P. K. Bahri ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against judgment dated 21/09/1992 of Rent Control Tribunal by which he had dismissed theappeal brought by the appellant against order dated 2/07/1992 of anadditional Rent Controller by which the objection petition filed by theappellant in proceedings under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act hadbeen dismissed. ( 2 ) FACTS, in brief, are that Late Harminder Singh Anand had let outthe premises in question to M/s. Hindustan Sugar Mills Limited vide alease Deed dated April 25, 1977. The premises were used by Sri Chandmehta, predecessor in interest of the appellant. The said company is statedto have surrendered the tenancy to the landlord on 25/03/1978. However, Sri Chand Mehta continued in the premises and on 23/05/1978,sri Chand Mehta and the landlord, Harminder Singh approached theadditional Controller for creating a limited tenancy under Section 21 witheffect from 1/06/1978 for a period of five years. The Additional Controller granted the permission for creating such limited tenancy for a periodof five years. ( 3 ) ON the expiry of the said period of five years, Harminder Singh,landlord had filed a petition for obtaining an order for being placed inpossession of the premises in question under Section 21 of the Act. Theobjections were filed by Sri Chand Mehta on 8/03/1975. Variouspleas were taken in resisting the said petition of the landlord but now twopleas have been raised before me in support of the said objections by learnedcounsel for the appellant. Firstly, that the order granting the permissionfor creating the limited tenancy was vitiated because of jurisdictional error,inasmuch as Sri Chand Mehta. was already in possession of the premises as atenant and thus the premises were not available for creating any limitedtenancy under Section 21 of the Act. The other plea urged before me is thatduring the pendency of the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act, therespondents, the heirs of the original landlord, had instituted an eviction caseagainst the appellants under Section 14-D which has the effect of wiping onthe proceedings under Section 21 of the Act inasmuch as the landlord hasnow treated the appellants as ordinary tenants for getting their eviction ourthe ground of eviction, if any, available under Section 14 of the Delhi Rentcontrol Act and thus, the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act should bedeemed to be terminated. ( 4 ) BOTH, the original landlord and the tenant, had died during thependency of the proceedings. ( 5 ) NOW coming to the first point, it is evident that the objectionshad been filed in the proceedings under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Controlact after the expiry of the period of limited tenancy created under the saidact. The learned Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the ratiolaid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Shrisht Dhawan v. M/s. Shaw Brothers, 1992 Rajdhani Law Reporter (SC) 97. After makingreference to various judgments earlier delivered by the Supreme Court withregard to the scope of the objections which could be raised in proceedingsunder Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, in the main judgmentdelivered by R. M. Sahai, J. , the principles which had been culled out havebeen reproduced as follows :- " (1) Permission granted u/sec. 21 of the Act can beassailedby the tenant only if it can be established that it was vitiated byfraud or jurisdictional error which in context of Section 21 is nothing else except fraud and collusion; (2) Fraud or collusion mustrelate to the date when permission was granted; (3) Permissioncarries a presumption of correctness which can be permitted to bechallenged not only by raising objection but proving it prima facie,to the satisfication of Controller before landlord is called upon tofile reply or enter into evidence; (4) No fishing or roving inquiryshould be permitted at the stage of execution; (5) A permission doesnot suffer from any of these errors merely because no reason wasdisclosed in application at the time of creation of short termtenancy; (6) Availability of sufficient accommodation either at thetime of grant of permission or at the stage of execution is not arelevant factor for deciding validity of permission. " ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant has also REFERRED TO to certainobservations made in this judgment in para 23 wherein it was highlightedthat if there is a mistake of tact in relation to jurisdiction, the statutoryauthority or Tribunal cannot assume jurisdiction in respect of the subject-matter which the statute does not confer on it by deciding erroneously thefact on which jurisdiction depends. The order of Court or Tribunal whichlacks the jurisdiction, the same is ultra vires and void. The order of Court or Tribunal whichlacks the jurisdiction, the same is ultra vires and void. It was also observedthat error in assumption of jurisdiction should not be confused with mistake,legal or factual, in exercise of jurisdiction and then it was observed that thejurisdictional fact can be said to be availability of vacant premises which arenot required by landlord for the particular period and its letting out forresidential purposes. It was held that permission obtained under Section 21may be vitiated if the premises were not vacant on the date of applicationand similarly, if the permission is obtained in respect of non-residential premises. Drawing support from these observations, learned Counsel for theappellant has argued that in the present case, there was a jurisdictional errorof fact in granting permission under Section 21 when infact the premiseswere not vacant and available for being let out for limited period under Section 21 of the Act. ( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has argued that this particular fact that Sri Chand Mehta was already in possessionof the premises at the time the limited tenancy was created is not a jurisdictional error as the parties could enter into a contract for creating limitedtenancy and obtain necessary permission even though there was alreadyexisting a tenancy in favour of that tenant. He