Velayudhan v. Receiver — 1993 DIGILAW 375 (KER)

Judgment :- Varghese Kalliath, J. Justice M.P. Menon has referred this original petition for the decision of a Division Bench. S.26 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. 1963 was amended by Act 27 of 1979 by substituting a new sub-sec. (3) in the place of old one and also introducing another sub-section as sub-section (3 a). Act 27 of 1979 itself came into force on 7th July. 1979. M.P. Menon. J. posed the questions: "Could the amendment have the effect of getting over applications dismissed as time barred prior to the coming in to force of Act 27/1979? Was there a clear legislative intention to destroy vested rights". The learned judge thought that these questions have general importance and so. they should be decided by a Division Bench. 2. Now. we turn to the skeletal facts necessary for the decision of the questions of law involved in this case. A tenant under the K.L.R. Act is the petitioner in this original petition. The Land Tribunal. Palghat. the second respondent herein passed an order determining the arrears of rent payable by the petitioner. This determination of arrears of rent was on 23-6-1972. E.P.No.498 of 1978 for recovery of the arrears of rent was filed on 30-7-1978 in terms of the order dated 23-6-1972. Ext.P1 is that application. The application was out of time hence the landlord - a receiver appointed by the court filed an application to condone the delay in filing the application. Application to condone delay was dismissed. When the petition to condone delay was dismissed. the execution application was also dismissed. 3. Section 26 of the K.L.R. Act. 1963 was amended by Act 27 of 1979. After the amendment. the Receiver of the property in question filed an application E. A. 148/1980 to execute the order for recovery of arrears of rent passed by the Land Tribunal. It was contended that as per the amended provision. the landlord is entitled to recover the arrears of rent. Petitioner herein filed his objection. The Land Tribunal rejected the objection and passed an order in terms of the amended provision - S.26(3 a) of the K.L.R. Act. Copy of the order is Ext.P5. Petitioner challenges Ext.P5 order. 4. Petitioner submits that the order of the Land Tribunal was sought to be executed by filing Ext.P1 as early as 1978. Petitioner herein filed his objection. The Land Tribunal rejected the objection and passed an order in terms of the amended provision - S.26(3 a) of the K.L.R. Act. Copy of the order is Ext.P5. Petitioner challenges Ext.P5 order. 4. Petitioner submits that the order of the Land Tribunal was sought to be executed by filing Ext.P1 as early as 1978. which was dismissed on the ground that it ought to have been filed within the time prescribed by the Act itself. viz.. one year from the date on which the order of the Land Tribunal was passed. Admittedly. in this case the order was passed on 23-6-1972. and the application was filed only in 1978. The dismissal of the application filed in 1978 has become final. The question is what is the effect of the amendment introduced. replacing the old provisions contained in sub-section (3) of S.26 of the K.L.R. Act? To understand this question. we feel that it is apposite to quote S.26 as amended by Act 27 of 1979. substituting sub-sections (3) and (3A) for the original sub-section (3) of S.26. 5. "26. Recovery of arrears of rent: (1) A landlord or any person claiming under him may apply to the Land Tribunal in such form as may be prescribed for recovery of arrears of rent due to him from his tenant. (2) The Land Tribunal shall. after such enquiry as may be prescribed. determine the amount payable to the landlord and the person liable to pay the same: Provided that where the amount claimed in the application does not exceed five hundred rupees. the Land Tribunal shall follow the procedure prescribed for the trial of small cause suits. (3) The person liable to pay the amount determined under sub-section (2) shall deposit the same with the Land Tribunal which determined the amount within a period of six months from the date of such determination. (3A) In the event of the failure to deposit the amount referred to in sub-section (3)' within the time specified in that sub-section. such amount shall. on a written requisition from the Land Tribunal to the District Collector. be recovered under the provisions of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. 1968. together with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of determination of the amount under sub-section (2). such amount shall. on a written requisition from the Land Tribunal to the District Collector. be recovered under the provisions of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. 1968. together with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of determination of the amount under sub-section (2). (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force. no court or other authority or officer other than the Land Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain any claim for arrears of rent". (3) The Land Tribunal may. on application by the person entitled to the amount determined under sub-section (2) at any time within one year from the date on which the order of the Land Tribunal under that sub-section has become final recover the amount in such manner as may be prescribed and pay the same to the applicant. 