A. R SINGH, J. This case has some unfortunate history behind it. On 5-5-1993, the case was listed before me for admission, on which date an order was made for its final disposal in August, 1993 and the stay order dated 19-3-1991 was also vacated on that very date. However, subsequently, on the mention made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the order could not be signed and the case was directed to be put up as unlisted on 10-5-1993. For one or the other reason, on the request made by learned Counsel for the petitioner, the case continued to be ad journed from one to another date. Ul timately, on 17-5- 1993, order dated 5-5-1993 was signed. Again on 18-5-1993, the case was finally heard and the writ petition was dismissed with the direction that reasons for the dismissal of the writ peti tion will be given on 21st May, 1993. This course was adopted on account of the fact that hearing of the case lasted on that date throughout the day and no time was left for dictation of the judgment; and the Counsel for the opposite party apprehended that the petitioner may on the next date adopt some course to prolong the pendency of the writ petition. It appears that after 18-5-93 the file of the case was not sent to me for dictation of the reasons of the judgment and it remained in the office. 2. An application was filed before me on behalf of the petitioner by S/sri A. P. Srivastava and P. P. Srivastava on 9-7-1993 asking for rehearing of the writ petition and also for grant of stay order presumably on the ground that petitioners Counsel Sri VM. Sahai had not been heard on 18-5-1993 when the writ petition was dis missed. This application of the petitioner was also rejected by me vide order dated 9-7-1993. 3. After rejection of the application in the normal course, the file should have been sent to me for dictation of the reasons of my order dated 18-5r93 but again it was retained in the office and due to my trans fer to Lucknow Bench of the Court, file of the case remained in the office and the reasons for the order dated 18-5-93 could not be given. Above abnormal happenings in the case also escaped my notice for the above reasons. 4. Above abnormal happenings in the case also escaped my notice for the above reasons. 4. Ultimately on 19-11-1996, an ap plication was filed on behalf of the heirs of respondent No. 3 as also by one Narain Das son of Nand Lal, Jwala Prasad respon dent No. 4 and Batuk Prasad, respondent No. 5 for seeking clarification of my order dated 18-5-1993 and 21-5-1993. It is to be noticed that no order dated 21-5-1993 had been passed in the case. This application was filed for getting clarification of the position regarding pendency of the writ petition in the light of certain develop ments, which had taken place on account of non-dictation of the reasons by me pur suant to the passing of the order on 18-5- 1993 dismissing the writ petition. 5. It appears that so as to stall the execution proceedings, an affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioner making a representation to the execution Court that the writ petition was still pending in this Court which had not been decided till then. In support of his affidavit, a ques tion-answer having been obtained from the Courts Registry was also filed for giving proof of the pendency of the writ petition. It was in these circumstances that the application dated 7-11-1996 was filed before me by the decree holder. 6. On the said application, 20-11-1996 was fixed and the application was directed to be put up with the record of the writ petition. Learned Counsel for the ap plicant was also directed to inform the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the case willbe taken up on 20-11-1996. 7. On 20-11-1996, learned Counsel for the petitioner did not appear, however looking to the urgency of the matter, a direction was made on that date for staying the disposal of the application filed before the execution Court by the decree holder until further orders of the Court in case the same had already not been disposed of. A direction was also issued for listing of the application, withrecord on 28-11-1996. 8. On 28-11-1996, Sri Anand Prakash Srivastava appeared in the Court on behalf of the petitioner; on his request the case was again fixed for 2nd December, 1996 so as to enable Sri S. N. Singh, learned Coun sel for respondent No. 3 to appear and argue the case. Direction was also issued for the appearance of Sri VM. 8. On 28-11-1996, Sri Anand Prakash Srivastava appeared in the Court on behalf of the petitioner; on his request the case was again fixed for 2nd December, 1996 so as to enable Sri S. N. Singh, learned Coun sel for respondent No. 3 to appear and argue the case. Direction was also issued for the appearance of Sri VM. Sahai who had initially appeared on petitioners be half and had argued the case leading to the passing of the order dated 18-5-1993. On 2-12-1996, Sri VM. Sahai appeared before me and stated that he had nothing to argue in the case and that the writ petition had already been argued by him and was decided on 18-5-1993 after he had con cluded his arguments. 9. Taking note of the previous hap penings which took place in this case after 18-5-1993, a serious view was taken on the conduct of Sri A. P. Srivastava, Advocate and the two officials of the Registry who were instrumental in producing the ques tion-answer from the Registry for making wrongful representation before the execu tion Court that the writ petition was still pending and was not yet decided. Accord ingly, contempt proceedings were in itiated on that very day against Sri A. P. Srivastava, Advocate, and the two officials of the Registry of this Court. 