principles of res judicata would not be applicable in this case. The petitioner raised the plea for the first time that his statement about being tenant of the land was on account of and at the instance of the landlord. This was not the case in earlier proceedings under Section 32g of the Act. In the present case so-called statement of the petitioner-tenant was not examined from the viewpoint that it was got made to satisfy a particular purpose of the landlord. No such case was urged and denied nor there was any hearing and final decision in the earlier proceedings inasmuch as the proceedings under Section 32g came to be dropped merely on the basis of so-called statement. In the facts and circumstances of the case doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to be applicable to so-called statement. In this connection Mr. Shaikh placed reliance on the case of Nathubhai Rambhai v. Bhaidas Ranchhoddas (since deed. by his heirs) Shashikant Bhaidas Dudhwala and Ors. 20 G. L. R. 406. It is held in that case that when the question arises before the Tribunal in respect of proceedings under Section 32g of the Bombay Tenancy Act it is reasonable to infer that the Tribunal is conscious of the requirement of the provisions of Section 32f (1) (b) of the Act. The said section very clearly mentions that where the landlord is a person subject to any mental or physical disability the tenants right to purchase such land under Section 32 would arise within one year from the expiry of the period during which the landlord was entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section 32 (1 ). In this view the point of fact namely whether the landlord was suffering from disability on 1-4-57 or not was a question concluded by the necessary implication on. the second occasion and is essentially a pure findings of fact and the said order operates as res judicata. Therefore said decision which is on peculiar facts of that case will not be applicable to the facts of the present case. the second occasion and is essentially a pure findings of fact and the said order operates as res judicata. Therefore said decision which is on peculiar facts of that case will not be applicable to the facts of the present case. I therefore find no substance in submission of Mr. Shaikh that petitioners case was barred by principles of res judicata. ( 13 ) MR. Shaikh lastly submitted that the petitioner being relative of respondent cannot claim tenancy under Section 4 of the Tenancy Act. Section 4 of the Tenancy Act provides that a person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such person is not member of the owners family or a servant on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share. The petitioner is a distant relative of the respondent. There is nothing on the record to suggest that the parties had a common estate or residence. In the facts of the case it cannot be said that petitioner was family member of the respondent-landlord so as to discard the claim of his tenancy on the land. In the facts and circumstances of the case there is no merit in contention of Mr. Shaikh. Every kith and kin of the landlord cannot be within purview of Section 4 of the Act. ( 14 ) IN the result petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. Impugned judgment of the Tribunal confirming decisions of the courts below are quashed and set aside. Matter is remanded to Mamlatdar and A. L. T. Petlad for deciding the matter afresh in accordance with law and in light of the aforesaid observations after giving due opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. .