JUDGMENT 1. WITH the changing structure of society, the Law Courts in its bid and relevant to the context of time, have also kept pane so as to do complete justice between the parties. Since the days of Radha Krishna Agarwal in 1977 ( AIR 1977 SC 1496 ) the Supreme court has been seriously considering the expansion of the horizon in administrative law with particular reference to the concept of fairness in a governmental action culminating into however, the decision in Shrilekha Vidyarthi. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court has not been ousted as such, but the purview of writ jurisdiction has undoubtedly been widened. In Srilekha Vidyarthi ( AIR 1991 SC 537 ) the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms suggested that contractual matters even, can come up for consideration before the Writ Court since all governmental agencies are supposed to act fairly and reasonably and in the event, there being any departure, the Writ Court ought not to hesitate to entertain the issue irrespective of the fact that the matter pertains to the contractual field. The introduction of the concept of promissory estoppel was undoubtedly a welcome advancement in this regard also, so far as the Writ jurisdiction is concerned. The decision of this Court in Surendra Prasad Mishra vs. O. N. G. C. ( AIR 1987 CAL 1 ) express laid down that the doctrine of promissory estoppel ought not to be restrictive in nature and thus be made applicable only in the matter of discharge of statutory functions but it ought to have its necessary extension to all fields including a contractual field. The subsequent decision of this Court in Steel Crackers vs. The State ( 1991 (1) CLJ 491 ) lends support to the view that the Writ Court is within its jurisdiction to interfere or intervene where occasion so arises in regard to matters which cannot but be termed to be contractual in nature. 2. THE Supreme Court subsequently, however, has in Kamdhenu Cattle feed Industries [JT 1992 (6) SC 259] applied the doctrine of legitimate expectation in administrative action vis-a-vis the jurisdiction of the Writ court. This is however, inspite of the factum of a different note being sounded by the Supreme Court in the case of Jalgaon Municipality. 2. THE Supreme Court subsequently, however, has in Kamdhenu Cattle feed Industries [JT 1992 (6) SC 259] applied the doctrine of legitimate expectation in administrative action vis-a-vis the jurisdiction of the Writ court. This is however, inspite of the factum of a different note being sounded by the Supreme Court in the case of Jalgaon Municipality. Whereas Pathak, J. in Somprokash Rekhi's case ( AIR 1981 SC 212 ) has left it to be decided at a future point of time by reason of involvement of a wider debate in regard to the public law element in the contractual field. Venkatachaliah J. in Jalgaon Municipality stated it to be a relevant consideration in regard to the involvement of a public law element before any judicial review is called by the Writ Court. Be that as it may, in Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries (supra) Verma J. applied the doctrine of legitimate expectation in administrative action being the basis of a cause of action in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is therefore, no longer in the realm of consideration but a well settled principle of law, so far as the doctrine of legitimate expectation is concerned. Verma, J, in Paragraph 8 of the Report very succinctly laid down that failure to consider and give due weight to the legitimate expectation of a citizen may render the decision arbitrary and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, being a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Verma, J. observed that the doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system to the extent indicated. 3. HAVING discussed the law on the subject as above, it would be convenient to refer to the factual aspect of the matter at this juncture. 4. THE petitioner submitted its tender in pursuance of the global tender notice published by the Respondent No. 6 for charter hire of onshore-drilling rig for Rajasthan Project of the Oil India. Incidentally it is to be noted that the tender as above, was invited in respect of Oil India petroleum Project financed with loans from the World Bank. 4. THE petitioner submitted its tender in pursuance of the global tender notice published by the Respondent No. 6 for charter hire of onshore-drilling rig for Rajasthan Project of the Oil India. Incidentally it is to be noted that the tender as above, was invited in respect of Oil India petroleum Project financed with loans from the World Bank. It is an admitted state of affairs that by a communication dated 26th September, 1990 the Respondent No. 6 accepted the tender submitted by the writ petitioner and issued the Letter of Intent. In terms of the Letter of Intent the writ petitioner was informed that the mobilisation of the rig should be completed and the work to commence on 25th March, 1991 i.e. 180 days from the date of the issuance of the Letter of Intent. It appears that the writ petitioner duly furnished Bank Guarantee for Rs. 89,59,854.00 as and by way of Performance Guarantee, through United bank of India in terms of the agreement. 5. ON the further factual score it appears that upon furnishing of the performance Guarantee a contract in writing being Drilling Contract No. RPF/330 was executed by and between the parties on 18th January, 1991 containing the following: "2.0 EFFECTIVE DATE AND DURATION OF CONTRACT 2.1 The Contract becomes effective as on 4th October, 1990 the date on which the Contractor received the letter of intent notifying the contractor that it has awarded the contract and it shall remain in force for a period of two years from the commencement date. (Commencement Date means the date on which the first well under this contract is spudded in). The Contract may be extended by an additional period of one year at the discretion of Company at the same rates, terms and conditions. Further extension of the contract will be on rates, terms and conditions to be mutually agreed upon between the parties. 