10. On 18-12-1996, all the three per sons appeared before me through their respective Counsel. On their request they were granted time for filing their replies. A request was also made in my order passed on that date to the Honble the Chief Jus tice for causing an enquiry to be made and action to be initiated against officials who were responsible for issuance of the ques tion-answer and for wrongfully retaining the file in the office for such a long time despite the order dated 18-5-1993 as a result whereof reasons for the judgment which was to be dictated and the matter remained as it was on 18-5-1993. 11. I have not been informed of any action that may have been taken by Honble the Chief Justice in the matter thus for. 12. It is how, at this stage, I am proceeding to dictate my reasons in sup port of the order passed in the case on 18-5-1993. 13. 11. I have not been informed of any action that may have been taken by Honble the Chief Justice in the matter thus for. 12. It is how, at this stage, I am proceeding to dictate my reasons in sup port of the order passed in the case on 18-5-1993. 13. This writ petition has been filed by tenant against the judgment and decree passed by the Judge Small Cause Court Varanasi dated 15-2-1991 in Small Cause Case No. 606 of 1973. Small Cause suit was filed by respondent No. 3 seeking petitioners eviction from house No. D-10/53 situate in mohalla Sakshi Vindyaka, Varanasi which comprised of shop num bers 3 and 4. The Judge, Small Cause Court (hereafter referred to as respondent No. 2) decree the suit of the landlord (hereafter called respondent No. 3) and the Vlth Additional District Judge (hereafter called respondent No. 1) too dismissed petitioners revision which he had filed under Section 25 of the Provin cial Small Cause Courts Act against the judgment of the trial Judge. 14. In brief, the facts are that the house No. D-10/53 Sakshi Vinayaka, Varanasi, comprising of Shop Nos. 3 and 4 was let out to the petitioner by respondent No. 3 on a monthly rent of Rs. 75. Sub sequently, on the permission granted by respondent No. 3, two shops, namely shop Nos. 3 and 4, were converted into one shop by the petitioner after removing the divid ing wall in between the two shops. The suit was filed by respondent No. 3 seeking evic tion of the petitioner on the ground of sub-letting with the allegation that he had sub-let the shops in dispute to one Batuk Prasad and the said Batuk Prasad was run ning his own business in the shop in the name and style of M/s. Indian Antiquities and the said Batuk Prasad was in its ex clusive possession with which the petitioner has no concern hence he was liable to be evicted from the shops. Relief for payment of arrears of rent and damages till the delivery of possession was also claimed. 15. Relief for payment of arrears of rent and damages till the delivery of possession was also claimed. 15. Petitioner, as well as, respondent No. 5 and Jwala Prasad respondent No. 4 who was also impleaded as defendant No. 2 in the suit, filed their written statement and contested the case, inter alia, on the ground that the shops in dispute had never been sub-let and that the petitioner was still in its possession; he was running his business along with his father Batuk Prasad, respondent No. 5. It was further pleaded that in a family partition between the petitioner and respondent Nos. 4 and 5, the shops in dispute fell in the share of respondent No. 4 another brother of the petitioner, but after respondent No. 4 refused to take the same and opted for another shop, as his share, the shop was given in the share of respondent No. 5 who happens to be the father of the petitioner as well as of respondent No. 4. It was in this manner, stated the petitioner, that respon dent No. 5 was running his business in the said shop. It was further pleaded that the petitioner had not severed his relationship from the shop or interest as its tenant; he was still having his own business in the said shop along with respondent No. 5 in whose favour there was no sub-letting; hence the suit was liable to be dismissed. 16. The trial Court, after considering the respective contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings, as well as the evidence which was tendered by them, came to the conclusion that the petitioner had sub-let the shop in dispute to respon dent No. 5 without obtaining permission either of respondent No. 3 or of the Dis trict Magistrate Varanasi; he had also severed his relation as tenant from the said shop and was left with no interest therein and the business which was being run in the shop in dispute belonged exclusively to Batuk Prasad, respondent No. 5; hence it was a clear case of sub-letting of the shop by the petitioner in favour of respondent No. 5. It was further found that it was respondent No. 5 who was paying the rent of the shop from his own account to respondent No. 3 through the petitioner and the petitioner had never paid its rent through his own resources obviously for the reasons that it was respondent No. 5 who was running his business in the said shops. On above findings, trial Court decreed the suit. 17. Feeling aggrieved from the decree of eviction and payment of rent and damages, which was passed by the Judge Small Cause, petitioner filed revision under Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act which however also met with failure and the revisional Court too affirmed the findings which had been recorded by the trial Court in the suit. The decree passed by the trial Court for the eviction of the petitioner and payment of arrears of rent and damages was also con firmed. 