Judgment :- Srinivasan, J. The appeal arises out of the suit filed by the respondent herein on a promissory note dated 18. 1973, marked as Ex.A-1, for a sum of Rs.50,000 executed by the appellant herein. The suit is filed by the Idol of Sri Sellandi Amman at Sri Sellandi Amman Temple, Noyyal Village, Karur Taluk. Originally the idol was represented by the fit person and later, the Executive Officer, Sri Kalyana Pasupatheeswarar Temple, Karur Taluk, Karur got substituted in the place of the fit person. The suit is based only on the promissory note and as per the plaint, valuable consideration passed under the promissory note. A lawyer’s notice was issued on 21. 1979 and the defendant sent a reply on 31. 1979 admitting the execution of the promissory note, but pleaded loss in the toddy business and inability to pay the amount to the plaintiff. A rejoinder was sent on 12. 1979 and the suit was filed on 8. 1979. There was an endorsement on the promissory note evidencing payment of Rs.100 on 8. 1976. 2. In the written statement, the plea raised by the defendant is as follows: The defendant did not receive any cash consideration but executed the promissory note in favour of one Ramasamy Gounder, who was a poosari in the temple. During 1972-73 the arrack shop at Noyyal village was taken in auction by Ramasamy Gounder. That shop was run by the defendant. Out of the profits earned by him, he paid a sum of Rs.18,000 in all to the plaintiff temple and obtained receipts from Ramasamy Gounder. The villagers of the Noyyal village came to an agreement that the auction should be taken by a person agreed to by all the villagers and the benefit of the auction should go to the temple. It was also agreed in 1973-74 that the auction should be taken in the name of Ramasamy Gounder, poosari of the temple, but the business shall be run by the defendant, who shall execute a promissory note for Rs.50,000 in favour of Ramasamy Gounder and another promissory note for a sum of Rs.50,000 in favour of Nallappa Gounder, hereditary trustee of the temple. The two promissory notes were produced by the fit person of the temple before the Sub Collector of Karur, who called upon the defendant and got endorsements as if a sum of Rs.100 was paid for each promissory note though no amount was paid actually. Subsequently, a panchayat was convened in the village and the promissory note executed in favour of Nallappa Gounder was given back to the defendant without any payment. The suit is not maintainable as the plaintiff is not the promisee in the document and it is also barred by limitation. The suit is also not sustainable as the transaction is illegal. 3. The trial court held that the suit promissory note is supported by consideration and the plaintiff is entitled to maintain the suit. It is also held that the suit is not barred by limitation and not hit by the provisions of Sec.23 of the Contract Act as the suit is filed de hors the illegality. 4. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the plaintiff is not competent to file the suit as the promissory note is not in the name of the plaintiff. Reliance is placed upon the judgments in the cases of Narayanamoorthi v. Umamaheswaran, A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 197: 122 I.C. 345, Lachmi Chand v. Madanlal Khemka, AI.R 1947 All. 52, Bacha Prasad v. Janki Rai, A.I.R 1957 Pat. 380 (F.B.), K.M.K.Subbaraya Chettiar v. Abirami Animal, (1965)1 M.L.J. 185 .I.L.R (1964) 2 Mad. 720: A.I.R 1965 Mad. 157 and Babu Kalingarayar v. Rajam alias Rajalakshmi Ammal, (1978)1 M.LJ. 67 . In those cases, it has been held that it is only a holder of the promissory note whose name appears on the document itself who can maintain the suit. Sec.8 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 defines a ‘holder’ as any person entitled in his own name to the possession thereof and 10 receive or recover the amount due thereon from the parties thereto. It is vehemently argued that the plaintiff temple is not a holder within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Act as the name of the temple does not find a place in the suit promissory note. It is contended that even if as a fact the temple is the beneficiary of the promissory note, it cannot maintain the suit as it is based on a negotiable instrument. We are unable to accept this contention. It is contended that even if as a fact the temple is the beneficiary of the promissory note, it cannot maintain the suit as it is based on a negotiable instrument. We are unable to accept this contention. We find in Ex.A-1, the relevant portion of the recital reads thus: The fact that the name of the temple is mentioned therein is sufficient to indicate that the promissory note is only in favour of the temple as such. Many persons do not know that Idol is a legal person and there can be an instrument in favour of the Idol. Hence, the document is written as if it is in favour of the temple. It is contended that the name of the temple and the office of the poosari are mentioned only to describe the promisee. We do not accept this contention. No doubt, the poosari’s name is mentioned as Ramasamy Goun-der, but that does not mean that the promissory note is in favour of Ramasamy Gounder and not the temple. This fact is substantiated by the admissions in the written statement itself. In paragraph 2(b) of the written statement it is stated very clearly that it was decided in the village panchayat that the promissory note should be executed in favour of Ramasamy Gounder for the temple. There is a similar recital in paragraph 2(c) of the written statement. The relevant portion reads thus: 5. In Ex.A-4, the reply notice issued by the defendant’s counsel to the plaintiffs counsel on 37. 