has argued that such anobjection, even if is available to the particular tenant, could be raised onlyduring the currency of the limited tenancy and he has placed reliance onpankaj Bhargava v. Mohinder Nath, A. I. R. 1991 Supreme Court 1233. In thesaid case also, a similar objection was raised in proceedings under Section 21by the tenant and it was held that such an objection could not be raisedafter the expiry of the limited tenancy. This judgment given by three Judgeshas been also REFERRED TO to in the case of Smt. Shrisht Dhawan (supra ). In thisjudgment, reliance was also placed on Dhanvanti v. D. D. Gupta, A. I. R. 1986supreme Court 1184; where it was held that permission under Section 21 forletting out the premises to the same tenant for limited period more than oncesuccessively would not by itself and without any thing more vitiate the saidpermission granted under Section 21. The judgment in Smt. Shrishtdhawan s case (supra) was given by two Hon ble Judges. The judgment in Smt. Shrishtdhawan s case (supra) was given by two Hon ble Judges. The views expressed in the two judgments are not, in my opinion, in any manner inconsistent. The jurisdictional error which is REFERRED TO to in case of Smt. Shrisht Dhawan (supra) with regard to premises being not available for creating limitedtenancy could only mean that premises are occupied by some other personthan the person approaching the Court for creating the limited tenancy. Itis to be emphasised that it was not a discovery of a new fact which couldenable the tenant to file the objections even after the expiry of the limitedtenancy which, according to him, may amount to obtaining permission fromthe Additional Controller by practicing any fraud. ( 8 ) THE judgment delivered in the case of Pankaj Bhargava, (supra)has been followed by this Court in the case of O. Bahree v. Rikhi Brothers,49 (1993) Delhi Law Times 71 and also in Oriental Express Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Smt. Usha Pasricha, 1993 (1) Delhi Lawyer 43. So, I hold that this pleadoes not raise such jurisdictional error which could enable the appellants tochallenge the permission granted under Section 21 even after the expiry ofthe period of limited tenancy. So, I negative the first ground. ( 9 ) THE next point to be decided is whether with the filing of an eviction petition under Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act by the respondents against the appellants, the proceedings under Section 21 come to anend or not. The learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that ordergranting permission under Section 21 creates a limited tenancy and sameorder has the effect of a decree of eviction, execution of which is postponedtill the expiry of the limited tanancy and the status of a person who is inducted as a tenant for a limited period under Section 21, after obtaining necessary permission, remains as a tenant only till the expiry of the period oflimited tenancy and thereafter the landlord has a choice either to treat sucha person as an ordinary tenant or to get him dispossessed by filing a petitionunder Section 21 before the Controller within six months of the expiry of thesaid period of the limited tenancy. He has argued that the landlord in thepresent case chose to file a petition within six months of the expiry of thelimited tenancy by filing a petition under Section 21 but later on had chosento treat the appellants as ordinary tenants when the petition was filed undersection 4 of the Delhi Rent Control Act and the earlier choice made by thelandlord amounts to have been given up. ( 10 ) THE short question arises as to what is the status of a person whois inducted in the premises as a tenant on the basis of limited tenancy created under Section 21 of the Act. Whether he continues to be tenant for thepurposes of Section 2 (1) of Delhi Rent Control Act or not till any order ofrecovery of possession is passed against such a person. It is true that Section 21 is a special provision and can be termed as a Code by itself as thisparticular provision is introduced in the statute giving protection to thetenants to enable the landlord to obtain back the possession of the premisesif he did not require a particular premises for some period and lets out thepremises after obtaining permission from the Controller under the aforesaidsection. It is argued that the status of a person inducted in the premisesunder the provisions of Section 21 is determined the moment the permissionis granted and limited tenancy is created and such a person could not bedeemed to be a tenant under the definition of tenant giver, under Sec. 2 (1)after the expiry of the period of limited tenancy unless and until the landlord chooses to have him treated as an ordinary tenant and learned Counselhas further argued that by filing a petition under Section 14, the landlord inthe present case has chosen to accept him as an ordinary tenant amenable tothe jurisdiction of the Rent Controller under Section 14 of the Act and thereby he should be deemed to have abandoned his choice of getting recovery ofpossession under Section 21 of the Act. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, hascontended that till the order of recovery of possession is passed, the status ofa person whose limited tenancy expires is no different from the status of anordinary tenant whose contractual tenancy had come to an end inasmuch assuch a person would continue to be a tenant for the purposes of Section 2 (1)of Delhi Rent Control Act and mere fact that landlord had also filed a petition for eviction against such a person on any of the grounds enumerated insection 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act would not lead to any inferencethat landlord had foresaken his right to get an order for recovery of possession against such a tenant under Section 21 of the Act as well. He has madereference to a few judgments in support of his contentions. ( 12 ) IN SAO 66/74, A. S. Sawhney v. Smt. Suhag Rani, decided in 7/03/1974 by a Single Judge of this Court, the question arose whetheran order under Section 15 (2) could be made against a person whose limitedtenancy had expired and against whom proceedings for recovery of possessionare