Judgment :- Srinivasan, J. This appeal is at the instance of the 7th defendant in the suit O.S.No.2353 of 1981 on the file of the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. The suit was filed by respondents 1 and 2, sons of the K.Subbarayalu Chetty, who was the first defendant in the suit. He died during the pendency of the suit. Subbarayalu Chetty had two wives, Annapoornammal and Saradambal, who were defendants 11 and 10 respectively in the suit. Through the former, he had three daughters and a son, who were defendants 13, 15, 16 and 4 respectively. Through the latter he had four sons, two of them being the plaintiffs and the other two were defendants 2 and 3. There were two daughters, who were defendants 12 and 14. The third defendant died pending suit and his wife and children were brought on record as defendants 24 to 26. The 5th defendant was a mortgagee of item No.l of plaint ‘A’ Schedule. That is the only item which is the subject matter of this appeal. The 7th defendant/ appellant was a purchaser of the said item of property in an auction held by the official assignee , Madras, on 15.11.1973 pursuant to an order of this Court made in Application No.625 of 1973 in I.P.No.85 of 1972. The sale was confirmed by this Court on 3.12.1973 and a sale deed was executed by the official assignee in favour of the appellant on 19.12.1973. 2. The present suit was filed for declaration that the official assignee was not entitled to sell the share of the plaintiffs in the properties described in Schedule ‘A’ to the plaint and in any other assets of the joint family for payment to the creditors of defendants 1 to 3 being the insolvents in I. A.No.85 of 1972, for a declaration that the sale held on 15.11.1073 with respect to item No.l of plaint ‘A’ Schedule by the official assignee in public auction was void and not binding on the plaintiffs and for a declaration that the mortgage deed dated 19.11.1969 with respect to the said property in favour of the fifth defendant was not valid and binding on the plaintiffs. In short, the case of the plaintiffs was that the properties belonged to the joint family of the first defendant, his father and brother and in a family partition dated 15.11.1956, the suit properties were allotted to the first defendant. The first defendant was conducting a business in partnership with the second defendant. On 19.11.1969, a mortgage was executed by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of the fifth defendant for a sum of Rs.35,000. The debt was an avyavaharika one and not binding on the plaintiffs, who were minors at that time. The step-mother of the plaintiffs, purporting to act as their next friend, filed a suit O.S.No.6994 of 1972 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras for partition and separate possession. The binding nature of the mortgage in favour of the fifth defendant was not questioned. The suit was filed on 1.7.1972. On the very next day, the creditors of the first defendant filed I.P.No.85 of 1972 for adjudicating defendants 1 to 3 as insolvents. On 30.11.1972 the first defendant attained majority. There was a preliminary decree for partition of half share of the plaintiffs in that suit on 28.7.1973. On 24.8.1973, defendants 1 to 3 were adjudicated as insolvents by this Court. In the final decree proceedings in the partition suit, orders were passed for selling the subject-matter of this appeal in auction for the purpose of discharging the mortgage debts. At that stage, the official assignee applied to this Court for staying the auction. In that application, by consent of parties, the court directed sale of the properties by the official assignee in public auction by order dated 24.9.1973. The order of adjudication passed by this Court in the insolvency proceedings had the only effect of vesting the shares of defendants 1 to 3 in the joint family properties with the official Assignee and the latter had not right whatever to sell the shares of the plaintiffs and the other sons of the first defendant, who were not adjudicated. 3. After the execution of the sale deed in favour of the appellant herein, on 19.12.1973, the official Assignee filed Application No.452 of 1974 in this Court for a declaration that he was entitled to sell the share of the plaintiffs and the fourth defendant for the purpose of payment of debts due to the creditors of the first defendant. 3. After the execution of the sale deed in favour of the appellant herein, on 19.12.1973, the official Assignee filed Application No.452 of 1974 in this Court for a declaration that he was entitled to sell the share of the plaintiffs and the fourth defendant for the purpose of payment of debts due to the creditors of the first defendant. An ex parte order was passed on the said Application on 7.10.1974 granting the prayer. On coming to know of the same, the plaintiffs filed Application No.29 of 1975 to set aside the exparte order. On 17.2.1975, this Court granted the prayer in the application on the following reasoning: “From the records, there is no material to accept the statement of the official assignee . Notwithstanding the fact that the sale had taken place as early as December, 1974 (sic.) inasmuch as it is evident that the minor had attained majority even long before viz., on 30.11.1972, it is a just and fit case for getting aside the exparte order. Accordingly it is set aside. Time to file counter two weeks”. Thereafter, the said application was ultimately dismissed as infructuous by this Court on 17.6.1977. Thus, the official assignee did not get a declaration that he was entitled to sell the shares of the plaintiffs and the fourth defendant. 