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1993 DIGILAW 365 (CAL)

Rabindra Nath Sinha v. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd.

1993-08-02

Susanta Chatterji

body1993
Order Having heard the learned Attorney General of India with Dr. Tapas Banerjee for Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. in support of the application for vacating and/or varying the order dated 30th December, 1992 and the subsequent order dated 7th January, 1993 and Mr. Suhas Banerjee, learned advocate for the writ petitioner it appears that the writ petition was entertained and considering the urgency compliance with Rule 27 of the Original Side Rules was dispensed with. An interim order was made restraining the respondents from passing any final order till 11.1.93. The matter was to appear before the Appropriate Bench on 5.1.93. Liberty was granted to pray for extension of the interim order. By order dated 7.1.93, leave was granted to the respondents to make a formal application for vacating the interim order. It was made clear that the interim order granted by the learned Vacation Judge would continue till the disposal of the application for vacating the interim order. 2. The writ petitioner Rabindra Nath Sinha filed the writ petition challenging the notice dated l4.12.92, issued by the Director (Personnel), Andrew Rule & Co. to the petitioner in order to take suitable decision on the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer on the basis of the departmental enquiry. 3. As suggested and agreed by the learned Counsel of both sides the application for vacating the interim order is taken up for consideration. The learned Attorney General has argued, inter alia, that the writ petition is not maintainable and consequently the interim order cannot be sustained and the application for vacating the interim order can be disposed of. He has strongly argued, inter alia, that the respondent Andrew Yule :& Co. Ltd. is not a State as envisaged under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and as such it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. In support of his contention he has referred to a decision reported in 1991 (1) Calcutta Law Times 300 (Sri Anupam Ghosh vs. Union of India & Ors.). In the said case a writ petition was filed against erstwhile finance Director of Andrew Yule & Co. In support of his contention he has referred to a decision reported in 1991 (1) Calcutta Law Times 300 (Sri Anupam Ghosh vs. Union of India & Ors.). In the said case a writ petition was filed against erstwhile finance Director of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd., Government Company and the Division Bench having discussed all the relevant facts and circumstances held inter alia:- "The decisions of the Supreme Court are uniform that it is a cumulative effect of all the relevant factors which are to be assessed in order to find out the instrumentality or agency of the Government and one or two tests by themselves will not be the determinate factors. The tests are not conclusive or clinching but they are indicative indica to be considered carefully. The concept of authority under Article 12 should not be stretched very far so as to bring every autonomous body or other body corporate which have some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression ‘State’." It has further held: "The Central Government certainly ensures that the Government Company follows the general policy decision of the Government and guidelines and directives of the Bureau of Public Enterprises so that the Company functions in a desired manner. Such exercise of control by itself will not constitute deep and pervasive control on the functioning of the Company so as to make it an instrumentality and or agency of the Government." 4. In the said decision it has been considered in depth and in details as to whether M/s. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. is an instrumentality of the Central Government and whether it is to be construed as State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Giving detailed reasons and discussing threadbare, it has been conclusively held that M/s. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. 5. In a similar matter, the Division Bench has also disposed of a case at the instance of one Sumit Kumar Bose against Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. The ratio of the said judgment was extended and the Division Bench decided conclusively that Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. is not a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The matter was taken to Hon'ble Supreme Court under special leave being Civil Appeal No. 976 of 1991. Ltd. The ratio of the said judgment was extended and the Division Bench decided conclusively that Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. is not a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The matter was taken to Hon'ble Supreme Court under special leave being Civil Appeal No. 976 of 1991. A copy of the order dated July 24, 1991 has been palced on record before this court and it has been submitted that by exercising the jurisdiction conferred under Article 136 of the Constitution of India the said leave petition was disposed of by granting certain financial benefits to the writ petitioner as agreed and/or as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the said order it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that: "The tests that are applied to find out whether an institution is 'State' have been laid down in several decisions of this Court. In fact, some of them have been referred to in the judgment of the division Bench. We do not think it would serve any practical purpose by collating the law. The main question that requires to be dealt with in this case is as to the individual employee's fate in his service and, therefore, we have considered it appropriate to leave the matter which was dealt with by the Division Bench open and go into the consideration of doing justice to the appellants." 