6. Prima facie. as per the amended provision. sub-section (3A) of S.26 of the Act. no application by the landlord is necessary. The application filed by the first respondent is in the nature of information that the tenant has not deposited the amount within six months of the passing of the order and to alert the Land Tribunal to take action for recovery of the amount through the machinery provided in sub-section (3A) of S.26 and as such it is not a second execution application to recover the arrears of rent. Counsel for the tenant submits that as per the original provision. an order for arrears of rent passed by the Tribunal gives the landlord the right to recover the amount by approaching the Land Tribunal by an application. which application has to be filed within one year from the date on which the order of the Land Tribunal has become final. Further. counsel submits that since in this case it is obvious that the landlord has not filed an application. within the prescribed time and the application filed by the landlord was dismissed and that dismissal has become final. the tenant has acquired a vested right in the sense that * Sub-section (3) before the amendment. the order brings upon liability to pay arrears of rent has become unexcitable. Counsel submits that it is a vested right and unless and until there is a clear mandate in the statutory provision. this vested right cannot be interfered with invoking the amended provision. the order brings upon liability to pay arrears of rent has become unexcitable. Counsel submits that it is a vested right and unless and until there is a clear mandate in the statutory provision. this vested right cannot be interfered with invoking the amended provision. He submits that the amended provision has no retrospective effect and is not capable of taking away the vested right of the petitioner tenant in this case. 7. It is an interesting question. We feel that the question can be answered in a simple straight forward manner. From a careful reading of sub-sec.(3A) of S.26. it is possible to say that by the introduction of the new sub-section (3A) the whole scheme of recovery of arrears of rent has been changed. The Legislature has made it the obligation of the Land Tribunal to recover the arrears of rent determined under S.26(2) of the K.L.R. Act. The scheme now provided is:- by S.26(t) which makes it obligatory for the landlord if he is interested to recover arrears of rent to apply in the prescribed form for recovery of arrears of rent due to him from his tenant. On application by virtue of sub-section (2). the Land Tribunal is obliged to make such enquiries as prescribed and has to determine the amount payable to the landlord and the person liable to pay the same. It is also provided that where the amount claimed in the application docs not exceed five hundred rupees. the Land Tribunal shall follow the procedure prescribed for the trial of small cause suits. Sub-section (3) gives the tenant a period of six months time from the date of determination of the Tribunal to deposit the amount determined. This provision is added by the amendment. 8. The amended sub-section (3A). which is important makes it obligatory on the part of the Tribunal if the tenant fails to deposit the amount within the time specified in sub-section (3) to recover even without an application of the tenant by making a written requisition by the Land Tribunal to the District Collector for recovering the money due as arrears of rent under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. 1968. So. the recovery of the amount. as we see. is not on an application by the party aggrieved. viz. the landlord. as per the amended provision contained in sub-section (3A). 1968. So. the recovery of the amount. as we see. is not on an application by the party aggrieved. viz. the landlord. as per the amended provision contained in sub-section (3A). It has been made a statutory obligation of the Tribunal itself to recover the amount even without an application. and for this action no time limit is prescribed. 9. Rule 23 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules. 1970 is important. Clause (1) of R.23 of the Rules is in conformity with the provision contained in subsection (3A) of S.26. It has to be noted that this rule was first amended by SR0.495/ 75 dated 16-6-1975. Subsequently it was amended on 5th April. 1980 by adding "if the tenant does not deposit the amount due from him." which is in consonance with the substituted sub-section (3) of S.26 by the amendment of Act 27 of 1979. The rule was amended only on 5th April. 1980. Now we shall quote the rule. "23. Written requisition to District Collector. (1) If the tenant does not deposit the amount due from him before the Land Tribunal within the time specified in sub-section (3) of S.26 or in the Court or before the Land Tribunal within the time specified in sub-section (7) of S.73. the Court or the Land Tribunal. as the case may be. shall send a written requisition to the District Collector together with a copy of its order. the order in appeal or revision against such order. if any. and the extracts of the order prepared in Form No.6. (2) Any person entitled to any amount deposited under sub-section (3) of S.26 or subsection (7) of S.73. as the case may be. in any Court or Land Tribunal. may file. a statement in duplicate in writing and signed by him furnishing full particulars of the name and address of the tenant liable to make the deposit and the details of the movable and in movable properties if any. belonging to such tenant. and the Court or the Land Tribunal. as the case may be. shall on receipt of such statement. forward one such statement to the District Collector together with the written requisition referred to in sub-rule (1) or if such statement is filed only after the despatch of such requisition. subsequent to such despatch". 