Judgment :- K.A. SWAMI, C.J. 1. This Writ Appeal is preferred against the order dated 7.1.1993 passed by the learned single judge in W.P. No. 220 of 1993. In the writ petition, the petitioner who is the owner of the land bearing S. No. 116/2A of Saligramam village measuring 3450 Sq. Metres situated in Madras urban agglomeration, sought for quashing the order dated 18.11.1992 bearing No. (Ms) No. 1314 passed by the State Government under S. 21(1) of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, hereinafer referred to as the Act). By the aforesaid order the State Government has rejected the application filed by the petitioner for exempting the land in question from the purview of Chapter III of the Act, on the ground that on the date the application for exemption was filed, the land had vested in the State Government having regard to the order passed and the notification issued under S. 11(3) of the Act specifying the date from which the land vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It is not in dispute that the land in question is a vacant land. It was held by the petitioner. Therefore, he filed the returns under the provisions of the Act for determination of the question as to whether he held vacant land in excess of ceiling area. Pursuant to that return the competent Authority decided the question as to whether the vacant land held by the petitioner exceeded the ceiling limits. Pursuant to the order passed by the Competent Authority a notification was issued in Form VI under sub-S. (3) of S. 11 of the Act in the following terms: “Notification declaring the acquisition of excess vacant land under sub-S. (3) of S. 11.(Rc. 1251/80-C.) No. VI(1)/1339/81. Pursuant to the order passed by the Competent Authority a notification was issued in Form VI under sub-S. (3) of S. 11 of the Act in the following terms: “Notification declaring the acquisition of excess vacant land under sub-S. (3) of S. 11.(Rc. 1251/80-C.) No. VI(1)/1339/81. Under sub-S. (3) of S. 11 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 (Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 978), I.S. Meer Ahamed Ibrahim, Competent Authority of Kunnathur, hereby declare that the excess vacant land referred to in the schedule below and having been published under sub-S. (1) of S. 11 of the said Act as Notification No. VI/(1)1175/81, dated the 4th September, 1981 in Part VI-S. 1 of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated the 30th September, 1981, shall, with effect on and from the 18th November, 1981 be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and that such land shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the Stale Government free from all encumbrances with effect on and from the date specified above. Table 2. For our purpose it is also relevant to notice that on 21.2.1991, the land owner-petitioner filed an application under S. 21 of the Act for exempting the excess vacant land from the provisions of Chapter III of the Act. After such an application was filed, even according to the case of the respondent, possession of the vacant land in question was obtained by the State Government on 11.10.1991 pursuant to vesting. 2.1. The application filed under S. 21 of the Act by the petitioner has been rejected by the State Government on the ground that there is no scope for exercising the power under S. 21 of the Act, as on the date of filing of the application the land had vested in the State Government. It is the validity of this order, as already painted out, that is challenged in the writ petition. The learned single judge, has also taken the same view. Accordingly the learned single judge has held that the order passed by the State Government does not suffer from any infirmity. Consequently, the learned single judge has rejected the writ petition. Hence this Writ Appeal. 3. The learned single judge, has also taken the same view. Accordingly the learned single judge has held that the order passed by the State Government does not suffer from any infirmity. Consequently, the learned single judge has rejected the writ petition. Hence this Writ Appeal. 3. The point that arises for consideration in this Writ Appeal is, as to whether an application filed under S. 21 of the Act can be considered and the power under S. 21 of the Act can be exercised irrespective of the fact that the notification under S. 11(3) of the Act specifying the dale on which the excess vacant land will vest in the State Government, is published and the possession is obtained, if the application seeking exemption is filed at any time before the excess vacant land, is disposed of by the State Government in favour of a third parry. 4. In order to decide this question certain provisions of the Act may first be noticed: The provisions of S. 21(1)(a) and (b) with the proviso thereof are as follows: “21. Power to exempt- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other foregoing provisions of this Chapter:— (a) Where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government is satisfied, either on its own motion or otherwise that, having regard to the location of such land, the purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of these cases may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, the State Government may, by order, exempt whether prospectively or retrospectively and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter: (b) Where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government, either on its own motion or otherwise, is satisfied that the application of the provisions of this Chapter would cause undue hardship to such person, the State Government may, by order, exempt, whether prospectively or retrospectively and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter. Provided that no order under this clause shall be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing” Clause (c) of sub-S. (1) of S. 21 and sub-S. (2) of S. 21 of the Act are not relevant for our purpose. Hence the same are not extracted. 5. On the basis of the wordings contained in clauses (a) and (b) of S. 21(i) it is contended by the learned Government Pleader that on the date when the application was filed seeking exemption the petitioner did not hold the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit either as owner or in any other capacity, because, the land came to be vested in the State Government with effect from 18.11.1992. In support of this contention learned Government Pleader placed reliance on the definition of the expression ‘to hold’ as contained in clause (1) of S. 3 of the Act. The said definition is as follows: “to hold” with its grammatical variations, in relation to any vacant land, means (i) to own such land; or (ii) to possess such land as owner or as tenant or as mortgagee or under an irrevocable power of attorney or under a hire-purchase agreement or partly in one of the said capacities and partly in any other or the said capacity or capacities. Explanation I.