4. Even before that, the plaintiffs filed the present suit on 19.11.1975 for the reliefs referred to already. We are not referring to the other reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs relating to the other property in the suit, as we are not concerned with the same. 5. The appellant herein filed the suit O.S.No.3262 of 1978 for declaration that defendants 1 to 5 in his suit had no right to occupy portion of the subject matter of this appeal and for recovery of possession and for damages. The plaintiffs in the present suit were defendants 1 and 2 in that suit. Defendants 2,3,10 and 24 to 26 in the present suit were defendants 4, 5, 3 and 6 to 8 respectively in that suit. Both the suit were tried together and the evidence was recorded in common. The. issues raised in the present suit insofar as they relate to the subject matter of this appeal were also raised in the other suit. 6. Both the suit were tried together and the evidence was recorded in common. The. issues raised in the present suit insofar as they relate to the subject matter of this appeal were also raised in the other suit. 6. By judgment dated 13.5.1986, the 7th Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, granted a decree in favour of the plaintiffs in the present suit and dismissed the suit filed by the appellant herein. The relevant findings are that the mortgage in favour of the fifth defendant was not binding on the plaintiffs, the shares of the plaintiffs did not vest in the official assignee and the sale in favour of the appellant herein was not binding on the plaintiffs’ shares. 7. The 7th defendant filed this appeal on 23.4.1987 in this Court. As against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.3262 of 1978, the appellant herein, who was the plaintiff therein, presented an appeal in this Court on 6.7.1987. It was returned on 18.9.1987 by the Registry for rectification of certain defects. The papers were represented only on 25.6.1993 and again returned on the same day. The Registry pointed out that the appeal was not maintainable in this Court, as the value of the suit being Rs.26,585 is below Rs.30,000 The appellant presented the papers in the City Civil Court on 30.6.1993. That court returned the papers on 5.7.1993 for getting the delay in representation condoned by this Court. Once again, the Deputy Registrar of this Court returned the papers stating that it is only the City Civil Court which has jurisdiction. The papers were represented in the City Civil Court on 15.7.1993. 8. On 15.7.1993, this appeal was taken up for hearing and the appellant’s counsel stated the facts. Learned counsel for the respondents raised an objection that the appeal is barred by the principle of res judicata inasmuch as there is no appeal against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.3262 of 1978. Learned counsel for the appellant represented that the appeal against the said decree is in the City Civil Court, Madras with a petition for condonation of delay in representation. We passed an order on that date exercising our suo motu powers and withdrew the proceedings in the City Civil Court, Madras, to this Court to be heard along with this appeal. We adjourned the matter to 21.7.1993. We passed an order on that date exercising our suo motu powers and withdrew the proceedings in the City Civil Court, Madras, to this Court to be heard along with this appeal. We adjourned the matter to 21.7.1993. On that date, the papers from the City Civil Court had been received and we found that there was an inordinate delay of nearly six years in representation of the appeal. We passed a detailed order dismissing the application for condonation of delay in representation. Consequently, we rejected the said appeal. On a request by learned counsel for the appellant, we adjourned this appeal to yesterday for further hearing. Yesterday, learned counsel on both sides argued the question of res judicata. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents contend that the present appeal is barred by the principles oires judicata in view of the rejection of the appeal as against the decree and judgment in O.S.No.3262 of 1978. According to him, the judgment of the trial court gets confirmed by our rejection of the appeal and the findings therein will be conclusive in the present appeal. It is submitted that there cannot be a decree in this appeal, which would conflict with the decree passed in the other suit. In support of his contention, he relies on the following rulings: Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 338, Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar,A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1332: (1966)1 S.C.W.R. 891: (1966)2 S.C.J. 768, Koshal Pal v. Mohan Lal, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 688, Lonankutty v. Thomman, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1645: 1976 S.C.R. (Supp.) 74, Venkateswara Prabhu v. Krishna Prabhu, A.I.R 1977 S. C. 1268, K.Khaja Mohideen v. K.Muhaideen Batcha, A.I.R. 1979. Mad. 155, Angappa Gounder v. Rajavelu Gounder, A.I.R. 1981 Mad. 282:1981 T.L.N.J. 280: (1981)94 L.W. 