Mathevan Sankaran v. Narayanan Narayanan — 1993 DIGILAW 370 (KER)

JUDGMENT P. Krishnamoorthy, J. 1. What are the circumstances under which partial redemption can be allowed is the question referred to the Division Bench by one of us. The mortgage sought to be redeemed (Ext. P1) was executed on 6-12-1094 in the erstwhile Travancore State to which the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act were extended only in 1951. The question to be decided Ss as to whether such mortgages can be partially redeemed in spite of the specific prohibition contained in the last proviso to S.60 of the Transfer of Property Act. 2. This appeal is by the plaintiff whose suit for partial redemption was concurrently dismissed by the courts below. The facts necessary for the disposal of the case are the following: The suit is for redemption of Ext. P1 mortgage dated 6-12-1094 ME in respect of eight items included therein, scheduled as A-schedule to the plaint. Fourteen items of properties including the plaint schedule properties belonged to Kuzhivilakam tarwad. The said tarwad executed a mortgage of these 14 items of properties under Ext. D1 dated 5-8-1088 ME. This was followed by Ext. P1 superior mortgage (Melotti) in favour of one Krishnan Appi and her son, the plaintiff who was a minor at that time. The mortgage money under Ext. P1 was 24500 Fanams made up of 12500 Fanams reserved for redeeming Ext. D1 mortgage: 7600 Fanams out of the mortgage money was paid out of tarwad funds of Krishnan Appi. 1400 Fanams paid by plaintiff's father for the benefit of the plaintiff and 3000 Fanams reserved to be paid to Eachambi Madevan, plaintiff's father to whom it was due from the mortgagors. Thereafter by Ext. P10 release deed dated 30-9-1097 ME. Ext. D1 mortgage was redeemed. Defendants 1 and 2 are the children of Krishnan Appi through her first husband Narayanan. The 3rd defendant is the son of the 2nd defendant and the 4th defendant is the daughter of 2nd defendant's deceased daughter. Plaintiff's father had another wife and eight children and he was a misradayi Ezhava. Ext. P2 dated 7-5-1100 ME is the partition deed among the Makkathayam and Marumakkathayam heirs of Eachambi Madevan. The 1st defendant was party No. 15 and plaintiff and his mother party No. 16 to that document 3000 Fanams which was recited to be paid to the plaintiff's father under Ext. Ext. P2 dated 7-5-1100 ME is the partition deed among the Makkathayam and Marumakkathayam heirs of Eachambi Madevan. The 1st defendant was party No. 15 and plaintiff and his mother party No. 16 to that document 3000 Fanams which was recited to be paid to the plaintiff's father under Ext. P1 was allotted to the plaintiff and in f lieu of that D-schedule properties (two items) were allotted to the plaintiff. Those items were properties included In Sy. No. 1789 and plaint B-schedule property included in Ext. P1 mortgage. Thereafter, an anubhava udampadi (maintenance arrangement) was entered into in respect of tavazhi properties of Krishnan Appi and her children, evidenced by Ext. P3 dated 5-6-1102 ME. The 1st defendant - karnavan of the tavazhi was party No. 1 and he had a special claim of 5250 Fanams. In lieu of that amount D-schedule properties therein were allotted to him exclusively. D-schedule properties included 4 items of properties included in Ext. P1 mortgage. The normal share for maintenance was allotted to the 1st defendant under A-Schedule, B-schedule was allotted to the plaintiff and his mother's branch and C-schedule to the 2nd defendant and others. There were further provisions in that anubhava udampadi regarding devolution of the maintenance right after the death of the mother. 3. As Stated earlier, the equity of redemption in respect of Ext. P1 properties belonged to Kuzhivilakam tarwad who sold their rights to the members of the Thengil Azhikath Veedu. Ext. P4 is the partition dated 1-10-1114 ME in the Thengil Azhikath tarwad by which the properties included in Ext. P1 were allotted to various sharers. By the allotment and subsequent purchase Exts. P7 and P8, the equity of redemption over the plaint schedule properties vested in Krishnan, Sarada and Kunju Devaki and her children. They sold their right to one Ramakrishnan benami for the plaintiff under Ext. P5. Plaintiff filed O. S. No. 306 of 1954 against the benamidar for declaration of his title and possession. That suit was decreed and thereafter the benamidar Ramakrishnan executed Ext. P6 sale deed dated 24-2-1959 in favour of the plaintiff and he became entitled to the equity of redemption over the plaint schedule properties. Plaintiff further alleged that he is in possession of plaint A-schedule items 4 and 7 by Ext. P3 udampadi and that he is in possession or plaint B-schedule under Ext. P2 partition deed. P6 sale deed dated 24-2-1959 in favour of the plaintiff and he became entitled to the equity of redemption over the plaint schedule properties. Plaintiff further alleged that he is in possession of plaint A-schedule items 4 and 7 by Ext. P3 udampadi and that he is in possession or plaint B-schedule under Ext. P2 partition deed. It is further alleged by him that the mortgage