JUDGMENT This is an application under the Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction of this Court. This application was moved on behalf of Nirmal Wires Pvt. Ltd. and its Director Nirmal Sharaf. Since the matter relates to the petitioner No.1 Nirmal Wires Pvt. Ltd. I shall hereinafter refer to the said petitioner No. 1 as petitioner and/or as writ petitioner. 2. The case of the writ petitioner is that the department of Telecommunications of the Union of India issued notice inviting tenders for supply of Mild Steel Galvanised wire with heavy zinc coating in soft condition. The petitioner purchased the tender documents by paying Rs. 200/-. The further case of the petitioner is that the petitioner, thereafter, duty submitted its tender, a copy whereof is annexed as annexure–"A" to the writ petition. The petitioner company also deposited the requisite earnest money. Further case of the petitioner is that the petitioner submitted all necessary documents and papers and all relevant particulars as required to be submitted along with the said tender and the tender was submitted within the time specified. 3. In paragraph–8, the petitioner states that the petitioner had submitted its tender for supply of two items namely 2.00 mm and 3.55mm Mild Steel Galvanised Wire with Zinc coating in soft condition. The tenders submitted by various concerns were according to the petitioner opened on 21st August, 1992 and the petitioner's representative was present at the time when the same were opened. According to the writ petitioner, it transpired at the time of tender opening that the price quoted by the petitioner was the lowest in respect of wires having size of 3.55 mm. According to the petitioner, one Clipcorn & Associates had purported to quote lower rate than the petitioner but the said Clipcorn & Associates were not entitled to submit the said tender since the goods produced by the said Clipcorn & Associates, did not bear the ISI certification. 4. From Annexure–"C" to the petition, it appears that 35 different parties had submitted tenders for supply of different items to the extent of the different quantities, from out of the total quantities for which the tender invitation was issued. The tender invitation was issued for four different sizes of M. S. Galvanised Wires and the total quantities required of the different sizes was as follows :– Item No. Sizes Quantity 1. 1.60 MM 500 MT. 2. 2.00 MM 5,000 MT. 3. The tender invitation was issued for four different sizes of M. S. Galvanised Wires and the total quantities required of the different sizes was as follows :– Item No. Sizes Quantity 1. 1.60 MM 500 MT. 2. 2.00 MM 5,000 MT. 3. 3.55 MM 10,000 MT. 4. 5.6 MM 3,000 MT. 5. From the above particulars, it will appear that there were four different sizes of M. S. Galvanised Wires as required by the department of Telecommunications, and the total quantity required of the four items, came to about 18,500 MT. The writ petitioner did not at all participate nor did it submit tender so far as Items Nos. 1 & 4 i.e. 1.60 mm and 5.60 mm are concerned and as such the writ petitioner cannot possibly have any claim with regard to the said two items. 6. The case of the writ petitioner in the petition is that the price quoted by the writ petitioner was the lowest in respect of the wires having the size of 3.55 mm. The writ petitioner has no where stated in the writ petition that its offer for 2 mm. size of wire was the lowest. In paragraph 9 of the writ petition the petitioner has stated that the petitioner was confident that since the tender submitted by the petitioner in respect of the goods in the size of 3.55 mm was the lowest amongst the eligible tenderers and since the petitioner company was, otherwise, fully qualified, it was expected that its tender in respect of the 3.55 mm. wires, should have been accepted. 7. It appears from the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 that the purchase orders were placed on various firms on 28th January, 1993. Some of the purchase orders, as annexed to Annexure–"C" to the affidavit affirmed by Mrinmoy Kr. Das on 15.2.93 shows that purchase orders dated 28.1.93 were placed on seventeen different parties i. e. 1. Usha Martin Industries Ltd. Calcutta, 2. Bhillai Wires Ltd., Bhillai, 3. Industrial Fastners of Gujrat Pvt. Ltd., 4. Hindusthan Wires Ltd., 5. Arkay Wires (P) Ltd., 6. Himachal Tubes & Wires Ltd., 7. Monoharlal Hiralal (P) Ltd., 8. Swastik Wires Ltd., 9. General Engineering Works, 10. Modi Steels, 11. Mohata & Hackle Ltd., 12. Indian Steel & Wire Product Ltd., 13. Hind Wire Industries Ltd., 14. Vora Wires, 15. Indore Wire Co. Ltd., 16. Hindusthan Wires Ltd., 5. Arkay Wires (P) Ltd., 6. Himachal Tubes & Wires Ltd., 7. Monoharlal Hiralal (P) Ltd., 8. Swastik Wires Ltd., 9. General Engineering Works, 10. Modi Steels, 11. Mohata & Hackle Ltd., 12. Indian Steel & Wire Product Ltd., 13. Hind Wire Industries Ltd., 14. Vora Wires, 15. Indore Wire Co. Ltd., 16. The Asiatic Wires Ltd. and 17. Ramsarup Industrial Corporation. The submission was that the entire tender quantity could not be supplied by one tenderer, nor had one tenderer tendered for the entire tender quantity and that is why limited quantities were ordered to several suppliers. 8. By 28th January, 1993 the Government had placed purchase orders for the entire tender quantity required as per invitation to tender excepting a quantity of 250 I metric tons of 3.55 mm wire which remained unordered. 9. The instant application was moved on 1st of February, 1993 and an interim order was obtained on the said date injuncting the respondents inter alia from giving effect to any decisions to accept any tender pursuant to the said tender. 10. The petitioner knew the names and addresses of an the parties who participated in the said tender and as a matter of fact 17 parties from out the participating parties had already received the purchase orders from the Union of India prior to the moving of the instant application. Such parties who participated in the said tender were interested as participants therein and the 17 parties on whom orders had been placed were interested in their respective contracts. The petitioner did not chose to make the interested parties as parties to this writ petition. Even after the affidavit was affirmed on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and even after the petitioner came to know from the said affidavit that purchase orders had already been issued on 17 parties the petitioner did not chose to add them as parties to this writ petition. Leave was asked on behalf of M/s. Bhillai Wires (P) Ltd. Ramsarup Engineering Industries Ltd. and M/s. Usha Martin Industries Ltd. to intervene in the matter as interested parties and they were given leave to intervene and they filed affidavits and/or appeared through counsels at the time of hearing of the writ petition. Leave was asked on behalf of M/s. Bhillai Wires (P) Ltd. Ramsarup Engineering Industries Ltd. and M/s. Usha Martin Industries Ltd. to intervene in the matter as interested parties and they were given leave to intervene and they filed affidavits and/or appeared through counsels at the time of hearing of the writ petition. However, still further 14 of the parties on whom purchase orders had already been placed were not added as parties in this proceeding. It is quite apparent that the orders sought for by the writ petitioner are likely to affect the said 14 parties who have received purchase orders but are not made parties to this proceeding. It is also quite clear that the petitioner did have knowledge that the said parties participated in the tender. Even according to the petitioner the petitioner came to know that the orders were likely to be placed on established suppliers yet no attempt was made to make established suppliers as parties respondents. That the writ petitioner was aware with regard to the names of all the participants, appears from the comparative chart annexed to the petition itself. In any event, the petitioner after receiving the copy of the Affidavit-in-Opposition affirmed by Sri Mrinmoy Kumar Das, on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 came to know the names and addresses of the parties on whom the purchase orders were placed and it was the duty of the petitioner at least, thereafter to add them as parties to this writ petition The fact remains that all the interested parties have not been made parties to this writ petition The petition is therefore, liable to be rejected on the ground of non-joinder of interested parties, who are necessary parties. The next important question is whether the petitioner 'duly submitted' its tender as per the notice inviting tender as alleged in the petition. Annexure "A" to the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed on behalf of the state respondents shows that invitation to tender contained inter alia a printed document described as 'invitation to tender', a printed document described as 'general terms and conditions', a printed document in red and headed as 'MUST CLAUSE', a document headed as "Notice Inviting Tender' another printed form headed as Tender Form bearing No. CGMTS-3. The said tender form is a printed document containing blank spaces to be filed in by the tenderer. The said tender form is a printed document containing blank spaces to be filed in by the tenderer. The aforesaid documents were supplied to all the tenderers as the tender documents. In the said Invitation to tender, it is clearly mentioned as follows :– "Please submit your quotation to this office on the prescribed schedule (Form CGMTS-3) attached to this tender. Tenders submitted by the tenderers in their own proforma are liable to be rejected". Clause 7 of invitation to tender provides that the tender offer is liable to be ignored if complete is information not given therein or if the particulars asked for in CGMTS-3 are not filled in. Clause 10 of the said invitation to tender provides that the tender is liable to be disqualified if each clause of CGMTS-3 is not answered as laid down. Clause 12 provides that the tender form is not transferable. 11. Clauses 5(d) and 6(a) of the General Terms and Conditions provides as herein :– "5. (d) Prototype samples wherever required are to be submitted within the time specified in the Letter of Intent. Whenever prototype sample stands approved, bulk supply should commence within two months of issue of purchase order and complete progressively in next six months or earlier. Two months time thus is a lead time permitted to the supplier to commence supplies. A maximum of six months' time shall be permitted for completion of supply. 6.(a). The time or the date of delivery of stores stipulated in the schedule shall be deemed to be the essence of the contract and delivery must be completed according to the monthly delivery schedule not later than the date as specified in the contract. Failure to complete the supply of the stores within the stipulated delivery date may involve levy of Liquidated Damages at the rate of half percent per week or part thereof on the total value of delayed supplies inclusive of excise duty, sales tax etc. subject to maximum of 5% of the total value of stores delivered late." The must clause also provides as herein :– "1.1. Tenders must be submitted in the Tender Form CGMTS-3. failing which tender is liable to be rejected. 1.8. Any document other than Type Approval Certificate as Proof of Capacity Assessment/Proof of Supply received after the tender has been opened shall1be ignored. 1.10. Tenders must be submitted in the Tender Form CGMTS-3. failing which tender is liable to be rejected. 1.8. Any document other than Type Approval Certificate as Proof of Capacity Assessment/Proof of Supply received after the tender has been opened shall1be ignored. 1.10. No covering letter except technical information printed literature to CGMTS-3 is called for. This may be avoided as this will not be given validity in case of dispute. 1.14. Each page of the Tender form etc. should be signed as required vide Clause 8(iii) (d) of CGMTS-1." The form CGMTS-3 which is described as tender form has a note at the top which reads as follows : "Note : 1. Please read each item carefully before filling up. Only indigenous offers will be accepted. Tender of shorter validly period is liable to be disqualified. Tender is also liable to be disqualified if any clause is not answered clearly. Tender is to be submitted in this Form only. Tender submitted by the Tenderer in their own proforma is liable to be rejected. Tenderers may, however, attach separate sheets where space provided against any clause is insufficient. 11. Rates against para 3 must be indicated strictly in the proforma given there as otherwise tender shall be liable to be disqualified. 12. As per various terms and conditions which have been specified above, the tender could only be submitted on the printed Form supplied and numbered as CGMTS-3. It was clearly mentioned that the tender should be submitted on the prescribed schedule (Form CGMTS-3) attached to the tender. The tender form also clearly mentioned that the tender was to be submitted in that form only that is the form No.CGMTS-3. It is also mentioned in the tender form that tender submitted by tenderer in their own proforma is liable to be rejected. It was also stated ''The tenderers could, however, attach seperate sheets where space provided against any clause was insufficient.'' It is also mentioned in the said tender form that rate against paragraph-3 must be indicated strictly in the proforma given there as otherwise tender shall be liable to be disqualified. 13. In the instant case, the writ petitioner has not submitted its tender in the form No. CGMTS-3 as supplied by the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3. It has not even followed in the tender submitted the form in all its particulars. The lines Nos. 13. In the instant case, the writ petitioner has not submitted its tender in the form No. CGMTS-3 as supplied by the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3. It has not even followed in the tender submitted the form in all its particulars. The lines Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7 of Clause-3 are totally missing in the tender submitted. In items Nos. (i) and (ii) in Clause 3, of the form, there is an asterisk mark attached to the clause with regard to excise duty which is missing in tender submitted by the petitioner. Again in Clause No. 3.1 of the form there is another asterisk mark before Clause "A" which again is missing in the tender submitted. The idea of putting asterisk mark in items Nos. (i) and (ii) of Clause 3 of the form in the column of Excise Duty is to connect and/or to join the same with clause No.3.1 (a) where the asterisk mark is again put. The petitioner in the column of Excise Duty while filling in the same in items Nos. (i) and (ii) of its tender has stated excise duty 'nil' but in the connected portion as per the asterisk in Clause-3. 1 (a) it has used the word "Excise Duty" is not applicable at present". This is to be noted that by virtue of the asterisk mark, the two portions namely Excise Duty in Item No. (i) and Excise Duty in item No. (ii) are connected to and are to be read with Clause-3. 1 (a) where the asterisk mark appears in the form. The petitioner has not followed the form and the asterisk marks are missing in the petitioner's tender. It was sought to be submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the Court may read as if the asterisk marks are there. However in the same breath the petitioner submitted that the two portions with asterisk marks should be read in such a way that the word 'at present' are not joined with the words 'excise duty nil'. This is a contradictory stand taken and the complication has arisen due to non-submission of the tender in the form as required. Clause–4. 4, has not been fully quoted in the tender submitted. This is a contradictory stand taken and the complication has arisen due to non-submission of the tender in the form as required. Clause–4. 4, has not been fully quoted in the tender submitted. Furthermore the printed schedule containing particulars of past deliveries made by the tenderer does not find place at all in the tender submitted, Clause No.5 also does not contain the entries as mentioned in the form supplied and no answer to the queries as contained in the clause-6 of the form supplied have been given in the tender submitted. Clause-5A is also not in the form and all the particulars in the form are not, answered. It is not disputed that the tender submitted was not in the printed form as required. It could not either be said that the form was even substantially followed. In the premises the tender submitted by the petitioner was liable to be ignored. 