JUDGMENT - Dhanuka D.R., J.:—On 23rd October, 1992, I had delivered my judgment on Issue No. 1 and 2 formulated in para 3 of the said judgment. Issue No. 2(a) of the issues requires the Court to determine as to whether the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 354-S of the Bombay Municipal corporation Act, 1888 read with scale of solatium/additional compensation set out in Schedule CC to the Act are violative of constitutional guarantee enshrined in Article 14 of Constitution of India on the ground that the said provisions excluded applicability of sub-section (2) of section 23 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to cases of acquisition of land under Chapter XIIA of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 except in respect of acquisition made under the same Chapter for purpose of police accommodation scheme and make provisions for payment of much lesser solatium or additional compensation in all other cases of acquisition i.e. on .the scale setout in Schedule CC to the Act in lieu thereof. By my Order dated 23rd October, 1992, I directed issue of notice to the Advocate General for the State of Maharashtra as in my opinion the determination of the said issue involve substantial question of law as to interpretation of Constitution. By my said judgment and Order dated 23rd October, 1992, I directed that parties shall be heard further on Issue No. 3(a), Issue No. 3(b) and Issue No. 4 and 5 at the adjourned hearing after the requisite notice was served on Advocate General for State of Maharashtra. 2. Accordingly the Prothonotary and Senior Master issued notice to the learned Advocate General for the State of Maharashtra on 6th November, 1992 and forwarded a copy of my Order dated 23rd October, 1992 to the Advocate General. The Reference herein, therefore, remained part-heard. The proceedings were adjourned from time to time on the request of the learned Counsel for the State of Maharashtra and the learned Counsel for the Acquiring Body. Ultimately the hearing on the remaining issues has been completed with the Assistance of Shri C.M. Korde, learned Counsel for National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Ltd., Shri N.T. Saraf, the learned Special Land Acquisition Officer, Maharashtra and Special Land Acquisition Officer and Shri R.L. Dalal, learned Counsel for Acquiring Body i.e. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay. Ultimately the hearing on the remaining issues has been completed with the Assistance of Shri C.M. Korde, learned Counsel for National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Ltd., Shri N.T. Saraf, the learned Special Land Acquisition Officer, Maharashtra and Special Land Acquisition Officer and Shri R.L. Dalal, learned Counsel for Acquiring Body i.e. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay. The Advocate General for State of Maharashtra did not appear at the hearing of the reference. 3. At the resumed hearing of this part-heard Land Acquisition Reference Shri R. L. Dalal, learned Counsel raised an additional contention to the effect that this Hon'ble Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide Land Acquisition Reference No. 12 of 1978. The learned Counsel contended that the Special Tribunal as and when constituted alone could entertain such references. The learned Counsel Shri R.L. Dalal invited attention of the Court to section 354-SA of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 in-this respect. I granted permission to the learned Counsel for the acquiring body to raise the jurisdictional question and argue the same in detail. I must deal with the contention raised on merits. 4. New Chapter XII-A was inserted in the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 by Bombay Act No. 13 of 1933. The said chapter deals with the subject of (1) Improvement Schemes (2) Police Accommodation Scheme (3) Clearance areas (4) Re-development areas (5) provision of housing accommodation for the poorer classes. Chapter XII-A of the said Act consists of sections 354-B to 354-X. Section 354-S of the Act provides that “The Land Acquisition Act shall apply to the extent set forth in Schedule CC to the acquisitions made under the said Chapter, otherwise then by agreement, subject to specific provisions, made in the said Chapter and particularly section 354-S thereof. It is more than clear from plain reading of section 354-S and Schedule CC to the Act that Part III of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dealing with the “Reference to Court and procedure thereon” is in terms incorporated in Chapter XII-A of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act as if enacted in body of the Act for the purpose of considering jurisdictional question raised by Shri R.L. Dalal, the Learned Counsel for acquiring body, it is enough to refer to section 18 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 duly incorporated in Chapter XIIA of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 in terms provides that “the Court” as defined in section 3(d) of Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 shall have jurisdiction to decide all the land acquisition references concerning inter alia amount and payment of compensation for acquisition of land etc. Section 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 defines the expression “Court” as under : “The expression “Court” means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the (appropriate Government) has appointed (as it is hereby empowered to do) a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under this Act.” The High Court of Bombay is the principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction and has jurisdiction to receive and decide all land acquisition references arising out of awards made under the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 or the awards made under Chapter XII-A of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. The jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain and decide 'land