2.2 The same rates, terms and conditions shall continue to be in force until the completion or abandonment of the last well being drilled except in condition 2.1 above. Further extension of the contract will be on rates, terms and conditions to be mutually agreed upon between the parties. 2.2 The same rates, terms and conditions shall continue to be in force until the completion or abandonment of the last well being drilled except in condition 2.1 above. 3.0 TERMINATION 3.1 Company may, without prejudice to any other remedy for breach of Contract, by Written notice of default sent to Contractor, terminate the contract in whole or in part if, Contractor fails to perform any of its obligations under the Contract and if contractor does not cure its failure within a period of 30 days (or such longer period as the Company may authorise in writing) after receipt of the default notice from Company. 3.2 In the event Company terminates the contract in whole or in part pursuant to Paragraph 3. 1, Company may procure upon such terms and in such manner as it deems appropriate the materials, equipment and services required to complete the work and contractor shall be liable for any excess costs incurred by company. However, Contractor shall continue performance of the contract to the extent not terminated. 3.3 During the last three (3) months of the contract period, Company may, by giving three (3) days notice, terminate this Contract under any one of the following circumstances: a) If the well under drilling has reached a stage of completion or danger to such extent that Company feels that drilling has to be abandoned. b) If the well has in the opinion of the company, reached a depth, beyond which it is not worthwhile or economical to drill further. c) If the well has reached the objective depth as required by company and the well has been drilled and completed by the contractor to the satisfaction of the Company. 3.4 The Company shall have the right to terminate this contract by giving 15 days notice in the event of Contractor's failure to rectify the defects within a reasonable time, as stated in para 3.1 above, after having served written notice to the contractor specifying the cause, under the following conditions: a) should the performance of the Contractor's equipment be unsatisfactory. b) Should the general standard of performance of work of Contractor be materially reduced due to reason, but not limited, to defective drill pipe, drill-collars, or other equipment. c) Incompetence of contractor. d) Negligence of Contractor. b) Should the general standard of performance of work of Contractor be materially reduced due to reason, but not limited, to defective drill pipe, drill-collars, or other equipment. c) Incompetence of contractor. d) Negligence of Contractor. 3.5 Company may at any time terminate the Contract by giving written notice to Contractor, without compensating Contractor, if contractor becomes bankrupt or otherwise insolvent, provided that such termination will not prejudice or affect any right of action or remedy which has occurred or will occur thereafter to company. 3.6 Company may, by written notice sent to Contractor, terminate the contract in whole or in part at any time for its convenience. The notice of termination shall specify that termination is for Company's convenience, the extent to which performance of work under the contract is terminated, and the date upon which such termination becomes effective, which should be at least 15 days after the date of the notice of termination. If Company exercises this right, it shall pay contractor in accordance with the provisions of the contract, for work satisfactorily performed upto the date of termination as well as for demobilisation as per terms of the contract. 6.0 MOBILISATION 6.1 The mobilisation of the Drilling Unit shall commence on the date of issue of the Firm Letter of Intent awarding the Contract and continue until the complete drilling unit is properly positioned at the first drilling location, rig-up operations completed, camp is made ready for use and the well is actually spudded in. 6.2 The mobilisation will be completed within six months from the date of the Firm Letter of Intent. 6.3 The Contractor will advice the Company its readiness for commencement of shipment to Company at least 3 days before actual shipment commences. 6.4 Liquidated Damages for default in timely mobilisation, @ 0.5 per cent of the contract value for delay of each week or part thereof, subject to a maximum of 7.5 per cent of the contract value shall be payable by the Contractor. 36.0 PERFORMANCE SECURITY 36.1 Within 60 days of receipt of Company's notification of award of the Contract or 30 days of signing of the Contract, (i.e. 24.11.90) whichever is earlier. Contractor shall furnish Performance security to Company in the form of Performance Bank Guarantee amounting to Rs. 89,59,854/- from a Scheduled Bank in the form provided in the bid document. 36.0 PERFORMANCE SECURITY 36.1 Within 60 days of receipt of Company's notification of award of the Contract or 30 days of signing of the Contract, (i.e. 24.11.90) whichever is earlier. Contractor shall furnish Performance security to Company in the form of Performance Bank Guarantee amounting to Rs. 89,59,854/- from a Scheduled Bank in the form provided in the bid document. The proceeds of the Performance security shall be payable to Company as compensation for any loss resulting from Contractor's failure to complete its obligations under the contract. 