JUDGMENT 1. - This is an special appeal by the State against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated 15.1.1991 in a writ petition filed by the respondent. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that during the period November, 1985 to June, 1987, the respondent, who was Headmaster in Government service, was posted on deputation in a private school. Then in June, 1987 he was posted as headmaster in Podar Higher Secondary School Jaipur. Without going into the reasons as given out by the respondent, it may be stated that a charge sheet was issued to him on 8th June, framing seven charges against him, which were mainly for financial irregularities. The Addl. Commissioner II, Departmental Enquiries, was appointed as an enquiry officer and the respondent was informed that he should appear before him. However, he did not appear as directed but took time and thereafter exparte enquiry was completed against him and on the basis of this exparte enquiry an order of removal from service was passed and he was relieved on 12th March, 1990. This order of removal was challenged by the respondent in the writ petition. Several grounds were raised on account of which it was stated that the enquiry was vitiated. Particularly (sic particulars) about another writ petition filed by the respondent were also given. This related to the petitioner's seniority and a direction had been given in the writ petition to decide the seniority within two months. The contempt petitions followed and in one of them in was also directed that the enquiry against the respondent be conducted from day to day and be concluded within one month. 3. The written reply to the writ petition was filed by the appellant giving circumstances in which the enquiry had to be concluded within a short period and also giving the circumstances in which the matter had to be proceeded with in the absence of the respondent. On the one hand the respondent was threatening the officers of the education department with action for contempt of court and on the other hand he was not cooperating in the proceedings before the enquiry officer. In such circumstances, the enquiry officer had to proceed exparte. 4. On the one hand the respondent was threatening the officers of the education department with action for contempt of court and on the other hand he was not cooperating in the proceedings before the enquiry officer. In such circumstances, the enquiry officer had to proceed exparte. 4. The learned Single Judge held that reasonable opportunity of cross examining the witnesses and to adduce his own evidence as required by Rule 16 (6) of the Raj. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Rules of 1958) had not been given and also he was not furnished with the finding of the enquiring authority and this resulted in violation of sub rule (1) of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. As a consequence the enquiry report and the order of the disciplinary authority imposing penalty were quashed and the order of removal from service was set aside and the writ petition was allowed with full salary and allowances but it was directed that this would not affect the right of the State Government to hold departmental enquiry afresh in accordance with law. 5. We may refer to the relevant provisions on the basis of which the matter is to be decided. Article 311 of the Constitution of India was amended by the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976 and thereafter it reads as under : "311. (1) No person who is a member of civil service of the Union or an All India Service or a Civil Service of a under the Union or State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of these charges. Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty imposed. Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty imposed. Provided further that this clause shall not apply (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charges; or (b) where an authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonally practicable to hold such inquiry. (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. (3) If, in respect of any such persons as aforesaid, a question.arises whether it is reasonably practiable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final." The following words which were parts of this Article earlier were deleted : "and where it is proposed, after such inquiry, to impose on him any such penalty, until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry." The object of the deletion of this part is to do away with the second opportunity of making the representation at the stage of penalty after completion of enquiry. This has been considered and it has been so held in Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel ( AIR 1985 SC 1416 ). 6. Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Rules of 1958) provides for the procedure for imposing major penalties and it contains the stage at which the opportunity to show cause has to be given to the employee. 6. Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Rules of 1958) provides for the procedure for imposing major penalties and it contains the stage at which the opportunity to show cause has to be given to the employee. Sub rule (10) of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 reads as under : "(10) (i) If the Disciplinary authority, having regard to its finding on the charges is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clause (iv) to (vii) of rule 14 should be imposed, it shall (a) Furnish to the Government servant a copy of the Inquiring Authority and, where the Disciplinary Authority is not the Inquiring Authority a statement of its findings together with brief reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of the Inquiring Authority; and (b) give a notice stating the penalty proposed to be imposed on him calling upon him to submit within a specified time such representation as he may wish to make on the proposed penalty, provided that such representation shall be based only on the evidence adduced during the inquiry. (ii)..... (iii)..... " After the amendment in Article 311 by the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976 in the Constitution sub-rule (10) of Rule 16 was substituted by the Notification dated 21.6.1983 and now it reads as under : "(10) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on the charges is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of rule 14 should be imposed on the Government servant, it shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall not be necessary to give the Government servant, any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed : Provided that in every case in which it is necessary to consult the commission the record of the inquiry shall be forwarded by the Disciplinary Authority to the Commission for its advise and such advise shall be taken into consideration before making an order imposing such penalty on the Government servant." That part of the rule which provided for furnishing to the Government servant that copy of the report of the enquiry authority has been deleted. 7. 7. In this background it has been argued that after the amendment of Rule 16(10) of the Rules of 1958 and Article 311 of the Constitution of India, the copy of the report of the Enquiry report has to be furnished only when the Government servant makes a request for the same and when it has not been demanded then the Government servant cannot make a grievance. This is such a right which can be waived and it is contended that the decision in the case of Union of India vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan (1991) 1 SCC 588 = AIR 1991 SC 471 , can have only prospective effect and it will not be applicable to matters which have already been decided. 8. On the other hand the learned counsel for the delinquent has contended that if the decision in the case of Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) is to be given prospective operation then the court cases which have already been decided will not be reopened, but those which are to be decided after this decision are to be based on it. 9. Much has been argued on behalf of both the sides about the applicability and nature of the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case, as to whether it can be followed in the face of contrary decision of larger Bench. Then attempt has also been made as to which is the direct authority which can be said to be applicable to the present case and emphasis has been made on the principles of natural justice. 10. As the point involved in the case is very important a general notice was given in the cause list and Mr. K.K. Mehrish, Mr. Manish Bhandari, Mr. S.C. Agrawal, Mr. Virendra Bandhu, Mr. P.V. Calla and Mr. R.K. Pareek have also addressed this court and cited several decisions. It has been argued that amendment in sub rule (10) of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 became necessary after the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution. It is contended that the several decisions of the Supreme Court itself were not brought to the notice to the Bench which decided Ramzan Khan's case, as such it cannot be said to have over ruled other decisions. However, others have argued that the decision in Ramzan Khan's case is the last word and the latest decision has to be followed. 11. However, others have argued that the decision in Ramzan Khan's case is the last word and the latest decision has to be followed. 11. We will refer to the other decisions which have been cited before us and it may be said that after the decision in the case of Mohd. Ramzan Khan similar matters have arisen before the Supreme Court wherein the decision in Mohd. 2 (1991) 1 SCC 588 = AIR 1991 SC 471 Ramzan Khan has been held to be prospective, to be applicable to the matters which have been decided after the decision in Ramzan Khan's case. 12. The Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers Association and others vs. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1990 SC 1607 ) has been cited contending that the precedents dealing with the important questions should be respected and it is not proper to scrutinise for the purpose of finding a possible error. 13. In Govindnaik G. Kalaghatigi vs. West Patent Press Co. Ltd (AIR 1980 Karnataka 92) , Full Bench decision, it was held that if two decisions of the Supreme Court on a question of law cannot be reconciled and one of them is by larger Bench then the decision of the larger Bench whether it is earlier or later in point of time should be followed. If the two decisions by equal number of Judges cannot be reconciled then the later of the two decisions should be followed. 14. In Union of India vs. Godfreh Philips India Ltd. (1985) 4 SCC 369 , it was held that a Bench of the court cannot overrule or dispprove the decision of another Bench of equal number of Judges and in case of disagreement the matter should be referred to a larger Bench. 