acquisition references' arising out of awards made under Chapter XII-A of the Act is far too obvious in view of specific incorporation of section 18 of Land Acquisition Act in Chapter XII-A of the Act Section 354-SA of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 provides that “For the purposes of acquisition of land under a compulsory acquisition Order made and confirmed under the provisions of this Chapter, the functions of the Court under the Land Acquisition Act shall be performed by a Tribunal having the constitution and powers set forth in Schedule II and in the construction of the said Act and the provisions of this Chapter the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the Court, and the President of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the Judge”. It is common ground that no Tribunal as contemplated under section 354-SA has ever been set up for all these several decades. It is common ground that accordingly references are being filed in this Court by the Land Acquisition Officer concerned as and when an application is made for filing of reference by the party aggrieved against the awards made under Chapter XIIA of the Act. 5. It is common ground that accordingly references are being filed in this Court by the Land Acquisition Officer concerned as and when an application is made for filing of reference by the party aggrieved against the awards made under Chapter XIIA of the Act. 5. Shri R. L. Dalal, the learned Counsel for acquiring body has submitted that section 354-SA of the Act is mandatory and whatever be the hardship and whatever be the injustice to the party aggrieved no reference under section 18 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 can be made to this Court and the parties concerned have no remedy of reference at all until the 'Tribunal contemplated under section 354-SA of the Act is established by the prescribed authority. It must be said to the credit of Shri N.T. Saraf, the learned Counsel for the State of Maharashtra that he has not supported this line of argument advanced by the Acquiring Body presumably because the argument urged before the Court is far too absurd and patently unjust. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be excluded except by express provisions of the Act or by necessary implication. The plain and simple construction of section 354-SA of the Act appears to be as under :— As and when the Tribunal having the constitution and power set forth in Schedule II of the Act is duly established, such Tribunal shall discharge the functions of the Land Acquisition Court in so far as the reference arises out of awards made under Chapter XII of the Act. Till such Tribunal is set up, the land Acquisition Court as defined under section 2(d) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 must entertain and decide Land Acquisition references arising out of awards made under the said Chapter. This Court as the principal Court of Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction is “the Land Acquisition Court” under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 and it cannot be reasonably argued that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to entertain and determine the references even though no Tribunal is established. The citizens of this country cannot be deprived of their legal remedy to challenge the award before this Court in the manner suggested by Shri Dalal. In view of the above discussion, I have no hesitation in rejecting this submission of Mr. Dalal, the learned Counsel for Acquiring Body. The citizens of this country cannot be deprived of their legal remedy to challenge the award before this Court in the manner suggested by Shri Dalal. In view of the above discussion, I have no hesitation in rejecting this submission of Mr. Dalal, the learned Counsel for Acquiring Body. It is not possible to accept the construction of a statute which will create anomaly and which is patently absurd and unjust. It appears from letter dated 10th June, 1993 addressed by Deputy Secretary to Government of Maharashtra to Shri N.T. Saraf, Government Counsel that the Government has now initiated action to establish the proposed Tribunal. 6. I shall now deal with the principal question debated at the Bar i.e. the issue regarding constitutional validity of the second proviso to section 354(3) of the Act excluding sub-section (2) of section 354-SA of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to cases of acquisition made under Chapter XIIA of the Act except in case of acquisition for “Police Accommodation Scheme.” 7. Chapter XII-A of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 contemplates acquisition of land for diverse purposes. If the same very chapter is invoked for acquisition of land for the purpose of a Police Accommodation Scheme, the owner of the concerned land and other persons interested therein shall be entitled to claim to compensation as well as solatium as contemplated under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 including sub-section (2) of section 23 thereof. Section 354-O of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 provides that the Corporation shall have power to make a police accommodation scheme for constructing dwellings, Police Stations and accessory buildings for any or all classes of such police, and for acquiring, raising and levelling any land required for the execution of the scheme. Sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act is fully applicable to the cases of acquisition of land under the same very chapter for purpose of police accommodation scheme. However, the applicability of the abovereferred beneficial provision is excluded when the land is acquired for 'other purposes' under Chapter XIIA of the Act. In this case the land is acquired in connection with a clearance area under section 354-RD of the Act. However, the applicability of the abovereferred beneficial provision is excluded when the land is acquired for 'other purposes' under Chapter XIIA of the Act. In this case the land is acquired in connection with a clearance area under section 354-RD of the Act. Second proviso of section 354-S(3) of the Act provides that in such cases the owner of the land under acquisition and other persons interested in the said land shall not be entitled to payment of solatium as provided by section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act and shall be entitled to claim and receive such solatium labelled therein as additional compensation to much lesser extent as sefout in schedule DD to the Act. If the benefit of section 23(2) of the Act is not to be made available to the owner of land under acquisition, amount of solatium or additional compensation (whatever be the nomenclature) would be payable at the following scale only:— Amount of Compensation awarded Percentage to be allowed in addition under section 354.