10. So it is clear after the amendment. as the case may be. shall on receipt of such statement. forward one such statement to the District Collector together with the written requisition referred to in sub-rule (1) or if such statement is filed only after the despatch of such requisition. subsequent to such despatch". 10. So it is clear after the amendment. the responsibility to recover the arrears of rent clearly vests with the Tribunal itself. The Tribunal has to make the requisition to the District Collector for invoking the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act. Of course. to facilitate smooth action under the Revenue Recovery Act. the rule provides that the landlord "may file" a statement of particulars of the assets of the tenant. It is significant to note that a filing of statement by the landlord as per the rule is not mandatory for initiating Revenue Recovery proceedings. This aspect is clear by the use of word may' and also from the provision that if the statement is filed "only after the despatch of such requisition". 11. We have adverted to these aspects only to indicate that emphasis has been shifted to the Tribunal from the party concerned by the amendment in the matter of recovery of the amount of arrears of rent determined by the Tribunal to the Land Tribunal itself. If what now we have said is the effect and we believe it so. there is an easy answer to the questions referred to in this original petition. By the amended provision. the Tribunal gets an entitlement to recover arrears of rent determined by the Tribunal which has not been deposited within the time prescribed by S.3 by recourse to the Revenue Recovery Act. In this view. now what has been done by Ext.P5 is perfectly legal and valid since it is the Tribunal which is seeking recovery of the amount through a different machinery and through a different forum the amount of arrears of rent determined by the Tribunal. As such what we see as the effect of the amendment is: (i) the recovery is not by the landlord; "(ii) the forum or the machinery through which the recovery is effected is not by the Land Tribunal but by the District Collector invoking the jurisdiction of the Revenue Recovery Act. (iii) the recovery is at the instance not by the party but by the Tribunal itself. (iii) the recovery is at the instance not by the party but by the Tribunal itself. (iv) there is a change of forum and also a change of a person and authority who has to initiate the recovery of the amount. 12. In these circumstances. what we have to examine is whether the Tribunal in the case at hand can invoke the provision contained in S.(3A). The only requisite conditions are that (i) there must be a determination of rent: (this condition is satisfied in this case) (ii) the tenant must have failed to deposit the arrears of rent determined by the Tribunal within six months of its determination. This condition is also existent in (his case. If the above two conditions are satisfied. the Tribunal is bound to exercise its power under sub-section (3A) of S.26. When the Tribunal is exercising the power now we have articulated by examining the content of S.(3A) read with the ancillary provisions. the tenant cannot say that he has got a vested right by virtue of the dismissal of an application by the landlord for recovery of the amount. This defence is not available as against the Tribunal. Every right has got a significant element in the sense (hat that right is as against a person or class of persons or against the whole world. We do think that even if there is a vested right acquired by the dismissal of the earlier execution petition filed by the landlord. it is only a vested right as against the landlord and persons claiming under the landlord. It cannot be said that by the statutory provision of S.(3A) introduced by the amendment. the Tribunal is claiming a right under the tenant. In fact. this is a new right given by the Legislature to the Tribunal which can be exercised on satisfying the conditions prescribed therein. We hold that the conditions are satisfied and so. the order Ext.P5 is perfectly valid and legal. 13. We may now consider the question under a different angle. s.26(3A) of the Act does not prescribe a lime limit. but the earlier provision prescribed a time limit of one year. After the expiry of that one year. of course it can be contended that the tenant has acquired a vested right. What is that right has to be examined. According to counsel for the petitioner. s.26(3A) of the Act does not prescribe a lime limit. but the earlier provision prescribed a time limit of one year. After the expiry of that one year. of course it can be contended that the tenant has acquired a vested right. What is that right has to be examined. According to counsel for the petitioner. that vested right is a vested right that the landlord should not be allowed io trouble the tenant by seeking execution of the order through the Land Tribunal because the time limit prescribed has expired for the application to be filed before the Tribunal for the execution of the order. If in regard to the recovery of the amount determined. a different forum is prescribed. it is possible to invoke the aid and assistance of that forum for recovery of that amount. since we hold that the vested right if any obtained by the tenant is limited to the annihilation of the remedy of execution of that order against the tenant through the Tribunal. 