36.2 The performance security will be in the form of a Bank Guarantee issued by any Nationalised Bank and be in the form provided in the Bid Document. 36.3 In that event of Contractor failing to honour any of the commitments entered into under the contract and/or in respect of any amount due from Contractor to Company, Company shall have an unconditional option under the guarantee to invoke the performance bank guarantee and claim the amount from Bank. 36.4 The Performance Security will be discharged by Company not later than 30 days following the date of successful completion of contractor's performance, obligations including any warranty obligations, under Clause 35 of the Contract. 37.0 FORCE MAJEURE 37.1 Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, Contractor shall not be liable for forfeiture of its performance security, payment of penalties or treatment for default, if and to the extent that, its delay in performance or other failure to perform its obligations under the Contract is the result of an event of Force Majeure. 37.2 In the event of either partly being rendered unable by Force majeure to perform any obligations required to be performed by them under this contract, the relevant obligations of the party affected by such force majeure shall upon notification to the other party be suspended for the period during which such cause lasts. 37.3 For purpose of this clause "force Majeure" means an act of God. War, revolt, riots, strikes, fire, flood, sabotage, failure or destruction of roads, systems and acts and regulations of the government of India and other causes beyond the reasonable control of the parties. 37.3 For purpose of this clause "force Majeure" means an act of God. War, revolt, riots, strikes, fire, flood, sabotage, failure or destruction of roads, systems and acts and regulations of the government of India and other causes beyond the reasonable control of the parties. 37.4 Upon the occurrence of such cause and upon its termination, the party alleging that it has been rendered unable to function, shall notify the other party in writing within 72 hours of the alleged beginning and ending thereof giving full particulars and satisfactory evidence in support of its claim. 37.5 Time for performance or the relevant obligation suspended fay force Majeure shall then stand extend toy the period for which the force Majeure conditions last. 37.6 Unless otherwise directed by Company in writing Contractor shall continue to perform its obligations under the Contract as far as reasonably practicable and shall seek all responsible alternative means for performance not prevented by Force Majeure event". 6. HAVING noted the various provisions in the agreement between the parties certain other factual details ought to be adverted to at this juncture in order to appreciate the contentions raised. Admittedly, the Letter of Intent was issued on 26th September, 1990 and the performance guarantee was furnished by the writ petitioner on 23rd October, 1990. On the factual score, it further appears that the writ petitioner has failed to mobilise the rig within six months from the date of issuance of the Letter of Intent and by reason of such a failure the respondent No. 6 by a letter dated 28th June, 1991 refused to grant any further extension for mobilisation of the rig. 7. MR. Gupta, appearing in support of the writ petition, contended that it is within the knowledge of the respondent No. 6 that the petitioner No. 1 has had to obtain other governmental approvals for the purpose of importation of the rig, to wit, firstly clearance and sanction or permission from the Ministry of Industry, Government of India. Secondly, an import licence was required to be obtained from the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports for the import of the said rig. Thirdly an approval is also required of the bid submitted by the petitioner to the respondent No. 6 by the respondent No. 2 and fourthly a further approval of respondent No. 3 for importation of the rig. Mr. Thirdly an approval is also required of the bid submitted by the petitioner to the respondent No. 6 by the respondent No. 2 and fourthly a further approval of respondent No. 3 for importation of the rig. Mr. Gupta drew the attention of this Court as regards the requirement of law in the matter of obtaining thee approval of the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 for the grant of loan in foreign exchange and opening of Letter of Credit to enable the petitioner No. 1 to effect importation of the rig and the import licence was to be conditional upon such permission. The respondent No. 6, however, was required to execute a formal contract within a reasonable period of the issue of Letter of Intent as also grant essentiality certificate together with the issue of recommendation to enable clearance of the rig through Customs Authorities so as to enable the petitioner to open the Letter of Credit. According to Mr. Gupta, there was delay on the part of the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 on each and every count as noted above. In support of his contention as regards the delay on the part of the Ministry of Industry, Mr. Gupta contended from the date of application to the date of sanction there was approximately a delay of one year. It appears from the records, however, that on 26th September, 1990 the Letter of Intent was issued by the respondent No. 6 and the same was received on 4th October, 1990 by the petitioner No. 1 The confirmation issued by the respondent No. 6 of Bank Guarantee was obtained by the petitioner No. 1 on 7th November, 1990. The petitioner No. 1 thereafter applied for permission for import of rig from the respondent No. 1 after selecting the rig to be imported in consultation with the respondent No. 6. The respondent No. 1 however, viz. Ministry of Industry, sought two clarifications