6. Mr. Attorney General has laid much emphasis in interpreting the said order and the subsequent developments that while drawing up the said order it was recorded as if the judgment and order dated 31st August, 1990 of the Division Bench at Calcutta in F.M.A.T. No. 3412 of 1985 has been set aside. It was subsequently mentioned before the Appropriate Bench and recorded by order dated 6th April, 1992 that the words "Judgment and Order dated 31st August, 1990 of the High Court at Calcutta in F.M.A.T. No. 3412 of 1985 be and is hereby set aside and instead" are deleted from the decree dated 24.7.91 to show that the order 'will remain as it is. It is pointed out, inter alia, that the Apex Court became conscious as to interpret the order dated 24th July, 1991 inasmuch as the impact of the said order is not to set aside the order of the Division Bench. It is pointed out, inter alia, that the Apex Court became conscious as to interpret the order dated 24th July, 1991 inasmuch as the impact of the said order is not to set aside the order of the Division Bench. The gist of the submissions of the learned Attorney General is that regard being had to the materials on record and reading the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 976 of 1985 it may not be construed that the judgment of the Division Bench in F.M.A.T. No. 3412 of 1985 has been reversed. It is also pointed out that in another matter viz., F.M.A.T. 2649 of 1987, which has been reported in 1991(1) Calcutta Law Times 300 there is a finding by both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench that M/s. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. is not a State and the same has not been set aside as yet. He has argued that the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have unanimously held that M/s. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. is not a State and not amenable to writ jurisdiction. Therefore, no writ petition may be entertained by this Court and the interim order may not be allowed to be continued. 7. Mr. Subhas Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner and in support of the continuity of the interim order, has submitted that the order of the Division Bench has merged into the order dated 24th July, 1991 in S.L.P. in Civil Appeal No. 976 of 1991. He has also laid much emphasis upon the relevant observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said order, and according to him, the Supreme Court has been pleased to grant reliefs in the case of Sumit Kumar Bose and it should not be construed that the writ petition is not maintainable. While the Supreme Court itself has granted reliefs considering the merit of the case the present writ petition should not be thrawn in limine and the question of maintainability of the writ petition has been kept open by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court may consider again the question as to whether M/s. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. is a State or not and whether the case is maintainable or otherwise. Ltd. is a State or not and whether the case is maintainable or otherwise. Pending such question the interim order should be allowed to continue and vacation of the interim order would cause irreparable injury and the merit of the case would go undecided. 8. With great patience and respect this court has heard the submissions of the learned lawyers of the parties. It is appreciated by both the Bar and the Bench, that the scope under Article 136 of the Constitution is wide enough. The Supreme Court in its discretion can grant reliefs where the situation demands and for the ends of justice, notwithstanding the maintainability of the writ petition, whereas if the writ is not maintainable a Single Judge and/or the Division Bench exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of this Constitution cannot grant reliefs. The ratio of the Division Bench judgment holding that M/s. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. is not a State has not been set aside by the Supreme Court in so many words. On the contrary, it has been observed and/or recorded that by order granting relief to Sumit Bose, the judgment of the Division Bench has not been set aside. If the judgment of the Division Bench is not set aside and if the ratio of the judgment that M/s. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. is not a State, then certainly it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. If it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction, it may mathematically be concluded that no interim order can be passed against such company. So long the judgment delivered by the Division Bench presided by G.N. Ray, J. as reported in 1991 (1) Calcutta Law Times remains in force, the petitioner cannot proceed with the petition so far as M/s. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. is concerned. 9. Considering this aspect, this court finds that there is sufficient force in the submissions of the learned Attorney General and to find out that M/s. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. is not amenable to writ jurisdiction and the interim order passed against the said company cannot continue. Accordingly, the interim order is vacated and the application for vacating the interim order is disposed of. 10. All parties to act on a signed copy of the operative part of the judgment on the usual undertaking. Application allowed; interim, order vacated.