—Not exceeding ten thousand rupees or, if the amount exceeds ten thousand rupees for the first ten thousand. Exceeding ten thousand, but not exceeding fifty thousand, for the amount by which it exceeds ten thousand. Exceeding fifty thousand rupees but not exceeding one lakh, for the amount by which it exceeds fifty thousand. Exceeding one lakh, for (the amount by which it exceeds one lakh. Two and a half per cent. The abovereferred scale of payment is very much lower than the scale of solatium prescribed under section 23(2) of Land Acquisition Act. Under section 23(2) of Land Acquisition Act as amended, the rate of solatium payable is 30% of amount of compensation. This is not a case of differentiation or discrimination between the cases of acquisition under different Acts. This is a case of differentiation or differentiation between the cases of acquisition under Chapter XIIA of the B.M.C. Act, 1888 depending upon the purpose for which the land is acquired. Purpose of acquisition is made the criteria for payment of different scale of solatium under the same statute. Is this differentiation constitutionally permissible? Six per cent. Four per cent. Three per cent. 8. Purpose of acquisition is made the criteria for payment of different scale of solatium under the same statute. Is this differentiation constitutionally permissible? Six per cent. Four per cent. Three per cent. 8. The question to be asked is as to whether the classification made by second proviso to section 354-S(3) of the Act for payment of solatium between- the persons interested in land under acquisition whose lands are acquired for police accommodation scheme on one hand and the persons interested in land under acquisition whose lands are acquired for some other purpose under the same very chapter of the Act is a reasonable classification and as to whether such classification has a rational and intelligible nexus with the object of the Act sought to be achieved. 9. Shri Korde, the learned Counsel for National Textile Corporation has invited attention of the Court to the ratio and observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court set out in para 7 of its judgment in the case of (Ballmal others v. State of Madras others)1, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1425. In this case, it was held by the Apex Court that Clause 6, sub-clause (2) of the Schedule read with section 73 of Madras City Improvement Trust Act 37 of 1950 was invalid and the owners of the lands were entitled to the statutory solatium as provided under section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act in consideration of compulsory acquisition of their lands. It was held by the Apex Court that the abovereferred provision of the Madras City Improvement Trust Act was violative of Article 14 of the. Constitution of India, and the distinction made was not supported by any rational classification having rational relation to the subject matter of the special provision. By the impugned provision of the Madras Act referred to hereinabove, the owners affected were sought to be deprived of statutory right to solatium at the rate of 15% of market value of land as prescribed under unamended provision of Land Acquisition Act I of 1894. The said special provision contained in Madras City Improvement Trust Act was struck down by the Apex Court. To my mind, the ratio of the judgment of this case is helpful to the claimant. 10. The said special provision contained in Madras City Improvement Trust Act was struck down by the Apex Court. To my mind, the ratio of the judgment of this case is helpful to the claimant. 10. The learned Counsel for the claimant heavily relied on the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (Nagpur Improvement Trust another v. Vithal Rao others)2, 1973 Mh.L.J. 373 (S.C.) : A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 689. In particular, the learned Counsel relied on observations of the Apex Court set out in paras 23, 25 and 26 of the Judgment delivered by Sikri, C. J., in this case. It was observed by the learned Chief Justice in this case that “different principles of compensation could not be formulated for lands acquired on the basis that the owner was old or young healthy or ill, tall or short, or whether the owner had inherited the property or built it with his own efforts, or whether the owner was a politician or an Advocate”. In para 26 of the judgment, Sikri, C.J., addressed himself to the pointed question before the Court when he observed as under : “Can classification be made on the basis of the public purpose for the purpose of compensation for which land is acquired?” The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that different yardstick for payment .of compensation could not be laid down with reference to purpose of acquisition, for which the land was acquired. The problem was admirably illustrated by the Apex Court by formulating the relevant question as under :— “Can the legislature say that for a hospital land will be acquired at 50% of the market value for a school at 60% of the value and for a Government building at 70% of the market value?” The Hon'ble Supreme Court answered