14. There is another point which again goes to the root of the validity of the tender as submitted. The general terms and conditions in Clause-5d provided that a maximum of six months time shall be permitted for completion of supply. It also provided that wherever prototype samples were required to be submitted bulk supplies should commence within two months of issue of the purchase order and complete progressively in next six months or early. Clause 6A provides that the time or the date of delivery of the stores stipulated shall be deemed to be the essence of the contract and delivery must be completed according to the monthly delivery schedule not later than the date specified in the contract. There are the terms and conditions of the contract which were to be binding on all tenderers. The Maximum period of delivery given as per general terms and conditions was six months time with a further lead time of two months in the beginning in case prototype samples were required to be submitted by the tender. The tender submitted by the writ petitioner is thus in violation of the general terms and conditions contained in the tender documents and intended to be applicable to all tenders. The petitioner has offered for 1,200 Metric tonnes in respect of 2 mm wire and he has given a delivery schedule of 100 Metric tonnes per month. The tender submitted by the writ petitioner is thus in violation of the general terms and conditions contained in the tender documents and intended to be applicable to all tenders. The petitioner has offered for 1,200 Metric tonnes in respect of 2 mm wire and he has given a delivery schedule of 100 Metric tonnes per month. Here again due to non-user of the actual prescribed form the word "month" has not appeared in the tender but it has not been disputed that the offer for supply of 2 mm wire was 1,200 Metric tannes to be supplied @ 100 Metric Tonnes per month making a total delivery period of 12 months. Similarly in the case of 3.55 mm wires, the writ petitioner has offered for 2,400 Metric Tonnes and the monthly delivery schedule has been given as 200 Metric Tonnes making a delivery period of 12 months. It is, therefore, quite clear that the tender submitted by the writ petitioner was in violation of the essential terms of the invitation to tender inter alia with regard to the period with in which the delivery was to be made and the general terms and conditions applicable to the tender and was not in the form supplied as required by the invitation to tender and thus the same was liable to be rejected and/or to be ignored altogether. In any event the petitioner has failed to prove that it 'duly submitted' its tender in accordance with the invitation to tender and/or documents forming part thereof. As such the tender submitted by the petitioner was liable to be ignored and/or to be rejected. As such the petitioner could not possibly claim any right of obtaining any order on the basis of the tender submitted by the petitioner and the petition is liable to be rejected on the aforesaid grounds. I shall now discuss the various other points which have been argued on behalf of the parties, appearing before me. 15. So far as the petitioner's offer for 2 mm galvanised wire is concerned the petitioner has not claimed in the writ petition that it was the lowest tenderer and as such the petitioner could not even have the expectation to get such purchase order in respect of 2 mm galvanised wire. 15. So far as the petitioner's offer for 2 mm galvanised wire is concerned the petitioner has not claimed in the writ petition that it was the lowest tenderer and as such the petitioner could not even have the expectation to get such purchase order in respect of 2 mm galvanised wire. A lot of arguments were made on behalf of the writ petitioner on the point that so far as the petitioners offer and/ or tender is concerned, the same could not be loaded with excise duty, the maximum of which at the relevant time was Rs. 1150/- per metric ton. The relevant clause relied on by the petitioner is the clause contained in the invitation to tender relating to the basis of ranking which reads as follows :– "Price inclusive of spares (if applicable) after taking advantage of discount, if any, but inclusive of excise duty, concessional rate of CST mentioned below shall be taken into consideration for the purpose of ranking. Firms which quote 'excise duty nil/excise duty element not indicated shall be ranked with excise duty nil and shall not be paid excise duty any time during the currency of the PO. Firms quoting' 'specific percentage of excise duty' shall be ranked with the said amount of excise duty. Firm, quoting' excise duty nil at present or excise duty with certain percentage at present or 'indicating slabs of excise duty' shall be ranked taking the highest ceiling of excise duty. Firms which do not indicate anything against excise duty and Sales tax shall be ranked with ED & ST as nil in both cases and shall not be paid ED & ST any time during currency of PO. As regards sales tax, concessional rate of CST @ 4% shall be taken into account for the purpose of ranking. State Sales Tax shall not be taken into consideration for the purpose of ranking. Tenders quoting 'CST nil' shall be ranked accordingly. Those firms which quote 'CST extra' or 'CST nil at present' shall be ranked with CST extra @ 4%. Where specific rate of CST has been indicated ranking shall be made after taking the specific rate into account subject to a maximum of 4%. Tenders quoting 'CST nil' shall be ranked accordingly. Those firms which quote 'CST extra' or 'CST nil at present' shall be ranked with CST extra @ 4%. Where specific rate of CST has been indicated ranking shall be made after taking the specific rate into account subject to a maximum of 4%. While indicating the excise duty and sales tax elements in the prescribed Form CGMTS-3 (enclosed) the firms must specifically indicate the quantum of excise duty along with surcharge on basic excise duty (if any), after availing MODVAT/other scheme and the quantum of sales tax. Tenderers must indicate in their offers against Para 3. 1 of Form CGMTS-3 whether they belong to SSI/DGTD Unit in addition to the particulars asked for there in Firms not indicating the above category (i. e. SSI/DGTD) shall be ranked with the highest ceiling of excise duty element for DGTD Units. Detailed particulars mentioned above must be indicated in the proper place of para 3. O of Form CGMTS-3/failing which the Tender is liable to be cancelled". This Clause provides that if the offerer fills in the word "excise duty nil at present" the offer concerned shall be ranked by adding the highest sale of excise duty applicable. The writ petitioner has submitted that in the column of excise duty the writ petitioner has put the word nil. Therefore, excise duty should not be loaded to its offer. But as I said excise duty column has got an asterisk mark attached to it and the asterisk mark joins the same with Clause 3. l. Now putting the two clauses together and reading the answer to Clause 3 1, the writ petitioner has used the word excise duty is not applicable at present. Thus reading the two clauses together excise duty has to be added to the quoted amount by the petitioner. If excise duty is to be added to the petitioner's quoted price, then there are many offers even in the case of 3.55 mm. wire, where the offers of established suppliers are lower than the writ petitioner. The rate offered by the writ petitioner was Rs. 18,749/- per metric ton whereas the rate offered by M/s. Mohata & Heckle Limited was Rs. 18,475/- per metric ton. The rate offered by M/s. Monoharlal Hiralal (P) Limited was Rs. 18,695/-. wire, where the offers of established suppliers are lower than the writ petitioner. The rate offered by the writ petitioner was Rs. 18,749/- per metric ton whereas the rate offered by M/s. Mohata & Heckle Limited was Rs. 18,475/- per metric ton. The rate offered by M/s. Monoharlal Hiralal (P) Limited was Rs. 18,695/-. Both are established suppliers and their rates are lower than the rates of the writ petitioner. Even in the case of 2 mm. galvanised wire, the rate offered by the writ petitioner was Rs. 21,249/- whereas the rate offered by Bhillai Wires Rs. 20,700/- less 2%, per metric ton. Needless to mention that according to me, the excise duty factor has to be added, to the offer made by writ petitioner because the word excise duty not applicable at present finds place in column No.3.1. 