Jaspal Singh ( 1 ) THE facts are eloquent and speak for themselves. In the posh locality of Saket in South Delhi there is a building bearing No. E-26. It is built on a plot of land measuring approximately 500 sq. yards. There is a basement, besides the ground floor comprising of threebed rooms with attached toilet, drawing-cum-dining room besides, of course,a lawn in front. It is owned by the present petitioner Mr. Krishan Lalkohli, a non-resident Indian who has an attorney in India. That attorneyis Marshal (retd.) M. L. Sethi. The building, at present, is in possession of atenant. It is claimed that on 19/04/1989 it was let out to Pepsi Foods ona rental of Rs. 7000. 00 per month through Mr. Ranjit Salve who was earlieremployed with M/s. Pepsi Foods and who claims that it is he who is thetenant in his personal capacity. It is, however, not disputed that it is hewho is presently in occupation of the building. Much before 19/04/1989negotiations for letting out the premises had taken place with respondentno. 1, Mr. V. K. Khanna. Mr. Khanna in fact claims that those negotiations had resulted in the execution of an agreement of lease between him andthe said Air Marshal M. L. Sethi. It is alleged that the said agreement wasexecuted on 9/01/1989 though possession was to be delivered to himon 1/04/1980 from which date the tenancy was to commence. Mr. Khanna further alleges that rent was agreed to be Rs. 2000. 00 per month. Aswould be obvious from what I have noticed above, the possession was neverdelivered to Mr. Khanna. Instead, the premises were let out on 19/04/1989 to another party. On 20/04/1989 Mr. Khanna filed a suit for specific performance basing his entire claim on the said agreement of lease. Alongwith that suit he moved an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The application, itneed hardly be mentioned, was contested. After hearing the parties, thelearned Subordinate Judge disposed of that application by his order dated 9/09/1991 holding that the plaintiff (Mr. Khanna) had made out aprima facie case. The learned Court taking notice of the fact that the premises were in possession of defendant No. 2 i. e. Mr. Ranjit Salve extendedits protective hands to him but restrained Mr. Kohli from delivering possession of the premises to any other person. Khanna) had made out aprima facie case. The learned Court taking notice of the fact that the premises were in possession of defendant No. 2 i. e. Mr. Ranjit Salve extendedits protective hands to him but restrained Mr. Kohli from delivering possession of the premises to any other person. Aggrieved by that order Mr. Kohli has filed this appeal. ( 2 ) MR. Ravinder Sethi, Senior Advocate submitted that no agreement of lease had ever been entered into with Mr. Khanna and that thealleged lease deed was actually a forged document. In support he drew myattention to the affidavit of Air Marshal M. L. Sethi wherein he has claimedthat he had never executed the document and that it did not bear his signatures. Mr. Ravinder Sethi also drew my attention to the admitted signaturesof Air Marshal Sethi on his affidavit and to the disputed signatures on thelease deed and submitted that even a cursory look by naked eye would go toshow that the admitted and the disputed signatures did not tally with eachother. It was further argued that in any case the document being unregistered Mr. Khanna could not take benefit of the same and in support myattention was drawn to a judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Bajaj Autoltd. v. Bihari Lal Kohli, J. T. 1989 (3) S. C. 324 and to a judgment of thiscourt in Smt. Abnash Rani Suri v. Smt. Santosh Chowdhry and. Anr. ,1991rlr 159. It was also the contention of Mr. Ravinder Sethi that one couldnot possibly believe that a person would agree to letting out a premises on amonthly rent of Rs. 2,000. 00 when house tax amounting to Rs. 26,000. 00 wasbeing paid and when on 19/04/1989 itself the premises bad actually beenlet out on a monthly rent of Rs. 7,000. 00. ( 3 ) ON the other band my attention was drawn by Mr. Rajiv Behl,the learned Counsel for the respondents, to as many as 8 photographs filedbefore the learned Trial Court by Mr. Khanna. It was claimed that ahavan was performed in the premises itself immediately upon the executionof the agreement of lease and that the photographs in question were takenon that occasion. It was argued that had there been no agreement with Mr. Kohli there would have been no occasion for performing the Havan. Khanna. It was claimed that ahavan was performed in the premises itself immediately upon the executionof the agreement of lease and that the photographs in question were takenon that occasion. It was argued that had there been no agreement with Mr. Kohli there would have been no occasion for performing the Havan. Myattention was also drawn to two letters- one dated 1/04/1989 and theother dated 10/04/1989 addressed by Mr. Khanna to Air Marshal M. L. Sethi. I was told that those letters were sent to him by registered