this question in the same para of its judgment as under :— “It seems to us that ordinarily a classification based on the public purpose is not permissible under Article 14 for the purpose of determining compensation”. In the result the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the provisions of paras 10(2) and 10(3) of the schedule to the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act in so far as they added a new Clause 3(a) to section 23 and a provision to section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the result the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the provisions of paras 10(2) and 10(3) of the schedule to the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act in so far as they added a new Clause 3(a) to section 23 and a provision to section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India. To my mind, the ratio of this judgment clearly supports the submission made on behalf of the claimants. 11. The learned Counsel Shri C.M. Korde has also relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (State of Kerala others v. T.M. Peter another)3, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1438. In this case, Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the relevant principles of law in para 16 of his judgment. The Hon'ble Supreme Court followed the principles laid down in its earlier judgment in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust Act referred to hereinabove. In para 16 of its judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under : “But the differential nature of the public purpose does not furnish a rational ground to pay more compensation for one owner and less for another and that impertinence vitiates the present measure. The purpose may be slum clearance, flood control or housing for workers, but how does the diversity of purposes warrant payment of differential scales of quantum of compensation where no constitutional immunity as in Articles 31-A; B or C applies?” These observations made by the Highest Court of the country completely support the submissions made by Mr. Korde. It is not the contention of the learned Counsel for the State of Maharashtra or the learned Counsel for acquiring body that in this case the constitutional immunity under Articles 31-A, B or C of the Constitution is available to save the impugned provision. No one has invoked Articles 31-A, B or C of the Constitution and perhaps rightly so. Different scales of solatium cannot be laid down in the same Act merely with reference to diversity of public purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired under Chapter XIIA of the Act. 12. No one has invoked Articles 31-A, B or C of the Constitution and perhaps rightly so. Different scales of solatium cannot be laid down in the same Act merely with reference to diversity of public purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired under Chapter XIIA of the Act. 12. The learned Counsel Shri Korde also relied on the judgment of Honourable Chief Justice Shri Y.Y. Chandrachud (as he then was) in the case of (P.C. Goswami v. Collector of Darrang)4, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1214, in support of his contentions on Issues Nos. 3(a) and 3(b). In this case also, Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for the Bench of the Apex Court observed that there was no justification for discrimination in respect of payment of solatium. It was held by the Hon'ble Court that in matter of payment of solatium no discrimination could be made between requisition is made under the Land Acquisition Act and the acquisitions made under the Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act (25 of 1948). 13. Shri R.L. Dalal, the learned Counsel for the Acquiring Body relied on the ratio of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (P.A. Shah v. State of Gujarat others)5, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 468. In this case, the writ petitioner before the High Court of Gujarat had challenged the constitutional validity of the Town Planning Scheme in respect of land situated in Surat city in the State of Gujarat and also impugned certain provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954. In this case, Venkataramiah, J., speaking for the Court dealt with the relevant question in para 34 of his judgment. It was contended before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the denial of the solatium of 15% or 30% (as is the law now) of the market value of the land in addition to the compensation payable for land taken by the local authority for purpose of Town Planning Scheme was discriminatory. Reliance was placed by the appellant before the Court on the ratio of decision of the Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust and another v. Vithal Rao and others as well as the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Kerala and others v. T.M. Peter and another referred to hereinabove. Reliance was placed by the appellant before the Court on the ratio of decision of the Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust and another v. Vithal Rao and others as well as the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Kerala and others v. T.M. Peter and another referred to hereinabove. While distinguishing these two cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 disclosed a totally different pattern. After considering the scheme of the Act and analysing its provisions, the Court held that the Act provided 'for a package deal' where a reconstituted plot could be allotted to a person whose land was affected by the four planning schemes. The Court held that in a case of this nature, where a Town Planning Scheme was formulated and provisions were 'made for allotment of reconstituted plot etc. to a person whose land was affected by the scheme, the pattern of legislation was different. The Court held that in such a case abscuce of provision in the Act for payment of solatium did not make the Act vulnerable. In my opinion