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1993 DIGILAW 366 (RAJ)

Dalpat Raj Bhandari v. President of India

1993-07-06

J.R.CHOPRA, RAJENDRA SAXENA

body1993
Honble RAJENDRA SAXENA, J.—This Civil Special Appeal has been directed against the order dated 22.1.1991 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3923/90, whereby appellants writ petition was dismissed summarily on the ground that it involved political matters and as such the Court was not inclined to go into these controversies. 2. Briefly the relevant facts for disposal of this appeal are that the appellants filed a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and prayed that by an appropriate writ, direction or order, the removal of Shri Devilal, the then Dy. Prime Minister (respondent No. 4) by the President of India as reported in Rajasthan Patrika, Jodhpur Edition dated 2.08.1990 (Ex.1) be quashed and status-quo ante be restored by impleading respondent No. 4 as Dy. Prime Minister in the Union Cabinet or Council of Ministers. The appellants contended that they were trying to bring national truth on Nations platform by judicial approach and that they were fighting for the cause of a Rajasthan rural based M.P., who had been illegally sacked from the Union Cabinet. They however did not file the copy of the impugned order, passed by the President of India dismissing respondent No. 4 from the Central Council of Ministers on the recommendation of Shri V.P. Singh, the then Prime Minister of India. They also did not file the certified copy of the letter of Shri V.P. Singh written to Shri Devilal, However, they relied on the text of the said letter published in Hindi (Ex. 1/A) in the Rajasthan Patrika dated 2.08.1990. The case of the appellants was that Shri Devilal was dismissed from the Cabinet on the ground that he had violated the principles of collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers, that he had allegedly written a forged letter and levelled corruption charges against his colleagues and failed to submit any proof thereof despite opportunity and that he had also accused the Prime Minister in an interview given to Illustrated Weekly. The appellants contended that the Constitution of India does not provide any specific method for removal of the Dy. The appellants contended that the Constitution of India does not provide any specific method for removal of the Dy. Prime Minister or the Minister and that as per provisions of Art. 367, unless the context otherwise requires the provisions of General Clauses Act, 1897 shall, subject to any adoption or modifications that may be made therein under Art. 372, apply for the interpretation and that as per provisions of Sec. 16 (15) of General Clauses Act, the power of appointment includes the power of suspension or dismissal. According to the appellants, for the removal or dismissal of Ministers, the principles of natural justice will apply and since no reasonable opportunity of hearing was provided to Shri Devilal, his impugned dismissal from the post of Dy. Prime Minister was ex facie illegal. They have submitted that though under Art 75(2) of the Constitution of India, the Minister shall hold office during the pleasure of President, such pleasure" can be exercised as "pleasure simplicitor only and not with any extraneous considerations. According to them as per text of the letter written by Shri V.P. Singh, the then Prime Minister to Shri Devilal (respondent No. 4) which was published in Rajasthan Patrika (Ex 1/A) the latter was guilty of committing the alleged breach of the principle of collective responsibility, for sending the alleged forged letter to the President of India and for entering into a shallow conspiracy. But for the said misconducts, no enquiry whatever was conducted. Thus, the dismissal of respondent No. 4 according to the appellants, was patently illegal, without jurisdiction and in violation of Arts. 14 and 75 (4) of the Constitution. The appellants therefore, prayed that the Presidents order dismissing/removing Shri Devilal as Dy. Prime Minister of India be quashed and the status-quo ante be restored. 3. The learned Single Judge by his impugned order dated 22.1.1991 dismissing the said writ petition hold that the appointment of Shri Devilal as Dy. Prime Minister of India and his resignation against appointment as Dy. Prime Minister were all political matters and that the Court was not inclined to go into those controversies. Hence this appeal. 4. We have heard Mr. D.R. Bhandari, appellant, at length and perused the relevant record. 5. Mr. Bhandari has strenuously contended that the impugned order is against the order because the writ petition did not pertain either for the appointment or resignation of respondent No. 4. Hence this appeal. 4. We have heard Mr. D.R. Bhandari, appellant, at length and perused the relevant record. 5. Mr. Bhandari has strenuously contended that the impugned order is against the order because the writ petition did not pertain either for the appointment or resignation of respondent No. 4. According to him, the learned Single Judge did not apply his mind & probe into the matter and summarily dismissed the writ petition. He has further contended that the Court should not shrik from performing its duties under the Constitution. 6. We have given our most earnest and anxious consideration to the submissions made by Shri Bhandari. 7. At the very outset, we are of the considered opinion that this appeal is devoid of any force and substance. 8. Firstly, the appellants have neither cared to file the impugned dismissal order of respondent No. 4 passed by the President of India nor submitted the original certified or authentic copy of the letter alleged to have been written by Shri V.P. Singh, the then Prime Minister, to Shri Devilal. The news item Ex. 1 and Ex. 1/A published in Rajasthan Patrika cannot be treated as the impugned dismissal order/letter, Therefore, for want of these basic documents, the writ petition was maintainable. Secondly, the term of the then Lok Sabha has already come to an end and new Lok Sabha has been constituted and, therefore, the relief souhgt by the appellants in their writ petition has already become infructuous and this Court cannot invoke its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to decide academic questions /controversies. 