14. We shall refer to the decision reported in AIR 1976 SC 237 (N.I. Co. v. Shanli Misra) wherein the Supreme Court was considering a question as to how the law of limitation will impinge upon arresting the running of time when there is a change of forum. This happened when Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals were established outlying the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of claims for compensation for motor accidents and in considering that question. the Supreme Court said: "On the plain language of S.110A and 110f the change in law was merely a change of forum i.e. a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of substantive law. Such a change of law operates retrospectively and the person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of action accrued prior to the change of forum. The jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted as soon as the Claims Tribunal is constituted and the filing of the application before the Tribunal is the only remedy available to the claimant. apropos the bar of limitation provided in S.110A(3). one can say that strictly speaking. the bar does not operate in relation to an application for compensation arising out of an accident which occurred prior to the constitution of the Claims Tribunal. apropos the bar of limitation provided in S.110A(3). one can say that strictly speaking. the bar does not operate in relation to an application for compensation arising out of an accident which occurred prior to the constitution of the Claims Tribunal. But since in such a case there is a change of forum. the reasonable view to lake would be that such an application can be filed within a reasonable time of the constitution of the Tribunal. which ordinarily and generally. would be the time of limitation mentioned in sub-section (3). If the application could not be made within that date from the date of the constitution of the Tribunal. in a given case. the further time taken in the making of the application may be held to be the reasonable time on the facts of that case for the making of the application or the delay made after the expiry of the period of limitation provided in sub-section (3) from the date of the Tribunal can be condoned under the proviso to that sub-section". 15. It has to be noted that when changing the forum. the legislature also did not fix any time limit to invoke the forum to recover arrears of rent. So long as there is no time limit prescribed in sub-section (3 a ) of the S.26. we are of opinion that the change in law was merely a change of forum. It can overcome the bar of limitation; since it is the general rule which has been approved by the Supreme Court that by and large. the law of limitation is a procedural law. Of course. there can be exceptions to this principle. Generally the law of limitation which is in vogue on the date of commencement of the action governs it. 16. In this case. the recovery is sought in a different forum by a different person. The law of limitation which is in vogue on the date of commencement of the action should govern it and here sub-section (3 a ) does no! provide for any period of limitation; and so Ext.PS. the order of the Land Tribunal is a valid order. 17. We think. now we are obliged to consider the exceptions to this rule. It is contended that the new law of limitation providing for a longer period or an indefinite period cannot revive a dead remedy. provide for any period of limitation; and so Ext.PS. the order of the Land Tribunal is a valid order. 17. We think. now we are obliged to consider the exceptions to this rule. It is contended that the new law of limitation providing for a longer period or an indefinite period cannot revive a dead remedy. This is the sheet-anchor of the argument of counsel for the petitioner. Nor can it suddenly extinguish vested right of action by providing for a shorter period of limitation. The wider aspect involved is that a Limitation Act which has not expressed plainly to extinguish a cause of action. is procedural and that a statute which is merely procedural is prima facie retrospective. The statement that the statute of limitation is procedural will not be a complete statement for the purpose of stating that even a dead remedy will be revived since a procedural statute is prima facie retrospective. 18. Counsel for the petitioner referred us to a Privy Council decision reported in (1982) 3 Alt.E.R 833 (Yew Bon Tewv. Kenderaan Bas Mard). There a question relating to the application of the provision of the new Limitation Act was considered. The case was an appeal from the Federal Court of Malaysia. The question was whether the claimants. whose cause of action became statute barred in 1973 by virtue of the Public Authorises Protection Ordinance. 1948. can nevertheless issue a writ in 1975 in reliance on the Public Authorities Protection (Amendment) Act 1974. which substituted a limitation period of 36 months for the previous period of 12 months. After considering several decisions. the court held that the Amendment Act will not destroy a potential defendant to plead a defence at the expiration of the new statutory period. which he had already possessed at the commencement of the new Act and will not allow the revival of a barred cause of action. 19. The statute of limitation being procedural is always retrospective is not a complete statement. Statute of limitations may be prescribed as procedural or substantive. In English Law as well as in Indian law. there are provisions which make it clear that at the expiration of the period prescribed for any person to bring an action to recover land. the title of that person to the land is extinguished. Such a limitation therefore goes to the cause of action itself. In English Law as well as in Indian law. there are provisions which make it clear that at the expiration of the period prescribed for any person to bring an action to recover land. the title of that person to the land is extinguished. Such a limitation therefore goes to the cause of action itself. But it has to be remembered that in most cases. the statute of limitation only takes away the remedies by action or by set off. It goes only to the conduct of the particular action. It leaves the claimant's right otherwise untouched in theory so that in the case of debt. if the statute barred. creditor has any means of enforcing his claim other than by action or set off. the Act does not prevent his recovering by those means. (Sec Harris v. Quite (1869) LIZ 4 QB 653 and Rodrigues v. Parker (1966) 2 All E.R. 349). 