PEE SHAH, J. :, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has been detained under the order Annexure-A to the petition, dated October 16, 1992, passed by the Police Commissioner, Rajkot City - respondent No. 1 herein - under Section 3 (2) of the Gujarat Prevention of anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short the PASA"), on the allegation that he is a dangerous person. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, he has challenged the detention order and his continued detention. ( 2 ) IN the grounds of detention annexure-C to the petition, it is stated that the petitioner is indulging in violent activities in the areas of Jaganath Plot, radhe Hotel, Bilwas and Girnar Cinema, and there the petitioner moves about carrying with him lethal weapons like knives, and he, with the help of his associates, with a view to carrying out his common object, assaults, beats and belabours people in public, and injures them by means of knives and glass pieces, and such anti-social activities of the petitioner are prejudical to the maintenance of public order in the city of Rajkot. It is also stated in the grounds of detention that four cases as detailed in the grounds of detention have been registered against the petitioner at the police Stations in the City of Rajkot. The first case is in relation to the incident dated May 6, 1992, and in that connection it is stated in the grounds of detention that one Amrut Kalu Gadhvi had, on that day, gone to Girnar Cinema and as the said Amrut Kalu could not get ticket at the booking window for the reason that there was houseful in the theatre, the petitioner who was present there, at first asked the said Amrut Kalu to give him rs. 15 - if he (Amrut Kalu) wanted the cinema ticket, whereupon when Amrut kalu took out currency notes from his pocket with a view to purchase the ticket from the petitioner, the petitioner noticed that Amrut Kalu had with him Rs. 15 - if he (Amrut Kalu) wanted the cinema ticket, whereupon when Amrut kalu took out currency notes from his pocket with a view to purchase the ticket from the petitioner, the petitioner noticed that Amrut Kalu had with him Rs. 500/, and therefore, the petitioner lured away amrut Kalu in a nearby lane where two other associates of the petitioner were standing, and there Amrut Kalu was assaulted by the petitioner and his associates and they robbed away the money from Amrut Kalu, and in that connection an offence punishable under sections 392, 323, 114 I. P. Code has been registered at C. R. No. 267/92, against the petitioner and others on May 8, 1992. The second case registered against the petitioner was in relation to an offence that was committed by the petitioner on august 14, 1992. In the incident that led to the registration of the said case, the petitioner robbed away Rs. 100/ from one ramesh Shamjibhai near Radhe Hotel, and an offence in that connection punishable under Sections 397 and 114 i. P. Code and Section 135 Bombay Police act was registered at C. R. No. 501/92 on august 14, 1992. The third case registered against the petitioner was in relation to the incident that happened on July 28, 1992, in which the petitioner had assulted and intimidated one Sunil Babubhai Brahmin on the ground that he was a Brahmin. The fourth case registered against the petitioner was on the basis that on september 12, 1992, the petitioner carried with him in public place a big knife in violation of the prohibitory orders issued by the concerned authority under Section 37 (1) of the Bombay Police Act, and had thus committed an offence punishable under Section 135 of the Bombay Police act. After giving the details of the four cases registered against the petitioner in the grounds of detention, the detaining authority stated that even persons other than the victims of the aforesaid four cases have become victims of the anti-social activities of the petitioner. But out of fear emanating from the petitioner, they are not prepared to go to the police station and lodge information against the petitioner. However, some of such persons have been taken into confidence and on the assurance of anonimily about them being maintained, they have made statements. But out of fear emanating from the petitioner, they are not prepared to go to the police station and lodge information against the petitioner. However, some of such persons have been taken into confidence and on the assurance of anonimily about them being maintained, they have made statements. After making these statements in the grounds of detention, the detaining authority has given the substance of the statements of three witnesses recorded by the concerned authority, and pointed out that about 20 days prior to September 16, 1992, the petitioner had gone to the shop of witness no. 1 and had demanded Rs. 200/- for consuming liquor, and on witness No. 1 refusing to oblige him, the petitioner drew out a knife, pointed it at the neck of the witness and took away some cash from the till of the witness and intiminated the witness not to lodge an information about the incident. Referring to the substance of the statement of witness No. 2, the detaining authority, in the grounds of detention stated that about 10 days prior to September 16,1992, the petitioner