16. In the case reported in (1) 1993 (1) SCC 71 , Food Corporation of India v. M/s. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, the Supreme Court held as follows :– "In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of which non arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law : A public authority possess powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is 'fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision-making process in all State actions. To satisfy this requirement of non-arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely to be affected by the decision or else that unfairness in the excise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess or power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise by judicial review. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise by judicial review. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not be itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non–arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweight what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectations gets assimilated in the rule of law and ore rates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent. Even though the highest tenderer can claim no right to have his tender accepted, there being a power while inviting tenders to reject all the tenders, yet the power to reject all the tenders can not be exercised arbitrarily and must depend ; or its validity on the existence of cogent reasons for such action. The object of inviting tenders for disposal of a commodity is to procure the highest price while giving equal opportunity to all the intending bidders to complete. Procuring the highest price for the commodity is undoubtedly in public interest since the amount so collected goes to the public fund. Accordingly, inadequacy of the price offered in the tender would be a cogent ground for negotiating with the tenderers giving them equal opportunity to revise their bids with a view to obtain the highest available price. The inadequacy may be for several reasons known in the commercial field and would be question of fact in each case. Accordingly, inadequacy of the price offered in the tender would be a cogent ground for negotiating with the tenderers giving them equal opportunity to revise their bids with a view to obtain the highest available price. The inadequacy may be for several reasons known in the commercial field and would be question of fact in each case. Retaining the option to accept the highest tender, in case the negotiations do not yield a significantly higher offer would be fair to the tenderers besides protecting the public interest. A procedure wherein resort is had to negotiations with the tenderers for obtaining a significantly higher bid during the period when the offers in the tenders remain open for acceptance and rejection of the tenders only in the event of a significant higher bid being obtained during the negotiation would ordinarily satisfy this requirement. This procedure involves giving due weight to the legitimate expectation of the highest bidder to have his tender accepted unless outbid by a higher offer, in which case acceptance of the highest offer within the time the offers remain open would be a reasonable exercise of power for public good. In the present case the respondent's highest tender was superseded only by a significantly higher bid made during the negotiations with all tenderers giving them equal opportunity to compete by revising their bids. The fact that it was a significantly higher bid obtained by adopting this course is sufficient in the facts of the present case to demonstrate that the action of the appellant satisfied the requirement of non-arbitrariness, and it was taken for the cogent reason of inadequacy of the price offered in the highest tender, which reason was evident to all tenderers invited to participate in the negotiations and to revise their bids. The High Court was in error in taking the contrary view." In the case reported in (2) AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1992, M/s. Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. The State of Jammu & Kashmir and Another, the Supreme Court held as follows :– "Where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or granting other forms or largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will. There are two limitations imposed by law which structure and control the discretion of the Government in this behalf. There are two limitations imposed by law which structure and control the discretion of the Government in this behalf. The first is in regard to the terms on which largess may be granted and the other, in regard to the persons who may be recipients of such largess. Unlike private individual, the State cannot act as it pleases in the matter of giving largess and it cannot choose to deal with any person it pleases in its absolute and unfettered discretion. Every activity of the Government has a public element in it and it must, therefore, be informed with reason and guided by public interest. If the Government awards a contract or leases out or otherwise deals with its property or grants any other largess, it would be liable to be tested for its validity on the touchstone of reasonableness and public interest and if it fails to satisfy either test, it would be unconstitutional and invalid. It must follows as a necessary corollary that the Government cannot act in a manner which would benefit a private party at the cost of the State ; such an action would be both unreasonable and contrary to public interest. The Government, therefore, cannot, for example, give a contract or sell or leaseout its property for a consideration less than the highest than can be obtained for it, unless of course there are other considerations which render it reasonable and in public interest to do so. Such considerations may be that some Directive Principal is sought to be advanced or implemented or that the contract or the property is given not with a view to earning revenue but for the purpose of carrying out a welfare scheme for the benefit of a particular group or section of people deserving it or that the person who has offered a higher consideration is not otherwise fit to be given the contract or the property. There may be an infinite variety of considerations which may have to be taken into account by the Government in formulating its policies and it is on a total evaluation of various considerations which have weighed with the Government in taking a particular action, that the Court would have to decide whether the action of the Government is reasonable and in public interest" 17. In the case reported in (3) AIR 1987 Supreme Court 251, State of M. P. and others v. Nandalal Jaiswal and others, the Supreme Court held as follows :– "It is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise or its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent of the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in, filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches, or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is 'invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weights with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. There is no fundamental right in a citizen to carryon trade or business in liquor. The State under its regularity power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants its manufacture, shortage, export, import safe and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But when the State decides to grant such right or privilege to others the State cannot be excape the rigour of Art. 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor. But when the State decides to grant such right or privilege to others the State cannot be excape the rigour of Art. 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor. It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention that Art. 