R. A. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned orders at annexure-A dated September 8 1982 passed by the Competent Authority and annexure-C dated December 19 1985 passed by the appellate authority under the Urban- Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 Against the order dated September 8 1982 an appeal was preferred on November 22 1984 The appeal was obviously and hopelessly time barred and therefore application for condonation of delay was filed and the only explanation that was given was that the appellant had not been given the information of the order dated September 8 1982 and that he came to know about that order only after two years on September 10 1984 and he had obtained certified copy immediately and thereafter the appeal was filed on November 22 1984 ( 2 ) THE appellate authority had examined the case papers and it had found that the draft statement issued under section 8 (3) of the Act was sent to the appellant (petitioner Anilkumar ) and was received on his behalf on July 31 1982 Then the final statement was issued to the appellant on September 25 1982 In para 5 it is observed that the final statement was received by the appellant on 25th September 1982 but he had not preferred any appeal against the said statement within the prescribed period In view of these findings and observations of the appellate authority in paras 4 and 5 of the order the petitioner was directed on May 14 1986 to file an affidavit and the following order was passedthe learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the observations and findings of the Tribunal in its order dated 19-12-85 in paras 4 and 5 are not correct In these two paragraphs the Tribunal has observed that the final statement was issued to and received by the appellant on 25-9-85 and it was received by the appellant himself on 25-9-85. The petitioner is directed to file an affidavit to that effect Meanwhile status quo to be maintained Notice returnable on 23. 6. The petitioner is directed to file an affidavit to that effect Meanwhile status quo to be maintained Notice returnable on 23. 6. 86 ( 3 ) THE petitioner-Anilkumar has not filed any affidavit ascertaining that the final order dated September 8 1982 at annexure-A was never served upon him but an affidavit of his power of attorney holder is filed slating that the final order was never served upon he petitioner This affidavit does not carry any conviction ( 4 ) AT the final hearing of the matter the original record is shown to the Court and to the learned advocate for the petitioner At page 237 there is a registered AD slip addressed to the petitioner at his address and it is signed on behalf of the petitioner. It is in respect of the draft statement At page 341 is another AD slip which also bears illegible signature. It is also addressed to the petitioner at his address Since the draft statement and the final statement have been sent by registered post AD at the address of the petitioner given by the petitioner and it is not disputed that it was not his address there is no reason to believe that these orders were delivered to someone else instead of the petitioner Both these registered AD slips clearly and reliably show that these orders were served on the petitioner In the present proceedings the petitioner has produced a xerox copy of the General Power of Attorney wherein the signature of the petitioner has been shown Prima facie the signature on the AD slip more particularly on the second one seems to be identical one with the signature on the Deed of General Power of Attorney. The petitioner was given opportunity to satisfy the Court about the truthfulness of his averment that he really did not have any intimation of the impugned order However there is no material whatsoever excepting his bare averment which is not credit-worthy at all ( 5 ) EVEN on merits the petitioner has no case. The petitioner has submitted three points. The first is that the land of plot no 10 of survey no 74 admeasuring 324. 4 sq. mts. is the land which could not have been included in his holding of vacant land. The petitioner has submitted three points. The first is that the land of plot no 10 of survey no 74 admeasuring 324. 4 sq. mts. is the land which could not have been included in his holding of vacant land. It is submitted that this plot of land is on 150 feet wide Ring road and under the Ribbon Development Rules no construction is permitted on this land and therefore it is not a land putting construction and therefore it should be excluded from the computation of the vacant land Vacant land is defined in section 2 (q) (i) as follows2 (Q) vacant land means land not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture in an urban agglomeration but does not include (I) land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which such land is situated ( 6 ) RELYING on this exclusion clause it is submitted that this plot of land is such on which construction of building is not permissible under the Ribbon Development Rules These Ribbon Development Rules are executive rules framed by the Revenue Department for National Highways/state Highways and for such other cause. This is made clear by the title of the rules and it is made clear that these rules apply only to roads which are under Public Works Department. This road is not under Public Works Department. These rules are not statutory rules and building regulations in force in the area in which the land is situated. Therefore this argument with reference to Ribbon Development Rules for this land has no basis. These rules are not applicable and therefore this argument is required to be rejected. ( 7 ) IT is also contended in the alternative that under the building regulations like relating to Floor Space Index (FSI) 40 of the land is required to be kept open and therefore 40 of the land is such on which construction of building is not permissible under the building regulations in force in the area and therefore 40 of the land should be excluded from the vacant land hold by the petitioner. ( 8 ) ADMITTEDLY the entire plot of land is physically a vacant land. There is no construction on it. It is also not pointed out as to which specific 40% of the land is to be excluded. ( 8 ) ADMITTEDLY the entire plot of land is physically a vacant land. There is no construction on it. It is also not pointed out as to which specific 40% of the land is to be excluded. A similar question has been decided by the Full Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of Prabhakar N. Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1984 Bombay 122 and this question has been negatived and the answer is against the petitioner. The absurdity of the resultant situation of the petitioners convention was illustrated and considered in para 11 on page 128 and it was held in para 12 as follows:when the extent of the vacant land is to be determined it is clear that what is sought to be excluded under each one of the heads must be separately determined by the Competent Authority. The owner of the land will be entitled to the benefit of each one of the sub-clauses as well as the proviso if they are relevant on the facts of a given case. There may be cases where the land which is sought to be excluded by sub-clause (ii) can be included in the land which is sought to be excluded by sub-clause (i ). Where for example on a given piece of land the area of two thirds of the land is not to be constructed upon but this area of two-thirds is more than the land occupied by the building as well as the land appurtenant to the building then the owner will not be entitled to a separate exclusion both under sub-clauses (i) and (ii) because the area under sub-clause (i) will obviously include the land appurtenant which is referred two in sub-clauses (i) and (ii ). Indeed this position was not disputed by Mr. Karnik. But since vacant land has to be determined on the basis of totality of the land owned by or in possession of the owner as contemplated by Sec. 2 (1) of the Act the Competent Authority will have to determined separately the land which falls under sub-clauses (i) (ii) (iii) and the proviso of Sec. 2 (q) of the Act subject to some land falling in clause (ii) being covered by clause (i ). Having regard to what we have said earlier we cannot accept the convention advanced before us on behalf of the petitioners on the ratio of the decision of Billimorias case (1983-2 Bom CR 618) that two thirds of the ratio of the decision of land in the instant case will be straightway liable to be excluded for the purpose of computation of vacant land and ceiling area. IN view of this clear answer with which I respectfully agree the contention of the petitioner deserves to be rejected. ( 9 ) THIS Full Bench case of the Bombay High Court was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. P. R. Patel AIR 1988 SC 220 and the Supreme Court had agreed with the observations of the Full Bench of Bombay High Court. ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the case of Vinubhai Bavishi vs. Competent Authority 25 (1) GLR 379. In that case there was plinth level cons ruction and the Government permitted to raise construction and therefore the building was completed. When the construction of the building was over as per the FSI of he municipal regulations open land could not be built up and therefore it was not vacant land in terms of section 2 (q) (i) of the Act. In these circumstances the Court held that if there is a portion of the land on which construction of a building is not permissible the land cannot be a vacant land. It was also held that the Government. granted permission to complete the construction and hence it can be said that under section 20 of the Act the Government granted a sort of exemption. It was further observed that the moment the building became over the local building space was exhausted and the remainder land was required to be kept unbuilt under the municipal regulations. It is in these facts and circumstances of the building having been constructed after the permission that the question of unbuilt land had come up before the Court. It was not a case of wholly vacant land without any construction. Therefore this judgment is of no use and assistance to the petitioner. Therefore this contention of the petitioner deserves to be rejected. ( 11 ) IT is further contended that there is a properly admeasuring 110 sq. mts. It was not a case of wholly vacant land without any construction. Therefore this judgment is of no use and assistance to the petitioner. Therefore this contention of the petitioner deserves to be rejected. ( 11 ) IT is further contended that there is a properly admeasuring 110 sq. mts. which is a house and this land is occupied by a building which has been constructed before the commencement of the Act. On this bare averment it is submitted that this land is also required to be excluded from the definition of the vacant land under section 2 (q) (ii ). However such construction has to be shown with the approval of the appropriate authority. There is no such averment much less any proof before any authority and this question cannot be raised for the first time in a writ petition. Therefore this convention is also required to be rejected. ( 12 ) THE same reasoning would apply to the land admeasuring 4. 30 sq. me. and this land is included in the land permitted to be held by the petitioner and which is not declared surplus. ( 13 ) IN the result there is no merit in any of the contentions. Hence the petition is dismissed. The orders of the Competent Authority as well as Appellate Authority are confirmed. Rule discharged with costs. Interim relief vacated. Petition Dismissed. .