JUDGMENT Samir Kumar Mookherjee, J. 1. By this Revisional application, the petitioners, who are defendants in a Title Suit for declaration and other reliefs, have challenged Order No. 246 dated 17.3.1992, where by the learned First Assistant District Judge, Hooghly, overruled the objection preferred by the petitioners and accepted the report of the Investigating Commissioner, filed on 25.3.1985. Appearing in support of the Revisional application, Mr. Bihani has contended that in view of the statements made by the Investigating Commissioner, in course of his deposition as a withness, the report should not have accepted. Mr. Tapas Mukherjee, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/opposite party, has, however contended that in view of the settled position in land that a careful report by an Investigating Commissioner ought not to be disturbed by a Revisional Court ordinarily, the impugned order calls for no interference, particularly when the tests, which are required to be satisfied for attracting section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are not fulfilled in the instant case. In connection with the second point, as stated above, Mr. Mukherjee has tried to argue that this is not a case decided, because the suit remains pending, but only at an interlocutory stage this order has been passed and again such order can be challenged in case there is any necessity for challenging the decree which may be ultimately passed in the suit, in terms of section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. It appears from the deposition of the Commissioner in cross-examination that the Commissioner admitted that he had no necessity to relay and deed as there was no such direction, that sixty bighas of disputed land had been found out by him but not depicted in the map filed by him, though on actual measurement of the relayed land, the area was found to be eighty six bighas and on the basis of his experience he thought that the same was the disputed land, because he presumes that the area in the Trust deed was given without actual measurement in identifying the disputed land as 'Chara Bagan'. He relied on the statements of two persons, who were aged thirty years and forty-six years, though the relevant deed dated back to 1895. He relied on the statements of two persons, who were aged thirty years and forty-six years, though the relevant deed dated back to 1895. The Commissioner had further to admit in reply to cross-examination that he was shown a trust deed wherefrom he found the area to be sixty bighas, though there was no mention of the same in his report nor could he remember the particulars of the deed. From the copies of the deed produced before us the western boundary also appears to differ from that mentioned in the Commissioner's report. 3. In course of argument on behalf of the petitioners a certified copy of another Trust deed executed within the period of a week from the one referred to by the plaintiff had been produced before us. 4. In the aforesaid facts, we are of the view that the impugned order, accepting the Commissioner's report ought not to be sustained. We are fully alive to the principles of law to which Mr. Mukherjee, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/opposite party, has referred. In this connection, we would like to keep on record two references cited by Mr. Mukherjee – one reported in the case of Rani Amrita Sundari vs. Murshi Serajuddin, 28 CWN 318 and the other in the case of Chandanmull Indra Kumar vs. Chimani Lal, 44 CWN 205, which followed the principle laid down in the former decisions, but both the said Division Bench decisions do not rule our interference upon clearly defined and sufficient grounds but forbid such interference only when investigation can be said to be long, careful and laborious and when the report did not blindly adopt the assertions of either party. In the instant case, the extract city or summary of the statements made by the local investigating commissioner, as adumbrated by us hereinabove, clearly indicates the most essential criterion for preventing interference with the local inspection reports, as mentioned in the above two Division Bench decisions, cannot be said to have been fulfilled in the instant case. In short, the report cannot be said to be careful and laborious as to warrant being sustained. 5. The other point, which Mr. In short, the report cannot be said to be careful and laborious as to warrant being sustained. 5. The other point, which Mr. Mukherjee has raised also does not have much merit, as it is now well settled by different Supreme Court decisions, to wit, the cases reported in Pandurang Dhondi Chaugule & other vs. Maruti Hari Jadhav & other, AIR 1966 SC 153 , Baldevdas Shivlal & another vs. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. & another, AIR 1970 SC 406 and M/s. D. & F. Housing & Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Sarup Singh & other, AIR 1971 SC 2324 , clearly lay down that there is no bar to treat even an interlocutory order as a case decided and secondly, a Court in entitled to interfere with such interlocutory order even in terms of the amended section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure if the same becomes necessary to prevent manifest injustice and multiplicity of litigation. In the instant case, in spite of the vulnerable nature of the report, if the report is permitted to remain for being challenged in course of challenge to the final decree, it will unnecessarily drag litigation and in the absence of proper identification of the disputed property, final decree may not be effective and conclusive. Such point of Mr. Mukherjee therefore must fail in the facts and materials of the present case. Moreover, explanation to section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure inserted through the amendment in 1976 sets at rest whatever distinotion was required to be observed prior to such amendment between the interlocutory orders and final orders. 6. For the aforesaid reasons, the Revisional must succeed and the order impugned must be set aside and we do so accordingly. 7. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 8. The trial Court is directed to issue order for fresh local investigation and expedite the same and if possible, should emdeavour to complete the same within eight weeks the date of communication of this order to the trial Court. Let xerox copies of this order passed today be handed over to both the learned advocates for the contesting parties on the usual terms on their undertaking to apply for and obtain urgent certified copies.