JUDGMENT 1. IN the instant application under article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, inter alia, challenges an order of reference dated December 27, 1988 issued by the Assistant secretary, Government of West Bengal under memo No. 2938-I. R which is annexure T to the petition. The issue referred to in the aforesaid order of reference is as follows:-"whether retrenchment of Sri Amar Nath Chatterjee is justified ? To what relief, if any, is he entitled." 2. THE petitioner is an existing company within the meaning of companies Act, 1956. The business activities of the petitioner company are two-fold namely, trading and manufacturing. Owing to the rescission in business, the Board of Directors of the company in its meeting held on October 8, 1986 reviewed the entire situation of the company and it was observed that the company had been incurring loss due to steep rise in the cost of raw materials and the company also was experiencing other manufacturing problems. It was ultimately decided in the said meeting to keep the factory in a nucleus form till a new profitable product line could be identified. In the said meeting ultimately it was decided to terminate the services of surplus workers phasewise with payment of full dues and compensation under the law. Accordingly, two notices of retrenchment dated October 22, 1986 and December 26, 1986 were issued by the company whereby 32 workmen were retrenched. It is alleged that by the said notices, each of the retrenched workmen was tendered in cash of one month's wages in line of notice and retrenchment compensation as per law together with their wages upto the respective dates of the notices. 3. IT is the assertion of the company that pursuant to such notices of retrenchment, the respondent No. 3 duly received the notice of pay and compensation and acknowledged receipt of the same in full and final settlement of his dues. A copy of the said receipt dated December 27, 1986 has been annexed to the writ petition marked with the letter 'c. The company asserts that the remaining 31 retrenched workmen also received the money legally due to them in full and final settlement of their respective claims and acknowledged receipt of such money and those 31 workmen did not raise any dispute at any point of time. The respondent no. The respondent no. 3 after having received the retrenchment compensation made an application to the company for payment of gratuity due to him on January 6, 1987 stating therein that he was entitled under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 to get the gratuity on account of his retrenchment after completion of not less than five years of continuous service. The company contends that the respondent No. 3 was paid all amounts due to him on account of gratuity and the respondent No. 3 accepted the said amount in full and final settlement of his claim on that account. The respondent No. 3 thereafter filled in the required forms for payment of the provident fund amount lying into his credit and in fact he ultimately withdrew all amounts from the Regional Provident Commissioner to his credit. 4. AFTER a lapse of about eight months and after receiving all conceivable benefits under the various laws the respondent No. 3 by a letter dated august 24, 1987 made a complaint to the Assistant Labour Commissioner, government of West Bengal stating, inter alia, that his retrenchment was made without showing proper reason and without following the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. A conciliation proceeding ensured and failed and the failure report was, in due course, submitted before the appropriate authority under Section 12 (4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 where on the impugned reference dated December 27, 1988 was made under Section 10 (1) of the said Act. It is the contention of the petitioner that after having availed of all the benefits available to him due to such retrenchment and after letting the grass grow for long eight months, the respondent No. 3 was not entitled to initiate the machinery of conciliation and the Government in its turn ought not to have referred the dispute under Section 10 (1) of the said Act. The petitioner contends that non application of mind was writ large on the face of the order of reference and as such he same should be quashed and set aside. The petitioner heavily relied upon certain notings in the file of the government which were made before making the impugned order of reference. The petitioner contends that non application of mind was writ large on the face of the order of reference and as such he same should be quashed and set aside. The petitioner heavily relied upon certain notings in the file of the government which were made before making the impugned order of reference. The petitioner contends that not: only non application of mind is writ large on the face of the order of reference in making the impugned order of reference but in making the impugned order of reference the appropriate authority misdirected itself in the matter. 5. THE petitioner thereafter sought to go into the merits of the case or the merits of the baselessness of the allegations of respondent No. 3 by showing discrepancies in the statement of the respondent No. 3 at various stages of the proceeding thereby seeking to show perversity and non application of mind. The petitioner also contends that there was no dispute existing or apprehended on the date of reference because everything stood stall long prior to the date of the order of reference. 