PATEL, J. ( 1 ) FROM the record, it also appears that Executive Magistrate recorded dying declaration of Meena on the same day. From Exh. 97, it is clear that Dy. S. P. , G. K. Parmar took over the investigation from P. S. I. Choudhari on 3-9-1984. From the evidence, it is also clear that after taking over the investigation, this officer has also recorded statement of deceased Meena. Meena succumbed to her injuries on 5-9-1984 and inquest panchnama was prepared which has been verified by this officer. Thus, it goes without saying that it is well within the knowledge of this officer that Meena succumbed to burn injuries and also the circumstances under which she suffered the burn injuries. However, on completion of investigation, this officer, G. K. Parmar pw. 15, who was Dy. S. P. at the relevant time, filed a charge-sheet for offences punishable under Sec. 498-A and 114 of the Penal Code and Sec. 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It is surprising that a senior police officer in the rank of Dy. S. P. who was investigating the case has not filed chargesheet for an offence punishable under Sec. 306 of the Penal Code, though within a period of five months from the date of her marriage, Meena committed suicide. Sec. 306 of the Penal Code reads as under :"306. If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. "sec. 498-A of the Penal Code reads as under :"498a. Whoever being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with inprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. "sec. 498-A of the Penal Code reads as under :"498a. Whoever being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with inprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. "explanation : For the purpose of this Section "cruelty" means- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or, (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. " sec. 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act is also a relevant section in this case for raising a presumption, which reads as under :"113a. When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstancesof the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation : For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in Sec. 498a of the Indian Penal Code (45 of I860 ). "in this case, it is very clear that within a short period of five months from the date of marriage, unfortunate Meena was being subjected to cruelty, hence Meena committed suicide. She has narrated in her complaint about the torture and cruelty and therefore, it was expected that chargesheet should have also been filed for an offence punishable under Sec. 306 of the Penal Code. Mr. She has narrated in her complaint about the torture and cruelty and therefore, it was expected that chargesheet should have also been filed for an offence punishable under Sec. 306 of the Penal Code. Mr. S. T. Mehta, learned A. P. P. fairly concedes that it was equally the duty of the Public Prosecutor as well as the defence Advocate to point out to the Court below that an offence punishable under Sec. 306 of the penal Code has also been made out. It is equally the duty of the Court to frame charge for the relevant offence. In the charge-sheet, there is a reference that Meena poured kerosene over her body and set herself on fire on 2-9-1984 as a result of which she died on 5-9-1984. Therefore, the trial Court ought to have realised that the case is exclusively triable by Court of Sessions as the offence under Sec. 306 appears to have been committed. . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 2 ) CHARGE is framed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, vide Exh. 5, where there is a specific reference that deceased poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire and on 5-9-1984 at about 13-10 hours, she died in the hospital during the treatment. Thereby, the accused abetted each other and committed an offence punishable under Sec. 498a of the Penal Code read with Sec. 114 of the Penal Code and also under Sec. 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Sec. 173 of the Code casts duty on the police officer to submit report on completion investigation. The Magistrate has taken cognizance upon the police report while exercising powers under Sec. 190 of the Criminal procedure Code. Sec. 209 of the Code contemplates that when in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, he shall commit after complying with the provisions of Sec. 207. The Magistrate has to come to the conclusion on perusal of the police papers whether the case is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions or not. In the instant case the Chief Judicial Magistrate has failed in discharging this burden. The Magistrate has to come to the conclusion on perusal of the police papers whether the case is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions or not. In the instant case the Chief Judicial Magistrate has failed in discharging this burden. It is apparent from the record of the case that complainant poured kerosene on her person, set herself on fire and she died as a result of burn injuries on 5-9-1984. The incident took place on 2-9-1984 while the marriage took place on 9-5-1984. Sec. 498a is brought on statute with effect from 25-12-1983 and Sec. 113-A of the Evidence act with regard to presumption as to abutment of suicide by a married woman is also brought on statute by an Act No. 46 of 1983, i. e. , with