one dated 30th December, 1990 and the other dated 4th January, 1991 which were duly answered by the petitioner No. 1 and it is at this juncture that there was total lull till 24th April, 1991 on which date a communication was issued by the Ministry rejecting the application of the petitioner No. 1 on the ground that the rig could be available indigenously through BHEL. It is at this juncture that the petitioner thereafter informed the respondent No. 1, Ministry of Industry that in the event of the rig to be obtained from BHEL there would be an unnecessary delay of 12 months and there would also be loss of foreign exchange. In May, 1991 the respondent No. 1 however, agreed to reconsider the decision and such reconsideration in favour of the writ petitioner came only on November, 1991 i.e. after the institution of the instant proceedings before this Court. This delay of about one year cannot thus, be ascribed on to the petitioner no. 1 as contended by Mr. Gupta. 8. IT is significant to note in this context that immediately after clearance from the Ministry of Industry, the petitioner No. 1 sought the approval from the Controller of Imports and Exports and there is also a delay of about three months in the matter of grant of import licence by the chief Controller of Imports and Exports in. favour of the petitioner No. 1. As regards the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 Mr. Gupta laid emphasis on the delay involved in the matter of obtaining permission from the above-noted respondents and submitted that there was a delay of about four months and two weeks in the matter of grant of approval of the bid submitted by the petitioner No. 1 by the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3. It was contended that whereas the technical bid was submitted by petitioner No. 1 on 14th september, 1989 and the price bid was submitted by the petitioner No. 1 on 26th February. 1990, the respondent No. 3, being the Ministry of Finance, approved the bid submitted by the petitioner No. 1 on 8th August, 1990 and on 13th August, 1990 the Ministry of Petroleum also approved the bid of the petitioner. Incidentally, it is to be noted that no affidavit has been filed by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and in accordance with the normal presumption that in the event of there being no counter-affidavit after service of the petition and inspite of an opportunity to that effect, it is presumed that the statements made in the petition are deemed to be correct. 2 and 3 and in accordance with the normal presumption that in the event of there being no counter-affidavit after service of the petition and inspite of an opportunity to that effect, it is presumed that the statements made in the petition are deemed to be correct. On the part of the respondent No. 4 being the Reserve Bank of India and the respondent No. 5 being Industrial Finance Corporation of India there appears to be some delay as well, in the matter of grant of foreign exchange and opening of Letter of Credit, Mr. Gupta contended that there was delay of about one year on the part of the concerned respondents to grant the sanction of required foreign exchange to the petitioner No. 1 even after furnishing all information more than two years in the matter of opening up of the Letter of Credit. 9. IN regard to the issue of delay Mr. Gupta next contended that on a plain reading of the factual details there exists no doubt as to the involvement of delay in the matter of discharge of respective obligations but the same cannot by any stretch be ascribed to the petitioner. For convenience's sake the same be summarised as follows:- i) After sanction of bids submitted by the petitioner No. 1 by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. there was delay of one month two weeks on the part of the respondent No. 6 to issue Letter of Intent. ii) There was delay of approximately four months in executing the formal contract after issuance of Letter of Intent my the respondent No. 6. iii) There was delay of approximately four and half months on the part of the respondent No. 6 in issuing essentiality certificate after request was made for the same by the petitioner No. 1. iv) There was delay in issuing recommendation to open Letter of Credit on the part of the respondent Mo. 6 to the extent of approximately, one month after such request was made by the petitioner No. 1. 10. ON a consideration of the above submission of Mr. Gupta in regard to the element of delay and having due regard to the decumentary support in regard thereto, there appears to be considerable force in Mr. 6 to the extent of approximately, one month after such request was made by the petitioner No. 1. 10. ON a consideration of the above submission of Mr. Gupta in regard to the element of delay and having due regard to the decumentary support in regard thereto, there appears to be considerable force in Mr. Gupta's submission in regard to the factum of petitioner not being responsible for the delay and this element of delay has thus, acted as a deterrent factor in the matter of complying with the obligation in terms of the agreement, so far as the petitioner is concerned. Having come to the definite funding that the element of delay has rendered it a near impossibility for the petitioner to comply with the obligations in terms of the agreement as above two other tactual details ought to be noted in slightly more greater detail viz. the grant of foreign exchange by Reserve Bank of India and opening of the Letter of Credit by industrial Finance Corporation of India. 11. AS regards the grant of foreign exchange, it is to be noted that on 26th September, 1990 the respondent No. 6 while accepting the bid submitted by the petitioner No. 1 requested the petitioner No. 1 to submit the performance guarantee for Rs. 89,59,854/- within 30 days, being 7.5% of the estimated the contract price as per the stipulation in the bid document and the formal acceptance of the Letter of Intent was issued by the petitioner No. 1 to the respondent No. 6 on 4th October. 