Honble SHARMA, J.—This Special Appeal is directed against the order dated December 3, 1991 of the learned single Judge of this Court. Under the aforesaid order the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant herein, Agriculture Market Committee, Alwar (for short Agriculture Market Committee) against the order dated August 16,1991 made on the application under Section 28-A(2) of the Rajasthan Shops & Commercial Establishment Act, 1958 (for short, the Act). The said application was filed before the Prescribed Authority under the Act (for short, the Prescribed Authority) by Kishorilal respondent No. 2 herein. (2). Kishorilal, respondent No. 2 herein, filed an application under Sec. 28-A(2) of the Act before the Prescribed Authority in which a case was set up that he was appointed on the post of Class IV in the office of the appellant herein and he continued to work on that post upto February 22, 1989 and without any notice his services were terminated on February 22, 1989. The said claim of the respondent No. 2 was contested by the appellant No. 2. The respondent was appointed on the post of class IV but it was admitted that the respondent No. 2 was appointed for the purpose of cleaning the office on daily wages. He having been appointed for specific job after the need for the specific job came to an end, he was removed from the service and therefore it was not necessary for the appellant to give any notice to him before removing him from service. The jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority to entertain the claim was also challenged or the ground that the claim was also challenged or the ground that the appellant was not covered under the definition of commercial establishment as per the meaning of the Act. The Prescribed Authority framed two issues, issue No. 1 was as to whether the office of the appellant is a shop and commercial establishment under the Act and second to what relief the respondent No. 2 was entitled. Learned Prescribed Authority decided the issue No. 1 in favour of the respondent No. 2 and held that it was an commercial establishment under the Act. Learned Prescribed Authority decided the issue No. 1 in favour of the respondent No. 2 and held that it was an commercial establishment under the Act. Dealing with the issue No. 2 it came to the conclusion that the respondent No. 2 was appointed as a peon and he was removed without any prior notice and his removal was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Consequently, the Prescribed Authority allowed the claim of the respondent No. 2 and directed the appellant to take the respondent No. 2 in service within 30 days and the respondent No. 2 was held entitled for back-wages. (3). The said order of the Prescribed Authority was challenged by the appellant by filing the S.B. Civil Writ Petition and the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition and upheld the order of the Prescribed Authority. (4). Learned counsel for the appellant Market Committee has challenged the order of the learned Single Judge as well, as that of the learned Prescribed Authority under the Act on various grounds including the ground that the appellant is a local authority and, therefore, the provisions of the Act were not applicable as it was exempted under Section 3 of the Act and one of the provisions of the Act including Sec. 28A(2) was applicable and the order of the Prescribed Authority was without jurisdiction. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Single Judge has not taken this matter into consideration though a specific plea was raised in the writ petition that the appellant Market Committee was a local authority. Learned counsel for the appellant has also challenged the order of the learned Single Judge on the ground that the learned Single Judge has wrongly agreed with the Prescribed Authority that the establishment of the Market Committee was covered under the provisions of the Act. (5). So far as the second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the establishment of the Market Committee is not covered under the provisions of the Act and it is not a shop or commercial establishment is concerned, we find no merit in it. (5). So far as the second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the establishment of the Market Committee is not covered under the provisions of the Act and it is not a shop or commercial establishment is concerned, we find no merit in it. A bare reading of the definition of Commercial establishment as given in Section 2(3) of the Act will show that the said definition is very wide and enlarged and even the establishment or administrative service in which the persons employed are mainly engaged in office work will be included. A bare perusal of the preamble of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 {for short the Act of 1961) will show that the object of that Act is to provide better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produced and the establishment of markets for agricultural produce in the State of Rajasthan. With that object and purpose in view, the Act of 1961 was enacted by the State Legislature. The Market Committees are constituted under Sec. 6 of the Act of 1961 and Section 9 of that Act enumerates the functions and duties of the Market Committees and a perusal of the functions and duties of the market committee will show that they are many- fold and a market committee is required to manage the market proper the principal market yard and sub-market yards in the market area for which it is constituted and it is also required to control and regulate the running of the market in the interest of agriculturists and trades operating in the market; the making of transections in the market; admissions and entry of persons to the market and the use thereof and the behaviour of those who enter the market for transacting business and further to take steps for the prevention of adulteration of agricultural produce and to provide for the grading and standardisation of agricultural produce. Therefore, we are in agreement with the learned Single Judge that the market committee is a commercial establishment covered under the Act. (6). But the question is as to whether it automatically stands exempted by virtue of Section 3 of the Act. Therefore, we are in agreement with the learned Single Judge that the market committee is a commercial establishment covered under the Act. (6). But the question is as to whether it automatically stands exempted by virtue of Section 3 of the Act. It appears that the learned Single Judge did not direct himself of this important matter which goes to the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority to entertain the application under Sec. 28-A(2) of the Act of an employee of the market committee. We may at this stage say that the law can be said to be settled that even in a case where the provisions of the Act as well as the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 (for short, the ID Act) are applicable, both the Acts being supplemental to each other option is with the employee to approach competent authority under any of those Acts. In a case where the provisions of the Act, are not applicable by virtue of Section 3 of the Act, the provisions of the Act being not applicable, then a dismissed or retrenched employee will still have a remedy under the provisions of the ID Act and it will be open for him to challenge his retrenchment under the provisions of the ID Act. This controversy is no longer res-integra and in the case of National Engineering Industries Ltd. V. Shri Kishan Bhageria and others (1), a case which had gone from this court to the Apex Court, the Apex Court has said that the ID Act and the Act, though treading on the same field, they are not repugnant or inconsistent to each other but supplemental -to each other and dismissal of an application under Section ....(2) of the Act on the ground of limitation did not bar the remedy under Section 10 of the Act. But as shall be presently shown to us, it appears that by virtue of Section 3 of the Act the application of the Act is exempted to any local authority and we shall recently show that the market committee is a local authority for the purposes of the Act and by virtue of Section 3, the provisions of the Act will not be applicable to it and if that be so the Prescribed Authority will have no jurisdiction to entertain the application under Sec. 28A(2) of the Act. (7). (7). It will be seen from para 8(E) of the S.B. Writ Petition that the petitioner has stated that; "Even otherwise the petitioners Institution is a local authority, the affairs of which are being governed by a committee constituted under the provisions of the aforesaid Act of 1961. Thus, the petitioner Institution by no stretch of imagination can be said to be a shop and commercial establishment within the meaning of section 2 of sub-section 3 of the Act of 1958". There, a plea was taken that the market committee was local authority, though no specific plea was taken that on that ground it stands exempted under Sec. 3 of the Act and perhaps it was the reasons as to why the learned Single Judge was not requested to go into this ground. But nonetheless a plea was taken that the market committee was a local authority and it is purely a question of law and inference if it is a local authority whether by virtue of Sec. 3 it stands exempted from the application of the Act and therefore the order of the Prescribed Authority is without jurisdiction and a specific ground has been taken in the special appeal and both the parties were heard at length on this plea." (8). Thai apart, it will be seen that this controversy can be said to be covered under issue No. 1 framed by the Prescribed Authority. It was contended by the learned counsel for the market committee that the market committee is a local authority and, therefore, by virtue of Section 3 of the Act its provisions are not applicable to it. Section 3 of the Act may now be read so far as it is relevant which reads as under — "3. Exemptions: - (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to- (a) offices of or under the Central or any State Government or local authorities; Learned counsel contends that it will therefore be clear that the offices of the local authorities are exempted and nothing in the Act shall apply to the offices of the local authorities. Exemptions: - (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to- (a) offices of or under the Central or any State Government or local authorities; Learned counsel contends that it will therefore be clear that the offices of the local authorities are exempted and nothing in the Act shall apply to the offices of the local authorities. He further contends that the local authority has not been defined anywhere under the Act or even under the Act of 1961 and therefore one has to go on the definition of local authority as contained in clause (43) of Sec. 32 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 (for short, the State General Clauses Act). Section 32 of that Act is a definition section and its clause (43) is as under: — "Local authority" shall mean a municipal board, committee, corporation or council, a district board, a Zila Parishad, a Panchayat Samiti, a Panchayat or other authority legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal local fund." From the aforesaid definition of local authority it will be seen that it is almost identical with the definition of the said expression as given in Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (for short, the Central General Clauses Act) except that in Section 32(43) the Zila Parishads etc. have been added. But even if they would not have been added specifically perhaps they would have fallen within the expression local authority" as given in Sec. 3(31) of the Central General Clauses Act. Therefore, what it to be seen is as to whether the market committee is or is not a local authority within the meaning of clause (43) of Sec. 32 of the State General Clauses Act and.......to area at the correct answer one has to go to the scheme of the Act of 1961 moreso, in this case, the question is as to whether the market committee, the appellant herein, is legally entitled to or entrusted with the control or management of the municipal or a local fund.? The Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. R.C. Jain. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. R.C. Jain. (2) was dealing with the question whatever or not Delhi Development Authority is a local authority and it referred to Section 3(31) of the Central General Causes Act and in para 2 said — "A proper and careful scrutiny of the language of Section 3 (31) suggests that an authority, in order to be a local authority, must be of like nature and character as a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners, possessing therefore, many, if not all of the distinctive attributes and characteristics of a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body Port Commissioners, but possessing one essential feature, namely, that it is legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government municipal or local fund. What then are the distinctive attributes and characteristics, all or many of which a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners shares with any other local authority? First, the authorities must have separate legal existence as Corporate bodies. They must be legally independent entities. Next they must function in a defined area and must ordinarily, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly be elected by partly, directly or indirectly, be elected by the inhabitants of the area. Next they must enjoy a certain degrees of autonomy, with freedom to decide for them selves questions of policy affecting the area administered by them. The autonomy may not be complete and the degree of dependence may vary considerably but an appreciable measure of......be entrusted by Statute with such Governmental functions and duties as are usually connected with providing amenities to the inhabitants of the locality, like health and education survives, water and sewerage, town planning and development, roads, markets, transportation, social welfare services etc. etc. The Apex Court referred to its earlier case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi V. Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Delhi (3), where Hidayatullah J. observed — "Local bodies are subordinate branches of Government activities and they are democratic institutions managed by the representatives of the people. They function for public purposes and take away a part of the Government affairs in local areas. They are political sub-divisions and agencies which exercise a part of State functions. As they are intended to carry on local self- government the power of taxation is a necessary adjunct to their other powers. They function for public purposes and take away a part of the Government affairs in local areas. They are political sub-divisions and agencies which exercise a part of State functions. As they are intended to carry on local self- government the power of taxation is a necessary adjunct to their other powers. They function under the supervision of the Government". Holding that Delhi Development Authority was constituted for specific purpose of "the development of Delhi according to plan" and planned development of towns is a government function which is traditionally entrusted by the various Municipal Acts in different States to municipal bodies, the Apex Court said that the Delhi Development Authority is a local authority. In the case of Kendriya Nagrik Samiti Kanpur, V. Jal Sansthan Kanpur and others (4), the Allahabad High Court said that Jal Sansthan is a local authority and was constituted by the State Government under Section 18 of the UP Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1975 to perform its functions under the said Act and the functions were to provide water supply services and sewerage services amongst other from part of the duties of the Mahapalikas, Municipal boards and other such bodies. The Apex Court in the case of Patel Premji Jiva V. State of Gujarat (5), was dealing with a case under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and said that the expression local authority is defined as meaning a municipal committee district board body of port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of municipal or local fund. It was held that by virtue of Section 10(2) of Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 the market committee is a local authority within the meaning of the Bombay General Clauses Act. It was held that it was entrusted by the Government with control or management interalia of a local fund. (9). Let us see the provisions of the Act of 1961. A reference has already been made to the preamble and purposes of that Act for which it was enacted and at the cost of repetition it may be said that the said Act has been made by the State Legislature to manage and establishment the markets for agricultural produce in the State of Rajasthan for the better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce. Market Committees are established under Sec. 6 of the Act for every market area in respect of the agricultural produce for which it is declared to be market area under Sec. 4. "Fund" has been defined in Sec. 2(vi) of the Act of 1961 and means market committee fund referred to in Sec. 18 and reference to Sec. 18 will show that market committee had paid into a fund which will be called the market committee fund. Section 18A deals with contribution to marketing development fund. Section 19 deals with the purposes for which the fund shall be expended and the fund can only be expended for the purposes of acquisition of a site or sites for the market, the maintenance and improvement of the market, the maintenance and improvement of the market, cost auctioned repairs of buildings and provisions and maintenance of standard weights and measures etc. One of the functions of the market committee is marketing development and it will be seen that under Sec. 22-H there shall be a fund called the marketing development fund which shall be administered by the Marketing Board. This Court in the case of M/s Narain Hari Shanker V. State of Rajasthan and others (6) said that the establishment of a market committee under the Act of 1961 is for public purpose. A.P. Sen, J. as he then was, dealing with an argument that the fee collected was much more as the funds collected by way of fee already were much in excess than the expenditure said that the activities of the Mandi committee are also the development and Sec. 18 of the said Act contemplates for market committee fund all expenditure incurred by the market committee shall be defrayed out of the said fund. A perusal of the provisions of Sec. 7 of the Act of 1961 will show that it deals with constitution of market committees and it consists of 15 members, out of whom, seven have to be elected by such recognised organisations of agriculturists in the market area for which it is established as the State Government may prescribe, two have to be elected by the traders licensed by the market committee in the prescribed manner, two shall be the representatives of the Co- operative marketing societies and co-operative central financing agencies in the market area for which it is established as the State Government may prescribe. Then their has to be election by the local authorities. Thus, it will be seen that the market committee has to be by and large an elected body except few members in the circumstances mentioned therein. It is an autonomous body, has to- lay out its own policies. It can therefore be said that it satisfies all conditions of local authority. It has to make its own funds and has been given power to administer the same. We are, therefore of the opinion that the market committee is a local authority and if that be so, by virtue of Sec. 3(l)(a) of the Act nothing in the Act shall apply to the offices of the local authority and therefore Section 28-A of that Act was not applicable and the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application under Sec. 28A(2) of the Act. (10). Consequently, we allow this Special Appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge dated December 3, 1991 and we allow the writ petition filed by the Market Committee and the order dated August 16, 1991 passed by the Prescribed Authority is also set aside. The respondent No. 2 will be free to agitate the questions and the issues under the ID Act in accordance with that Act. Costs made easy.