1979 it is recited that the promissory note is executed in the name of Ramasamy Gounder for the temple. In Ex. A-9 which is an agreement brought about in the village panchayat the defendant has agreed that he would pay a sum of Rs. 18,600 to the Idol within eight months. Ex.A-9 reads thus: That document relates to the previous year. It is not in dispute that the transaction was similar and there was a similar agreement in the previous year also. No doubt, the defendant has chosen to dispute the signature in Ex.A-9, but it is proved by P.W.3. He has stated categorically that the signature in Ex.A-9 is that of the defendant. In the cross-examination it is suggested to him that it is not the signature of the defendant, but he has denied it. No doubt, the defendant has chosen to dispute the signature in Ex.A-9, but it is proved by P.W.3. He has stated categorically that the signature in Ex.A-9 is that of the defendant. In the cross-examination it is suggested to him that it is not the signature of the defendant, but he has denied it. The defendant has stated in the witness-box that in the note-book in which Ex.A-9 is a part, his signature is not found. But we have compared the signatures of the defendant in the written statement as well as in the deposition with the signature found in Ex.A-9. We have no doubt that the signature found in Ex.A-9 is that of the defendant and he is making a false statement that he did not sign Ex.A-9. 6. Hence, we conclude that the promissory note is only in favour of the temple as such and it is entitled to maintain the suit. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to the judgment of this Court in the case of Ponnusami Chettiar v. Vellaimuthu, (1957)1 M.L.J. 179 : 1957 M.W.N. 169: A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 355. In that case, the name of the promisee was not mentioned in the promissory note. The description of the payee was “son of Palaniandi Chettiar”. The Court held that on the evidence it was made clear that the plaintiff was the only person who was entitled to be the payee. It was laid down that absence of the name of the payee in a promissory note will not make the note invalid where the payee was known with certainty even at the time of execution. The learned Judge observed, "the description of the payee in the suit promissory note was "son of Palaniandi Chettiar. He was certainly that. But there are also three other sons of Palaniandi Chettiar, according to the plaintiff, though they never lent a pie to the petitioner and had not come into the picture at all. I think the law is not so wooden as to allow this kind of quibbling by a debtor in a desperate attempt somehow to escape his just liability. ...So too, no amount of quibbling can change the fact that this particular promissory note was executed by the petitioner in favour of the plaintiff/that particular son of Palaniandi Chettiar." 8. I think the law is not so wooden as to allow this kind of quibbling by a debtor in a desperate attempt somehow to escape his just liability. ...So too, no amount of quibbling can change the fact that this particular promissory note was executed by the petitioner in favour of the plaintiff/that particular son of Palaniandi Chettiar." 8. Sec.96 of the Evidence Act, 1872 provides that when the facts are such that the language used might have been meant to apply to anyone, and could not have been meant to apply to more than one, of several persons or things, evidence may be given of facts which show which of those persons or things it was intended to apply to. In the present case, the pleadings as well as the evidence are clearly indicative of the fact that the promissory note is only in favour of the temple and not in favour of the Poosari Ramasamy Gounder in his individual capacity. The said Ramasamy Gounder is named in the promissory note only as a representative of the temple. Hence, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant is rejected. 9. It is next argued by learned counsel for the appellant that the promissory note is not supported by consideration. There is no merit in this contention. No doubt, no cash was given as such when the promissory note was executed. But admittedly, the defendant was permitted to run the business of arrack shop which was taken in auction. He has also said that there is loss in the business and only if there is profit he is liable to pay any amount to the temple. Once it is admitted that the defendant has been running the business that would amount to valuable consideration to support the promissory note. Hence, this contention fails. 10. Next contention is that the suit is not maintainable inasmuch as the promissory suit is a result of an illegal transaction, which is opposed to Sec.23 of the Contract Act. Once it is admitted that the defendant has been running the business that would amount to valuable consideration to support the promissory note. Hence, this contention fails. 10. Next contention is that the suit is not maintainable inasmuch as the promissory suit is a result of an illegal transaction, which is opposed to Sec.23 of the Contract Act. Sec.23 of the Contract Act reads thus: "What considerations and objects are lawful, and what not.The consideration of object of an agreement is lawful, unless, it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or the court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy; In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful, is void." The suit is based only on the promissory note. The promissory note does not fall in any of the clauses of Sec.23 of the Contract Act. Even if it is assumed that there was an anterior transaction which is illegal and that resulted in the suit promissory note, the enforcement of the promissory note cannot be resisted on the ground of illegality. The suit is filed de hors illegality and therefore it is maintainable. 11. Similar question has been considered by this Court in the case of Pichaiah Pillai v. Govindaswamy Chettiar, (1977)1 M.L.J. 107 . The learned Judge has pointed out that the illegality did not attach to the suit contract and it was out side the contract. In the present case also whatever might have been the illegality in the agreement arrived at in the village panchayat, that does not vitiate the promissory note as such. Moreover, nothing has been placed before us to show that the agreement arrived at by the village panchayat is illegal or opposed to any provisions of law. Hence, this contention also fails. 12. In the result, the appeal has to suffer dismissal and it is dismissed with costs.