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State can not ride roughshod over the requirement, of that Article. But while considering the applicability of Art. 14, in such a case, the Court must bear in mind that, having regard to the nature of the trade or business, the Court would be slow to interfere with the policy laid down by the State Government for grant of licences for manufacture and sale of liquor. The Court would, in view of the inherently pernicious nature of the commodity allow a large measure of latitude to the State Government in determining its policy of regulating, manufacture and trade in liquor. Moreover, the grant of licences for manufacture and sale of liquor would essentially be a matter of economic policy where the Court would hesitate to intervene and strike down what the State Government has done, unless it appears to be plainly arbitrary irrational or mala fide. What can be said in regard to legislation relating to economic matters must apply to equally in regard to executive action in the filed of economic activities though the executive decision may not be placed on as high a pedestal as legislative judgment in so far as judicial deference is concerned. Court must not forget that in complex economic matters every decision is necessarily empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call "trial and error method" and, therefore, its validity cannot be tested on any rigid "a priori" consideration or on the application of any strait-jacket formula. The Court must while adjudging the constitutional validity of an executive decision relating to economic matters grant a certain measure of freedom or 'play' in the joints to the executive". 18. The Court must while adjudging the constitutional validity of an executive decision relating to economic matters grant a certain measure of freedom or 'play' in the joints to the executive". 18. In the case reported in (4) AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1579, Jai Kishan v. L. Kanoria & Co, the Supreme Court held as follows :– "Now there can be no doubt that clause (2) of the prescribed form was scored out and omitted form the contract notes in respect of the contracts between the parties. There was no provision included in any of these contracts requiring the buyers to give any particular number of clear working days notice to the sellers to place goods along side export vessel in the port of Calcutta. The contracts thus clearly departed from the prescribed form in respect of this particular provision. The question is whether on that account it could be said that the contracts were not in the prescribed from in accordance with the requirement of bye-law 1(b). Now, when can a contract be said to be in the prescribed form and when not, is no longer a question which presents any serious difficulty. It is settled by the high authority of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and there is also pronouncement of this Court on the point. We may first refer to the decision of the Privy Council in (5) Radhakisson Gopikisson v. Balmukund Ramchandra, 60 Ind App. 63 : AIR 1933 PC 55. The question which arose for determination in this case was whether certain contracts entered into between the parties contravened any of the bye-laws made by the Board of Directors of the East India Cotton Association Ltd., and were, therefore, void under Section 5 of the Bombay Cotton Contract Act, 1922. Bye-law 81 provided that “Contracts......shall be in writing in the form given in the Appendix”. The contracts in question were admittedly inconsistent with the terms and conditions set out in the prescribed form in at least two respects and yet the contention of the appellants was that the contracts were in the prescribed form and there was no contravention of bye-law 81 so as to render the contracts void under Section 5. The Judicial Committee or the Privy Council negatived this contention. Lord Thankerton, delivering the opinion of the judicial Committee, pointed out at page 70 of the Report. The Judicial Committee or the Privy Council negatived this contention. Lord Thankerton, delivering the opinion of the judicial Committee, pointed out at page 70 of the Report. "Their Lordships are of opinion that the form prescribed is, in its terms, applicable to contracts between a commission agent and his constituent and that the parties in the present case were bound to comply with the bye-law and its form. They are unable, however, to agree with the view that the form is a streetyped one and that literal compliance with it is essential, in their opinion, the contract must contain all the terms and conditions set out in the form in order to comply with it. For instance, in the prescribed form the main terms and conditions are contained in the memorandum of contract............sent by the agent to his constituent in which former reports the fulfilling of the order by a purchase or a sale, as the case may be, in Bombay. If identical terms and conditions instead of being in the memorandum sent by the agent, were contained in the initial order by the constituent, their Lordships are of opinion that there would be protanto sufficient compliance with the bye-law. But this is clearly not found in the present case, for the initial orders are inconsistent with the terms and conditions set out in the prescribed form in at least two respects.............It follows that the contracts having failed to comply with the bye-laws they are rendered void under the Provisions of Section 5 of the Act." The same view was reaffirmed by this Court in (6) 1971(2) SCR 751 : AIR 1971 SC 166 where Grover, J. speaking on behalf of the Court, said with reference to the same bye-law 1 (b) with which we are concerned in the present appeal and what was said there is binding upon us : "Literal compliance with the prescribed form may not be essential but if the contract does not contain all the terms and conditions set out in the form the contract will be void under the provisions set out before ; See the ratio of the decision in 60 Ind App. 63 : AIR 1933 PC 55. 63 : AIR 1933 PC 55. It is, therefore, clear that in order that a contract may be in the prescribed form, literal compliance is not essential, what is necessary is that the contract must contain all the terms and conditions set out in the prescribed form. If this test is applied, as it sought to be, there can be no doubt that the contracts in the present case were not in the prescribed form as they did not contain any term or condition corresponding to clause (2) of the printed form requiring the buyers to give a particular number of clear working days notice to place goods along side export vessel in the port of Calcutta." 19. So far as the instant case, is concerned, the petitioner has not even followed the form. It has left out many of the terms which found place in the form. He has not answered many of the queries which are required to be answered as per the form. The form has not been substantially followed. In the instant case, the terms and conditions of the invitation to tender required him to submit the tender on the form supplied by the department. This is the additional requirement in this case and the particular form supplied by the department was required to be used and the petitioner has not done so. Further more the petitioner has in its tender violated the essential requirement as to delivery schedule. Petitioners offer is to supply the tendered goods in 12 months period whereas the invitation to tender does not permit more than 6 months time for delivery, with a lead time of two months where prototype samples are required. Thus the petitioners offer was liable to be rejected and/or ignored. 