this judgment is clearly distinguishable and has no bearing whatsoever on the question arising before the Court in this case. In my judgment the ratio of judgments cited by Shri Korde in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust and another v. Vithal Rao and others and in the case of State of Kerala and others v. T.M. Peter and another., is directly applicable. In case of P. A. Shah vs. State of Gujarat, it was also observed by Venkataramiah, J. that the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 was already upheld by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas)6, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 634, and it was not possible to unsettle transaction entered into during course of seventeen years. With respect to Mr. Dalal and Mr. Saraf, I have reached the conclusion that the submissions made by Mr. Korde are well founded and acceptable to the Court and not the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the State of Maharashtra and Acquiring Body. 14. With respect to Mr. Dalal and Mr. Saraf, I have reached the conclusion that the submissions made by Mr. Korde are well founded and acceptable to the Court and not the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the State of Maharashtra and Acquiring Body. 14. In view of the above discussion, I hold that the ratio of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Nagpur Improvement Trust and another and State of Kerala v. T. M Peter is clearly applicable. Applying the ratio of the said decisions to our cases, I hold that there is no justification whatsoever for differentiation between the cases where lands are acquired for .purpose of Police Accommodation Scheme on the one hand and the lands acquired for other purposes under the same very Chapter of the Act i.e. Chapter XIIA of B.M.C. Act for purpose of grant of solatium. In this view of the matter, I hold the impugned provisions as discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in so far as the said provisions restrict the applicability of provisions contained in section 23(2) of Land Acquisition Act to Police Accommodation Scheme only and exclude its applicability to cases of acquisition for other purposes under the same very chapter of the same Act. It is hereby declared that all cases of acquisition of land under Chapter XIIA of the Act shall be treated on par for payment of solatium as the cases of acquisition under Police Accommodation Scheme are provided for under the same Chapter. I hold that the Kohinoor Mills Co. Ltd. and/or National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) being in statutory management of the said mills is entitled to award of solatium at the rate of 30% of the market value as provided under section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 as amended. Accordingly I answer Issues Nos. 3(a) and 3(b) in affirmative. 15. The next question which arises for consideration of the Court is as to whether the claimants are entitled to payment of interest on differential amount as provided in section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 as amended by Act No. 68 of 1984. It appears to me that section 354-S(4) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 is not applicable in this case. It appears to me that section 354-S(4) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 is not applicable in this case. It follows therefore, that the claimants must be treated on par with other persons interested in land under acquisition. Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 provides for payment of interest on excess compensation. The said section forms part of part m of Land Acquisition Act I of 1894. Section 34 of the said Act also provides for payment of interest on the same scale. The said section also forms part of Part V of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894. Both the said sections are in terms incorporated in Chapter XII-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 by virtue of the provisions contained in Schedule CC to the Act. I accept the submission made by the learned Counsel Mr. Korde to the effect that the claimants are entitled to payment of interest on differential amount of compensation awarded at the rate of 9% from the date of possession for the first year and at the rate of 15% thereafter as contemplated under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894. The Court is informed by learned Counsel appearing in this case that the Land Acquisition Officer had taken possession of the land from the Mill Company on 14th November 1973 and possession of the said land was handed over by the Land Acquisition Officer to the Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay on the same day. Accordingly the claimants are entitled to payment of interest on the differential amount of compensation at the rate of 9% per annum for the first year as aforesaid and at the rate of 15% per annum for subsequent years. No submissions were made on this issue on behalf of State of Maharashtra or the Acquiring Body. 16. In the result I modify the award dated 10th November, 1976 in terms of my findings on issues Nos. 1 to 4 and direct payment of the additional amount as discussed above. The abovereferred additional amounts with interest till the date of payment would be paid by the Special Land Acquisition Officer to National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Limited within Three months from today. Parties shall file the calculation sheet at the earliest. 17. 1 to 4 and direct payment of the additional amount as discussed above. The abovereferred additional amounts with interest till the date of payment would be paid by the Special Land Acquisition Officer to National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Limited within Three months from today. Parties shall file the calculation sheet at the earliest. 17. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no Order as to costs. 18. Issue of certified copy is expedited. Order accordingly. -----