Judgment : This revision is directed against the Order of the learned Sessions Judge, Salem in Criminal Appeal No.284 of 1985, dated 20.7.1988 setting aside the order of the trial Court, directing the return of the cash of Rs. 12,000 M.O.3 series to P.W.1 recovered from the first accused according to the prosecution as part of the money of Rs.24,000 robbed from P.W.1 at about 4.30a.m. on 18. 1992 by four accused among whom, one died during the investigation and the rest were acquitted after full trial. The learned trial Magistrate has held that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt and complicity of the accused therein. While holding so, the trial Magistrate, directed that M.O.3 series, a sum of Rs.12,000 claimed to have been recovered from the house of A-1 by P.W.8, the investigating officer pursuant to the voluntary confession statement given by him, recorded under Sec.27 of the Indian Evidence Act, to be returned to the first accused (A-1) namely the petitioner herein. But however, on appeal by P. W. 1 Muthusamy, the learned Sessions Judge, Salem, set aside and reversed the said finding and directed the return of M.O.3 series to P.W.1 instead of the first accused for the various reasonings given by him in the impugned judgment. Aggrieved at the impugned order rendered by the learned Sessions Judge, the lower appellate authority the present revision has been filed by the first accused by name Thangavel. 2. Aggrieved at the impugned order rendered by the learned Sessions Judge, the lower appellate authority the present revision has been filed by the first accused by name Thangavel. 2. Mr.K.V.Sridharan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the impugned order is perverse and not legal in the sense that the appellate court is not the trial court which conducted the trial and recorded the evidence and that while reversing the order passed by the learned trial Magistrate, the lower appellate court, has exceeded its limit of jurisdiction and as a result of which it ought not to have reversed the finding in the context of Sec.452,Crl.P.C.Mr.S.Shanmugha-velayutham, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, supported the judgment rendered by the lower appellate court and contended that since Ex.P-1 was given by P.W.1 claiming that during the occurrence, he and P.W.2 Ramalingam were intercepted by all the accused including the revision petitioner, beaten away and the cash to the extent of Rs.24,000 kept in a kakki cloth bag by P.W.1 for the purpose of distributing the same to several of the milk suppliers, had been robbed by them and that subsequently, some of the accused were chased by the witnesses and that P.W.8, the investigating officer arrested A-1, recorded his voluntary confession statement and pursuant thereof, recovered M.O.3 series from him and since that aspect has not been considered by the learned trial Magistrate, the learned Sessions Judge, was perfectly justified in interfering with the said order passed by the learned trial Magistrate and that therefore, the impugned judgment cannot be inter-ferred with. 3. In the context of the above rival contentions, the only question that has arisen for consideration before me, is whether the impugned judgment rendered by the lower appellate court is not legal, improper and perverse and liable to be interfered with in this revision? 4. 3. In the context of the above rival contentions, the only question that has arisen for consideration before me, is whether the impugned judgment rendered by the lower appellate court is not legal, improper and perverse and liable to be interfered with in this revision? 4. To appreciate the point involved in this revision, it is worthwhile to note the very substratum and ingredients of Sec.452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with the disposal of properties, which runs as follows: “Order for disposal of property at conclusion of trial: (1) when an inquiry or trial in any criminal court is concluded, the court may make such order as it thinks fit for the disposal by destruction, confiscation or delivery to any person claiming to be entitled to possession thereof or otherwise, of any property or document produce before it or in its custody, or regarding which any offence appears to have been committed, or which has been used for the commission of any offence. .(2) An order may be made under Sub-sec.(1) for the delivery of any property to any person claiming to be entitled to the possession thereof, without any condition or on condition that he executes a bond with or without sureties, to the satisfaction of the court, engaging to restore such property to the court if the order made under Sub-sec. .(1) is modified or set aside on appeal or revision. .(3) A court of sessions may, instead of itself making an order under Sub-sec.(1), direct the property to be delivered to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who shall thereupon deal with it in the manner provided in Secs.457,458 and 459. .(4) Except where the property is livestock or is subject to speedy and natural decay, or where a bond has been executed in pursuance ofSub-sec.(2), an order made under Sub-sec.(1) shall not be carried out for two months, or when an appeal is presented, until such appeal has been disposed of. .(4) Except where the property is livestock or is subject to speedy and natural decay, or where a bond has been executed in pursuance ofSub-sec.(2), an order made under Sub-sec.(1) shall not be carried out for two months, or when an appeal is presented, until such appeal has been disposed of. .(5) In this section the term”property“includes, in the case of property regarding which an offence appears to have been committed not only such property, as has been originally in the possession or under the control of any party, but also any property into or for which the same may have been converted or exchanged, and anything acquired by such conversion or exchange, whether immediately or otherwise.” The Supreme Court in N. Madhavan v. State of Kerala, 1980 L.W. (Crl.) 10 Sum. (S.C.), has observed as follows: “An analysis of this provision would show that it refers to property or document, .