15. In Aarti Gupta and ors. vs. State of Punjab and others, ( 1988 (1) SCC 258 , it was held that the view of the coordinate Bench is binding on the Court and the learned Judges found it difficult to differ from what had been held in the other case. 16. Again in Samru Das vs. State of M.P (1985 (2) SLR 520) , it was held that when two Benches of the Supreme Court take different view of law, later view should be followed. 17. 16. Again in Samru Das vs. State of M.P (1985 (2) SLR 520) , it was held that when two Benches of the Supreme Court take different view of law, later view should be followed. 17. In Prakash Amichand Shah vs. State of Gujarat and others ( 1986 (1) SCC 581 ) , it has been held that only principles underlying a decision and not the decision on facts would be binding on subsequent decisions. Unless a decision is later expressly overruled, mere opinion of the Court that decision had been 'virtually overruled' or 'in substance overruled by a subsequent decision would not have the effect of overruling it. In such circumstances Court's duty is to ascertain the effect of the subsequent decision on the decision in question. 18. In Gangma Suger Corpn. vs. State of U.P ( AIR 1980 SC 286 ) the principle of Stare decision was considered and it was laid down as under : "Enlightened litigative policy in the country must accept as final the pronouncements of the Supreme Court by a Constitution Bench unless the subject be of such fundamental importance to national life or the reasoning is so plainly erroneous in the light of later thought that it is wiser to be ultimately right rather than to be consistently wrong. Stare decision is not a ritual of convenience but a rule with limited exceptions. Pronouncements by Constitution. Benches should not be treated so cavalierly as to be revised frequently. The decisions of the Supreme Court cannot be devalued to brief ephemerality." 19. In Delhi Municipal Corporation vs. Gurnam Kaur ( AIR 1989 SC 38 ) it was observed as to what decision of the Supreme Court termed as precedents should be followed. It was observed as under : "It is axiomtic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay down any principle. Quotability as 'law' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritive. Quotability as 'law' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritive. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule has over since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedent is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex catedra statement, having the weight of authority." 20. In S.G. Pharmaceuticals, Division of Ambala vs. V.D. Padamwar, President Officer, Third Labour Court, Nagpur and another (1985 (1) SLR 374) , it has been held that the judgments of Supreme Court comprising of the same number of judges appear to have settled on the view that latest judgment of Bench of same strength has binding force. 21. In Sundaram Pillai and others vs. V.R. Pattabiraman and others ( 1985 (1) SCC 591 ) , it has been held that construction of statutes which would avoid divergence of judicial opinions is preferable. 22. On a consideration of these decisions, there is hardly any controversy on this subject and it can be said in case of divergent view in decisions comprising of the different number of Judges then the decision of the larger Bench has to be followed and when there are equal number of Judges then the later view is to be followed. When the question arises before the Bench of the Supreme Court itself then the Bench consists of larger number of Judges can over rule the decision. It can also be said that to over rule a decision specific observations to this effect have to be made. 23. In Union of India vs. Mohd. When the question arises before the Bench of the Supreme Court itself then the Bench consists of larger number of Judges can over rule the decision. It can also be said that to over rule a decision specific observations to this effect have to be made. 23. In Union of India vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra), it has been held that the delinquent employee is entitled to the copy of the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer to the disciplinary authority and to make a representation against that and not furnishing a copy of the enquiry report is violative of the principles of natural justice and the final order of punishment is invalid. It has been held that proviso to sub clause (2) of Article 311 of the 42nd Amendment Act is prospective only. It has been held that the supply of the copy of the enquiry report along with recommendation, if any, in the matter of proposed punishment to be inflicted, would be within the rules of natural justice and the delinquent would therefore be entitled to the supply of a copy thereof. According to this decision 42nd Amendment has not brought about any change in the provision which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the proceedings. In para 17 of this decision it has been stated as follows : "Contrary conclusion, if any reached by High Courts or any two Benches of the Supreme Court will no longer be taken to be laying down good law, but this ruling shall have prospective application and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground." 