20. In the case reported in (7) 1972(2) Supreme Court Cases 36, State of Orissa and Others v. Harinarayan Jaiswal and Others, the Supreme Court held as follows :– "Even apart from the power conferred on the Government under Sections 22 and 29, we fail to see how the power retained by the Government under Clause (6) of its order, dated January 6, 1971, can be considered as unconstitutional. As held by this Court in Cooverjee B. Bharucha's Case (supra), one of the important purpose of selling the exclusive right to sell liquor in wholesale or retail is to raise revenue. As held by this Court in Cooverjee B. Bharucha's Case (supra), one of the important purpose of selling the exclusive right to sell liquor in wholesale or retail is to raise revenue. Excise revenue forms an important part of every State's revenue. The Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. Hence quite naturally, the Legislature has empowered the Government to see that there is no leakage in its revenue. It is for the Government to decide whether the price offered in an auction sale is adequate. While accepting or rejecting a bid, it is merely performing an executive function. The correctness of its conclusion is not open to judicial review. We fail to see how the plea of contravention of Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14 can arise in these cases. The Government's power to sell the exclusive privileges set out in Section 22 was not denied. It was also not disputed that those privileges could be sold by public auction. Public auctions are held to get the best possible price. Once these aspects are recognised, there appears to be no basis for contending that the owner of the privileges in question who had offered to sell them cannot decline to accept the highest bid if he thinks that the price offered is inadequate. There is no concluded contract till the bid is accepted. Before there was concluded contract, it was open to the bidders to withdraw their bids see Union of India and Others v. M/s. Bhimsen Walaiti Ram. By merely giving bids, the bidders had not acquired any vested rights. The fact that the Government was the seller does not change the legal position once its exclusive right to deal with those privileges is conceded. If the Government is the exclusive owner of those privileges, reliance on Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14 becomes irrelevant. Citizens cannot have any fundamental right to trade or carry on business in the properties or rights belonging to the Government-nor can there be any infringement of Article 14, if the Government tries to get the best available price for its valuable rights. The High Court was wholly wrong in thinking that purpose of Sections 22 and 29 of the Act was not to raise revenue. The High Court was wholly wrong in thinking that purpose of Sections 22 and 29 of the Act was not to raise revenue. Raising revenue as held by this Court in Cooverjee B. Bharucha's Case (Supra) was one of the important purposes of such provisions. The fact that the price fetched by the sale of country liquor is an excise revenue does not change the nature of the right. The sale in question is but a mode of raising revenue. Assuming that the question of arbitrary or unguided power can raise in a case of this nature, it should not be forgotten that the power to accept or reject the highest bid is given to the highest authority in the State i.e. the Government which is expected to safeguard the finances of the State. Such a power cannot be considered as an arbitrary power. If that power is exercised for any collateral purposes, the exercises of the power will be struck down. It may also be remembered that herein we are not dealing with a delegated power but with a power conferred by the Legislature. The High Court erroneously thought that the Government was bound to satisfy the Court that there was collusion between the bidders. The High Court was not sitting on appeal against the order made by the Government. The inference of the Government that there was a collusion among the bidders may be right or wrong. But that was not open to judicial review so long as it is not proved that it was make-believe one. The real opinion formed by the Government was that the price fetched was not adequate. That conclusion is taken on the basis of Government expectations. The conclusions reached by the Government does not affect anyone's rights. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court misapplied the ratio of the decision of this Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Another v. Company Law Board and Others and Rothas Industries Ltd. v. S. T. Agarwal." 21. In the case reported in (8) AIR 1992 Kerala 265, N. Kunhiraman v. State of Kerala & Ors., tenders were invited for construction of shopping complex. The petitioner's tender which was the lowest was not accepted but tender of another was accepted which was higher. The contention of the authorities was that petitioner would not be able to complete the work satisfactorily considering his past performance. The petitioner's tender which was the lowest was not accepted but tender of another was accepted which was higher. The contention of the authorities was that petitioner would not be able to complete the work satisfactorily considering his past performance. It was the case of the authorities that the petitioner had committed default in executing contracts awarded in past and awarding of contract for major work would be inadvisable in the interest of public. It was also contended that the choice in respect of tender was made by Municipal Council which consisted of sixteen elected persons. 22. It was held, that the past performance of petitioner/contractor and the reports made by competent authorities were considered and a decision was taken by an elected body of sixteen persons after deliberation. The decision was not unreasonable. 23. Acceptance of it tender for a higher amount, ipso facto, does not make acceptance illegal. Rule 8 of the Rules permits such a course, if there are valid reasons for departing from the normal rule of accepting the lowest tender. 24. It was settled law that a public authority cannot act arbitrarily, even in the matter of a awarding contracts, or distributing largesse. There is a public clement in all its activities and it must conform to the mandates of Art. 14 and observe tenets of equality and principles of fair action. While guarding against arbitrary exercise of power, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the foremost aspect to be considered is public interest. Proceedings of this nature do not involve a lis between parties. Such proceedings are more in the nature of a public interest litigation, than in the nature of litigation for establishment of private rights of redressal of wrongs. It is only to ensure that public interest is protected that rival claims are considered--not for their own sake, in their right." 25. In the case reported in 1986 (4) Supreme Court Cases 566, State of M. P. and Others v. Nandlal Jaiswal and Others. The Supreme Court held as follows :– "But, while considering the applicability of Article 14 in such a case we must bear in mind that, having regard to the nature of the trade or business, Government for grant of licence for manufacture and sale of liquor. The Supreme Court held as follows :– "But, while considering the applicability of Article 14 in such a case we must bear in mind that, having regard to the nature of the trade or business, Government for grant of licence for manufacture and sale of liquor. The Court would, in view of the inherently pernicious nature of the commodity allow a large number measure of latitude to the State Government in determining its policy of regulating, manufacture and trade in liquor. Moreover, the grant of licences for manufacture and sale of liquor would essentially be a matter of economic policy where the Court would hesitate to intervene and strike down what the State Government has done, unless it appears to be plainly arbitrary, irrational or mala fide. We had occasion to consider the scope of interference by the Court under Article 14 while dealing with laws relating to economic activities in R. K. Garg v. Union of India. We pointed out in that case that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion, etc. We observed that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints because it was to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinarie or strait-jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matter where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. We quoted with approval the following admonition given by Frankfuter, J. in Morey v. Dond : "In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The Courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled by events-self-limitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability. The Courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled by events-self-limitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability. "What we said in that case in regard to legislation relating to economic