right over the property in Sy. No. 1789 was surrendered to the allottee under Ext. P4 partition deed in the mortgagor's family. It is alleged that the 1st defendant executed Ext. P9 release deed dated 14-8-1122 ME of one of the mortgaged properties included in D-schedule to Ext. P3 to the allottee under Ext. P4 partition deed According to the plaintiff, in view of the partition in the family of the mortgagors and mortgagees and also on account of the release by the 1st defendant of one of the mortgaged properties under Ext. P9, the integrity of the mortgage is lost and he is entitled to partial redemption of the properties belonging to him on payment of the proportionate mortgage money. Accordingly the suit is filed for redemption and possession of items 1 to 3 and 5 and 6 and for extinguishment of the mortgage in respect of items 4 and 7 (which are already in his possession) by payment of a proportionate mortgage amount of 6352 Fanams. 4. Defendants filed different written statements mainly contending that the suit is barred by limitation that they are deemed tenants under the Land Reforms Act, that all persons interested in the mortgage are not impleaded in the suit, that the entire mortgage right belongs to the undivided tarwad and that the suit is bad for partial redemption. 5. The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court and the lower appellate court confirmed the dismissal on the ground that the suit is bad for partial redemption and that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. 6. The question as to whether the defendants are entitled to any benefit under Act I of 1964 is concluded by a previous judgment of this Court. Thus, the only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the plaintiff's suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground that it is for partial redemption of a mortgage. 7. Thus, the only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the plaintiff's suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground that it is for partial redemption of a mortgage. 7. The main contention raised by counsel for the appellant - plaintiff is that the integrity of Ext. P1 mortgage having been broken by act of parties, he is entitled to redeem his share alone by paying proportionate money. It is further contended by him that Ext. P1 was executed in 1094 ME in the Travancore State to which the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act were extended only in 1951 and the prohibition contained in the last proviso to S.60 of the Act cannot apply in relation to mortgages executed before that date. On the other hand, counsel for the contesting respondents contended that the law in Travancore was in no way different from other parts of India and that even accepting that the law was different in Travancore, the conditions necessary for partial redemption are not satisfied in this case. He contended that the mortgage right still vests in Krishnan Appi's tarwad and that Ext. P1 is only a maintenance arrangement and the recitals therein will conclusively show that the mortgage right is still undivided. 8. Counsel for the appellant placed considerable reliance on three decisions of this Court reported in Gopala Kurup v. Raman ( 1957 KLT 1289 ), Thommi v. Devasia (AIR 1963 Kerala 75) and Krishnamma v. Parukutty Amma ( 1964 KLT 153 ) in support of the position that his suit is maintainable. These three decisions have laid down that the law in Travancore as it existed prior to the coming into force of the Transfer of Property Act in regard to partial redemption was different and that on satisfying certain conditions such a suit is maintainable. In Gopala Kurup v. Raman ( 1957 KLT 1289 ) a learned Single Judge of this Court, following the decisions of the Travancore High Court in Ponnan Rowel Nadan v. Mathukutti Nadan Subbaian Nadan (34 TLJ 829) and Chenthammal Lakshmi Amma v. Narayana Pillai Govinda Pillai (1947 T. L. R.593) as also the decision of the Travancore - Cochin High Court in Gopala Pillai Madhavan Pillai v. Krishna Pillai Parameswaran Pillai (5 D. L. R. T-C 148), held that Travancore courts had recognised three exceptions to the rule against partial redemption. These are: (i) Where the mortgagee recognises a portion of the mortgaged property among the comortgagors: (ii) Where the mortgagee himself acquires a portion of the mortgaged property, and (iii) Where comortgagors have distinct and separate interests. According to counsel for the appellant, the above exceptions are satisfied in this case by the partition in the mortgagees family evidenced by Ext. P3 the partition in the mortgagors' family evidenced by Ext. P4 and the release by the 1st defendant of one of the mortgaged properties under Ext. P9 dated 14.8 1122 M. E. To understand the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions which are based on the earlier decisions of the Travancore and Travancore - Cochin High Courts, it is necessary to consider as to what was the ratio laid down in those decision and in the other decisions of the Travancore High Court. 