went to the shop of witness No. 2, and at that time, a man and a woman had come to that shop for some work. But the petitioner and his associates who came there, tried to harass and molest the woman and thereupon the womans companion male objected. But the petitioner tried to assault that male companion of the woman by means of a knife and thereupon both the man and the woman ran away and entered Girnar cinema. So far as the substance of the statement of witness No. 3, it goes to show that about a month prior to September 16, 1992, the petitioner had approached witness No. 3 in company of his two associates and the petitioner had then carried a knife with him, and he pointed the knife at the neck of witness No. 3 and extorted from the pocket of witness no. 3, a sum of Rs. 3, a sum of Rs. 200/-, and then the petitioner and his associates felled down that witness and belaboured him, and at that time, quite a large number of persons gathered there, and soon then they started running helter-skelter, but nobody dared to save the witness who was being assaulted and belaboured; and on account of the fear emanating from the petitioner, that witness also has not dared to lodge an information about the incident. ( 3 ) ON the basis of the aforesaid facts as narrated by the detaining authority in the grounds of detention, the detaining authority stated that the petitioner is a desparate, dangerous and fanatic person and it would not be in public interest to disclose to him the names and addresses and business places of the witnesses. On this basis, the detaining authority has claimed privilege not to disclose those particulars to the petitioner, under Section 9 (2) of the PASA. On the aforesaid facts, the detaining authority stated that the petitioner is a dangerous person. The detaining authority further stated that the other less drastic remedies under the Bombay Police act would take a long time during which the petitioner would continue to behave in the manner in which he behaved in the past and such a possibility being quite strong, it is not advisable to resort to such proceedings under the Bombay police Act, if the petitioner has to be prevented from acting in the manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. On these statements in the grounds of detention, the detaining authority recorded his subjective satisfaction to detain the petitioner. The detaining authority also stated in the grounds of detention that in respect of the cases registered against him, the petitioner was in custody. However, there was a high degree of probability of the petitioner applying for bail in those cases, and/or getting released on bail in those cases, and once he is released on bail, he would once again indulge in such anti-social activities posing threat to the maintenance of public order. Therefore, in the opinion of the detaining authority, there was no other alternative but to pass the detention order. ( 4 ) IT was on the aforesaid basis as spelt out in the grounds of detention that the detention order has been passed. 25-8 1993: ( 5 ) MR. Therefore, in the opinion of the detaining authority, there was no other alternative but to pass the detention order. ( 4 ) IT was on the aforesaid basis as spelt out in the grounds of detention that the detention order has been passed. 25-8 1993: ( 5 ) MR. Satish Patel, L. A. for the petitioner, firstly contended that there is delay in the matter of passing of the detention order. Therefore, on that ground alone, the said order should fail. According to Mr. Patel, in the present case, the statements of three witnesses upon which reliance has been placed by the detaining authority have been recorded on September 16, 1992, while the detention order has been passed exactly a month later, i. e. on October 16, 1992, and this delay of one month in the matter of passing of the detention order should prove fatal to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to the effect that there is need to detain the petitioner. We are just not impressed by this argument. We have hereinabove excerpted in exlenso the material contained in the grounds of detention, and that material shows that the activities of the petitioner had widespread effect. The detaining authority was required to scrutinise those activities and take a decision. Taking of such a decision is bound to take somtime, even after the three statements were recorded by the police Inspector, Pratapnagar Police station on September 16, 1992. ( 6 ) THE question of delay in passing the detention order came up for consideration before Their Lordships of the Supreme court in some cases. It will be advantageous here to refer to the decision in the case of Malwa Shaw v. The State of West Bengal, A. I. R. 1974 S. C. p. 957. In that case, the contention on behalf of the detenu was that all the three grounds on which the order of detention was made related to incidents alleged to have taken place between October 5, 1971 and October 31, 1971, and they could not reasonably form the basis for reaching a satisfaction on April 21, 1972, when the order of detention was made, that the detenu was acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, and with a view to preventing him from so acting, it was necessary to detain