JUDGMENT - A.A. CAZI, J.:-This second appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 30th April, 1990 of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Panaji, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 64 of 1986 whereby the appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree dated 31st July, 1986 of the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Panaji, dismissing the Suit No. 258/76/D was set aside and the 1st respondent's suit was decreed and then defendant No. 1, the predecessor of present appellants, as well as present respondent No. 2 were ordered to deliver to respondent No. 1 vacant possossion of the suit house within sixty days from the date of the order. 2. Mrs. Preciosa Fornandes had two sons- (i) respondent No. 1 and (ii) Domingos, the original defendant No. 1, who was since died and whose legal representatives are the present appellants. Respondent No. 1 has a daughter by name Eulanda. By a gift deed dated 6th May, 1970 Preciosa gifted the suit property so as to give the corpus or naked property to Eulanda while giving the usufruct thereof to respondent No. 1. Thereafter on 21st July, 1974 Preciosa died. Further facts which cannot be disputed at this stage were that respondent No. 1 lived in the suit house during certain times of the year and he was there in May 1976 and then he locked the suit house and went to Bombay. On 29th November, 1976 when he came to Goa he found that he had been dispossossed by Domingos who had allowed the present respondent No. 2 to occupy the suit property. Respondent No. 1 therefore filed Suit No. 258/76/D in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Panaji, for recovering possession of the suit property. There was a dispute regarding the nature of the suit but on that point the matter was considered by the Division Bench of this Court and it was held that the suit was not based on section 6 of the Specific Reliefs Act but it was based on title, the title being the right to usufruct of the suit property. It was further held that the defence of Domingos the defendant No. 1 was that the 1st respondent's right of usufruct had been extinguished by collation under the law of succession. It was further held that the defence of Domingos the defendant No. 1 was that the 1st respondent's right of usufruct had been extinguished by collation under the law of succession. In the suit Domingos was made defendant No. 1 while the present respondent No. 2 Shaba Narvenkar, was made defendant No. 2. The trial Court dismissed the 1st respondent's suit by the judgment and order dated 31st July, 1986, whereupon respondent No. 1 filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 64 of 1986. The 1st respondents' appeal was allowed and his suit for recovering possession of the property from the defendants was decreed. It is under those circumstances that the present second appeal has been filed by the legal representatives of original defendant No. 1, Domingos. 3. It may be pointed out that the law applicable in this case is the Family Laws of Goa, Daman and Diu which form part of the Civil Code in force in the territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. Under this law, "Decujus", which means the Estate Leaver, can dispose of only certain part of his property by way of gift and if he makes a gift of his property in excess of the disposable portion then such excess, which may be referred to as the undisposable excess, can on the death of the "Decujus", be claimed by the heirs of the "Decujus" according to intestate succession. If such gift is made to an heir then the gifted property is subject to "collation". In Black's Law Dictionary at page 710, collation is defined as follows: "... In the civil law, the collation of goods is the supposed or real return to the mass of succession which an heir makes of property which he received in advance of his share or otherwise, in order that such property may be divided together with the other effects of the succession. In the civil law, the collation of goods is the supposed or real return to the mass of succession which an heir makes of property which he received in advance of his share or otherwise, in order that such property may be divided together with the other effects of the succession. The fundamental basis of the doctrine is legal presumption that ancestor intended absolute eqality among his descendants in final distribution of his property, that donation by him during his lifetime to any of them was merely advancement of d'horic or advance on donee's hereditary share to establish him in life or for some other useful purpose, and that ancestor intended to or establish equality among his descendants in final partition of his estate." Collation would not be applicable if the donor has stated so in the terms of the gift. In other words, if he has not exempted the gift from collation, then there was no such exemption. Mr. Usgaocar therefore, urged that Domingos being the heir of Preciosa and who had the right to claim collation in respect of the 1st respondent's usufructary rights in respect of the suit property cannot be said to have no rights in the suit property and under these circumstances he could not be evicted or thrown out from the suit property and that if respondent No. 1 had any right of possession in respect of the suit property through his usufructary rights he could claim them only as jointly with Domingos and if at all he had any grievance he could claim nothing more than joint possession of the suit property with Domingos. 