9. One of the earliest decisions is reported in Madhavan Padmanabhan v. Aruvappan Mathavan (25 TLR 137). In that decision it was said that that the indivisible character of a mortgage is well established. It was further held that it is "for the obvious reason that in a mortgage transaction a creditor values his security as a whole, and if the mortgagor were to be allowed to break up its compactness the mortgagee would suffer in the depreciation thereby caused, besides being driven to the necessity of bringing several suits against the several purchasers of the equity of redemption". It was further held: "This character of indivisibility exists not only with reference to the mortgagee, who may generally be more benefited thereby, but also with reference to the mortgagor. And save as a matter of special arrangement and bargain entered into between all the persons interested, neither the mortgagor nor the mortgagee or persons acquiring, through either, a partial interest in the subject, can under the mortgage, get relief except in consonance with the principle of indivisibility referred to." (underlining is ours) Thereafter, the Court relies on a passage in Court on Transfer of property and lays down the three exceptions which were mentioned in 1957 KLT 1289 . 10. In Ponnan Rowel Nadan v. Mathukutty Nadan Subbaian Nadan (24 TLJ 829) the suit was for redemption of Ext. D mortgage therein in its entirety and the question arose as to whether the plaintiff in that case was entitled to redeem the entire mortgage. 10. In Ponnan Rowel Nadan v. Mathukutty Nadan Subbaian Nadan (24 TLJ 829) the suit was for redemption of Ext. D mortgage therein in its entirety and the question arose as to whether the plaintiff in that case was entitled to redeem the entire mortgage. It is clear from the statement of facts in that case that the mortgagors therein held specific shares in the mortgaged property and that the consideration was also received separately by each of the mortgagors. There was only one mortgagee (the 16th defendant) and he obtained all the rights possessed by the mortgagee under Ext. D. The 16th defendant became the owner of a portion of the equity of redemption also. It was in such circumstances that the Court relying on the three exceptions mentioned above held that exceptions 1 and 3, namely that the interests of the Comortgagors are distinct and separate and that the mortgage has obtained the equity of redemption over a part of the property, are satisfied in that case and that the plaintiff is not entitled to redeem the property in full. This is a case clearly falling within the last proviso to S.60 of the Transfer of Property Act. 11. In Chentha Amma Lakshmi Amma v. Narayana Pillai Govinda Pillai (1947 T. L. R.593) there was a partition among the mortgagors who divided the mortgaged property into several shares. The sole mortgagee allowed a number of other sharers to redeem on the basis of the partition deed without reference to the rest on payment of the amount agreed to be paid between the redeeming sharers op the one band and the mortgagee on the other. It was a case where there was only one mortgagee and he recognised the partition among the comortgagors by allowing himself to be redeemed by the sharers of their separate share. In this context the court observed: - "The integral contract of mortgage had already been split up and the partition deed having been recognised by the mortgagee, it can be confidently asserted that the sharers under the partition have each an individual right to redeem that part of the property that had fallen to their share by paying the proportionate part of the debt ...................................................... when and how the integrity of a mortgage is broken up is necessarily based upon the acts and conduct of the parties in each case, and we are clear that in this case the mortgagee had broken up the integrity of the mortgage so far as the plaintiffs are concerned ......" (Underlining is Ours) 12. In Gopala Pillai Madhavan Pillai v. Krishna Pillai Parameswaran Pillai (5 D. L. R. TC 148) the suit was for redemption of a mortgage of plaint A-schedule properties alone whereas the mortgage sought to be redeemed covered both A and B schedule properties. Plaintiff wanted to redeem only the A-schedule properties on payment of one half of the mortgage amount based on his right to claim such a relief on the provisions contained in Ext. A partition deed by which the parties who obtained the equity of redemption over the A and B schedule properties had agreed to charge one half of the mortgage and purakkadom over A-schedule properties and the remaining one half over the B-schedule properties. Defendant - mortgagee contended that the suit is bad for partial redemption. The court found that the mortgagee is not bound by the terms of the partition deed entered into in the mortgagors' tarwad and that he is entitled to oppose the suit for partial redemption. Plaintiff, in support of his contention that he is entitled to redeem, relied on the decision in 25 T. L. R.137 referred to above. After stating the three exceptions to the rule of indivisibility, a Division Bench of the Travancore Cochin High Court held: - "Except to