him. The time lag between the incidents relied upon, and the date of the detention order was about five months. A three-Judge bench of the Supreme Court held that the contention was without force and could not be accepted. Their Lordships said that the delay which was relied upon by the detenu for voiding the detention order was but a reed of straw which could not support the argument of the petitioner. Their Lordships said that the time lag between the dates of the alleged incidents and the making of the order of detention is not so large that it could be said that no reasonable person can possibly arrive at the satisfaction which the District Magistrate did on the basis of the alleged incidents. Their Lordships emphasised that, it must be remembered that some time is bound to elapse before the investigation into the alleged incidents is completed and the matter is brought to the notice of the District Magistrate, and the District Magistrate applies his mind and arrives at the requisite satisfaction culminating in the order of detention. In the opinion of Their lordships, the period of about 5 months which elapsed between the date of the incidents and making of the order of detention could not be regarded as so unreasonably long so as to warrant the inference that no satisfaction was really arrived at by the District Magistrate or that the satisfaction was colourable or no satisfaction at all as required by the statute. The satisfaction which the district Magistrate is required to reach in order to support the order of detention is that it is necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a particular manner and that satisfaction can obviously be founded only on a reasonably anticipated prognosis of future behaviour of the petitioner made on the basis of past incidents. Their lordships observed that it was not possible to say on the facts of that case that the incidents referred to in the grounds of detention were such that they could not reasonably lead to the satisfaction which the District Magistrate reached when he made the order of detention. The aforesaid judgment of the Supreme court in Malwa Shaws case amply makes it clear that some time is bound to elapse between the incidents relied upon by the detaining authority, and the passing of the detention order. The aforesaid judgment of the Supreme court in Malwa Shaws case amply makes it clear that some time is bound to elapse between the incidents relied upon by the detaining authority, and the passing of the detention order. Sometime is bound to be consumed in the investigation. After the investigation is over, the sponsoring authority would send the proposal to the detaining authority through the intermediate authority, and once the detaining authority receives the file, he has to apply his mind to all the facts of the case and that he has to do amidst other duties that he has to perform. All this is certainly bound to take sometime and it is just not possible for us to accept the argument of Mr. Patel that the time of one month elapsed between the recording of the three statements on September 16, 1992 and october 16, 1992, the date of passing of the detention order is so large that on that basis alone, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority should be held to have been vitiated. ( 7 ) IN Rajendrakumar Natwarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat and Others, AIR 1988 s. C. 1255, the decision in the case of malwa Shaw (supra) has been relied upon. In Rajendrakumars case, the facts were that on the night between 29/30th december 1986, a truck containing 77 cases containing 2040 bottles of different brands of scotch whisky, bear, etc. was intercepted by the police near Machan river at the border between the State of Gujarat and the State of Rajasthan. Both the driver and the cleaner of the truck were arrested by the police and their statements revealed that rajendrakumar - the detenu in that case was the person who had purchased the contraband liquor from Vanswada. On 4-1-1987, i. e. within about 5 days of the date on which the truck was intercepted, statements of witnesses were recorded. Rajendrakumar, the detenu of that case was ultimately arrested on February 2, 1987, and he was later on released on bail. The detention order in question was passed by the detaining authority on May 28, 1987, i. e. after a lapse of five months from the date on which the truck in question was intercepted. Rajendrakumar, the detenu of that case was ultimately arrested on February 2, 1987, and he was later on released on bail. The detention order in question was passed by the detaining authority on May 28, 1987, i. e. after a lapse of five months from the date on which the truck in question was intercepted. One of the arguments before the Supreme Court on behalf of the detenu was that there was unreasonable delay in the matter of passing of the detention order, and that on that ground alone the detention order should fail. The argument was ultimately negatived by the Supreme Court. In paragraph 10 of the judgment in the case of Rajendrakumar (supra), this is what their Lordships have posited: "viewed from the perspective, we wish to emphasise and make it clear for the guidance of the different High Courts that a