(a) which is produced before the court, or .(b) which is in the custody of the court, or .(c) regarding which any offence appears to have been committed, or .(d) which has been used for the commission of any offence. Then, at the conclusion of the enquiry or trial, the disposal of any class of the property listed above, may be made by (i) destruction, (ii) confiscation of, (iii) delivery to any person entitled to the possession thereof. The words may make such order as it thinks fit’ in the section, vest the court with a discretion to dispose of the property in any of three modes specified in the section. But the exercise of such discretion is inherently a judicial function. The choice of the mode or manner of disposal is not to be made arbitrarily, but judicially in accordance with sound principles founded on reason and justice, keeping in view the class and nature of the property and the material before it. One of such well-recognised principles is that when after an inquiry or trial the accused is discharged or acquitted, the court should normally restore the property of clause (a) or (b) to the person from whose custody it was taken. Departure from this salutary rule of practice is not to be lightly made, when there is no dispute or doubt-that the property in question was seized from the custody of such accused and belonged to him.” 5. Departure from this salutary rule of practice is not to be lightly made, when there is no dispute or doubt-that the property in question was seized from the custody of such accused and belonged to him.” 5. Following this principle envisaged by the Apex Court, this Court in very many judgments has held that after the trial or inquiry is over, the trial court is invested with the power to dispose of the property which has been produced before it in a given case in accordance with the ratio laid down in the above citation. Keeping in view the above proposition, to the facts of the present case, on a plain reading of judgment rendered by the learned trial Magistrate, I am sure that it is not correct in disposing the property so to say that he never followed any of the norms enumerated above. The reason for my above observation is that the trial court at no point of time has given any finding either that this M.O.3 series cash of Rs.12,000 was part of the robbed money from P.W.1 at the time of occurrence proper or that the said money was claimed by P.W.1 as part of his money robbed either in the witness box or at any place during the trial or otherwise. It is significant to note that this M.O.3 series has been marked through P. W.6 one of the attestors to the recovery mahazar and has not even been confronted with P.W.1. Curiously enough, the learned trial Magistrate never believed the alleged voluntary confession statement given by A-1, namely the revision petitioner and in pursuance thereof, the money was recovered under mahazar as claimed by the prosecution. In short, as was observed by the lower appellate court, no observation or finding of any kind was given by the learned trial magistrate either that the money M.O.3 series was recovered from the first accused/ revision petitioner or that it belonged to him. Added to which, it was never the claim of the revision petitioner at any point of time that this money M.O.3 belongs to him and that therefore, he is entitled to get back the same. 6. Similarly, the trial court has not even followed the norms specified above by not giving any finding or observation that the money M.O.3 belongs to P.W.1 or anybody else. 6. Similarly, the trial court has not even followed the norms specified above by not giving any finding or observation that the money M.O.3 belongs to P.W.1 or anybody else. True, the complaint given by P.W.1 and his statement recorded under Sec.l61(3), Crl.P.C. by P.W.8 during the course of investigation must be there and taken for consideration as authenticated documents for the purpose of disposal of the property, but that has not been done either by the learned trial Magistrate or the lower appellate court. In the context that though there is a complaint given by P.W.1 to P.W.8 specifically alleging that a huge sum of Rs.24,000 had been robbed from him during the occurrence, when it was the case of P.W.1 Muthusamy that M.O.3 series, cash of Rs.12,000 was not identified by him as part of his money of Rs.24,000, I feel rather surprised as to how the learned Sessions Judge has directed that money to be returned to P.W.1 as that of his own by interfering with the order passed by the trial court. In my view, it is not correct but however totally perverse in the context of the recorded evidence and the documents relied on by the prosecution and the various findings and observations given by both courts below. At this juncture, the only remedy and the proper exercise of the revisional power, for the purpose of disposing the property M.O.3 series on the basis of sound principles of judicial functions founded a reason and for the ends of justice to be properly met, would be to remit back the entire matter to the trial court once again for conduct of a fresh inquiry into the rival claims of A-1, the revision petitioner and P.W.1, the first respondent herein, by giving them opportunity to adduce any evidence if they so desire and dispose it in accordance with law. In this regard, there is consensus among the Bar and for which course, both the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor have consented to. 7. In this regard, there is consensus among the Bar and for which course, both the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor have consented to. 7. In the result, the impugned judgment rendered by the learned Sessions Judge, Salem in C.ANo.284 of 1985 is hereby set aside and the whole matter is remitted back to the then Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sangagiri and to conduct a fresh enquiry by giving opportunity to both parties to adduce oral and documentary evidence if necessary and to dispose it in accordance with law with regard to M.O.3 series within a period of three months from today and report the matter to this Court. Revision is ordered accordingly.