4. It was urged by Mr. Lotlikar, Counsel for respondent No. 1 that collation does not mean that the actual property gifted must be returned. Mr. Lotlikar drew my attention to the words "supposed or real return" given in the definition of collation as given in Black's Law Dictionary and urged that the return referred here does not necessarily mean the return of the actual property and only the value of the gifted property has to be accounted for the purpose of calculation of the value of the undisposable portion of the estate of the "Decujus" for the purpose determining the value of the shares of the heirs. He then drew my attention to the definition of collation as given in Article 2098 which reads as follows : "Collation is the return, which the forced heirs desiring to claim inheritance, are bound to do, to the mass of succession, of the values which have been gifted to them by the estate-leaver, for the purpose of calculation of the half and for the equality of the partition." Now, I do not agree with the submission of Mr. Lotlikar. The word "values" mentioned in the said Article 2098 does not, according to my reading, mean value of the property but means the property itself. This can be seen from the fact that in Article 2098 the word "values" is immediately followed by the words "which have been gifted to them by the estate leaver....". Mr. Usgaocar drew my attention to a portion of Article 1371 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads : "... Notice shall be issued to the donees, irrespective of whether they are bound by collation or not, to appear on the day fixed to take the oath of office that they will discharge their duties as administrator in relation to the properties which have been gifted to them." Now, administration of properties given cannot be done in respect of values of property. 5. Mr. Lotlikar then argued that it was not necessary for physically bringing back the property for the purpose of collation. What is urged by Mr. Lotlikar is true. However, the fact that the property may be considered notionally as brought into the hotch pot would be notionally considered as in the possession of all heirs entitled to share in the hotch pot. In this view of the matter, Domingos could be said to have had notional possession of the property at the time of the death of Preciosa which is the date of the opening of the inheritance. 6. Mr. In this view of the matter, Domingos could be said to have had notional possession of the property at the time of the death of Preciosa which is the date of the opening of the inheritance. 6. Mr. Lotlikar further urged that respondent No. 1 was in possession of the property at the time of Preciosa's death on 21st November, 1974 and therefore under Article 2070 he shall be deemed to be the administrator in respect of the suit property and could continue to be in possession of the suit property as administrator thereof and that even an heir who is entitled to get a share of that property would get possession only on distribution of the property according to law of succession and until that is done the heir cannot disturb administrator's possession of the property. According to Mr. Usgaocar Article 2070 must be read with Article 2068. Article 2068 states who are the adminisrators. Though Article 2068 states so none of the several persons listed there becomes an administrator automatically but requires to be appointed as an administrator. A co-heir who is excluded from being an administrator under Article 2068 would be included as one under the provisions of Article 2070. But though Article 2070 states so he too does not automatically become an administrator. Therefore, Articles 2068 and 2070 must be read as giving a list of persons who are eligible to be appointed as administrator. The word "deemed" in Article 2070 must be read in that light. This can also be seen from Articles 1369, 1370 and 1371 of the Code of Civil Procedure which require the administrator to take an oath of office and this would indicate that it is only after the oath of office is taken that the administrator can be said to have been appointed as administrator. Paragraph 4 of Article 1369 also speaks of appoinment of administrator. Hence, though the word "appointment" is not there in Articles 2068 and 2070, there cannot be any administrator until an appointment of the administrator is made. 7. In the circumstances, the appeal is partially allowed. The decrees of the First Appellate Court and the trial Court are set aside and there will be a decree for joint possession of the suit property in favour of respondent No. 1 along with the appellants. 7. In the circumstances, the appeal is partially allowed. The decrees of the First Appellate Court and the trial Court are set aside and there will be a decree for joint possession of the suit property in favour of respondent No. 1 along with the appellants. If there has been execution of the decree of the First Appellate Court, there will be restoration to comply with the decree as passed in this Second Appeal. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal partially allowed.