matters must apply equally in regard to executive action in the field of economic activities, through the executive decision may not be placed on as high a pedestal as legislative judgment in so far as judicial deference is concerned. We must not forget that in complex economic matters every decision is necessarily empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call trial and error method and, therefore, its validity cannot be tested on any rigid 'a priori' considerations or on the application of any strait-jacket formula. The Court must while adjudging the constitutional validity of an executive decision relating to economic matters grant a certain measure of freedom of 'play' in the joints to the executive. "The problem of government" as pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Metropolitan Theatre Co. v. State of Chicago are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors or government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declared void. ''The Government, as was said in Permian Basin Area Rate cases, is entitled to make pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances. The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the State Government merely because it feels that another policy decision would have been fairer or wiser of more scientific or logical. The Court can interfere only if the policy decision is patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. It is against the background of these observations and keeping them in mind that we must now proceed to deal with the contention of the petitioners bases on Article 14 of the Constitution". 26. The Court can interfere only if the policy decision is patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. It is against the background of these observations and keeping them in mind that we must now proceed to deal with the contention of the petitioners bases on Article 14 of the Constitution". 26. In the case reported in 1991 (3) Supreme Court cases, G. B. Mahajan and Others v. Jalgaon Municipal Council and Others. The Supreme Court held as follows :– "The 'reasonableness' in administrative law must, therefore, distinguish between proper use and improper abuse of power. Nor is the test the court's own standard of 'reasonableness' as it might conceive it in a given situation. This is the essence of Lord Greene's dictum now familiar as the 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation. It was observed.'' "It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word ‘unreasonable’ in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently uses as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. Warrington L. J. in Short v. Poole Corporation gave the example of the red haired teacher, dismissed because she had red hair. This is unreasonable in one sense. In another it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in had faith : in fact, all these things run into one another". 27. This is unreasonable in one sense. In another it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in had faith : in fact, all these things run into one another". 27. In another case reported in (9) 1993(1) Supreme Court Cases 445, Sterling Computers Limited v. M/s. M. N. Publications Limited and Others, Supreme Court held as follows :– "At times it is said that public authorities must have the same liberty as they have in framing the policies, even while entering into contracts because many contracts amount to implementation or projection of policies of the Government. But it cannot be overlooked that unlike policies, contracts are legally binding commitments and they commit the authority which may be held to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution in many cases for years. That is why the Courts have impressed that even in contractual matters the public authority should not have unfettered discretion. In contracts having commercial element, some more discretion has to be conceded to the authorities so that they may enter into contracts with persons, keeping an eye on the augmentation of the revenue. But even in such matters they have to follow the norms recognised by Courts while dealing with public property. It is not possible for courts to question and adjudicate every decision taken by an authority, because many of the Government Undertakings which in due course have acquired the monopolist position in matters of sale and purchase of products and with so many ventures in hand, they can come out with a plea that it is not always possible to act like a quasi-judicial authority while awarding contracts. Under some special circumstances a discretion has to be conceded to the authorities who have to enter into contract giving them liberty to assess the overall situation for purpose of taking a decision as to whom the contract be awarded and at what terms. If the decisions have been taken in bona fide manner although not strictly following the norms laid down by the courts, such decisions are upheld on the principle laid down by Justice Holmes, that Courts while judging the constitutional validity of executive decisions must grant certain measures of freedom of "play in the joints" to the executive" 28. If the decisions have been taken in bona fide manner although not strictly following the norms laid down by the courts, such decisions are upheld on the principle laid down by Justice Holmes, that Courts while judging the constitutional validity of executive decisions must grant certain measures of freedom of "play in the joints" to the executive" 28. Applying the principles laid down by the above referred cases the essential questions that arise for consideration in the instant case are as to whether the petitioner's tender was in accordance with the invitation to tender or was liable to be ignored or rejected. If the petitioner's tender was a duly submitted tender then has there been any violation of the petitioners rights under Article 14 of the Constitution of India or has there been any arbitrariness or unreasonableness on the part of the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 29. In the instant case, it appears that the matter with regard to the tender was ultimately referred to Telecom Commission which is a high powered body. Before the matter went to the Telecom Commission, the matter was considered at lower levels. There were different types of suppliers who had submitted tenders. A substantial number of suppliers were established suppliers. So far as other suppliers are concerned some of them were new suppliers having ISI specification and there were other suppliers who were new and did not have ISI specification. There were also suppliers with bad record in the past. The committee dealing with the matter at early stage found that there were 18 established suppliers, two suppliers with unsatisfactory performance of supply, four were new suppliers having ISI registration certificate and the remaining eleven suppliers were new suppliers without having ISI registration certificate. The writ petitioner fell in the category of new supplier having ISI registration certificate. The rates quoted by the new suppliers inclusive of excise duty and central sales tax having ISI registration certificate including the petitioner firm, (their ranking was third in the category in both the cases) were higher than the corresponding total rates quoted by established suppliers namely Bhillai Wires Ltd. The committee did not consider placement of any order on such new suppliers, to be proper, in the light of the tenders received. The committee did not recommend placement of order on firms with unsatisfactory performance of supply. The committee did not recommend placement of order on firms with unsatisfactory performance of supply. It also did not consider placement of any order on the firms without having ISI registration certificate for the obvious reasons. The stores purchase committee recommended placement of orders only on established suppliers. Working orders were in fact, issued on 28.1.1993 to 17 established suppliers. It was sought to be urged on behalf of the petitioner that the classification as to established suppliers and new suppliers with ISI specification is unreasonable classification. The petitioner did not dispute that new suppliers without ISI specification, were an inferior category of