1990. The application was made for the grant of foreign exchange by the petitioner no. 1 on 22nd November, 1990. 12. SUBSEQUENTLY, by a letter dated 2nd January, 1991 certain particulars were sought for by the respondent No. 5 and as appears on the factual score the same were duly furnished on 11th March, 1991 by the petitioner No. 1 considering however, the nature of the particulars so required by the respondent No. 5 as noted above, in my view, delay of about two months in the matter of furnishing of such particulars cannot in any way be ascribed to be blame-worthy, as has been so contended by Mr. Mitter, appearing for the governmental agency. The criticism leveled on this score cannot be ascribed to toe a justifiable criticism. Mitter, appearing for the governmental agency. The criticism leveled on this score cannot be ascribed to toe a justifiable criticism. Incidentally, in the first counter-affidavit filed by the respondent No. 5 it has been stated that sanction for necessary foreign exchange or the opening of the Letter of Credit, as required, was not granted, by reason of the factum of rejection of the application importation of the rig. In the second Counter-affidavit filed on 24th January, 1992 the respondent No. 5 has stated that permission was not granted as information sought from the petitioner No. 1 were not furnished. In the second affidavit, it was further contended that the respondent No. 5 was not in a position to sanction foreign exchange loan or open Letters of Credit but subsequently, however, after the filing of the second affidavit the loan was sanctioned by the respondent No. 5 on 28th March, 1992 as such, the defence as taken in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent No. 5 does not stand to any further scrutiny in regard to non-furnishing of the necessary particulars by the petitioner No. 1. Respondent No. 4, Reserve Bank of India, also filed a counter-affidavit stating there in that since the respondent No. 1 rejected the application for importation of rig, question of grant of permission by the respondent No. 4 did not arise. Delicate foreign exchange reserve position of the country was taken recourse to, though however, subsequently, it has been communicated to the petitioner No. 1 that the respondent No. 4 does not have any objections to release foreign exchange if the importation of rig was covered by specified project of the Government. 13. AS a matter of fact, pursuant to such sanction and approval, as noted above, the Letter of Credit was opened on 29th April, 1992 and such a fact was duly communicated to the respondent No. 6 by the petitioner by a communication dated 30th April, 1992. There is, therefore, admittedly, a delay of about two years in opening the Letter of Credit. The question arises as to whether this delay can be attributed to the petitioner No. 1 ? In any view, the answer cannot but be in the negative by reason of the facts as detailed above. 14. There is, therefore, admittedly, a delay of about two years in opening the Letter of Credit. The question arises as to whether this delay can be attributed to the petitioner No. 1 ? In any view, the answer cannot but be in the negative by reason of the facts as detailed above. 14. IT is to be noted that the obligation of the petitioner No. 1 in terms of the contract were to remain suspended during the period of such delay. In this context reference to Clauses 37.2 and 37.5 ought to be noted herein. Clause 37.2 reads as follows:- "37.2. In the event of either party being unable by Force Majeure to perform any obligations required to be performed by them under this contract, the relevant obligations of the party affected by such Force Majeure shall upon notification to the other party be suspended for the period during which such cause lasts." and Clause 37.5 reads as follows:- "37.5. Time for performance or the relevant obligation suspended by the Force Majeure shall then stand extended by the period for which the Force Majeure conditions last." It is on this score the contention of Mr. Gupta in regard to the mala fides and arbitrariness on the part of the respondents ought to be noted. The contract admittedly, made provisions for suspension of rights and obligations of the parties and extension of time in regard to the performance of the contract but inspite of the same however, there is a refusal on the part of the respondent No. 6 to extend the time for performance of the contract. On the factual score it appears that the respondent No. 6 after having negatived the prayer for extension sought to enforce the contract against the petitioner No. 1 and this attempt to enforce is said to be grossly irregular, capricious and wholly arbitrary in nature, Mr. Gupta contended that the arbitrariness being an ante-thesis of law cannot be permitted to vitiate the governmental action which is otherwise supposed to be fair and reasonable. There is no manner of doubt that action of a governmental agency, if found to be arbitrary, question of any hesitation in the matter of striking down the same, so far as the Law courts are concerned, does not and cannot arise. There is no manner of doubt that action of a governmental agency, if found to be arbitrary, question of any hesitation in the matter of striking down the same, so far as the Law courts are concerned, does not and cannot arise. Let us therefore, analyse the factual details in the context of submissions as above - The agreement between the parties contained Clauses 37.2 and 37.5 which has in no uncertain terms laid down suspension of the obligations in terms of the agreement between the parties and on the wake of such a clause