indicate that Defendants 2 to 10 were aware of the existence of the partition deed in the mortgagor's tarwad, it could not be held that they recognised the division of the equity of redemption between the mortgagors. The mere knowledge of a partition deed would not amount to the recognition of the same. By the exception mentioned above it would indicate that the mortgagee was to be deemed to recognise the partition of the mortgaged properties among the comortgagors in ease there is something to show that they accepted the partition deed in relation to the mortgaged properties. By the exception mentioned above it would indicate that the mortgagee was to be deemed to recognise the partition of the mortgaged properties among the comortgagors in ease there is something to show that they accepted the partition deed in relation to the mortgaged properties. If they had taken a renewal of the mortgage from one of the mortgagors for the share obtained by him or they surrendered a portion of the mortgage holdings of one of the mortgagors or they took some document recognising the different shares of the mortgagors they could be deemed to have recognised the partition deed." On the facts of the case it was further found that the evidence in the case is not sufficient to hold that the mortgagees had recognised the partition of the mortgaged properties from the comortgagors so as to entitle the plaintiff to claim a fraction of mortgage holding on payment of the proportionate mortgage amount chargeable on this fraction. 13. In Krishnamma v. Parukutty ( 1964 KLT 153 ) from the judgment the facts of the case are not clear and it was only held that if the mortgage sought to be redeemed came into existence prior to the date on which the Transfer of Property Act was made applicable, the question has to be decided under the law that existed in Travancore prior to that date. Under what circumstances the above law has to be applied is not stated in the judgment. 14. In Parukutty Amma v. C. B. Amma (AIR 1954 Madras 818) the question as to when the integrity of a mortgage is disintegrated was considered by the Madras High Court and it was held as follows: - "In our opinion the case has to be determined not on the principles laid down and recognised by S.60 of the Transfer of Property Act. Apart from it, in the present case, with the consent of all the parties interested in the mortgage including the mortgagee, the amount due under the mortgage liability in respect of it was apportioned between the two sets of properties, that is 2/5th share owned by the plaintiffs and the 3/5th share owned by the second defendant, thereby in effect and substance constituting what was one mortgage originally, into two distinct and separate mortgages. In such an event the principles laid, down under S.60 of the Transfer of Property Act would have no application. It cannot be disputed that, if there was once a mortgage effected between the parties, mortgage being a contractual transaction, it would be open to the parties by their consent to split up the mortgage into two distinct and separate mortgages. Thereby they are not trying to evade or in any way infringe the principles laid down in S.60, T. P. Act. S.60 of the Transfer of Property Act has application only so long as the mortgage continues without being modified or split up by agreement between the parties. By the Amendment introduced in 1929 in the proviso to S.60 of the Act, it is no doubt true, as was pointed by Mulla in his commentary, that the other modes of splitting up the integrity of a mortgage were probably intended to be negatived, and the only way by which the integrity would be broken is in the manner laid down in the last clause in S.60. But that is only, when there is no modification of the mortgage by consent of the parties." 15. In Ram Chand v. Prabhu Dayal ( AIR 1942 PC 50 ) considering the principles which would entitle a plaintiff for partially redeeming a mortgage, their Lordships held: - "But, in the end, the question is whether S.60 of the Act provides any rule upon such matters. That section as its language shows is to be regarded as conferring the right to redeem and while the opening words of the last clause "nothing in this section" do sot prevent a wider right of redemption bring given by agreement, express or implied, the mortgagor in the absence of such a stipulation must, in their Lordships' view, redeem upon the terms of the Act." (underlining is ours) Again, it was observed: - "Their Lordship consider that the extent of the right to redeem was intended to be de - limited by the Act which aimed at furnishing to Indian Courts a definite rule expressive of existing law: and that apart from the exception which it recognizes, the last clause of S.60 was intended to preclude mortgagors or persons deriving title from them from claiming independently of agreement to have an equity to redeem their own share on payment of a proportionate part of "the mortgage money". " (underlining is ours) 16. What was the law applicable to partial redemption in the Travancore area was considered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Thommi v. Devasia (AIR 1963 Kerala 75). In that case. D W. 5, a member of the mortgagee - family had purchased a share of the mortgagor - family's right. The Court held that where there are more mortgagees than one, all such mortgagees together must have purchased a portion or the whole of a share of a mortgagor. It was further held that the purchase being only by one of the members of the mortgagee family. The purchase by D. W. 5 does, not strictly fall within the last paragraph of S.60. Thereafter, this Court observed: - "But it is to be noted that this paragraph can apply only to a case, where all the parties interested in the mortgage including the mortgagee have not altered the arrangement under the original mortgage. The mortgage is a contractual transaction: and if all the parties to that transaction agree the transaction can be split up into two or more separate mortgages. By doing that the parties are not in any way trying to evade or infringe the principles laid down in S.60 of the Transfer of Property Act. S.60 has application only so long as the mortgage continues without having been modified or split up by agreement of all the parties. This has been laid down in Parukutti Amma v. C. Balameenakshi Amma, AIR 1954 Mad 818 by Satyanarayana Rao and Rajagopalan JJ. and I am in agreement with this view expressed by their Lordships of the Madras High Court. Therefore, if in this case it is established that the splitting up of the mortgage was agreed to, by all the parties thereto, S.60 cannot stand in the way of partial redemption as prayed for in the suit." After referring to the various decisions of the Travancore High Court and the decision in 1957 KLT 1289 , this Court further observed: - Thus, though the principle of indivisibility exists more for the benefit of the mortgagees, it exists for the benefit of the mortgagor also. That rule can be altered only as matter of special arrangement and bargain among all the Parties interested. That rule can be altered only as matter of special arrangement and bargain among all the Parties interested. If all the parties interested in the mortgage, if all the mortgagors and the mortgagees, consent to alter the indivisible character of the mortgage, the principle of indivisibility is no more a bar against partial redemption." (Underlining is ours) After stating the above principle, the Court considered the facts of the case and held that partial redemption is possible in that case on the ground that there was a partition in the mortgagor - family in 1116 as also a partition in the mortgagee family under Ext. P4 expressing their consent to treat the mortgage as no more indivisible. It was further held that in, the circumstances of the case the subsequent partition in the mortgagee - family has recognised the previous partition in the mortgagor - family. Accordingly this Court held that the first exception mentioned above to the indivisibility rule will apply to the facts of the case. 17. From the conspectus of the aforesaid rulings it is clear that the indivisible character of a mortgage is the normal rule and that the law in Travancore as also in the other parts of the country was not different. The rule of indivisibility can be altered only by a special agreement or bargain entered into by all the mortgagors and mortgagees together. If there is consent among the mortgagors and the mortgagees to alter the indivisible character of the mortgage, it will not be a defence thereafter to say that the mortgage is indivisible. In other words, the rule of indivisibility of a mortgage can be altered by an agreement entered into by all the mortgagors and the mortgagees together. Such an agreement or bargain can either be express or implied. From the principles laid down in 25 T. L. R.137 onwards it is clear that it was based on these principles that the Travancore Court held that there are three exceptions to the normal rule of indivisibility of a mortgage. This rule was applicable not only to the Travancore area but also to other areas where S.60 of the Transfer of Property Act is applicable, as could be seen from the ratio laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1954 Madras 818. This rule was applicable not only to the Travancore area but also to other areas where S.60 of the Transfer of Property Act is applicable, as could be seen from the ratio laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1954 Madras 818. Independent partition among the mortgagors or mortgagees by itself will not be sufficient to disintegrate a mortgage and the mere knowledge of such a partition either among the mortgagors or mortgagees by itself also would not indicate that the mortgagee was to be deemed to recognise the partition of the mortgaged properties among the comortgagors. There must be something more to show that the mortgagee had in effect recognised the partition among the comortgagors either expressly or by implication. We are accordingly in agreement with the view expressed by the Travancore -Cochin High Court in 5 D. L. R. T-C 148. In AIR 1963 Kerala 75 though the principles regarding the disruption of a mortgage were correctly stated, the learned