18. Sri VM. Sahai, learned Counsel for the petitioner unsuccessfully tried to attack the findings which had been recorded by the trial Court and have also been affirmed by the revisional Court. Thus those findings including the finding of sub-letting of the shops in dispute by petitioner to his father Batuk Prasad respondent No. 5, therefore, being a find ing based on appreciation of evidence in the case cannot be re-agitated in this writ petition. Sri Sahai too conceded that since it was a finding of fact, having been arrived at on appreciation of evidence, which was adduced by the parties, it could hardly be questioned as no piece of evidence was left unconsidered by the Courts below for reaching on that finding. I, therefore, proceed hereafter on the basis that the petitioner had sub-let the shops in dispute to respondent No. 5 and that he had no concern with those shops in which respon dent No. 5 alone was running his exclusive business. 19. I, therefore, proceed hereafter on the basis that the petitioner had sub-let the shops in dispute to respondent No. 5 and that he had no concern with those shops in which respon dent No. 5 alone was running his exclusive business. 19. It was then contended by Sri Sahai that since the incident of sub-letting, as per the own showing of respondent No. 3 who is now represented by this legal repre sentatives, had occurred much earlier to the enforcement of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Evic tion) Act, 1972 (Act No. 13 of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) hence the suit for eviction of petitioner from the shops in dispute could only be filed under the provisions of Section 7 of U. P. (Temforary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 947 (U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947) and not under Section 20 (2) of the Act. 20. It is also argued by Sri Sahai that respondent No. 3 was personally aware of the fact of sub-letting of the shops to respondent No. 5 by the petitioner and since he did not take appropriate action immediately thereafter the sub-letting estoppel will also apply and the s. count too was liable to be disconcert and piton that to be dismissed. cured the principle of acquiesces " " account too was lia 21. The learned Counsel ha s confined his attack against the orders impugned in this writ petition only on these two grounds. Coming to the first ground first, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions in this respect. 22. The Act by Section 25 (1) prohibits sub-letting in absolute terms. Its clause (2) however allows sub- letting with the written permission both of the landlord and of the District Magistrate. In the explanation appended to that Section, sub-letting has been assumed by way of fiction in two events, viz. , firstly that the tenant has allowed the building (both residential or non-residential) to be oc cupied by any person who is not a member of his family and in case of a non-residen tial building the tenant who has been car rying on his business in the building admits a person who is not a member of his family as a partner or a new partner. The word family has been defined in the Act by Section 3 (g ). The word family has been defined in the Act by Section 3 (g ). It rules out a parent of the tenant who has normally not been living with him from being a family member. In the present case, it was pleaded by the petitioner himself that there had been family partition between him, his brother and his father in which the shops in ques tion ultimately came in the share of his father Batuk Prasad respondent No. 5 (defendant No. 3 in the suit) who was running his own business in the shop in the name and style of India Antiquities. Both the Courts below have come to the con clusion that petitioner has no concern with the business which was being run by Batuk Prasad in the shops which was his exclusive business. In view of these findings there remains no doubt that Batuk Prasad is. not a family member of the petitioner and both under Sections 12 (1) (b) and 12 (2) read with Section 25 (1) and the explanation appended to it, sub-letting of the shops is fully made out under the Act. 23. A Full Bench of this Court in Kesharbai v. District Judge, 1980 ARC 223 (EB.) has held that Section 12 (1) (b) was retrospective in operation. In the light of the view taken by this Court in Keshar Bai (supra) notwithstanding the incident of deemed sub-letting occurring in respect of a building even before the enforcement of the Act it will all the more be a ground for the eviction of the tenant from the building by filing suit on the ground provided by Section 20 (2) (e) of the Act. Sub-clause (e) of Section 20 (2) of the Act too spells out in clear terms that a suit for eviction under Section 20 (2) (e) can be filed even if the incident of sub-letting had taken place after the Act was enforced or it took place before it and during the time U. P. Act No. HI of 1947 was holding the field. 24. In view of the clear statutory posi tion which is presented by the Act there is no merit in the first contention which has been raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the contention is accordingly rejected. 25. Coming to the second contention of Sri Sahai that should not detain the Court for long. 24. In view of the clear statutory posi tion which is presented by the Act there is no merit in the first contention which has been raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the contention is accordingly rejected. 25. Coming to the second contention of Sri Sahai that should not detain the Court for long. The question is one of fact. After analysing the evidence on the record both the Courts of fact have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff did not ever accept or acquiesce to the illegal sub-let ting of the building by the petitioner. He never accepted rent of the building from Batuk Prasad. He also refused the rent when it was tendered to him by Batuk Prasad. Thus, there is overwhelming evidence to demonstrate that the plaintiff never accepted Batuk Prasad either as a tenant or as a sub-tenant of the petitioner. This argument too, therefore, has no merit. 26. No other point was argued. The writ petition accordingly fails and is dis missed with costs. Petition dismissed. .