JUDGMENT 1. - Both these applications moved by Shri Sualal Yadav-one seeking extention of time beyond sixty days to remain on bail and the other for a certificate to leave to appeal to Supreme Court, are disposed of by this common order. These applications have come up for orders in very unusual circumstances and raise a simple question as to:- Whether after exercising powers under specific provisions of S. 19(3) of Contempt of Court Act 1971 and granting bail by this court after arrest are we still left with any inherent powers, and Whether exercising such powers, instead of advancing the cause of justice, would not result in abuse of the process of this Court ? 2. The applicant Shri Sualal Yadav was held guilty of criminal contempt of this court vide order, dated 31.3.1993 (reported in 1993(1) RLR 22) and was sentenced to three months' simple imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo 15 days' imprisonment. Warrants were issued in execution of the order and he was arrested on 2.4.1993 at 7.00 p.m. on 3.4.1993 the President of Bar Association, Jaipur sent a slip of paper to one of us, being the senior most Judge available in the town (Justice Dave), that two lawyers have been arrested in connection with a contempt application and application for suspension of sentence has been moved on their behalf, hence the deputy Registrar (Judicial) may be instructed to list the case today. It was a Saturday i.e, a non-sitting day yet keeping in view the fact that applicant had a statutory right of appeal and sentence was three months, the Deputy Registrar (Judi.) was directed to list the matter before Division Bench as a special case at 3.00 p. m. in court room No. 2. Bench consisting of justice Dave and justice 1srani JJ. heard the learned counsel appearing for the applicant and passed the following order on 3.4.1993: "For the reasons mentioned in the application the same is allowed. 60 days'. time from the date of the order/judgment is granted to the petitioners for filing appeal in the Supreme Court, during which period the sentence passed shall remain suspended and the petitioners shall be released on bail provided each of them executes a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 60 days'. time from the date of the order/judgment is granted to the petitioners for filing appeal in the Supreme Court, during which period the sentence passed shall remain suspended and the petitioners shall be released on bail provided each of them executes a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 1000/ with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Deputy Registrar (Judicial)." 3. Instead of filing an appeal against the aforesaid order the applicant moved an application on 27.5.1993 a day earlier to the last court sitting day before vacations for extension of period and the same was ordered to be listed before us by the order dated 28.5.1993 passed by the Chief justice and the case was listed on 31.5.1993 during vacations before us-29th and 30th May being Saturday and Sunday. We made the following queries to the applicant (a) Whether this court having exercised its powers under sub-section (3) of S. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act has any further power to extend the period for filing the appeal beyond the period of limitation, more particularly when the Bench had granted bail after order had already been executed and the applicants were arrested, i.e., whether second order of bail could be passed by this court, (b) Whether this court is not functus officio having exhausted the powers as stated above, (c) Whether the applicant by not filing the appeal within 60 days and by not surrendering to bail bonds on the expiry of sixty days( i.e. 31.5.93), has not abused the process of this court rather than securing ends of justice, more particularly when another contemnor had already filed an appeal and the Hon'ble Vacation Judge of the Supreme Court had fixed the appeal to be heard on 3rd June, 1993. 4. The applicant prayed for time to study the points raised. Time was allowed and the case was ordered to be listed on 4.6.1993 as prayed, we made it clear to the applicant that when the appeal of Co-contemnor Shri Radha Mohan Lal comes up for hearing before Hon'ble vacation Judge in the Supreme Court he may also move his application for suspension of his sentence if he so chooses. Time was allowed and the case was ordered to be listed on 4.6.1993 as prayed, we made it clear to the applicant that when the appeal of Co-contemnor Shri Radha Mohan Lal comes up for hearing before Hon'ble vacation Judge in the Supreme Court he may also move his application for suspension of his sentence if he so chooses. According to Shri Radha Mohan Lai, on 3.6.1993 his appeal has now been fixed on 16-7-1993 and the order qua him has been stayed and as such Radha Mohan Lal's application for extension of time before this court has become infructuous and the same has been dismissed as infructuous by a separate order recorded in the main Contempt Petition No. 3184/91. 5. The applicant Sualal Yadav submitted that he has also filed an appeal before the Supreme Court as a matter of abundant caution but it is not an effective appeal which he has filed and he wants a certificate of fitness for filing appeal, by this court and after that he would file the effective appeal. He stated that he did not ask for extension of time on 3.6.1993 as his appeal is not processed so far and that he simultaneously got on application filed before this court purporting to be one under Arts. 134(1) (c)/134A of the Constitution of India. The applicant Sualal who argued his matter in person today also did answer to our queries despite our repeatedly asking him to do so. He however, submitted that his case requires a special consideration as his case does not stand at par with ordinary cases coming to this court and that he is not like the other lawyers practicing before this Court. He submitted that he never wanted any other lawyer, lawyers or Bar Association to espouse his cause nor he wanted the lawyers to go on strike. On the contrary he submitted that he was always opposed to the idea of strike and he himself had been regularly appearing in various courts despite the lawyers' call for strike. He submitted that infact the members of the Bar have betrayed him time and again. He has several grievances against the members of Bar who have spoiled his case. His case has been pleaded without his instructions. He neither consented for filing review nor any other application. He submitted that infact the members of the Bar have betrayed him time and again. He has several grievances against the members of Bar who have spoiled his case. His case has been pleaded without his instructions. He neither consented for filing review nor any other application. He submitted that he has all through his life fought his own battle and his case must be paid special attention. He submitted that the criminal contempt is governed by criminal law and S. 418 Cr.P.C. should be made applicable to his case. He submitted that he has various remedies available against the punishment given to him and he can even file a writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. He submitted that he can also invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and/or can also file a civil suit seeking a declaration that the order is a nullity and may claim damages. He submitted that he can also prosecute the members of the Bench for not passing a judicial order punishing him for contempt and further that he can invoke the provisions of Art. 134(1)(c)/134A of the Constitution. He submitted that this court has inherent powers under S. 482 Cr.P.C., under Art. 215 of the Constitution and rule 159 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules. He submitted that questions raised by him are worth hearing by a Bench of not less than five Judges of Supreme Court and it can't be heard by vacation Judge of the Supreme Court. He submitted that four substantial questions of law arise in this case for which certificate may be issued certifying the case to be a fit case for filing an appeal to the Supreme Court and prayed that meanwhile the execution of the order of sentence should further be suspended. Questions he framed during the course of arguments are reproduced verbatim as under : "(a) Whether the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act defies every citizen of India not to tell truth under part III of the Constitution of India as it happened in the instant case"? "(b) Whether the inherent powers conferred on the High Court vide Art. 215 of the Constitution of India, S. 482 Cr. "(b) Whether the inherent powers conferred on the High Court vide Art. 215 of the Constitution of India, S. 482 Cr. P. C. and Rule 59 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules stand suspended, specially in the matters like the present one where the applicant is singled out from other lawyers and is required to go to jail"? "(c) Whether the pronouncement of the judgment in contempt cases could be pronounced in absentia, specially when the contemnors are subjected to specific sentence including fine"? and "(d) Whether fundamental right of the contemnor including the right to get his various petitions decided during the course of contempt, amounts to barring him from availing an opportunity of filing timely appeal under S. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act"?. The applicant during the course of arguments repeatedly made several remarks against the learned members of the Bar and the court, which we refrain from mentioning as we are neither moved/ influenced by them either way nor we intend to prejudice the higher court by mentioning them, as they are also not germane to points involved in the present application. 6. Coming to the application for grant of Certificate, first we may mention at the outset that the argument has only been advanced to be rejected. Neither the questions suggested either raise substantial questions of public importance nor this court can consider them at this stage, when statutory period of filing an appeal is already over. Otherwise also no certificate is required, in our opinion, in cases where the party has a statutory right of appeal given by the statute. Neither the questions suggested either raise substantial questions of public importance nor this court can consider them at this stage, when statutory period of filing an appeal is already over. Otherwise also no certificate is required, in our opinion, in cases where the party has a statutory right of appeal given by the statute. S. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act reads as under : "S. 19, Appeals:-(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt:- (a) Where the order or decision is that of a Single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) Where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court; Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union Territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." Even the opening words of the section, "an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court," make the position clear that after the punishment is given in cases of contempt of court the contemnor may prefer an appeal as of right and pending that appeal the appellate court may order the suspension of execution of the punishment or order appealed against can be suspended. If the applicant is in jail he can be released on bail. The legislature has even given the right of appeal to be heard, notwithstanding the fact that the contemnor has not purged himself of the contempt. Sixty days' period from the date of the order is available to the contemnor to file an appeal. Provision of Special Leave to Appeal or issuing certificate for filing an appeal only arises in cases where no statutory right is given to the party to file an appeal. Art. 134A of the Constitution of India has thus no application in cases of the present nature, more particularly when the stage is over. Provision of Special Leave to Appeal or issuing certificate for filing an appeal only arises in cases where no statutory right is given to the party to file an appeal. Art. 134A of the Constitution of India has thus no application in cases of the present nature, more particularly when the stage is over. As mentioned in the facts, the applicant could file an appeal within sixty days from the date of the order which opportunity he did not avail for reasons best known to him and now having filed an appeal Under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act on 3.6.1993 wants a certificate to be issued by this court certifying it to be a fit case for filing an appeal. We regret, we cannot accede to this request of the applicant. Neither we have the jurisdiction to enlarge the period of limitation nor we find it to be a case for issuing a certificate which even otherwise is not required as stated above. It may also be observed here that according to the applicant's own submission during the course of argument, he has filed an appeal along with an application for suspension of the order on 3.6.1993 before the Supreme Court simultaneous to the application under Art. 134A of the Constitution of India in the High Court on the very same day, i. e., 3.6.1993. 7. For the reasons stated above we are unable to accede to the prayer and dismiss the application. 8. Coming to the application for extension of time, we have already stated above that as much time was granted to the applicant as was permissible under law on 3.4.1993 and our queries made in respect of the legal arguments were not answered by the applicant. The applicant repeatedly stated and also mentioned in his application that unfortunately the Jaipur Bar took up the matter and resolved to persue it on behalf of the contemnors even upto Supreme Court and asked the undersigned on 12.4.1993 to sign the power for filing a review petition in the High Court, to which action, the undersigned did not agree, still the review petition was filed before the High Court on behalf of the Jaipur Bar as well as Shri Radha Mohan Lal. The review petition filed by the Jaipur Bar was dismissed vide order, dated 26.5.1993 (reported in 1993(1) RLR 35 ). The review petition filed by the Jaipur Bar was dismissed vide order, dated 26.5.1993 (reported in 1993(1) RLR 35 ). On one hand the applicant has called the Bar to be betrayer and working against his interest even to the extent of their unauthorized filing the application for review and on the other he mentioned in his memo that he has learnt that the review had been dismissed by the Bench constituting Hon'ble Justice Calla and Hon'ble Justice Singhvi J. against whom he has much material to disclose at any appropriate stage. The two stands are wholly inconsistent and we can only bemoan at the attitude of the applicant in which he has proceeded to condemn the Hon'ble Members of the Bar before the court again and again and also repeatedly making unsubstantiated remarks against the Benches of this court. Not assigning the reason that it is just because of Jaipur Bar, and because of not making available certain record to him, that he could not file an appeal and time should be granted to him in our opinion, is a prayer which cannot be allowed in the circumstances of this case. We have already mentioned above that utmost respect had been shown to the Members of the Bar by constituting the Bench on non-sitting day. Now also this Special Bench has been constituted during vacations, yet raising of such grounds by the applicant can only be said to be unfortunate. 9. Art. 215 of the Constitution of India has no bearing on the present application. According to Art. 215 of the Constitution every High Court is a court of record and has all the powers including the powers to punish for contempt of itself. Thus, it has the power to determine the question about its own jurisdiction as well as inherent power to punish for its contempt. This Article however, does not empower the High Court to extend the period of limitation prescribed by Special statute. Similarly S. 482 Cr. P.C. where the inherent powers are given to this court can also not be pressed into service as the provisions of S. 482 Cr. P. C. would be applicable for the orders passed under the Code. This Article however, does not empower the High Court to extend the period of limitation prescribed by Special statute. Similarly S. 482 Cr. P.C. where the inherent powers are given to this court can also not be pressed into service as the provisions of S. 482 Cr. P. C. would be applicable for the orders passed under the Code. Contempt of Court is a complete Code in itself, it has laid down its own procedure and procedure for filing an appeal including prescribing the period of limitation,the power to suspend the sentence; therefore it excludes the application of S. 482 Cr. P. C. as also S. 418 Cr. P. C. which, in our opinion, would be applicable in cases where a person is punished for committing contempt under the provisions of S. 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Thus, neither we have inherent jurisdiction under Art. 215 of the Constitution nor under S. 482 Cr. P. C. to extend the period of limitation prescribed by the Contempt of Courts Act and thereby suspending the sentences beyond that period. It may also be observed that inherent powers are always used for three purposes-(a) to secure the ends of justice, (b) for preventing the abuse of the process of the court, and (c) for giving effect to any order passed under a statute. Unfortunately all the three ingredients are missing in the instant case. It is not going to advance the cause of justice in case we put a lawyer above law and above a common citizen of this country. When this court dispenses justice to those who come to the court, it is not concerned with caste, class, creed or sex. Everybody has to be dealt with evenly and learned counsel cannot be said to be above law. On the contrary he is expected to respect the law and act according to it. We are unable to hold that cause of justice is going to be advanced in a case like the present where even process of this court has virtually been abused. A period of sixty days was granted from the date of order, i.e., from 31.3.1993 and that too after arrest of the accused, bail was granted to him on furnishing bonds to the satisfaction of the Deputy Registrar (Judi.). The bail bonds were executed on 3.4.93 for appearance on 31.5.1993. The bonds are on record and indicate accordingly. A period of sixty days was granted from the date of order, i.e., from 31.3.1993 and that too after arrest of the accused, bail was granted to him on furnishing bonds to the satisfaction of the Deputy Registrar (Judi.). The bail bonds were executed on 3.4.93 for appearance on 31.5.1993. The bonds are on record and indicate accordingly. Thus if the least respect for law would have been shown by the applicant it could have been by filing an appeal and asking for extending the period from the appellate court. This court once grants bail and releases an accused who is in detention, cannot grant bail for the second time and suspend the order as the court is functus officio. Sub-s. (3) of S. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act is an enabling clause which gives power to this court to exercise the powers if he intends to file an appeal. Two terms used by the Legislature in this section are very important, (1) 'satisfies the High Court; and 2-'intends to prefer an appeal'. The satisfaction and the intention cannot be a repetative process. On the saying of the President of the High Court Bar in an extraordinary circumstance on a non-sitting day on being satisfied and looking to the intention of the applicants for preferring appeal, he was granted bail by suspending the operation of the order. We are now functus officio, more particularly when the appeal has already been filed before the Supreme Court. In this view of the matter we are unable to accede to the prayer of the applicant. 10. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, both the applications are dismissed. The registry may proceed in accordance with law. A copy of this order may be sent to the Bar Council of Rajasthan.Applications dismissed. *******