444: (1981)2 Serv.L.R 547, S.Kandaswamy v. R.A.Murugesa, A.I.R. 1983 Mad. 131: (1982)2 M.L.J. 362 : (1982)95 L.W. 660 , Thangavelu Rounder v. Venkatarama Rounder. (1988)2 L.W. 14. (Summary of Cases), M.Subramaniam v. Chhottabhai and Company, (1990)2M.L.J. 66andArumughaNainarv. Laksh-mana Perumal, (1992)1 M.L.J. 457 . It is not necessary to refer to all the above cases in detail. The principle laid down in those cases is the same. 131: (1982)2 M.L.J. 362 : (1982)95 L.W. 660 , Thangavelu Rounder v. Venkatarama Rounder. (1988)2 L.W. 14. (Summary of Cases), M.Subramaniam v. Chhottabhai and Company, (1990)2M.L.J. 66andArumughaNainarv. Laksh-mana Perumal, (1992)1 M.L.J. 457 . It is not necessary to refer to all the above cases in detail. The principle laid down in those cases is the same. In Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1332: (1966)1 S.C.W.R. 891: (1966)2 S.C.J. 768, the court said: "Where the trial court has decided two suits having common issues on the merits and there are two appeals therefrom and one of them is dismissed on some preliminary ground, like limitation or default in printing, with the result that the trial court’s decision stands confirmed, the decision of the appeal court will be res judicata and the appeal court must be deemed to have heard and finally decided the matter. In such a case the result of the decision of the appeal court is to confirm the decision of the trial court given on merits, and if that is so the decision of the appeal court will be res judicata whatever may be the reason for the dismissal." 10.. In Venkateswara Prabhu v. Krishna Prabhu, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1268, the court said: "16. So far as the question of appeal to this Court is concerned, it is true that no appeal lay as a matter of right against the judgment in the appeal in the money suit, but, we think that the learned counsel for the respondents is correct in submitting that the question whether there is a bar of res judicata does not depend on the existence of a right of appeal of the same nature against each of the two decisions but on the question whether the same issue under the circumstances given in S.11 has been heard and finally decided. That was certainly purported to be done by the High Court in both the appeals before it subject, of course to the rights of parties to appeal. That was certainly purported to be done by the High Court in both the appeals before it subject, of course to the rights of parties to appeal. The mere fact that the defendant-appellant could come upto this Court in appeal as of right by means of a certificate of fitness of the case under the unamended Art. 133(1)(c) in the partition suit, could not take away the finality of the decision so far as the High Court had determined the money suit and no attempt of any sort was made to question to the correctness or finality of that decision even by means of an application for special Leave to appeal". 11. Recently, we have reiterated the principle of res judicata in our judgment in D.Krishnamurthy v. V.K.Parasuraman, A.S.No.566 of 1986, which was rendered on 15.7.1993. 12. Learned counsel for the.appellant seeks to distinguish the above rulings on the ground that in all those cases, the decision relied on by the parties for invoking the principle of res judicata had become final as there was no appeal against the same. According to him, in the present case, our order rejecting the appeal against O.S.No.3262 of 1978 was made only on 21.7.1993 and the appellant had already applied for certified copies of our order with a view to take up the matter on appeal to the Supreme Court of India. An affidavit sworn to by the appellant has been filed today before us. It is stated in that affidavit that the appellant is keen and anxious to take our order dated 21.7.1993 to the Supreme Court of India by filing special leave petition as soon as copies are made available to him. It is stated that he had not abandoned his claim in the suit O.S.No.3262 of 1976 at any time and is prosecuting the same in the special leave petition before the Supreme Court of India. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that so long as the time for preferring the appeal has not expired, the judgment cannot be said to have attained finality. According to learned counsel, the appellant has a right of appeal to the Supreme Court of India and at this stage, the judgment and decree in O.S.No.3262 of 1978 cannot bar the hearing of this appeal on the principle of res judicata. According to learned counsel, the appellant has a right of appeal to the Supreme Court of India and at this stage, the judgment and decree in O.S.No.3262 of 1978 cannot bar the hearing of this appeal on the principle of res judicata. Learned counsel places reliance on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Chengalavala Gurraju v. Madapathy Venkateswara Rao Pantulu Gam, A.I.R. 1917 Mad. 597. In that case, the respondent had filed two suits against the appellant to enforce acceptance of pattas for Faslis 1318 and 1319. They were dismissed by the Sub-Collector for want of jurisdiction, but on appeal the District Court remanded the matters. After remand, the Sub Collector passed decrees in both the suits. Appeals were preferred against the said decrees in the District Court. While the proceedings were pending, the respondent filed another suit to