Judgment :- The petitioner challenges Ext.P3 prohibitory order issued under the Revenue Recovery Act. The petitioner had joined a chit conducted by the first respondent company. According to the petitioner he was a subscriber in Chit No.1295/C495 of 1971. According to him he had bid the chit in auction on 10-6-1977 for Rs.5,570/- He claims that he had paid the instalments due and the transaction was closed and the chitty terminated on 10-1-1980. According to the petitioner thereafter no amount was due from him towards the chit transaction. A notice Ext.P1 was issued to the petitioner by the first respondent company claiming that on verification of his account it was seen that he had not remitted 10 instalments of the chit amounting to Rs.1,000/- and claiming from him the said sum of Rs.1,000/- with interest at 12% per annum. Another notice was sent to the petitioner on 19-2-1987 informing him that action will be taken against him for realisation of the defaulted amounts. According to the petitioner he issued a notice through his counsel pointing out that no amount was due from him and that i n any event the claim was barred by limitation. The petitioner has not chosen to produce the copy of that notice to show that he had put forward a case that the claim was barred by limitation. The petitioner has produced the reply to this notice from the first respondent company as Ext.P2. The petitioner complains that there after Ext. PS prohibitory order has been issued to his employer under the Revenue Recovery Act directing recovery of a sum of Rs.500/- per month from the salary of the petitioner. The petitioner contends that the said prohibitory order dated 25-11-1988 is liable to be quashed on the ground that the claim of the first respondent as against him is barred by limitation. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the only ground of attack raised by him on behalf of the petitioner is that the claim by the first respondent company as against the petitioner is barred by limitation. According to him the chitty terminated on 10-1-1980 and Ext.P1 demand was made only in the year 1986. He also points out that the prohibitory order under the Revenue Recovery Act was issued only on 25-11-1988. According to him the chitty terminated on 10-1-1980 and Ext.P1 demand was made only in the year 1986. He also points out that the prohibitory order under the Revenue Recovery Act was issued only on 25-11-1988. The petitioner's submission is that since the period for recovery of a debt is only three years, the claim of the first respondent company is barred by limitation. He seeks to contend that in the light of the decision reported in A.K. Nanu and others v. State of Kerala and others (1987 (2) KIT 921) Revenue Recovery Proceedings also cannot be initiated for recovery of a barred debt. 3. I am afraid that the contention on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted. The petitioner has produced no material before this court to show that the claim is barred by limitation. The petitioner has not even alleged that he has not executed any mortgage to secure the payment of the future instalments of the chit. He has also not produced the contract between the parties to prove the terms of the transaction. Ext.P2 reply notice served on the petitioner indicates that the petitioner had agreed to settle the liability. The chitty having terminated only on 10-1-1980 the respondent company could have 12 years to enforce the obligation of the petitioner if he had secured the future instalments payable by a mortgage as is usually done in such transactions. In the nature of the allegations contained in the Original Petition, and in the absence of the relevant materials, it is not possible to hold that the claim of respondent No.1 is barred by limitation. In that view of the matter, it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioner that proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act cannot be taken against him. Even if the ratio of the decision reported in 1987 (2) KLT 921 is applied to this case, since it is not shown that the claim is barred by limitation, the petitioner cannot get Ext. PS order quashed in this proceeding. 4. Even otherwise, with great respect, I have considerable hesitation in accepting the provision enunciated in the decision reported in 1987 (2) KLT 921. The Limitation Act applies only to an action in a civil court by way of suit or an application. PS order quashed in this proceeding. 4. Even otherwise, with great respect, I have considerable hesitation in accepting the provision enunciated in the decision reported in 1987 (2) KLT 921. The Limitation Act applies only to an action in a civil court by way of suit or an application. The Limitation Act is a statute of repose and is enacted not on the basis of any equitable consideration but only on the basis of public policy not to keep alive claims to be made to a court indefinitely. The Limitation Act does not extinguish the debt but only bars the remedy. The Limitation Act cannot be applied when a person does not approach the civil court for relief by way of a suit or by way of an application under the Code or under any other special enactment providing for relief through the civil court. (See K.S.E.B. v. T.P.K. 1976 KLT 810 (SC) and Jokkim Fernandez v. AminaKunhi Umma, 1973 KLT 138 (FB). The Revenue Recovery Act has been enacted for recovery of debts due to the State. It is conceded that the debts due to the first respondent company can be recovered through the Revenue Recovery Act. It appears to me that so long as the debt is not extinguished, the right to recover the same would survive except in cases where the Limitation Act may apply. Ft has to be noted that in the Decision Hansraj AIR 1933 PC 63 relied on by the Division Bench, the application by the liquidator was to a court. Equally, the decision in Kaluram's case (AIR 1976 SC 1637) relied on, related to the interpretation of the expression 'payable' and their Lordships held that payable in the context of the Act considered therein meant "legally recoverable" and hence took the view that the Estate Officer cannot insist that the barred amount was also payable. But their Lordships have pointed out: "It is not questioned that a creditor whose suit is barred by limitation, if he has any other legal remedy permitting him to enforce his claims, would be free to avail of it." The same proportion is enunciated in Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Edition Vol.24 at page 205. But their Lordships have pointed out: "It is not questioned that a creditor whose suit is barred by limitation, if he has any other legal remedy permitting him to enforce his claims, would be free to avail of it." The same proportion is enunciated in Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Edition Vol.24 at page 205. "Except in the cases previously mentioned, the Limitation Act, 1939 only takes away the remedies by action or set off, it leaves the right otherwise untouched and if a creditor whose debt is statute - barred has any means of enforcing his claim other than by action. or set off, this Act does not prevent him from recovering by those means...." Relying on this passage the Supreme Court has held in K.G. U. Trust v. Shri Ram Chandraji Mandir (AIR 1978 SC 287) that "Entire amount of rent due in U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, would include rent which has become time barred and a tenant who wants to avert an order for eviction, has to deposit the entire amount due including that portion the recovery by suit of which has become barred by limitation." It has also to be noted that this principle has been accepted by Janaki Amma, J. in Muliammedkutty v. Ahammed Kutty (1979 KLT 539). 5. It has also to be noticed in this connection that S.5 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act uses the words "revenue due" and S.71 of the Act uses the words "amounts due". In my view, the word payable' not having been used, there is no reason to whittle down the scope of the expression 'due' occurring in the Revenue Recovery Act. With respect, therefore, it appears to me that the proportion enunciated in Nanti's case 1987 (2) KLT 921 would require reconsideration. 6. In this view, normally I should have referred this case for decision by a Division Bench in view of the fact that the nanu's case is binding on me. But in the light of my finding that the petitioner has failed to show that the claim against him is barred by limitation, I do not think it necessary to refer this case to a Division Bench. 7. But in the light of my finding that the petitioner has failed to show that the claim against him is barred by limitation, I do not think it necessary to refer this case to a Division Bench. 7. I must also observe that the petitioner was employed as a Law Officer in the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation at the relevant time and the amount claimed from him towards the chitty liability was around Rs.1000/-. Taking note of the status of the petitioner and the nature of the liability, I am also not declined to exercise my jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution to enable him to evade his obligation to repay the amount. The Original Petition is dismissed. A copy of this judgment will be forwarded to the Managing Director, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation so as to enable him to effectuate the prohibitory order. I make no order as to costs.