6. THE petitioner further contends that when the dispute was raised, only two grounds were taken that (i) no proper reasons were given for retrenchment; (ii) retrenchment was not in accordance with law. The petitioner seeks to urge that so far as the first ground is concerned the order of retrenchment itself discloses; the reason and the workmen never raised the dispute that the reason were non existent. So far as the second ground is concerned the petitioner contends that law with regard to the retrenchment is governed under Sections 25f and 25g of the Industrial disputes Act and the petitioner contends that even during the course of argument before this High Court nothing could be complained of regarding the infraction of the compliance with the provisions of Section 25f and 25g. The respondent No. 3 alleged that persons junior to him were retained where as he was retrenched and the petitioner company wanted to counter that allegation by stating that the persons who are retained did not belong to the same rank or were not similarly circumstanced. In fact, the petitioner tried to go into the very depth of the matter to undo the case of the respondent No. 3 on its intrinsic merits. In fact, the petitioner tried to go into the very depth of the matter to undo the case of the respondent No. 3 on its intrinsic merits. It is well known that satisfaction of the appropriate authority in the matter of making a reference under section 10 (1) of the Act is a subjective satisfaction and unless perversity ex-facie can be shown the order of reference should not be quashed at its inception. Even if there are contradictory claims made by a workman at different stages of the proceeding yet that itself is the subject-matter of dispute to be resolved by the Industrial tribunal to which the dispute is referred. 7. IT may also be noted in passing that delay is not a factor to be taken into account in the matter of referring the dispute to an industrial forum under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It may also be noted in passing that simply by accepting the benefits under an order of retrenchment a workman is not estopped for challenging the legality or otherwise of such order of retrenchment because it is a statutory right of a workman guaranteed under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and there is no estopped against a statute. Moreover, a workman has to survive even for the sole purpose of fighting his lone battle against his mighty employer and for that purpose he needs money. He also needs money for feeding the hungry stomach not only of himself but of the other members of the family and he is left with no other alternative but to accept the tricking benefits doled to him by his employer for his mere survival, it can also be noted that there can be no equitable fight between two unequals and that is why statutes have been enacted to give shelter and protection to the vulnerable section of the society. That is why acceptance of benefits under an order cannot be stated to be a waiver of the right to challenge the action itself. It is also well known that in making a reference the adequacy or sufficiency of the material on which the opinion was formed is beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. That is why acceptance of benefits under an order cannot be stated to be a waiver of the right to challenge the action itself. It is also well known that in making a reference the adequacy or sufficiency of the material on which the opinion was formed is beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. The High Court at this stage neither has neither the power nor the capacity to know the working of the mind of referring authority and in the absence of any ex-facie perversity the satisfaction of the referring authority cannot be challenged before the High court in its writ jurisdiction. Even if two views are possible and the referring authority is of one view and the High Court is of another view, that is not sufficient reason for negating the view of the appropriate statutory authority and substituting it by the High Court view. It is not necessary to refer to numerous case laws cited by both the parties at the hearing but the principles of law enunciated therein are clear and unambiguous and all decisions say, in chorus that maximum latitude is to be given to a workman in an industrial dispute. The social legislations have been enacted for the purpose of protecting the vulnerable sections of the society and the rule of interpretation of these social legislation must invariably be heavily tilted in favour of the workmen and the provisions are to be very liberally construed so far as the workmen are concerned. 8. CONSIDERING all the circumstances, of this case, this court is of the opinion that the writ court should not at the outset seek to stiffle the demand of the workmen by setting aside and/or quashing the order of reference at its inception. In the circumstances, this application fails and is dismissed. All interim orders are vacated. Since the order of reference is dated December 27, 1988 and almost five years have elapsed from the date of making the order of reference it is fit and proper that the industrial adjudication should proceed forthwith. The Industrial Tribunal concerned is directed to commence the hearing of the matter in accordance with law and to finally dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible preferably within six months from the date of communication of this order to the tribunal concerned. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.