24. Kailash Chander Asthana vs. State of U.P. and others, (1983 (3) SCC 600) , is a decision by the Bench of three Judges, which had taken a different view from the view taken in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case (supra). This decision was not brought to the notice of the Bench which had given decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case. In Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case it has been observed that "we have not been shown any decision of a coordinate or a larger bench of this Court taking this view". This matter was considered in Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India vs. B. Karunakar ( 1992 (1) SCC 709 ) , and the matter was referred to a larger Bench. 25. Ramzan Khan's case it has been observed that "we have not been shown any decision of a coordinate or a larger bench of this Court taking this view". This matter was considered in Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India vs. B. Karunakar ( 1992 (1) SCC 709 ) , and the matter was referred to a larger Bench. 25. In S. P. Viswanathan (1) vs. Union of India (1991 Supp (2) SCC 269) , the Bench consisting of two Judges of the Supreme Court has held that the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case is prospective as is clear from para 17 of that judgment given prior to the date of rendering of the judgment (November 29, 1990) would not be affected by the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case, even though the enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner and the order of termination was held to be vitiated but due to the prospective operation of the decision no relief was given to the petitioner. 26. A Full Bench of the Orissa High Court has taken a similar view in Chitnaya Charan Jain vs. The Tribal Development Coop. Corporation of Orissa ( AIR 1993 Ori. 76 ). In this case reference has been made of para 17 of the judgment in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case. 27. Again in Union of India and others vs. A.K. Chatterjee ( 1993 (2) SCC 191 ) the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case holding that the employee had a right to get copy of the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer to the disiciplinary authority and to make representation against it had prospective effect and it would not apply to cases where order of punishment was passed prior to that decision. 28. The matter having been settled by the Supreme Court itself during the pendency of this appeal, we have to see when the order of punishment was passed in this case. 29. In the case of the respondent order of dismissal of service was passed on 12.3.1990. Hence this was prior to the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case, which was passed on 29.11.1990. As seen above the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case has prospective effect and it cannot be made applicable to punishment order passed prior to this decision. Hence the order of removal cannot be quashed on the ground of non-supply of report of the enquiry officer. Ramzan Khan's case, which was passed on 29.11.1990. As seen above the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case has prospective effect and it cannot be made applicable to punishment order passed prior to this decision. Hence the order of removal cannot be quashed on the ground of non-supply of report of the enquiry officer. 30. Here it may also be stated that the learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition has placed reliance on sub rule (10) 16 of the Rules of 1958 as it stood prior to the amendment made in 1983 and in the amended rule 16 (10) the term regarding furnishing of the enquiry report has been deleted with a view to make the rule in confirmity with Article 311 after the 42nd Amendment. It cannot be said that there is non-compliance of this rule on account of non-furnishing of the report of the enquiry officer and Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case will not help the respondent as the decision came later and the order of removal from service was passed earlier. 31. The next question which arises in this case is whether the respondent was given reasonable opportunity to defend himself in departmental enquiry and whether the opportunity of cross examining the witnesses and producing evidence has not been given to him, with the result that the enquiry is vitiated. For looking into this aspect of the matter certain facts will have to be looked into. The respondent has filed a D.B. Civil Writ petition No. 48 of 1988, which was for claiming his due seniority and promotion. According to him his juniors were occupying higher posts and they manipulated the issue of charge sheet for the acts done between 20.11.1985 to 27.6.1987, while working in a private school, namely, Shri Khandelwal Vaish Central Higher Secondary School, Jaipur. No proceedings were taken in the enquiry in respect of the charges for a long period. Meanwhile the writ petition of the respondent petitioner was allowed on 20.9.1988 and it was directed that the department should decide the question of seniority within a period of two months and thereafter within one month order of promotion should be passed resulting benefits should also be given. on 4.11.1988 the joint Director of Education, Ajmer Range, Jaipur was appointed as Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges with instructions to complete the enquiry within three months. on 4.11.1988 the joint Director of Education, Ajmer