Single Judge merely relying on the partition both among the mortgagors and the mortgagees came to the conclusion that the mortgage is disrupted, without considering the question as to whether the mortgagees had recognised the same. As we have already stated, the mere knowledge of a partition by itself is not sufficient and to that extent we cannot agree with the conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge in that case. 18. Applying the above principle, it has to be considered as to whether the integrity of the mortgage in this case has been broken by consent of parties either express or implied. Plaintiff relies on Ext. P4 partition deed in the mortgagor - family and Ext. P3 partition in the mortgagee - family as also on the release by the 1st defendant under Ext. P9 in regard to one of the mortgaged properties, in support of his case that the integrity of the mortgage is broken. No doubt, there was a partition in the mortgagor family but Ext. P3 document executed is only an Anubhava udampady or in other words, a maintenance arrangement. The recitals in the document are clear to the effect that the parties never intended to disrupt the tarwad. Moreover, the family was exempted from the provisions of the Ezhava Act by virtue of the provisions contained in S.33 of the Ezhava Act. P3 document executed is only an Anubhava udampady or in other words, a maintenance arrangement. The recitals in the document are clear to the effect that the parties never intended to disrupt the tarwad. Moreover, the family was exempted from the provisions of the Ezhava Act by virtue of the provisions contained in S.33 of the Ezhava Act. A reading of the plaint also would show that the mortgage right vested in the tarwad of Krishnan Appi and the suit was for redeeming the mortgage from the tarwad. The mere fact that certain items of properties were exclusively allotted to the 1st defendant in lieu of certain special rights in his favour by itself is not sufficient to hold that there was an outright partition of the mortgage right among mortgagees. Even assuming that certain properties included in the mortgage were exclusively allotted to the 1st defendant, so far as the rest of the mortgage is concerned, it remains undivided. There is a specific clause in Ext. P3 that even if there are any statements in the document to the effect that the tarwad has become divided, it is only due to lack of clarity of expression and want of legal knowledge and that it should never be taken as if the tarwad had divided. From these circumstances it is clear that there was no partition among the mortgagees or at any rate in regard to a major portion of the mortgage they wanted to remain joint and the suit for redemption is in respect of that part. Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that all the mortgagees had either expressly or by implication ratified or recognised the partition among the comortgagors evidenced by Ext. P4. The mere fact that one of the mortgagees, namely the 1st defendant, released a portion of the mortgaged property under Ext. P9 by itself will not be a recognition of the partition in the mortgagor family, for it was only by one of the mortgagees. Any recognition or ratification of the partition among the comortgagors must be by all the mortgagees together if there are mere mortgagees than one. That also is not satisfied in this case. P9 by itself will not be a recognition of the partition in the mortgagor family, for it was only by one of the mortgagees. Any recognition or ratification of the partition among the comortgagors must be by all the mortgagees together if there are mere mortgagees than one. That also is not satisfied in this case. A similar question also arose before the Privy Council in AIR 1942 PC 50 and considering the question it was observed: - "Again, where redemption has previously been permitted of a part of the mortgaged property on payment of a proportionate amount of the debt, it is difficult to find in that fact sufficient reason why the whole of the balance of the debt should not remain charged upon each and every portion of the remainder of the mortgaged property. Apart from any question of the policy of discouraging mortgagees from permitting one owner to redeem his own part separately, that the mortgagee's rights under the registered instrument of mortgage against other owners or parts of the property should be fundamentally altered by such permission is not justified or explained by saying that he has recognised or assented to a severance. He has not eo ipso assented to a severance of his rights as mortgagee against the others, nor made any bargain with them varying the terms of the registered mortgage." It is thus clear that the release by one of the comortgagees of a portion of the mortgaged property to the mortgagor by itself is not sufficient to hold that the plaintiff if entitled to a partial redemption of the rest of the mortgaged properties. In view of what is stated above, we hold that the courts below were right in dismissing the suit and we confirm the decrees and dismiss the Second Appeal, but, however, without any order as to costs.