20. The expressions "retrospective" and "procedural". though useful in a particular context. are equivocal and therefore can be misleading. A statute which is retrospective in relation to one aspect of a case. for example. because it applies to a pre-statute cause of action. may at the same time be prospective in relation to another aspect of the same case; e.g. because it applies only to the post-statute commencement of proceedings to enforce that cause of action. An act which is procedural in one sense may in particular circumstances do far more than regulate the course of proceedings. because it may. on one interpretation. revive or destroy the cause of action itself. 21. We may refer two cases -Noor Mohamed Yousoff v. TeoKai Tee (1953) 19 MLJ 188 and Maxwell v. Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261. Both the cases were accident cases. In the first case. the accident was alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the first defendant's servant on 9th February. 1952. At that time the limitation period would have expired on 9th February 1953. The plaintiff initiated action against the first defendant before that date. A statute came into force either on 22nd February or 17th March. 1953. which extended the period to three years. So the plaintiff got time to initiate action if that statute is the statute that has to be applied till 91h February. 1955. It has to be remembered that the accident took place on 9th February. A statute came into force either on 22nd February or 17th March. 1953. which extended the period to three years. So the plaintiff got time to initiate action if that statute is the statute that has to be applied till 91h February. 1955. It has to be remembered that the accident took place on 9th February. 1952 and before the new Act came into force. the remedy was barred on 9th February. 1953 since the period of limitation was only one year. Plaintiff on 10th April. 1953 amended the writ by adding the driver of the vehicle as the second defendant. It was held that proceedings against the second defendant were not barred. 22. In the Australian case (1957) 96 CLR 261. a fatal motor accident had occurred on 19th March. 1951. At that date. the time for bringing an action by the family of the victim was within 12 months from the death under the Compensation to Relatives Act. 1897. So. naturally. the period expired on 19th March. 1952. An amending Act came into force after the period of limitation expired. in the particular case on 16th December. 1953 and the period was extended to six years which would expire. if the Act applied on 19th March. 1957. On 30th November. 1954. the appellant brought her action. The question arose whether the amending Act did not revive the right of action. It was held by the High Court of Australia that it did not. This was a decision by four members of the High Court. The 5th member. Fullagar. J. dissented. The principal point involved in the case was whether the limit of time was an ingredient of the cause of action. so that the cause itself was extinguished when the period expired. The case was however also considered on the alternative basis. that time barred only the remedy and not the cause of action. Even in a case where time barred the cases of action in Noor Mohamed Yousoff v. Tea Kai Tee the court observed that it is possible by a new Limitation Act to get the cause of action revived. 23. that time barred only the remedy and not the cause of action. Even in a case where time barred the cases of action in Noor Mohamed Yousoff v. Tea Kai Tee the court observed that it is possible by a new Limitation Act to get the cause of action revived. 23. If we consider the matter from the point of view that a lost feasor will at the expiration of the old statutory period of limitation has "acquired immunity" it is not a vested right what he has acquired but only a vested defence (See Craxfords (Ramsgale). Ltd. v. Williams& Steel Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1954)3 All.E.R.16. We are tempted to construe a statutory provision enlarging time or not fixing a time at all for initialing action as a statutory provision not interfering with such an "acquired immunity" or "vested defence". If we equate an acquired immunity as an acquired right or a vested defence. certainly we are looking at the whole matter from the wrong end. We are not able to see any inherent probability that the legislature would. if it had thought about the matter. have been zealous to avoid disappointment to a wrongdoer. who might have thought himself safe. by not paying what he is liable to pay. We cannot afford to forget what the Privy Council has said in 1982 P.C. 833 at 839. "The purpose was not to deprive a potential defendant of a limitation defence which he already possessed. The briefest consideration will expose the injustice of the contrary view. When a period of limitation has expired. a potential defendant should be able to assume that he is no longer at risk from a State claim. He should be able to part with his papers if (hey exist and discard any proofs of witnesses which have been taken. discharge his solicitor if he has been retained. and order his affairs on the basis that his potential liability