in the agreement can the attempted termination in the contextual facts be said to be in accordance with law - The answer cannot possibly be in the affirmative - The facts narrated above, in no uncertain terms disclosed that successful performance of the contract was dependent upon approvals from different agencies and it is not the case of the respondent No. 6 that the latter was completely unaware of these exigencies; Necessary sanctions from different agencies have not been given and 1 need not dilate much on this score excepting what is noted above in the matter of obtaining approvals and prior sanctions and the opening of the Letter of Credit. The delay in any event, if any, attributable to the petitioner No. 1 cannot be of such an extent so as to defeat the legitimate rights of the petitioner No. 1 in the matter of obtaining relief from the Court of Law and the conduct of the respondent No. 6, considering the facts as above, cannot but be termed to be capricious and arbitrary in nature and is the resultant effect of administrative ipse dixit more so by reason of the factum of incorporation of clauses 37.2 and 37.5 in the body of the agreement noted above. 15. MR. Mitter, appearing for respondent No. 6, next contended that the writ Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a private contractual dispute between the parties. In my view, however, it is top late in the day to contend that the Writ court's jurisdiction is restrictive in nature and usurpation of the Civil Court's jurisdiction, as is contended by Mr. Mitter, in my view, does not and cannot arise and is not acceptable in the present day context. In my view, however, it is top late in the day to contend that the Writ court's jurisdiction is restrictive in nature and usurpation of the Civil Court's jurisdiction, as is contended by Mr. Mitter, in my view, does not and cannot arise and is not acceptable in the present day context. Considering the facts of the matter under consideration, there exists a special equity in favour of the writ petitioner and the Writ Court is within its jurisdiction to intervene and interfere by reason of such an equity. In my view, refusal to entertain such a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would be a travesty of the concept of justice. The advancement of the administrative law in this country leaves no manner of doubt that in the event of an action being found to be arbitrary, the jurisdiction of the Writ Court cannot be decried in any way to intervene and interfere with such a capricious action. The most accepted methodology of a governmental working is fairness and reasonableness and in the event there is any departure, the Writ Court is within its jurisdiction to intervene and interfere, since arbitrariness is an ante-thesis of law. On the wake of 21st century would the Law court be justified in refusing to entertain an application on such a technicality that intervention in a matter as the present one would amount to usurpation of the jurisdiction of the civil Court, the answer, in my view, cannot but be in the negative. The writ jurisdiction is available to a litigant wherever there is any administrative ipse dixit or arbitrary action. Legitimate expectation of a citizen can also form the basis of a cause of action in the event the action is contrary to such an expectation. Law Courts are basically concerned with the concept of justice and sheer technicality cannot be taken recourse to by a governmental agency to outweigh the course of justice. Having come to a definite finding of arbitrariness and administrative ipse dixit on the state of facts as detailed above, question of the petitioner being non-suited by reason of the matter being one of contractual fields does not and cannot arise. Having come to a definite finding of arbitrariness and administrative ipse dixit on the state of facts as detailed above, question of the petitioner being non-suited by reason of the matter being one of contractual fields does not and cannot arise. It is the concept of justice with which the Law Courts are concerned and in the event of there is any departure there ought not be any hesitation in invoking the writ jurisdiction and pass appropriate orders so that the person who seeks justice before the Writ Courts is not deprived of the same on technicality which has no co-relation with the concept of justice. Needless to record here that judicial pronouncements have brought about a change in the concept of justice by reason of the changed socio-economic condition of the country and the participation of the State in everyday trade and commerce. If contractual field is said to be within the domain of civil Courts only and writ petitions are rejected on the basis thereof, in my view, Law Courts by that process would put a premium to arbitrariness which the Law Courts cannot afford on the wake of 21st century. 16. TURNING attention on to the other aspect of the matter viz., invocation of the bank guarantee, it is to be noted that the Law Courts would be slow to intervene or interfere in matters of bank guarantees as otherwise the international trade and commerce would come to a grinding halt. The self same principle has also been applied in the event of bank guarantees for internal contracts as well. Law Courts however, while dealing with the matter, did consider the aspect of fraud and existence of special equity, which is now a well-settled principle of law to the effect that the jurisdiction of the Law Courts can be invoked and appropriate relief be granted in the matter of enforcement of Bank Guarantees. While it is true, however, that this intervention in the matter of enforcement of a bank guarantee is normally effected by the Civil Courts but does that mean and imply that the Writ Court is otherwise precluded from interfering with the issue of an enforcement of a bank guarantee on the wake of the present trend of expansion of the horizon under administrative law? It is no longer in the realm of consideration but a well-settled principle of law in regard to exercise of jurisdiction by the Writ court in regard to exercise of jurisdiction by the Writ Court in regard to relief founded purely on contractual premises in a long catena of cases, to wit the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahavir Auto Stores and Ors. ( AIR 1990 SC 1031 ); Dwarkadas Marfatia and, Sons ( 1989 (3) SCC 293 ) and that of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi ( AIR 1991 SC 537 ). The decision of this Court ought also to be noticed at this juncture viz., Steel Crackers and Anr. v M.S.T.C. and Anr. ( 1991 (1) CLJ 491 ) and also of Surendra Prasad Misra v Oil and Natural Gas Commission (AIR 1987 CAL. Page 1). 