distinction must be drawn between the delay in making of an order of detention under a law relating to preventive detention like the Conservation of Foreign exchange and Prevention of Smuggling activities Act, 1974, and the delay in complying with the procedural safeguards of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. It has been laid down by this Court in a series of decisions that the rule as to unexplained delay in taking action is not inflexible. Quite obviously, in cases of mere delay in making of an order of detention under a law like the conservation of Foreign Exchange and prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, enacted for the purpose of dealing effectively with persons engaged in smuggling and foreign exchange reckeleering who, owing to their large resources and influence have been posing a serious threat to the economy and thereby to the security of the nation, the courts should not merely on account of delay in making of an order of detention assume that such delay if not satisfactorily explained, must necessarily give rise to an inference that there was no sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority or that such subjective satisfaction was not genuinely reached. Taking of such a view would not be warranted unless the Court finds that the grounds are stale or illusory or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. Taking of such a view would not be warranted unless the Court finds that the grounds are stale or illusory or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. " (Emphasis supplied.) now, this decision in Rajendra- kumars case makes it amply clear that what is required to be seen is whether the grounds relied upon by the detaining authority for passing the detention order are or are not stale or illusory and that there is or is not any nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. The delay by itself in passing the detention order would not be sufficient to void the detention order unless as posited by the Supreme Court, the court finds that the grounds are either stale of illusory or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. In the present case, the grounds which are relied upon were so fresh at the time the detention order was made, that it could never be said that they were stale. Going by the facts of the present case, in all there were four cases registered against the petitioner. Three were for the offences punishable under the various sections of the Indian Penal Code, and one was for the offence punishable under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. So far as the offences under the I. P. Code are concerned, they were committed by the petitioner respectively on May 6, 1992, july 27, 1992 and August 14, 1992. Now, the three statements recorded by the police Inspector, upon which the detaining authority placed reliance have been recorded on September 16, 1992, and the witnesses who made those statements referred to the incidents which happened 10 days, 20 days and one month prior to the recording of the statements. Therefore, the incidents about which the witnesses have spoken also occurred sometime between the middle of August 1992 and the beginning of September 1992. The detention order is passed on october 16, 1992. All these incidents, three about which the witnesses have spoken and the three relating to the three crimes registered against the petitioner under the various Sections of the LP. Code have, therefore, occurred between May 1992, and September 1992. The detention order is passed on october 16, 1992. All these incidents, three about which the witnesses have spoken and the three relating to the three crimes registered against the petitioner under the various Sections of the LP. Code have, therefore, occurred between May 1992, and September 1992. Considering the matter from this angle, when on october 16, 1992, the detaining authority reached the subjective satisfaction for the need to detain the petitioner, it could not be said that the detaining authority has relied upon stale incidents. Looking to the facts of the case, it could not also be said that there is no real nexus between the grounds of detention and the impugned order of detention. Therefore, the first submission of Mr. Patel that as there was delay of one month in the matter of passing the detention order computed from the date on which the three statements were recorded, the detention order should fail, just cannot be accepted. That argument is, therefore, hereby, rejected. ( 8 ) MR. Patel nextly submitted that there is delay in the matter of consideration of the representation of the petitioner, and therefore, the continued detention of the petitioner would become invalid. This argument also does not appeal to us. The representation of the petitioner dated january 21, 1993 was presented by him before the jail authorities at Special Jail, bhuj, on January 27, 1993. The jail authorities forwarded the same to the detaining authority at Rajkot. The detaining authority received the same on january 30, 1993, and rejected it on february 2, 1993, i. e. within a period of three days. It is required to be noticed that 31st January, 1993 was Sunday, and 30th January 1993 the date on which the representation