has gone. That is the whole purpose of the limitation defence". We are not disagreeing but we are attempting to shed some light to certain areas which are relevant on (his issue. discharge his solicitor if he has been retained. and order his affairs on the basis that his potential liability has gone. That is the whole purpose of the limitation defence". We are not disagreeing but we are attempting to shed some light to certain areas which are relevant on (his issue. We should rather have thought (hat the legislature being concerned to enlarge a remedy of the person entitled to recover arrears of rent would have seen nothing fundamentally unjust in extending the enlarged remedy to persons who have - whether through ignorance or inadvertence or the mistake of a legal adviser- allowed the old short period to elapse without commencing proceedings for execution. In Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 10th Edn. (1953) at page 225. it is stated thus:- "a defaulter can have no vested right in a state of the law which left the injured party without. or with only a " defective remedy". We would reject the idea of a vested defence with its corollary that the Amending Act should be construed as applying to cases where the old statutory period was still current at the date of commencement of that Act. but as not applying to cases where the old statutory period had expired before the commencement of the Act. 24. True that a statute is prima facie to be construed as not having a retrospective operation. A succinct statement of the rule is stated in Moon v. Durden (1848) 2 Ex.22. Alderson B. said that in construing statutes. the general rule is that "they are not be supposed to apply to a past. but to a future state of circumstances. In Gardener v. Lucas (1878) 3 App. Cas. 582. Lord Blackburn said that "prima facie. any new law that is made affects future transactions. not past ones". 25. It has to be noted that the word "retrospective" does not occur in either of these statements. but this word is profusely used in precedents and text books where interpretation of statutes is decided. It is possible to say that to construe the provision. (sub-section (3A) of S.26 of the K.L.R. Act. which came into force in 1979) in the present case as extending to all actions commenced after it. is not really to give a retrospective operation. This is simply a matter of terminology. It is possible to say that to construe the provision. (sub-section (3A) of S.26 of the K.L.R. Act. which came into force in 1979) in the present case as extending to all actions commenced after it. is not really to give a retrospective operation. This is simply a matter of terminology. We think that the word retrospective also is a word of extended meaning. It is not synonymous with "ex post facto'. but is used to describe the operation of any statute which affects the legal character or the legal consequences of the events which happened before it became law. See Kraljevich v. Lake & Star Ltd. (1945) 70 C.L:R.647. 26. We feel that there is a difference between cause of action in juxta position to a right to execute a decree. There is no difficulty in holding that even though the execution of the decree may be statute barred. the judgment debt is not thereby extinguished. (See Ganda Mal v. Nanak Cliand. 3 PR 1887; Chunni Lal v. Banaspal Singh (ILR (1886)9 All. 23; Tilak Chand v. Jitammal (13) 10 Bom. HC 206; Anand Kishore v. Anand Kishore (ILR (1887) 14 Cal.50; Cally Nath v. Koonjo Behary (ILR (1883) 9 Cal. 651. 27. Because the right to take out execution upon a decree is time barred. it does not follow that the decree itself has ceased to subsist. The decree remains. and will ever remain in full force as an adjudication of the rights of parties whether execution can be taken out upon it or not. Seejokhhiram Sagarmal v. Chaman Choudhry (ILR (1935) 15 Pat. 356; Muppanna v. Shree Gajanan Urban Co-op. Bank (ILR 1947 Bom. 143). It is pertinent to note S.31 of the Limitation Act. 1963. wherein it is provided that nothing in the Act shall enable any suit. appeal or application to be instituted preferred. or made for which the period of limitation prescribed by the repealed Act expired before the commencement of the new Act. So. cases where it is generally said that revival of a dead cause of action is not possible if a longer period of time is given. may not be applicable in all cases. Where there is no specific statutory provision. the matter has to be considered on certain important general principles. We have stirred certain thoughts on these general principles to a limited extent. may not be applicable in all cases. Where there is no specific statutory provision. the matter has to be considered on certain important general principles. We have stirred certain thoughts on these general principles to a limited extent. We confess that we have not made any exhaustive investigation on this aspect of the question. for the simple reason that the width and operation of sub-section (3A) of S.26 we are deciding only on the interpretation of the language of sub-section (3) of S.26 and on the basis that sub-section (3A) postulates a radical change of forum and change of the schemes of the manner of implementation of order of the Tribunal. 28. We hold that sub-section (3A) of S.26 of the K.L.R. Act would enable the recovery of arrears of rent determined by the Land Tribunal even though at the time when the amendment came into force one year has elapsed from the date of determination of the arrears by the Land Tribunal. In the result. we hold that Ext.P5 is valid. and the original petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case„ there will not be any order as to costs.