17. ON the wake of the expansion of the principle of administrative law can it now be said that the writ jurisdiction is not available to a litigant in the matter of enforcement of bank guarantee. In my view, the answer cannot but be in the negative. Question of there being any attempt to curtail the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts does not arise but it is the expansion of the administrative law which ought to be the guiding factor as otherwise refusal to entertain an issue of the nature as the present one, would allow a premium to (the administrative ipse dixit in the matter of enforcement of bank guarantee. The entire concept of justice has changed; the old draconian concept with the passage of time and on the threshold of 21st century cannot be said to be the correct exposition of law at this juncture. To some one it might seem to be a judicial activism but to my mind it is not a activism but an expansion of the principle of administrative law, having due regard to the socio-economic condition and the changing structure of the society, Law courts are to adjudicate the disputes on the basis of such a change as otherwise the concept of justice in the present-day context will lose its efficacy. The criteria is to analyse the matter from all possible points off view and in the event Law Courts come to a finding that the concept of justice demands intervention, technicality ought not to thwart the process of justice though however, due care and caution ought to be exercised in the matter of such a consideration by the Law Courts. It is more or less now a well-settled principle of law that contractual field is open to Writ Court's intervention if the same is required, having due regard to the concept of justice. The introduction of the concept of legitimate expectation leaves no manner of doubt that the restrictions in regard to the assumption of the jurisdiction of the Writ Court in contractual field cannot be termed that rigid but depend upon the facts of the matter under consideration. Mr. Gupta's efforts to bring in the concept of legitimate expectation in regard to a grant of sanction or approval from various other departments cannot be decried in any manner whatsoever. 18. IN any event it is the decision-making process which can be challenged as being arbitrary as opposed to the decision being arbitrary. If the process is bad the processes not in accordance with law and the same is otherwise arbitrary then and in that event the decision on the bases of the above process cannot be said to be in accordance with law. This is however, upon an assumption of the fact that the Writ court does not have the jurisdiction to interfere with the decision in the matter of invocation of the bank guarantee. If the process is arbitrary, the decision cannot remain out if it is otherwise then and in that event, both the process and the decision remains. In the facts of the matter under consideration the contract between the parties contained provisions for extension of time and there are provisions for imposition of penalty and or liquidated damages in case the contractor fails to adhere to the time schedule mentioned in the contract and as such the time was therefore, not the essence of the contract and it is on this score that Mr. Gupta's submission that time being not the essence of the contract and on the wake of the factual details as above, there ought not to have been hesitation in the matter of extension of the time to perform the obligations in terms of the agreement rather than any arbitrary refusal in regard thereto and it is on this score that the court can interfere on the ground that the process of such a decision in the factual metrics of the matter under consideration cannot but be termed to be arbitrary in nature warranting intervention of the Writ court. The observation of the Supreme Court in Kamdhenu Cattle Feed industries (supra) seems to be rather apposite in in this context as well. Verma, J, in Paragraph 7 of the Report observed:- "7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law : A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is 'fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all state actions. To satisfy this requirement of non-arbitrariness in a State action, it is. therefore, necessary to consider and give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely to be affected by the decision or else that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate disfection in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise by judicial review." The Delhi High Court in Bottle Glass Pvt. Limited v. Union of India (AIR 1985 Delhi 400) did grant an injunction in the matter of invocation of bank guarantee and so has this Court in Bengal Engineering Company Limited and anr. v Union of India and Ors. as also in another unreported decision of Madhava Cotton Mills Limited v Indian Bank. In the promises, therefore, it can safely be concluded that the jurisdiction of the Writ Court in the matter of a bank guarantee cannot be decried in any way provided however, on the factual score this Court comes to a conclusion that there was, in fact, arbitrariness or mala fides so far as the invocation is concerned. As noted above, clause 37.2 read with 37.5 speaks of suspension of obligations under certain circumstances and in the event of the existence of these circumstances, question of in vocation cannot be said in order. It is therefore, to be seen whether, in fact, there was existing such circumstances to suspend the contractual obligation of the parties and in the event, the finding is in the affirmative, there is no manner of doubt that the right to encase the bank guarantee would also stand suspended. 