was received by the detaining authority was Saturday. Therefore, there was hardly any delay that has occasioned in the office of the detaining authority in the matter of consideration and rejection of the representation of the petitioner. ( 9 ) THEREAFTER the detaining authority forwarded the representation of the detenu to the State Government. The state Government received the same on february 6, 1993 and rejected the same on February 11, 1993. In between, there was February 7, 1993, which was a sunday. The State Government, therefore, in substance took only four days for consideration and rejection of the representation of the detenu. The state Government received the same on february 6, 1993 and rejected the same on February 11, 1993. In between, there was February 7, 1993, which was a sunday. The State Government, therefore, in substance took only four days for consideration and rejection of the representation of the detenu. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not think this delay of four days could, by any stretch of logic, be said to be long, unreasonable and inordinate. ( 10 ) IN Smt. Kamlabai v. Commissioner of Police, Nagpur and Ors. JT 1993 (3) s. C. 686, there was a delay of about 25 days in the matter of consideration of the representation of the detenu, the period of delay was between June 18, 1992 and July 13,1992, and for that delay, there was no explanation given by the concerned authority. In that connection, their Lordships of the Supreme Court said:"the delay by itself is not a ground which proves to be fatal, if there is an explanation. However, a short delay cannot be given undue importance having regard to the administrative actions. We do not think that the delay in this case is so inordinate as to warrant interference. "thus in Smt. Kamalabais case (supra), it has clearly been posited that having regard to the administrative actions, no undue importance can be given to short delay that might have taken place in the matter of consideration of the representation of the detenu. As said above, in Smt. Kamalabais case, the delay was of 25 days. In the instant case before us, the representation was received by the State Government on February 6, 1993, and was considered and rejected on February 11, 1993, and in between there was a holiday. Considering the matter from this angle, in the light of the decision in Smt. Kamalabais case and more particularly in view of the activities of the petitioner which had a widespread effect, we think there was no unreasonable delay in the matter of consideration of the representation of the detenu, which would require us to say that the continued detention of the petitioner is invalid. The second contention of Mr. Patel also fails, and is rejected. ( 11 ) MR. Patel nextly submitted that in all the four cases registered against the petitioner, he was in custody, and he had not been released on bail. The second contention of Mr. Patel also fails, and is rejected. ( 11 ) MR. Patel nextly submitted that in all the four cases registered against the petitioner, he was in custody, and he had not been released on bail. Therefore, there was no question of the petitioner indulging in activities which would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The detaining authority having not considered this aspect of the matter in its proper perspective, the detention order suffers from the vice of non-application of mind to the relevant facts of the case. This submission of Mr. Patel also, in our opinion, has no merit. In Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and Anr. , AIR 1991, S. C. p. 1640, Their lordships of the Supreme Court, after considering quite a large number of earlier judgments of that court on the point, observed as follows:"from the catena of decisions referred to above, it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possiblility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition to question it before a Higher court. What this court stated in the case of Ramesh Yadav ( AIR 1986 SC 315 ) (supra) was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. "mr. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. "mr. Patel, in order to substantiate his argument, relied upon the decision in the case of Smt. Shashi Aggarwal v. State of UP. and Others, A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 596. We may mention here that the decision in Smt. Shashi Aggarwals case has also been considered by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kamarunnissas case, and it is after considering that case and quite a large number of other cases that Their Lordships of the Supreme court in Kamarunnissas case posited as aforesaid. Therefore, the decision in the case of Smt. Shashi Aggarwal (supra) upon which Mr. Patel laid very heavy reliance, in our opinion, does not render any assistance to his submission. Coming to the facts of the present case, the detaining authority has, in the grounds of detention, clearly furnished material which answers the three requirements postulated by Their Lordships of the supreme Court in Kamarunnissas case, which we have excerpted hereinabove. Firstly, the detaining authority has shown his awareness to the fact that the petitioner is in custody. In the