class. I fail to understand this submission because even in the tender documents being tender form, tender qualifications are set out. One of the qualifications as contained in Clause 3/4 is whether the tenderer is au established supplier, does he have a type approval certificate and whether the capacity assessment was done and details of past performance have been asked. These things have been considered to be qualifications even in the tender form. If anyone looks into the tender form he could easily see that these are qualifications for submitting the tender and persons having better qualifications or experience in supply cannot be classified in the same category as those without such qualifications. Classifications on reasonable basis is permitted and in my opinion looking at the tenders received and after finding that sufficient number of tenders were received from established suppliers by which requirement could be fulfilled, the Telecom Commission was well within its rights to decide that the orders will be placed only on established suppliers and no educative orders will be placed on new comers. The decision was taken by the Telecom Commission which is a high powered body in the department of Telecommunication and in my opinion, the decision is based on reasonable classification as amongst the tenderers. After decision was made, the Telecommunication authorities invited the established suppliers for lowering their price to the tune of the lowest offeror as between the established suppliers, I do not think that there is any arbitrariness in the matter. I also do not think that the writ petitioner who did not fall in the category of established suppliers was required to be called for fresh negotiations, for reduction in price. I also do not think that the writ petitioner who did not fall in the category of established suppliers was required to be called for fresh negotiations, for reduction in price. A policy decision had already been taken that orders will be placed on established suppliers which were available in ample numbers as amongst the offerors. There is no denying of the fact, that established suppliers, with satisfactory past performance of supplies against past orders, were the best qualified class for placement of orders. The other classes of offerors consisted or (a) established suppliers with bad performance in the past, (b) New suppliers with ISI specification, but no past record of supply to this department, (c) New Suppliers without ISI specification and without any experience of past supply. The classification as aforesaid cannot be said to be unreasonable. Furthermore, it is also based on tender qualifications as mentioned in the tender form. An established supplier with satisfactory past performance, stands on a better footing than the other classes and the decision to place orders can established suppliers only, cannot be said to be arbitrary or an unreasonable decision, or in any manner suffering from lack of bona fides. Supplies required were so large that orders had to be placed on a large number of suppliers and if sufficient number of suppliers were available of the best qualified class, then the necessity to obtain supplies from the next suitable class did not arise. New supplier, having no past experience of supply cannot stand at par to an established supplier with a satisfactory record of supplies in past. 30. Even if the respondent No. 1 would have decided to place some orders on new suppliers then also the tender submitted by the writ petitioner could not stand scrutiny, as the same was not in accordance with the general term, and conditions nor on the forms supplied and even the delivery schedule was not as required and was liable to be rejected on these grounds. The writ petitioner had given delivery period of 12 months which was not permissible as per the terms and conditions of the invitation to tender and the other related documents. Furthermore, the writ petitioner did not submit the tender on the form as required by the various rules or regulations or tender papers as quoted above. The writ petitioner had given delivery period of 12 months which was not permissible as per the terms and conditions of the invitation to tender and the other related documents. Furthermore, the writ petitioner did not submit the tender on the form as required by the various rules or regulations or tender papers as quoted above. Even the tender, submitted, did not contain all the terms and conditions of the tender form and all the queries in the tender form were not answered. On the above grounds the tender submitted by the writ petitioner was liable to be rejected and/or was liable to be ignored amt the writ petitioner did not and could not have any right to claim any placement of orders upon it nor could the writ petitioner challenge the decision of the respondents in the instant case. I have already mentioned hereinabove that so far as the tender for supply of 2 mm galvanised Wire is concerned, the writ petitioner did not claim to be the lowest tenderer in respect of that item. In the premises, the writ petitioner could not possibly have any right to challenge the order so far as the item in respect of the supply of 2 mm wire is concerned. Even coming to the case of 3.55 mm wire, it appears factually that the writ petitioner was not the lowest tenderer. There were other tenderers who had given offers at a lower rate and they were also established suppliers. The writ petitioner not being the lowest tenderer even in respect of 3.55 mm wire had no right to challenge the decision of the authorities in this regard. Furthermore, in my opinion, the decision of the respondents for placing orders on established suppliers only was a reasonable decision and in any event it could not be said to be an arbitrary decision. It was also in public interest to get supplies from channels which are established channels and as I have already stated, the price offered by established suppliers were lower than what the petitioner had offered. Furthermore, the petitioner, not being an established supplier and the tender not being in accordance with the tender invitation, it could not claim any right to participate in negotiations. 31. Last but not the least is the point with regard to non-joinder of all the interested parties. Furthermore, the petitioner, not being an established supplier and the tender not being in accordance with the tender invitation, it could not claim any right to participate in negotiations. 31. Last but not the least is the point with regard to non-joinder of all the interested parties. The petitioner knew that there are large number of suppliers who had submitted tenders and they were interested or were likely to be affected by any decision on the prayers as prayed for by the writ petitioner. Even apart from that orders were in fact placed on some of the tenderers, even prior to the date of the moving of the writ petition. Rights of third parties have come into being. The said parties are likely be affected by the orders as prayed for by the writ petitioner and are interested in opposing the prayers. In any event the writ petitioner after having knowledge from the affidavit of the respondent No.2 should have taken steps to add at least the parties who had received the purchase orders. They are parties who have acquired rights by virtue of purchase orders which were issued in their favour prior to the making of the writ petition and in my opinion, prayers made on behalf of the writ petitioner are likely to affect the rights of those parties who have already received purchase orders and who have not been made parties here. The said parties are very much interested in opposing the application of the writ petitioner. Though some of them came and intervened in this proceedings. Yet about 12 to 13 of such parties have not been made parties here. In the absence of those parties this writ petition is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of essential parties. 32. This writ petition is therefore, dismissed and the interim order which is still subsisting as against the respondents and/or the intervenors since after the orders dated 22nd June, 1993 and 24th June, 1993 is also vacated. There will be no order as to costs. The parties will be at liberty to obtain Xerox copy of the judgment after the same is signed.