9. The appointment or dismissal of a Member of the Council or Ministers is entirely a political issue. Under Art. 75 of the Constitution, the Prime Minister as well as other Ministers are appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the President. The appointment, removal or dismissal of a Minister is entirely a political decision and essentially has to be taken by the Prime Minister under his prerogative. 10. The appointment, removal or dismissal of a Minister is entirely a political decision and essentially has to be taken by the Prime Minister under his prerogative. 10. Moreover, in absence of the impugned dismissal order of Shri Devi Lal, it cannot be said that his dismissal was based on certain extraneous considerations or for the alleged breach of collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers or for the alleged misconduct committed by him or his removal/ dismissal was on account of the pleasure simplicitor of the President. 11. Mr. Bhandari has cited U.N.R. Rao vs. Smt. Indira Gandhi (1), wherein interpreting Arts. 74 (1) and 75 (2) & (3) of the Constitution of India, it was held that the Council of Ministers does not cease to hold office even after the dissolution of the House of the People. Apparently, the facts of U.N.R. Raos case (supra) are distinguishable with the case in hand. Therefore, this case does not render any assistance to the appellants. 12. Mr. Bhandari has then relied on Minerva Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India (2), wherein the scope of judicial review about the constitutionality of the proclamation of emergency issued under Art. 352 (1) of the Constitution was discussed and defined. It was held that merely because a question has a political complexion, that by itself is no ground why the Court should shirk from performing its duty under the Constitution, if it raises an issue of constitutional determination. It was observed that it would not be right for the Court to decline to examine whether in a given case, there is any constitutional violation involved in the President issuing a Proclamation of emergency. It was further observed that the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court does not extend further than saying whether the limits on the power conferred by the Constitution on the President have been observed or there is transgression of such limits and that the Court cannot go into the question of correctness or adequacy of the facts and circumstances on which the satisfaction of the President is based. We respectfully agree with this dictum. 13. Mr. Bhandari has also cited the case of Indira Sawhney vs. Union of India (3), which is popularly known as Mandal Commission Report" Case. We respectfully agree with this dictum. 13. Mr. Bhandari has also cited the case of Indira Sawhney vs. Union of India (3), which is popularly known as Mandal Commission Report" Case. The Apex Court vide para 558, has emphasized that under our Constitution, the yardstick is not if it is a legislative act or an exceptive decision on policy matter but whether it violates any constitutional guarantee or has potential of constitutional repercussions as enforcement of an assured right, under Chapter III of the Constitution, by approaching Courts is itself a fundamental right. It has been observed that the "constitutional fiction" of political question should not be permitted to stand in the way of the Court to deny the Nation the guidance on basic democratic problem and that avoidance of entering into a political question may be desirable and may not be resorted to, not because of doctrine of separation of power or lack of rules but because of expediency in larger interest for public good but legislatures, too, have their authorised measured by the Constitution, therefore, absence of norms to examine political question has rarely any place in the Indian constitutional jurisprudence. It was further held that the legislative or executive action reserving appointments or posts in services of the State is neither a political issue nor matter of policy. We respectfully agree with the above proposition of law that if a legislative act or an executive decision on policy matter violates any constitutional guarantee or has potential of constitutional repercussions as enforcement of an assured right, which is under the ruse of political question then the Court should not abdicate its duties for upholding the provisions of the Constitution. But in the case in hand, the removal or dismissal of respondent No. 4 by the President of India on the recommendation of the then Prime Minister of India did neither offend nor infringe any fundamental/constitutional right of the appellants or any constitutional mandate. Even the respondent No. 4 did not challenge his removal/dismissal. Undoubtedly, the Prime Minister has the prerogative whether to keep or remove any of his colleagues in the cabinet/council of Ministers. As mentioned earlier in absence of the impugned removal/dismissal order passed by the President of India, it cannot be said whether such removal/dismissal was based on some extraneous considerations. Therefore, the judicial scrutiny/review is not at all warranted in this case. 14. As mentioned earlier in absence of the impugned removal/dismissal order passed by the President of India, it cannot be said whether such removal/dismissal was based on some extraneous considerations. Therefore, the judicial scrutiny/review is not at all warranted in this case. 14. It is true that the learned Single Judge has erroneously taken it to be a case of appointment or resignation of respondent No. 4 as Dy. Prime Minister whereas substantially, it was a case of challenging the impugned removal/dismissal order passed by the President of India. But only for this apparent error, it is not at all a fit case for remanding the matter to the S.B. because in our considered opinion even on merits, the writ petition filed by the appellants was devoid of any force and substance and manifestly merit-less. 15. The resultant of the above discussion is that this Civil Special Appeal is hereby dismissed summarily.