grounds of detention, it has clearly been stated that in respect of all the cases for the offences under the Indian Penal Code, registered against him, the petitioner has been taken in custody, and he is in custody. The cases registered against the petitioner for the offences under the various Sections of the I. P. Code were under Sections 392, 323, 337, 504 and 114 I. P. Code. The facts of those cases were also such that in all probabilities, if the petitioner applied for bail, he had a fair chance of getting bail. Therefore, the detaining authority had a reason to believe that there was real possibility of the petitioner being released on bail in those three cases. Looking to the past conduct of the petitioner as is reflected from the cases registered against him and from the statements of the witnesses, it could easily be said that if the petitioner came to be released on bail, he would in all probabilities indulge in prejudicial activities. Looking to the past conduct of the petitioner as is reflected from the cases registered against him and from the statements of the witnesses, it could easily be said that if the petitioner came to be released on bail, he would in all probabilities indulge in prejudicial activities. Thus activities, even otherwise, would lead any reasonable man to feel that it is essential to detain the petitioner to prevent him from so doing. All the three aspects of the matter as have been high-lighted by Their Lordships of the supreme Court in Kamarunnissas case, which we have excerpted hereinabove, are therefore, satisfied in the present case. The contention of Mr. Patel that as the petitioner had not applied for bail, there was no real probability of his being released on bail, is required to be stated merely for being rejected. Merely because between August 14, 1992 and October 1992, the petitioner had not applied for bail, would be no ground for saying that he would not apply for bail, and once he applied for bail, as indicated hereinabove, there was all the real possibility of getting an order for bail in his favour. Therefore, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority on this point, namely, that even though on the date the detention order was passed, the petitioner was in custody, he might be released on bail, and once he came to be released on bail, he would once again, by his anti-social and criminal activities, adversely affect the maintenance of public order in the City of Rajkot, cannot be faulted. The third submission of Mr. Patel also, therefore, fails. ( 12 ) MR. Patel nextly submitted that the statements of the three witnesses relied upon by the detaining authority are vague inasmuch as no hour of the day, and no place of the incidents are stated with precision. Therefore, the petitioner was deprived of an opportunity of making effective representation against the detention order. This submission of Mr. Patel also, in our opinion, has no merit. True, in the statements of three witnesses, the exact hour of the day at which the incidents about which they have spoken occurred, is not stated. But then, the day of the incident about which a particular witness spoke has been, in general terms, indicated by each witness. This submission of Mr. Patel also, in our opinion, has no merit. True, in the statements of three witnesses, the exact hour of the day at which the incidents about which they have spoken occurred, is not stated. But then, the day of the incident about which a particular witness spoke has been, in general terms, indicated by each witness. For example, the first witness referred to the incident and stated that the incident occurred some 20 days before the statement was recorded. The second witness referred to the incident that happened 10 days before the recording of his statement. The third witness referred to the incident that happened about a month prior to the recording of the statement. Therefore, on approximation, the witnesses have given the day on which the incident happened and in such cases, it is only in general terms or approximation that the day or date would be given by the witness. It would be hardly possible to give the exact date of the incident when one speaks about the incident quite a large number of days after the date of the incident, unless of course, the witness has any particular reason to remember the exact date of the incident, and it would be too much to expect the witness to remember and say in the statement/s the exact hour of the incident. In such cases, it is in general terms that the witnesses speak about the activities of the proposed detenu, and if one speaks with mathematical precision on this point, perhaps, the statement would be branded as unnatural. Considering the matter from this angle, the submission of Mr. Patel that as the exact day and time of the incident has not been given by the witnesses, their statements suffer from the vice of vagueness cannot be accepted. ( 13 ) SO far as the place of the incidents is concerned, the witnesses have in terms clear, indicated the places. It is required to be noted here that relying upon Section 9 (2) of the PASA, the detaining authority has claimed privilege not to disclose the names of the witnesses and their whereabouts and addresses. Those particulars