postacknowledgement-due and were actually received by the Air Marshal. Insupport my attention was drawn to a letter from the Department of Postcertifying that two registered letters were delivered to Air Marshal Sethi. Those letters do go to show that formalities with regard to the leasing of theproperty had been completed but possession had not been delivered. Comingto the so-called lease deed it was contended by the learned Counsel that itbeing an agreement of lease there was no need for its registration eitherunder the Registration Act or under the Transfer of Property Act. In thealternative, it was submitted that it was open to his client to file a suit forspecific performance under Chapter 2 of the Specific Relief Act on the basisof the said unregistered document. It was further contended that this wouldbe no stage for making ocular observations and come to a conclusion withregard to the disputed signatures of the Air Marshal on the said deed oflease. ( 4 ) I have purposely mentioned the rival contentions in detail. Whatdo these contentions show? They show that Mr. Khanna has raised substantial questions which need investigation and a decision on merits. I ammentioning this fact as it was vehemently argued by Mr. Ravinder Sethi thatno prima facie case had been made out and on that score alone the application ought to have been dismissed, prima fade case is after all, not to beconfused with prima facic title which has, of course, to be established onevidence at the trial. What is meant by prima fade case ? Prima fadecase is that which raises substantial question, of course bonafide, which needsinvestigation and ultimately a decision on merits and, as already noticed byme above, the respondent before me and the plaintiff in the suit, namelymr. Khanna doss succeed in raising such questions. What is meant by prima fade case ? Prima fadecase is that which raises substantial question, of course bonafide, which needsinvestigation and ultimately a decision on merits and, as already noticed byme above, the respondent before me and the plaintiff in the suit, namelymr. Khanna doss succeed in raising such questions. And, for the present,i find no reason to hold that the questions so raised have not been raisedbona fide. But then, as we all know, more existence of a prima fade casewould not suffice. The Court has further to be satisfied that non-interferenceby it would result in, what is called in legal parlance, an "irreparable injury"to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to itexcept one to grant injunction. It is also the requirement of law that irreparable injury must be a material one. In other words it must be suchwhich cannot be compensated by way of damages. The third requirement isalso sc well known that it need not be repeated. It is what we call "thebalance of covenience". It must be there in favour of the party seekingrelief. I do feel that respondent No. 1 Mr. Sethi has satisfied these conditions and the learned Trial Court very rightly came to the conclusion that heneeded to be protected. To that extent I am one with the learned Trialjudge. It is, however, the question of relief and its nature which has attractedmy thought. ( 5 ) AS already noticed, the premises are not lying vacant. They arein possession of a tenant who I am informed, was inducted without noticeof the alleged agreement of lease. His possession needs to be protected. To that extent also, I join my voice of agreement with the voice of thelearned trial Judge. ( 6 ) WHAT if the premises are vacated? Further, what if the premisesare sold away? These are the questions which have given me anxiousmoments and I do feel that interests of justice would be best served if insuch an eventuality some protection is afforded to Mr. Khanna. ( 6 ) WHAT if the premises are vacated? Further, what if the premisesare sold away? These are the questions which have given me anxiousmoments and I do feel that interests of justice would be best served if insuch an eventuality some protection is afforded to Mr. Khanna. In an effortto keep the balance I order that in case the premises are vacated and thesame are sought to be let out to another tenant or are sought to be given onlicence, in that case the landlord as well as the would be tenant/licenseeshall give an undertaking in Court that on the suit culminating in a decreein favour of Mr. Khanna, they would be bound by the same and the possession of the premises would be delivered by them to him if so ordered by thecourt in the decree. Without such an undertaking the premises would notbe let out or given on licence. In case during the pendency of the suitmr. Kohli decides to sell the property in that eventuality also before thesale an undertaking to the same effect would be given by the parties to thetransaction. I am making it clear that no transaction of such a sort wouldbe entered into without the execution and acceptance of such an undertakingby the Court. With these observations the appeal is partly accepted butwith no order as to costs.