- For the purpose of this clause, “tenant” means any person who has paid or has agreed to pay rent or other consideration for his being allowed by another to enjoy the land of the latter under a tenancy agreement, express or implied, and includes- (i) any such person who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement. (ii) the heirs, assignees, regal representative of such person, or persons deriving rights through such person. (ii) the heirs, assignees, regal representative of such person, or persons deriving rights through such person. Explanation I-A.- (a) A vacant land vested with an executor or an administrator under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (Central Act 39 of 1925) shall be deemed to be held by such executor or administrator, for the purpose of this Act; and (b) for the purpose of computing the ceiling limit of vacant land so deemed to be held by any person in the capacity of such executor or administrator, the vacant land held by such person in any other capacity shall not be taken into account and the vacant land held by such person in any other capacity shall be dealt with separately and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly”. The contention of the learned Government Pleader is that as per S. 11(3) of the Act, on the notification was issued under sub-S. (3) of S. 11 of the Act exempted, the excess vacant land came to be vested in the State Government from 18.11.1981 as specified in that notification free from encumbrances. Therefore, the applicant ceased to be the owner of the land and also ceased to possess any right whatsoever in the land. Hence he could not nave been considered as on 21.2.1991 the date on which he made an application under S. 21 of the Act, holding the land in any one of the capacities as stated in clause (1) of S. 3 of the Act. 6. On the contrary it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that having regard to the fact that S. 21(1) of the Act opens with non-obstante clause and it empowers the State Government to exercise the power under S. 21(1) retrospectively as well as prospectively, it cannot be held that the State Government ceases to have the power to exempt any land from the purview of Chapter III of the Act merely on the ground that the land is vested in it by reason of the notification issued under S. 11(3) of the Act. It is also further contended that even the definition section itself opens with the words “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires”, the definition of the expressions contained in S. 3 of the Act shall have to e read in the context in which those expressions are used. It is also further contended that even the definition section itself opens with the words “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires”, the definition of the expressions contained in S. 3 of the Act shall have to e read in the context in which those expressions are used. Thus, the submission made on behalf of the petitioner is that the State Government continues to have the power under S. 21 of the Act and similarly the owner of the land, even though he has lost possession of the land or it has vested in the State Government, continues to have the right to seek exemption. It is further submitted that as in the instant case the application has been rejected without going into the merits of it, the order passed by the Government is liable to be quashed and the application is entitled to be remitted back to the State Government for fresh consideration. 7. We have already reproduced the definition of the expression ‘to hold’ and also S. 21(1) (a) and (b) of the Act. S. 21(1)(a) and (b) empowers the State Government to exercise the power to grant exemption prospectively or retrospectively, of course, subject to such conditions the State Government may specify in the order. S. 21(1) opens with the non-obstante clause “notwithstanding anything contained in any other foregoing provisions of this Chapter” It is an established legal position in law and it is also one of the principles of interpretation of statute that whenever the statute begins with the clause the object of such non-obstante clause is to give an overriding effect to the provisions contained in the section opening with the non-obstante clause over the other provisions of the statute as mentioned in the very non-obstante clause. In South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Secretary Board of Revenue, Trivandrum and another ( AIR 1964 S.C. 207 ), while dealing with the non-obstante clause contained in Article 278 of the Constitution, it has been observed thus: “That apart, even if Art. 372 continues the pre-Constitution laws of taxation, that provision is expressly made subject to the other provisions of the Constitution. The expression subject to” conveys the idea of a provisions yielding place to another provision or other provision to which it is made subject. Further, Art. 278 opens out with a non-obstante clause. The expression subject to” conveys the idea of a provisions yielding place to another provision or other provision to which it is made subject. Further, Art. 278 opens out with a non-obstante clause. The phrase “notwithstanding anything in the Constitution” is equivalent to saying that in spite of the other Articles of the Constitution, or that the other Articles shall not be an impediment to the operation of Art. 278. While Art. 372 is subject to Art. 278, Art. 278 operates in its own sphere in spite of Art. 372. The result is that Art. 278 overrides Art. 372, that is to say, notwithstanding the fact that a pre-Constitution taxation law continues in force under Art. 372, the Union and the State Government can enter into an agreement in terms of Art. 278 in respect of Part B States depriving the State law of its efficacy. In one view Art. 277 excludes the operation of Art. 372, and in the other, view, an agreement in terms of Art. 278 overrides Art. 372. In either view, the result is the same, namely, that at any rate, during the period covered by the agreement the States ceased to have any power to impose the tax in respect of “works contracts”. In Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Asbalata ( AIR 1987 SC 117 ), while considering the non-obstante clause, it has been held as follows: “It was canvassed before us that the non-obstante clause was connected with the verb, i.e., that a licensee in S. 15 A of the Act on the date be deemed to become tenant, but it does not detract from the power of the tenant not to create licence. The construction placed by the Full Bench, in our opinion, would curtail the language of the Section and on the basis of the High Courts judgment, the amendment ceases to be meaningful for a large section intended to be protected and unless one is constrained b y compulsion to give a restricted meaning, one should not do it in this case. We find no such compulsion. We find no such compulsion. A clause beginning with the expression “notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in some particular provision in the Act or in some particular Act or in any law for the time being in force, or in any contract” is more often than not appended to a Section in the beginning with a view to give the enacting part of the Section in case of conflict and overriding effect over the provision of the Act or the contract mentioned in the non-obstante clause. It is equivalent to saying that in spite of the provisions of the Act or any other Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause or any contract or document mentioned, the enactment following it will have its full operation or that the provisions embraced in the non-obstante clause would not be an impediment for an operation of the enactment. See in this connection the observations of this Court in South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum (AIR 1964 S.C. 297 at p. 215 (1964) 4 SCR 280 ). It is well settled that the expression ‘notwithstanding’ is in contradiction to the phrase ‘subject to’, the latter conveying the idea of a provision yielding place to another provision or other provisions to which it is made subject. This will be clarified in the instant case by comparison of sub-S. (1) of S. 15 with sub-S. (1) of S. 15A. We are therefore unable to accept, with respect, the view expressed by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court as relied on by the learned single judge in the judgment under appeal.” Therefore, it is clear that the provisions contained in S. 21(1) of the Act shall have to be interpreted in such a Way that the other provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act preceding S. 21, do not in any way affect the exercise of the power under S. 21(1) of the Act. Similarly, the definition of the expression ‘to hold’ shall have to be interpreted and understood in the context it is used in S. 21 of the Act. Similarly, the definition of the expression ‘to hold’ shall have to be interpreted and understood in the context it is used in S. 21 of the Act. If the provisions contained in S. 21(1) of the Act have to be given overriding effect to those contained in Chapter III of the Act, the definition of expression ‘to bold’ has to be read so as to be in conformity with the object of the provisions contained in S. 21 of the Act, even though S. 3 of the Act does not fall under Chapter III, nevertheless it opens with the words “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.” Therefore, though S. 3 is not covered by the non-obstante clause contained in S. 21(1), nevertheless the very opening of the words in S. 3 of the Act will enable the words and expressions which are defined in S. 3 of the Act to be read in the context of the Act they are used in the various provisions of the Act. Therefore, the fact that S. 3 falls outside the purview of the Act will not in any way affect or cause any hindrance in the way of interpretation of S. 21(1) so as to give overriding effect over the provisions contained in Chapter III. In addition to this, it is also necessary to see the object with which the words ‘whether prospectively or retrospectively’ are inserted by way of the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act 62 of 1981 in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-S. (1) of S. 21 of the Act. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Act of the State Legislature to amend S. 21 of the Act it has been stated as follows: “S. 21 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 (Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1978), provides that State Government may, by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be notified in the order, any vacant land from the provisions of Chapter III of the said Act. The said S. 21 does not empower the Government to grant any exemption retrospectively. Absence of this provision has caused certain administrative difficulties. It is therefore proposed to amend the said S. 21 suitably to empower the Government to grant any exemption with retrospective effect”. The said S. 21 does not empower the Government to grant any exemption retrospectively. Absence of this provision has caused certain administrative difficulties. It is therefore proposed to amend the said S. 21 suitably to empower the Government to grant any exemption with retrospective effect”. The Statement of Objects and Reasons reveals that absence of power to grant exemption retrospectively has caused certain administrative difficulties. In this regard, it is to be seen that the power of exemption is exercisable by the State Government whereas the power to adjudicate and determine whether a person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit as prescribed in the Act vests in a different authority, viz., the competent Authority named under the Act. Pursuant to such determination it is the competent authority who causes publication of the notification for acquisition of the excess vacant land by the State Government, receives the claims of the persons interested in the vacant land and considers them and ultimately declares by notification published in the State Government Gazette that the excess vacant land described in the notification vests in the State Government with effect from the date specified in such notification. As a result thereof, there will not be any coordination between the two and it is likely that the competent Authority may declare that the vacant land exceeds the ceiling limit and issue notification under S. 11(3) before the State Government considers the application under S. 21 of the Act. In such a case, in order to see that the State Government is not divested of the power exercisable under S. 21 of the Act, the amendment appears to have been introduced empowering the State Government