JUDGMENT In B. Johnson v. C.S. Naidu ( 1985 JLJ 793 ) and Saiyed Kadri,s case (1988 MPRCJ 250) the scope of revisional jurisdiction under S. 23-E of the Accommodation Control Act has been considered. In B. Joshi's case, a Division Bench of this Court observed that a power of revision under S. 23-E of the Act is wider than the power given by S. 115 of CPC but it is narrower than the power of appeal. The Court has also observed that an attempt should be made to keep as near as possible to the limits of the power of revision under section 115 CPC, exceeding the same only to the extent necessary for preventing miscarriage of justice. In Helper Girdlwri's case (supra) the Supreme Court laid down the following parameters of the revisional jurisdiction under S. 29 (2)-E of the Gujrat Act, which is equivalent to S. 23-E of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act: - 1. The High Court must ensure that the principles of law have been correctly borne in mind by the lower Court; 2. The facts have been properly appreciated and a decision has been taken taking all material and relevant facts III mind; 3. It must be such a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at; 4. The impugned decision docs not lead to miscarriage of justice. It has also been observed that if two views arc possible and the lower Court has taken one of them, it would not be open for the High Court to interfere in its jurisdictional jurisdiction. In the present case, as already pointed out, the Rent Controlling Authority has asked the tenant to lead evidence first and has refused the right of rebuttal without giving any reasons. It is clearly a case in which interference is called for as there is patent miscarriage of justice. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be allowed to stand. It has to be and is hereby set aside. However, it is not necessary to order a fresh trial. The tenant reconciled to his being asked to lead evidence first and has actually done so. His only complaint is that he wanted to examine one witness in rebuttal, which has not been allowed by the Rent Controlling Authority. It has to be and is hereby set aside. However, it is not necessary to order a fresh trial. The tenant reconciled to his being asked to lead evidence first and has actually done so. His only complaint is that he wanted to examine one witness in rebuttal, which has not been allowed by the Rent Controlling Authority. The ends of justice will be met if the trial is ordered to be proceeded further from the stage of closure of evidence and the defendant-tenant's application for being allowed to examine one witness in rebuttal, is allowed. It is, therefore, directed that the Rent Controlling Authority shall proceed to decide the case afresh after allowing the tenant to examine one witness in rebuttal. It is made clear that no fresh application for amendment of the pleadings or for taking additional evidence shall be considered by the Rent Controlling Authority. The parties shall appear before the Rent Controlling Authority on 28.1.1993. The R.C.A. shall fix a date for examination of the witness proposed to be examined in rebuttal by the tenant. On which date, the tenant shall produce the witness himself. If a summons is needed, it shall be issued by the R.C.A. at the risk of the tenant but the case shall not be adjourned for want of service of summons on the witness. After examining the witness, the Rent Controlling Authority shall bear arguments of the parties and decide the case before 31.3.1993. 1985 JLJ 793 , 1988 MPRCJ 250 relied 1. Revision allowed on.