19. THERE is enough factual support in Mr. Gupta's submission that there existed cogent reasons for non-completion of the formalities so far as the writ petitioner is concerned and I need not dilate on this score any further by reason of exhaustive narration of facts as above and suffice it however, to record that the delay in performance of the contract cannot be attributed to the petitioner but has been occasioned by reason of the actions of the other non-appearing respondents. Be it noted here that the contract itself envisaged suspension of the obligation and it can thus be safely concluded that it was in the contemplation of the parties that such exigencies might occur. As a matter of fact, what was in contemplation has come true and there exists enormity of delay occasioned in the matter. Can the delay be ascribed to be solely on the part of the writ petitioner or major portion of blame-worthy conduct would go to the governmental agencies, in my view, considering the matter in issue and as noted above, there cannot be any manner of doubt that the delay occasioned in the matter cannot but be said to be at the governmental levels which was beyond the control of the petitioner. 20. ON the wake of such a finding, the invocation of the bank guarantee, in my view, therefore, cannot be said to be in accordance with law. 20. ON the wake of such a finding, the invocation of the bank guarantee, in my view, therefore, cannot be said to be in accordance with law. It is in here also Mr. Mitter's submission as regards the Writ Court's jurisdiction cannot be sustained for the reason noted above. After coming to a definite finding in regard to the existence of an arbitrary action so far as the governmental agency is concerned, can the writ Court be a more passive spectator and refuse relief to the petitioner on the ground of technicality? In my view, the answer again is in the negative. 21. BEFORE concluding however, a brief factual reference ought also to be made at this juncture more so by reason of the specific submission of Mr. Mitter that there had been no dearth of assistance from the respondent no. 6 so as to enable the petitioner to proceed with the mobilisation of the rig. The facts however, tell a different story. There is no manner of doubt that the respondent No. 6 was to issue recommendatory certificate for importation of the rig. There has been no such attempt on the part of the respondent No. 6 and it is only upon request being by the petitioner for issue of such a recommendation, such a certificate was made available. Why would it be so? It is a bipartite contract and both the parties have certain obligations in terms of the agreement. Can it be said to be a justifiable conduct on the part of the respondent No. 6 to wait for an application for such a certificate, in my view, the answer cannot be in the affirmative. Both the parties ought to be interested in successful completion of the agreement. Why there shall have to be a reminder or an application in regard to furnishing of a certificate? There seems to be no answer on that score. Similar is the position in regard to the furnishing of other certificates in terms of the agreement. Can governmental agency remain totally silent and tight lipped in the matter of obtaining of approvals from various other governmental agencies? It is the agency which requires the rig for the people of the country - for the benefit of the society. Is the conduct of the respondent No. 6 in consonance with such a necessity on the state of facts. It is the agency which requires the rig for the people of the country - for the benefit of the society. Is the conduct of the respondent No. 6 in consonance with such a necessity on the state of facts. I have no hesitation to answer the same in the negative again. 22. INCIDENTALLY, it is to be noted that by granting extension for 15 weeks as has been done in the matter under consideration, the respondent No. 6 cannot possibly be said to have discharged its duty in the facts of the matter under consideration, since in terms of the contract it is the primary requirement of the respondent No. 6 only, for the purpose of the nation. Considering the terms of the agreement, there exists no hesitation in me to come to a definite finding that by reason of the existence of Force majeure conditions there was delay in performance of the contract. It is to be noted in this context however, that during the course of hearing this court made a specific enquiry from Mr. Gupta as to whether the petitioner is otherwise able to import the rig at this juncture and Mr. Gupta's answer was in the affirmative. In that view of the matter, this writ petition succeeds. The order of imposition of liquidated damages as also invocation of the bank guarantee are set aside and quashed. The respondents are directed to render all possible assistance to the writ petitioner for the purpose of importation of the rig with utmost expedition and all formalities therefor be completed within a period of eight weeks from title date of communication of this order. There shall however, be no order as to costs. Writ petition allowed.