effect from 25-12-1983. Thus, when the papers were before the Magistrate, it was the duty of the Magistrate to peruse the papers, to frame proper charge and if not competent to try the accused if the case is triable exclusively by Court of Sessions, it was his duty to commit the accused to the Court of Sessions for trial. If the learned Magistrate had applied his mind to the case, he would have seen easily that prima facie case under Sec. 306 is made out. It was his duty to consider the record and prima facie come to the conclusion whether the case is triable by Court of Sessions or not. It was not proper for him to choose for trial only such offences over which he had jurisdiction and to ignore other offences over which he had no jurisdiction. ( 3 ) IN this regard, in the case of Matukdhari Singh and Ors. v. Janardhan prasad, reported in AIR 1966 SC 356 , the Honble Supreme Court has held that it was improper for the Magistrate to ignore the offences over which he had no jurisdiction and to choose for trial only such offences over which he had jurisdiction. In that case, in para 4 of the judgment, honble Supreme Court has observed as under :"the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kehanabad took cognizance under Sees. 468, 406 and 42.), Indian Penal Code and sent the case to the Hony. Magistrate for disposal. The Hony. Magistrate drew up charges against all the accused under Sec. 420, indian Penal Code. In that case, in para 4 of the judgment, honble Supreme Court has observed as under :"the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kehanabad took cognizance under Sees. 468, 406 and 42.), Indian Penal Code and sent the case to the Hony. Magistrate for disposal. The Hony. Magistrate drew up charges against all the accused under Sec. 420, indian Penal Code. In addition, Chhedilal and Deokilal were charged under Sec. 468, Indian Penal Code respectively. Matukdhari was charged under Sees. 465/ 471. Indian Penal Code These charges could be tried by the Honorary Magistrate. No charge under Sec. 467, Indian Penal Code was framed against any of the appellants. If it had been framed, the case had to be committed to the Court of Sessions. " ( 4 ) AGAINST the acquittal order, appeal was preferred before the high Court and it was contended that the trial before the Magistrate was without jurisdiction as the Magistrate should have acted under Chapter viii with a view to committing the case to the Court of Sessions for trial as the facts disclosed the offence under Sec. 467 of the Penal Code which is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions. (This is with regard to the case under the old Criminal Procedure Code ). In that case, the High court pointed out that it was the duty of the Magistrate to apply correct law and if the facts disclosed the offence exclusively triable by Court of sessions, he ought to have framed that charge and cot assumed jurisdiction over the case by omitting it. In the opinion of the High Court in that case, a prima facie case existed for framing a charge undgr Sec. 467 of the Penal Code which meant that the case ought to have beed committed to the Court of Sessions. The acquittal was accordingly set aside and retrial was ordered. Against the order of the High Court, appeal was preferred before the Supreme Court wherein the Court has held as under :"if the Magistrate had applied his mind to the problem, he would have seen easily that a prima facie case of forgery was made out. He should then have considered whether the receipts were valuable security or not. If he had done that, he would have seen that the main offence would prima facie be one under Sec. 467. He should then have considered whether the receipts were valuable security or not. If he had done that, he would have seen that the main offence would prima facie be one under Sec. 467. Indian Penal Code read with Sec. 471 and the other offences were subsidiary. It was thus not proper for him to choose for trial only such offences over which he had jurisdiction and to ignore other offences over which he had none His duty clearly was to frame a charge under Sec. 467, Indian Penal Code and to commit the appellants to stand their trial before the Court of Sessions. It was open to the High Court, while hearing an appeal under Sec 417 (3) of the Code to direct the Magistrate to frame a charge for an offence which was prima facie established by the evidence for the prosecution and also to order that the accused be committed to the Court of Sessions. It is wrong to contend that the High Court had no jurisdiction in the matter because the trial before the Honrary Magistrate insofar as it went was with jurisdiction. If it were so, there would be no remedy whenever a Magistrate dropped serious charges ousting him of his jurisdiction and tried only those within his jurisdiction. " ( 5 ) THUS, it is very clear that in the instant case also, the Chief Judicial magistrate has assumed jurisdiction and proceeded with the trial though it was his duty to commit the case to the Court of Sessions as the offence punishable under Sec. 306 would be exclusively triable by the Court of sessions. ( 6 ) UNDER the circumstances, the order of acquittal is not sustainable and the order is ab-initio void and hence is quashed and set aside. . . The chief Judicial Magistrate shall commit the case to the Court of Sessions for trial. . . Appeal allowed accordingly. Case is remanded. .