to exercise the power of exemption either prospectively or retrospectively. If that be so, the object of the provisions contained in sub-S. () of S. 21 of the Act is to enable the State Government to consider the request for exempting excess vacant land from the purview of Chapter III of the Act at any time, and it is because of this the State Government has been empowered to give exemption either prospectively or retrospectively. If this object has to be achieved, the interpretation that has to be placed on the statute must be to enable the State Government to exercise the power even after the notification under S. 11(3) of the Act is issued, and the excess vacant land vests in the State Government. Such an interpretation will be consistent and in conformity with the object of the Act and will also safeguard the interests of the owners of the excess vacant land, who, under several circumstances, may be entitled to seek exemption from the purview of Chapter III of the Act either in public interest or to relieve themselves of the undue hardship that is going to be caused to them, by reason of vesting of excess vacant land in the State Government. 8. In this connection, we have also to take into consideration one more aspect. After vesting of the excess vacant land in the State Government, it is possible that the State Government, pursuant to the publication of the notification under S. 11(3) of the Act, may dispose of it and thereby a third party interest is created in the land and the State Government would cease to have an interest and control over the excess vacant land, which is disposed of by it. If the power of exemption as contained in S. 21(1) of the Act is held as exercisable either retrospectively or prospectively without any limitation, it may lead to certain anomalies. Therefore, we have to consider whether this power can be exercised even after the excess vacant land is disposed of by the State Government in favour of third parties. It appears to us that the power of exemption either retrospectively or prospectively cannot be held to exist in respect of an excess vacant land once the State Government disposes of the excess vacant land in favour of third parties, as, otherwise, the interest of the third party will not be safe and exercise of such power will not also be consistent with the right conferred in favour of a third party in the excess vacant land. It is possible that the third party, on acquiring title as may be conferred by the State Government, might even improve the land. It is possible that the third party, on acquiring title as may be conferred by the State Government, might even improve the land. Therefore, if it is held that the State Government even after disposal of the excess vacant land to third parties, continues to have power to exempt such excess vacant land from the purview of Chapter III of the Act, it would be detrimental to the interest of the third party. However, in a case where the owner of the vacant land makes an application under S. 21 of the Act even before the excess vacant land is disposed of by the State Government in favour of the third party, ignoring such an application and without deciding it on merits, if the State Government disposes of the excess vacant land in favour of third party, such an act of the State cannot be held to affect the application and the right of the owner to have the application filed under S. 21 of the Act considered on merits and in accordance with law. In such a situation, the disposal of the excess vacant land to a third party cannot be held to create an indefeasible right in the third party. Therefore, we are of the view that the power of exemption exercisable by the State Government under S. 21(1) of the Act is available even after the vesting of the excess vacant land and even after possession of the excess vacant land is obtained from the owner and it continues to exist until the excess vacant land is disposed of by the State Government. The application seeking exemption can be made at any time before the excess vacant land is disposed of by the State Government in favour of third parties and such an application shall have to be considered by the State Government in accordance with law and without considering such application the excess vacant land cannot be disposed of in any manner. The point raised for determination is answered accordingly. 9. In the instant case, even though the possession was obtained on the relevant date, i.e. on 11.10.1991, as per the case put forth by the State Government, even before the possession was obtained, an application under S. 21(1) of the Act was filed by the appellant on 21.2.1991 itself. The point raised for determination is answered accordingly. 9. In the instant case, even though the possession was obtained on the relevant date, i.e. on 11.10.1991, as per the case put forth by the State Government, even before the possession was obtained, an application under S. 21(1) of the Act was filed by the appellant on 21.2.1991 itself. The State Government, without considering that application, appears to have proceeded to take possession of the land. In the light of the interpretation placed by us on S. 21(1) of the Act, taking possession of the excess vacant land by the State Government cannot be held to have affected the application filed by the appellant on 21.2.1991 under S. 21(1) of the Act. Therefore, as held above, the State Government, before disposing of the excess vacant land, is required to consider the application on merits and in accordance with law. Our view, is also fortified by following decisions:— (1) Beni Prasad v. District Judge, Allahabad (AIR 1982 Allahabad 103); (2) Maniial v. State (AIR 1985 Gujarat 47) (3) Katya Cooperative Building Society Limited v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1985 A.P. 242 ); and (4) M. Siva Ramakrishnaiah v. State ( AIR 1985 A.P. 376 ) For the reasons stated above, we hold that the impugned order of the State Government cannot be sustained. 10. In the result, the Writ Appeal is entitled to succeed. It is accordingly allowed. The order passed by the learned single judge dated 7.1.1993 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 18.11.1992 passed by the State Government is quashed. The application dated 21.2.1991 filed by the petitioner/appellant under S. 21 of the Act is remitted to the Stale Government with direction to consider the same on merits and in accordance with the law after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner within six weeks from the date of receipt of this order. No costs.