have therefore, been withheld from the detenu. It is required to be noted here that relying upon Section 9 (2) of the PASA, the detaining authority has claimed privilege not to disclose the names of the witnesses and their whereabouts and addresses. Those particulars have therefore, been withheld from the detenu. Nonetheless, in the copies of the statements of the witnesses, supplied to the detenu, there is clear indication about the place at which the incidents referred to by the witnesses had happened. The first witness referred to the incident that had happened near his shop. The second witness also referred to the incident that had happened near his shop, and the third witness also referred to the incident that had happened near Bhilwas. Therefore, the places of the incidents have also been clearly stated. It is a different matter that on account of the privilege claimed by the detaining authority under Section 9 (2) of the PASA, the addresses of the shops of the witnesses have not been supplied to the petitioner and that was necessary in public interest. Therefore, reading the statements as they are, we are more than convinced that the detaining authority has disclosed to the detenu, whatever was possible and advisable to be disclosed, keeping the need of public interest in mind. The statements of witnesses, therefore, cannot be faulted on the score of vagueness. The submission of Mr. Patel, on this line, therefore, fails. ( 14 ) MR. Patel nextly argued that the incidents referred to by the witnesses are in relation to specified individuals and they do not pose any problem for the maintenance of public order. The argument is required to be stated merely for being rejected. It is required to be remembered that essentially, it is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which matters, and once there is shown to be some material before the detaining authority on the basis of which such subjective satisfaction could have been reached by him, it would not be for the court to substitute its own decision for the decision of the detaining authority. Keeping this aspect of the matter in mind, if we examine the statements of the witnesses and the facts as they emerge from the three cases under the I. P. Code registered against the petitioner, we think the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the activities of the petitioner have been adversely affecting the maintenance of public order cannot be faulted. Mr. Patel relied upon the statement of witness No. 2 to argue that that was merely an individual incident wherein, allegedly the petitioner harassed the woman who had gone to the shop of the witness, and when the male companion of the woman registeed a protest against the behaviour of the petitioner, the petitioner pointed a knife at that male companion, and tried to assault the male companion by means of a knife and thereupon, the woman and the man ran away and entered Girnar cinema. According to Mr. Patel those facts do not constitute any hindrance to the public order, and would not, in any manner, adversely affect the smooth flow of the community life. We are afraid, the submission has no merit. In such cases, the matters have not to be viewed from the stand-point of isolation of events. The totality of the facts and circumstances have got to be taken into consideration. The past behaviour of the petitioner as reflected in the three cases under the I. P. Code registered against him, the other incidents deposed to by the witnesses and the other material placed before the detaining authority, all have to be taken into account, and once all these material are taken into account and once the detaining authority comes to the subjective finding that the petitioner is a dangerous person, and with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary to detain him, such subjective satisfaction cannot be faulted by viewing the facts and circumstances in isolation. ( 15 ) TAKE for example, the statement of witness No. 3. He has in clear terms stated that when the petitioner extorted from him Rs. 200/- at the point of a knife and assaulted him when he made entreaties on the score of his poverty, persons collected there, but on account of the fear emanating from the petitioner, those persons then started running helter-skelter, and nobody came to rescue the witness. He has in clear terms stated that when the petitioner extorted from him Rs. 200/- at the point of a knife and assaulted him when he made entreaties on the score of his poverty, persons collected there, but on account of the fear emanating from the petitioner, those persons then started running helter-skelter, and nobody came to rescue the witness. Thus, the activities of the petitioner went to the length of creating chaos in the community. People were so much afraid of his activities that at first, out of curiosity they would collect at the place of the incident to know as to what was going on, and once they saw that the petitioner was on rampage, forgetting their moral duty to save the victim, they were compelled to run away helter-skelter. If this does not pose a problem for the maintenance of public order, we fail to see what else could pose a problem for the maintenance of public order. Be that as it may, the