Range, Jaipur was appointed as Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges with instructions to complete the enquiry within three months. However, no proceedings were taken; then he moved a contempt petition on 24.2.1989 as the directions given in the other writ petition had not been complied with within a period of specific time. Notice of the contempt petition was issued and the non-petitioners had to be summoned by bailable warrants. Thereafter on 29.8.1989 the respondent was promoted to the rank of Deputy Director Education and posted at Churu. The respondent claimed to be promoted as Additional Director but this was not considered on the excuse that the enquiry was pending against him. In contempt proceedings the High Court directed on 20.9.1989 to complete the enquiry proceedings within one month. However the High Court issued fresh notice for disobedience of the directions of this Court to the Education Secretary. The Government went before the Supreme Court and the second contempt proceedings were stayed on 5.2.1990. Meanwhile on 30.12.1989 Shri Bhagirath Sharma, Deputy Secretary to the Govt. Education Department telephonically instructed the respondent to see the Deputy Secretary, Department of Personnel. The respondent met him and was delivered an order appointing the Additional Commissioner IInd, Departmental Enquiries as Enquiry officer and gave instructions that the should meet the enquiry officer immediately. The respondent informed the Additional Commissioner IInd on 30.12.1988 in writing that three contempt petitions were pending against the Education Secretary, Director of Education and himself, in the capacity of Deputy Director Education, Churu and were listed on 4.1.1990 and he had to submit the compliance report and for this purpose he had to remain at Churu within this week. In the writ petition it has been alleged that the enquiry officer assured the respondent to issue notice of the date of hearing to him after some time. However, when he made enquiries from him he stated that no adjournment was given on his application and the enquiry was proceeded and the report was submitted to the Government. According to him the admission, denial, reasonable opportunity of cross examining the witnesses and producing oral evidence in defence was not afforded to him. 32. The State appellant submitted the reply to the writ petition filed by the respondent. According to him the admission, denial, reasonable opportunity of cross examining the witnesses and producing oral evidence in defence was not afforded to him. 32. The State appellant submitted the reply to the writ petition filed by the respondent. Pendency of different proceedings was admitted and it was also stated that the State filed a written reply in the writ petition relating to seniority and the respondent avoided service in the same. Referring to several steps in relation to the proceedings in the departmental enquiry it is mentioned that in the contempt petitions there were pressure on the State appellant when this court refused to grant further time on 2.12.1989 as the enquiry had not been completed within the time allowed and in the second contempt petition a direction had also been given for completion of enquiry early and in view of this it became imperative to conduct the enquiry day to day for which instructions were given to the respondent to appear before the enquiry officer on 30.12.1989. The order delivered to the respondent contained a clear direction that the enquiry would be conducted day to day and it was to be completed within 15 days. As for the application submitted by the respondent on 30.12.1989 it was submitted that it was received by the enquiry officer after the proceedings at 4.40 p.m. The reasons given in the application were incorrect. It was mentioned that certain contempt petitions were listed before the High Court on 4.1.1990 but the respondent did not appear before the High Court even though he was at Jaipur on that date. He was at Jaipur on 1.1.1990, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 11th and 12th Jan., 1990, but he did not participate in the enquiry. He purposely remained absent on the pretext to compliance of the orders of the court in the other pending contempt proceedings. According to the respondent he had to appear on 4.1.1990 and submit compliance report of the court's order but this had already been made on 25.10.1989 and the respondent was not required to remain at Churu in that connection. The enquiry officer never assured the respondent that fresh notice of date of hearing would be sent. Because of the order of this court the enquiry had to be completed at an early date and as the respondent did not cooperate exparte proceedings had to be taken. The enquiry officer never assured the respondent that fresh notice of date of hearing would be sent. Because of the order of this court the enquiry had to be completed at an early date and as the respondent did not cooperate exparte proceedings had to be taken. According to the appellant the respondent was given an opportunity to show that the charges against him were not correct but he failed to appear and cross examine the witnesses and lead evidence and hence he cannot now say that he has not been given opportunity of hearing. 33. The Rule of audi alteram partem is well established and it can be said that no Government servant can be punished without affording a reasonable opportunity to show cause in respect of the charges levelled against him. It is only a second opportunity of showing cause against proposed punishment which has been deleted in Article 311 of the Constitution of India. What is reasonable opportunity and whether it has been given in this particular case are matters which would depend upon the facts of the case. The parties have placed reliance on certain decisions and first we may look into the same. 34. In Laxmi Shanker Pandey vs. Union of India and others ( 1991 (2) SCC 488 ) the charges of misconduct, on facts, established. Allegations that inquiry was not conducted properly and prejudice caused to the delinquent not made out. Held that the 18 (1991) 2 SCC 488 principles of natural justice not violated. It was held that the principles of natural justice not violated and held the order of dismissal valid. 35. In Union of India vs. H.C. Goel ( AIR 1964 SC 364 ) , it was held that the finding recorded by the enquiry officer is not binding on the Government and the Government is competent to differ from the conclusions. It was also observed that the public servant can claim a writ of certiorari if he is able to satisfy that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the enquiry proceedings which is the basis of his dismissal is based on no evidence. 36. It was also observed that the public servant can claim a writ of certiorari if he is able to satisfy that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the enquiry proceedings which is the basis of his dismissal is based on no evidence. 36. In U.R. Bhatt vs. Union of India ( AIR 1962 SC 1344 ) , it was held that the enquiry officer is not bound by the strict rule of the law of evidence and that when the public servant declined to take part in the proceedings and failed to remain present it was open to the enquiry officer to proceed on the materials which were placed before him. The Government servant had refused to participate in the enquiry in this case. 37. In State of U.P. vs. C.S. Sharma ( AIR 1968 SC 158 ) , it was held that omission to give opportunity to officer to produce his witnesses and lead evidence in defence vitiates the whole proceedings. 38. In Puran Chandra Das vs. Chairman, STA Orissa and another (AIR 1970 Orissa 1 , it was held that the petitioner was not afforded reasonable opportunity when no date was intimated to him as to when evidence oral and documentary was to be led by the department and this fact was not denied in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite party. 39. We may now confine ourselves to the notice given to the respondent for appearing before the enquiry officer and the application for seeking adjournment submitted by the respondent on 30.12. 1989. We have already noticed those facts and circumstances wherein the Government had been directed by this Court in contempt proceedings to complete the enquiry without delay. 40. Annexure 11 is the Government order dated 23.12.1989, appointing the Addl. Commissioner IInd Departmental Enquiries as the enquiry officer for making the enquiry into the allegations against the respondent. The Addl. Commissioner was directed to conduct the enquiry from day to day and submit his report within 15 days. The respondent was directed to appear before the enquriy officer on 30.12.1989. Receipt of this letter has been admitted by the respondent. Commissioner IInd Departmental Enquiries as the enquiry officer for making the enquiry into the allegations against the respondent. The Addl. Commissioner was directed to conduct the enquiry from day to day and submit his report within 15 days. The respondent was directed to appear before the enquriy officer on 30.12.1989. Receipt of this letter has been admitted by the respondent. Instead of appearing before the Additional Commissioner (Enquiries) on 30.12.1989 the respondent sent an application saying that three contempt proceedings are pending before the Rajasthan High Court in which the date of hearing was 4.1.1990 and that the Government had conveyed the sanction for complying with the orders of the court and that the petitioner had to look into preparation of arrear bills of pay etc. of the petitioners in those contempt proceedings and had to submit compliance before the High Court on 4.1.1990. In such circumstances he would be unable to appear before the enquriy officer as he had to stay at Churu. Further it was mentioned that he had already replied to the charges levelled against him and had already submitted a no dues certificates. This application was delivered to the Personal Assistant to the Additional Commissioner at 4.25 p.m. and by that time proceedings in the enquiry had already taken place. According to him he sent further application on 12.1.1990 and 2.3.1990 showing his extreme busy schedule on account of which he could not participate in the departmental enquiry. The Government on the other hand took exparte proceedings against the respondent and proceeded to examine witnesses and material and heard arguments and the enquriy report was submitted holding that the charges 1, 2,3,5 and 7 have been proved. 41. Reference has also been invited to order dated 14.12.1989 in Contempt Petition No. 32 of 1989, wherein this court directed the respondent to render cooperation in the enquiry proceedings and that he should seek no adjournments. Reliance has been placed on this also in order to show that after intimation to the respondent about date on which the proceedings in the enquiry would be conducted he had to appear and cooperate for the early conclusion of the enquiry. 42. This is a case wherein admittedly the witnesses of the department have not been cross examined by the delinquent officer and the delinquent officer has not produced any evidence in his defence. 42. This is a case wherein admittedly the witnesses of the department have not been cross examined by the delinquent officer and the delinquent officer has not produced any evidence in his defence. Now the question which arises is whether it can be said to be a case of denial of reasonable opportunity. The respondent did not appear before the enquiry officer as directed by the order Annexure 11. The application dated 30.12.1989 was sent by him after the proceedings in the enquiry had been taken. He did not himself appear personally in order to the either seek adjournment or to find out what steps were being taken. It is apparent that on the one had he was pressing in the contempt petition for not conducting the enquiry at an early date and on the other hand he was not cooperating in the enquiry even though he was at Jaipur. His claim that he was at Churn at that time has not been substantiated, but it has been shown that on some days between 30.12.1989 and 4.1.1990 he was at Jaipur. He wrote in the application dated 30.12.1989 that three contempt petitions were listed before the High Court on 4.1.1990, but on this date he did not appear before the High Court. it is merely a case of hide and seek. It is not necessary for the enquiry officer to issue notice on each and every date of hearing to the delinquent officer, if he fails to appear. It is for the delinquent officer who wants to seek adjournment to approach the enquiry officer and seek appropriate order and to find out as to what happened in the proceedings and what was the next date fixed in the enquiry. He cannot merely send an application and expect a fresh notice when the order Annexure 11 itself speaks about the enquiry to be cducted from day to day and even the High Court suggested this procedure and directed the respondent to cooperate and seek no adjournment. May be the notice Annexure 11 was issued by the authority which appointed the enquiry officer but the mere fact that the enquiry officer did not issue the notice will not vitiate the enquiry, when the respondent had already been informed as to when he had to appear before the enquiry officer. May be the notice Annexure 11 was issued by the authority which appointed the enquiry officer but the mere fact that the enquiry officer did not issue the notice will not vitiate the enquiry, when the respondent had already been informed as to when he had to appear before the enquiry officer. The evidence before the enquiry officer was recorded between 5.1.1990 and 18.1.1990 and it was not a case wherein the matter was hushed up on a single date in order to deprive the respondent from appearing and putting his case before the enquiry officer. Even in his application dated 30.12.1989 the respondent relied upon the no dues certificate which had been submitted by him with his reply to the charges and the reply has already been considered by the enquiry officer. The respondent has painted a picture that he was a very busy officer and has been entrusted with a lot of responsibility and could not spare any time for acting in a responsible manner for purposes of his own defence in the departmental enquiry. When he has adopted this attitude inspite of this directions of the court to co-operate in the departmental enquiry, it cannot be said that he has not been afforded with reasonable opportunity to present his case before the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice do say that the Government servant should be given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses and to produce his own witnesses in his defence but then this principle cannot be extended to saying that even if the Government servant fails to appear and defend himself then by hook and crook such an opportunity is to be given to him. There is no provision in the CCA Rules about giving notice of the date of hearing to the Government Servant at every stage of the proceedings. Once he has been given notice he should appear and participate in the enquiry and in case he seeks time he has to personally appear and make a request and find out as to what orders have been passed and in case he cannot appear personally for some reason then it is for him to find out what orders were passed on his request for adjournment. We are unable to agree with the learned Single Judge that in this case the respondent has not been afforded reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the charges levelled against him. 43. Another contention raised on behalf of the respondent is that the penalty is disproportitonate to the charges held to be proved against him. We have already noted that the Government recommended compulsory retirement of the respondent but when the matter was sent for consultation to the R.P.S.C., removal from service was proposed. The matter has been examined by the authorities and it can only be said that if the respondent makes any representation it would be open to the Government to consider the imposition of lesser punishment. 44. In view of the above discussions, this appeal is accepted. The decision of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the writ petition stands dismissed.Appeal accepted. *******