instituted by landlord under Section 21 of the Act. It was held by thecourt that on the expiry of the period of the tenancy fixed in the agreement,the relationship of landlord and tenant does not ipso facto come to an endand the tenant would continue to be a tenant within the meaning of thedefinition of tenant as given in Section 2 (1) and an order under Section 15 (2) can be made against such a person. This judgment was followed byanother Single Judge of this Court in Atma Steels Pvt. Ltd. v. Harbir Singh,1987 (1) Rent Control Journal 28. This judgment was followed byanother Single Judge of this Court in Atma Steels Pvt. Ltd. v. Harbir Singh,1987 (1) Rent Control Journal 28. ( 13 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that the ratiolaid down in these two judgments should not be made applicable to the factsof the present case inasmuch as in those two cases, the question was of passing an order for recovery of rent during the pendency of the objection petitions pending under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act and mere factthat for purposes of Section 15 (2) such persons have been treated as tenantswould not lead this Court to hold that even for purposes of Section 14 ofdelhi Rent Control Act, such persons should be treated as tenants and ifthey are treated as tenants by the landlord, then the proceedings undersection 21 cannot be allowed to continue and it should be deemed that landlord had given up his right to get recovery of possession which was availableto him under Section 21 of the Act. He has also argued that the law laiddown in these two judgments is not correct inasmuch as the person who isinducted in the premises on a tenancy created under Section 21 remains atenant only for the limited purpose for which the permission is obtainedfrom the controller and by no process of reason, such a person can be deemed to be tenant covered by the definition of the tenant given in Section 2 (1)of Delhi Rent Control Act. I am afraid it is not possible to countenancethis contention. ( 14 ) TILL an order is made by the Controller under Section 21 requiring the landlord to be placed in possession of the demised premises let out tothe tenant, the said person will continue to be a tenant for the purposes ofof Delhi Rent Control Act. It is evident that even if a contractual tenancycomes to an end by any process of law or in the terms of the contract sucha tenant is given protection by virtue of Section 14 of Delhi Rent Controlact and such a person is covered by the definition of tenant given in Section 2 (1 ). It is evident that even if a contractual tenancycomes to an end by any process of law or in the terms of the contract sucha tenant is given protection by virtue of Section 14 of Delhi Rent Controlact and such a person is covered by the definition of tenant given in Section 2 (1 ). I do not understand why the position of a tenant whose tenancyis created only for a limited period should not be analogous to some extentto the position of a contractual tenant whose tenancy stands terminatedunder the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or the Contract Act. ( 15 ) SECTION 21 is a Code by itself but it has to take its hue from thedefinition of tenant given in Section 2 (1) A person who is inducted in thepremises as a tenant continues to remain liable to pay rent to the landlordtill he surrenders the vacant possession of the premises to the landlord. Inlaw, till the order for recovery of possession is passed against such a person,he would be deemed to be continuing in the premises as a tenant. The landlord cannot treat him as a trespasser and approach the Civil Court for getting any decree for possession against such person. He has to come to therent Controller under Section 21 for getting an order for recovery of possession against such a tenant and for the purpose of Section 21, till an orderforrecovery of possession is passed against such a tenant, such person who is atenant, his status as a tenant would not terminate as far as provisions ofdelhi Rent Control Act are concerned. ( 16 ) IN the eviction petition, copy of which has been placed in thisfile, which has been filed under Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, ithas been mentioned by the landlord that proceedings under Section 21 havebeen instituted which are being resisted by the tenant. It is true that in somany words, the landlord had not mentioned that the eviction petition undersection 14 is being filed without prejudice to the right of the landlord topursue the remedy under Section 21 of the Act but the whole tenor of thepetition makes it clear that the landlord had no intention of giving up hisremedy under Section 21 by pursuing the petition under Section 14 of thedelhi Rent Control Act. ( 17 ) IN Oriental Express Co. ( 17 ) IN Oriental Express Co. Pvt. Ltd. (supra), a similar question arosefor decision. In that case also, while the proceedings under Section 21 werebeing continued by landlord, the landlord filed a petition under Section 14 ofthe Act and in that case, it was, of course indicated by the landlord in thepetition that the said petition under Section 14 was being filed without prejudice to the proceedings instituted by the landlord under Section 21 of theact. It was held in this judgment that the proceedings under Section 21would not stand terminated on the mere fact that eviction petition undersection 14 had been instituted inasmuch as the landlord had clearly reservedhis right to pursue the proceedings under Section 21 as well. ( 18 ) IN Jitender Kumar v. Krishan Chopra, 1986 Rajdhani Lawreporter 188, the facts were similar to the facts of the present case. still itwas held by a Single Bench of this Court that the petition under Section 21does not become infructuous by mere filing of a petition under Section 14 ofthe Act. ( 19 ) IN view of the above discussion, I bold that the landlord had notgiven up his right to pursue his remedy under Section 21 by mere filinganother petition against the tenant under Section 14-D of the Delhi Rentcontrol Act. I, hence, negative this point as well. ( 20 ) I dismiss the appeal but I leave the parties to bear their owncosts. Two weeks time is granted to vacate the premises.