submission of Mr. Patel that the activities of the petitioner as reflected in the grounds of detention could not be said to have adversely affected the maintenance of public order, has no merit whatsoever. ( 16 ) MR. Patel nextly submitted that though in the grounds of detention, it is stated that three cases under the i. P. Code have been registered against the petitioner, and though the petitioner, in his representation had made a demand for the copies of the panchnamas and the copies of the statements recorded in those cases, those documents are not supplied to him, and therefore, the petitioner has been hampered in the matter of making further effective representation against his detention and therefore, his continued detention should be held to be invalid. In support of his submission, Mr. Patel tried to rely upon the decision rendered by us in Special cri. Application No. 253/93, on August 3/4, 1993. Suffice it would be for us to say that the judgment rendered by us in Special Cri. Application No. 253/93 has no application to the facts of the case on hand before us. In that case, the documents which were the subject-matter of the grievance by the detenu, on the score that even not supplied to him, were specifically referred to and relied upon in the grounds of detention. Application No. 253/93 has no application to the facts of the case on hand before us. In that case, the documents which were the subject-matter of the grievance by the detenu, on the score that even not supplied to him, were specifically referred to and relied upon in the grounds of detention. In the present case, the panchnama and the other documents about which the petitioner in his representation, made a demand, have not only been not relied upon by the detaining authority, but they have not been even referred to by him, and there lies the distinction and distinguishing feature between the facts of the case in special Criminal Application No. 253 of 1993, and the facts of the present case. ( 17 ) IN the grounds of detention, the panchnamas and other documents about which the petitioner has made a demand in his representation, have not even been passingly referred to, and as we see the case, non-supply of those documents has, in no manner, impaired or prejudiced the petitioners right to make an effective representation, even slightly. In kamarunnissas case (supra), Their lordships of the Supreme Court were also required to decide a similar argument as the one which is now made before us by Mr. Patel, and in that context, Their lordships said that it is not sufficient to say that the detenus were not supplied the copies of the documents in time, on demand, but it must further be shown that such non-supply has impaired the detenus right to make an effective and purposeful representation. Demand for any and every document, however irrelevant it may be for the concerned detenu, merely on the ground that there is a reference thereto in the grounds of detention, cannot vitiate an otherwise legal detention order. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this behalf, but what is essential is that the detenu must show that the failure to supply the documents before the meeting of the advisory Board, had impaired or prejudiced his right, however slight or insignificant it may be. Thus the dictum in Kamarunnissas case is clear and explicit. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this behalf, but what is essential is that the detenu must show that the failure to supply the documents before the meeting of the advisory Board, had impaired or prejudiced his right, however slight or insignificant it may be. Thus the dictum in Kamarunnissas case is clear and explicit. It postulates that merely because the detenu makes a demand for certain documents, it does not become incumbent upon the detaining authority to supply those documents to him, nor would the detention order fail, if such documents are not supplied to him, so long as the non-supply of those documents, has not resulted in impairment or prejudice to the rights of the detenu to make an effective representation. Here, in the case on hand before us, as we see, the right of the petitioner to make an effective representation, has not at all been impaired or prejudicially affected, on account of the non-supply of the documents, viz. the panchnamas, etc. in relation to the three cases under the i. P. Code registered against him, about which he has made a demand in his representation dated January 21, 1993. The submission based on the non-supply of those documents made by Mr. Patel, in our opinion, has no merit. The same is rejected. ( 18 ) MR. Patel lastly submitted that the report about the detention order has not been forthwith made by the detaining authority to the State Government and therefore, the detention order should fail. The argument has no merit whatsoever. The detention order has been passed on october 16, 1992, and the detaining authority has reported the matter to the slate Government on October 17, 1992. There is, therefore, no breach of the procedural safeguards even on this ground. ( 19 ) HAVING considered the submissions of Mr. Patel, we do not find any substance in any one of them. The petition is, therefore, rejected. Rule is discharged. .