enforce acceptance of the patta for Fasli 1320. The Sub Collector passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff, on the ground that the decision in the earlier suits constituted res judicata. There was no appeal against the decree in the later proceedings. When the appeals against the earlier decrees were taken up, the District Judge dismissed them on the ground that the decision of the Sub Collector in the later proceeding barred the same on the principle of res judicata. It was that judgment of the District Judge, which was challenged in second appeal before this Court. The Bench held that the judgment in the later proceeding by the Sub Collector was on a mistaken view of the law and that would not render the question raised in the appeals before the District Judge res judicata. One of the arguments advanced before the Bench was that the possibility of filing an appeal and of a reversal of a judgment cannot affect the present validity of the judgment. Dealing with that argument, the Bench observed: "There is some force in this argument but, on the other hand, so long as a party is given a right of appeal it would lead to great hardship if an erroneous judgment operates as res judicata during the interval allowed by law between the date of judgment and the filing of an appeal, especially as a party cannot in this country file an appeal at once". The Bench concluded: "The erroneous decision in Suit No.412 of 1911, which was not on the merits but on a mistaken view of the law taken by the Sub Collector, would not therefore render the question raised in the appeals filed against the decrees in Suits Nos.466 of 1909 and 276 of 1910 res judicata because the correctness of the decisions in Suit No.412 of 1911 would not be questioned in the appeals against those decrees". Consequently, they reversed the decision of the District Judge and remanded the appeals for fresh disposal on merits. The ruling will have no bearing whatever on the present case. It is seen that the later judgment which was relied on by the party raising the question of res judicata was not a judgment on merits, but it merely depended upon the earlier judgment, which was subject matter of the appeal. 13. A similar ruling in Jaspat Rai v. Kahan Chand, A.I.R. 1938 Lahore 232, is referred to by learned counsel for the appellant. The facts of that case are entirely different and the ruling will not help the appellant in this case. 14. The contention of learned counsel that Sec. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure would come into play only after a judgment attains finality once and for all is fallacious. The relevant part of Sec.ll of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: “.....such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court.” It is sufficient if there is finality concerning the suit in which the proceeding is pending. It is not necessary that finality should have been attained by the proceeding being taken to the highest court of the country and confirmed. 15. The contention of learned counsel that the appellant has a right of appeal to the Supreme Court is also unsustainable. Our order dismissing the application for condonation of delay in representation and consequently rejecting the appeal against O.S.No.3262 of 1978 is not a matter falling under Art. 133 of the Constitution of India. The case does not involve a substantial question of law of general importance. Nor, in our opinion, the question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. The appellant can, if at all, approach the Supreme Court only under Art.136 of the Constitution of India and seek the special leave of that court. The case does not involve a substantial question of law of general importance. Nor, in our opinion, the question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. The appellant can, if at all, approach the Supreme Court only under Art.136 of the Constitution of India and seek the special leave of that court. Grant of special leave under Art.136 of the Constitution is discretionary and not a matter of right to any person. Hence, the appellant cannot claim that he has a right of appeal and this Court should wait till he exhausts that remedy or the time for preferring an appeal comes to an end. We have already referred to the judgment in Venkates-wara Prabhu v. Krishna Prabhu, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1268, and extracted the relevant passage. Even in a case falling under Art. 133 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court held that the finality of the decision so far as the High Court was concerned, was not taken away by the fact that the appellant could go to the Supreme Court as of right by means of a certificate of fitness under Art.133. A fortiori, the fact that the appellant could approach the Supreme Court of India under Article 136 will not take away the finality of the Judgment of this Court in the other case. As on date, the appellant is precluded by the findings given in O.S.No.3262 of 1978 which got confirmed by our rejection of the appeal filed against the same. 16. Consequently, we have no hesitation to hold that the present appeal is barred by res judicata in view of the judgment and decree in O.S.No.3262 of 1978 as confirmed by the rejection of the appeal filed against the same. 17. The appeal is dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs.