KALYANMOY GANGULI, J. ( 1 ) IN the instant application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners, inter alia, pray for a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to forbear from giving any effect or further effect to the purported notice of lockout issued by the respondent company on August 5, 1992 which is annexure 'i' to the petition and for cancelling, withdrawing and/or rescinding the same. ( 2 ) THE principal challenge in the writ petition initially was that the purported lockout was illegal. During the course of hearing it was submitted by both the parties that the lockout had been lifted in the meantime. In fact, records were produced before this court by both the parties showing that the lockout stood lifted with effect from March 14, 1993. The respondents contended, inter alia, that as the subject matter of the writ petition was no longer in existence on the date of hearing of the writ petition, the substratum of the writ petitioner was gone and the writ petition had become infructuous and should be dismissed on that ground alone. The petitioners on the contrary, contended that in the exigencies of the circumstances the writ court has the power to mould the relief. ( 3 ) IT is undoubtedly true that the writ court can 'mould' the prayer provided there is a logical connection of cause and effect between the original relief prayed for and the 'moulded' prayer. ( 4 ) BEFORE entering into the merits of the case a point raised by the respondents deserves some consideration. ( 5 ) IT has been stated in the writ petition that the Mayurakshi Cotton Mills was completely left abandoned since June, 1986 by the then management owing to financial reasons and the company was ultimately directed to be wound up by the High Court at Calcutta. At that juncture the Government of West Bengal purchased the assets of the company and constituted a committee of management consisting of six members. On that score the petitioners urged that this is an instrumentality of State and as such an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution and as such is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the court. At that juncture the Government of West Bengal purchased the assets of the company and constituted a committee of management consisting of six members. On that score the petitioners urged that this is an instrumentality of State and as such an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution and as such is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the court. The respondents contend that the said mill is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution inasmuch as it is not a monopoly concern that it is a trading concern like other industries in the field of cotton productions, that it has to run its business in competition with similar other industries. The respondents contend that as such its functions cannot be termed to be the functions having a public law character or that it is not closely related to Governmental functions. ( 6 ) THIS Court does not consider it necessary in the facts of this particular case to go into the question as to whether the respondent No. 2 is or is not an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. ( 7 ) EVEN if it is assumed that the respondent No. 2 is otherwise an authority within the meaning of Article 12 and is amenable to the Constitutional limitations yet there is a gulf of difference between a Government proper and the instrumentality of a Government. Whatever function the Government discharges is in the nature of a public function but all activity manifested by the instrumentality of the State is not necessarily be a public function having a public law element in it or having a public law character in it. All actions of an instrumentality of the State is not necessarily amenable to the constitutional limitations. If the instrumentality of the State is a trading concern like a Government company within the meaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 and has to survive in the competitive field of business then all its activities cannot be termed to be in the discharge of a public function. It is only in matters where there is a statutory obligation or the discharge of a public function that such instrumentality becomes amenable to the Constitutional limitations. It is only in matters where there is a statutory obligation or the discharge of a public function that such instrumentality becomes amenable to the Constitutional limitations. In domestic affairs, namely, in the matters of relationship of master and servant inter se which arises out of private treaties the instrumentality does not become amenable necessarily to Constitutional constraints. A reference in this connection may be made to the case of Anupam Ghosh v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 1991 Lab. I. C 2261 in which Division Bench of this court in paragraph 8 of the said judgment, inter alia, held as follows:-"8. Even if it is assumed that the company is "state" within the meaning of Article 12 in our view, no writ should lie against the order of termination passed against the writ petitioner. The nature of the State action impugned in the writ proceeding is required to be considered carefully for deciding as to whether or not the same can be held to be subject matter of public law remedy of writ. It is not the mere fact of employment by a public authority or instrumentality per se which makes an action of such instrumentality touching the question of employment of its employee a subject matter for interference under the Constitutional writ jurisdiction. In our view, if the right of the employee of an instrumentality or agency of the State flows from private contract between the parties and conditions of service are not governed or controlled by any statutory provision and the impugned action of the instrumentality or agency in the matter of employment of its employee has no public law character, there will be no occasion for interference in the writ jurisdiction. In the absence of other consideration namely existence of statutory provisions, the breach of which is complained in a State action relating to the employment of the concerned employee seeking for a remedy in writ jurisdiction, a State action relating to contractual obligations will not be examined unless the action has some public law character for exercising constitutional writ jurisdiction. In such a case, the employee of the agency or instrumentality may avail of other alternative remedies in a different forum. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision in Praga Tool's case (1969-II-LLJ-749 ). In such a case, the employee of the agency or instrumentality may avail of other alternative remedies in a different forum. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision in Praga Tool's case (1969-II-LLJ-749 ). It has been held in the said decision that" it is well understood that a mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty" p. 753. It is not necessary that the person or the authority on whom the statutory duty is imposed need be a public official or an official body. If the company is a non-statutory body but incorporated under the Companies Act there is neither a statutory nor a public duty imposed on it by a statute in respect of which enforcement could be sought by means of a mandamus nor is there in its workmen any corresponding legal right for enforcement of any such statutory or public duty. Similar view has also been taken in H. EM. Union's case (1970 Lab IC 212) (SC ). The decision in Praga Tools case and H. E. M. Union's case have been approved by the Constitution Bench in Sabhajit Tiwari's case (1975-I-LLJ-374 ). The decisions in the said two cases have also been approved in a later decision of the Supreme Court in Tekraj's case (1988-I-LLJ-341 ). Although the said two judgments have not been referred to in the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Ajoy Hasia 's case (1981-I-LLJ-103) but in this case, the decision of Sabhajit Tiwan's case is binding on the Constitution Bench. The decision about private and public law character or field in the matter of intervention by a writ has been highlighted in the decision of Master of Roll's in the case Ex parte Walsh in (1984) 3 All ER 425. " ( 8 ) IN paragraph 9 of the aforesaid decision it has been held that all actions of an authority are not per se amenable to the writ jurisdiction as would be seen from the decision of the Supreme Court in Escort's case, and M. C. Mehta's case. " ( 8 ) IN paragraph 9 of the aforesaid decision it has been held that all actions of an authority are not per se amenable to the writ jurisdiction as would be seen from the decision of the Supreme Court in Escort's case, and M. C. Mehta's case. ( 9 ) FROM paragraph 10 also it appears that the Hon'ble Division Bench held that any broad proposition that any action of an instrumentality or agency of a State relating to employment of its employee irrespective of fact as to whether or not the employment of the concerned employee and terms thereof flown from a private contract between the parties and not controlled by any statutory provisions and as such employment does not involve any public nature of duties, is amenable to writ jurisdiction cannot be held to be in consonance with the decisions of the larger and Constitutional Benches of the Supreme Court. ( 10 ) IN the instant case the question of appointment or variation of the terms of the employment etc. have not necessarily been laid down and is a fruit of domestic inter-course between the employer and the employee and as such the writ court should be slow to intervene in the employer and employee relationship of a concern even if that concern is otherwise an instrumentality of the State unless the nature of action be of a public character. In the instant case the doors of industrial adjudication are open to the petitioners where they can ventilate their grievance and the machinery under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 can afford complete and adequate remedy to the petitioner. In fact the nature of the dispute sought to be resolved by this High Court partakes of the nature of an industrial dispute and if such an industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or obligation created under the Industrial Disputes Act, then the only remedy available is to get an adjudication under the said Act. In this connection a reference may be made to the case of Premier Automobiles reported in (1975-II-LLJ-445 ). In this connection a reference may be made to the case of Premier Automobiles reported in (1975-II-LLJ-445 ). ( 11 ) FOR the reasons stated above this court is of the opinion that the writ court should not interfere in the matter of such domestic dispute between the employer and the employee which partakes of the nature of an industrial dispute, unless the matter comes before the writ court through the channel of the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. ( 12 ) IN the circumstances, this writ application fails and is dismissed. The petitioners however, are given the liberty to seek their remedies before the appropriate forum. It is made clear that in this case it has been left open to be decided in a proper case as to whether the respondent No. 2 is or is not an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. There will be no order as to costs.