Judgment :- SRINIVASAN, J. 1. The unsuccessful plaintiff in the trial court is the appellant herein. Pending the appeal, the defendant died and her legal representative has been impleaded after the delay in bringing him on record has been condoned. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to in this judgment by their ranking in the trial court. 2. The case of the plaintiff is as follows:— An agreement was entered on 9.7.1979 under Ex. A-1 between the plaintiff and defendant for sale of the property described fully in the plaint schedule for a sum of Rs. 75,000/-. A sum of Rs. 1,000/- was paid by way of advance to the defendant. It was agreed that the balance of consideration was to be received before the Sub Registrar at the time of registration. The agreement was attested by one Chakrapani, brother of defendant, and one Venkatesan, a broker. It was stated in the agreement that documents of title should be handed over to the plaintiff immediately and within fifteen days after scrutiny of the title deeds, a sum of Rs. 10,000/- should be paid by the plaintiff, if she was satisfied with the title. The total time fixed for registration of the document was three months. The plaintiff received a notice dated 17.8.1979 marked Ex. A.9 issued by a third party making a claim under a prior mortgage. The plaintiff, therefore, sent a telegram to the defendant on 1.9.1979 under Ex. B1 to the effect that the agreement was valid and if anything was found wrong the plaintiff would proceed legally against the defendant. We are not able to decipher the purpose of such a telegram at the instance of the plaintiff. 3. The defendant sent a notice on 12.9.1979 under Ex. A2 to the plaintiff informing her that as she had not paid the further advance of Rs. 10,000/- as agreed, she had forfeited the advance already paid and the agreement ceased to be enforceable. A reply was sent to the plaintiff on 16.10.1979 under Ex. A3 asserting that the plaintiff had a right to specifically enforce the contract. Disclaimer: The text is computer generated. The user must verify the authenticity of the extracted portion with the certified copy of the judgment. This extract is taken from Sakku Bai Ammal v. Vedhavalli, (1994) 1 LW 222 , at page 224 : 4. A3 asserting that the plaintiff had a right to specifically enforce the contract. Disclaimer: The text is computer generated. The user must verify the authenticity of the extracted portion with the certified copy of the judgment. This extract is taken from Sakku Bai Ammal v. Vedhavalli, (1994) 1 LW 222 , at page 224 : 4. The plaintiff filed a suit, O.S. No. 1478/79 on the file of the District Munsif, Poonamallee, on 4.11.1979 for restraining the defendant from making any alienation of the property. The parties entered into a compromise on 30.3.1981 by which it was agreed that the consideration payable under the agreement was to be enhanced by a sum of Rs. 2,500/- and a sum of Rs. 40,000/- should be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant on that date itself. Accordingly, the sum of Rs. 40,000/- was paid and an endorsement was made by the power of Attorney Agent of the defendant on Ex. A1, the suit agreement. It was also agreed that the balance of Rs. 36,500/- was to be paid by the plaintiff on or before 15.6.1981 and that time was the essence of the contract. It was further agreed that the suit for injunction should be withdrawn by the plaintiff. The defendant handed over the documents of title to the plaintiff under the compromise and the terms of the compromise were made subject to the approval of title by the plaintiffs counsel. After scrutinising the documents given to the plaintiff, she demanded some more documents from the defendant under Ex. B5 dated 5.4.1981. Finally, the plaintiff agreed to purchase the property and requested the defendant to get the income-tax clearance certificate. At that stage, the defendant suggested that it was not necessary to get the income-tax clearance certificate, if the sale was executed under two different sale deeds with regard to two different portions of the property. Accordingly, it was agreed that one sale deed should be in the name of the plaintiff and the other sale deed in the name of her husband. Two draft sale deeds were prepared and sent for approval to the defendant, and the same were approved by the defendants counsel and her brother Chakrapani on 30.6.1981. Thereafter, the plaintiff purchased the requisite stamps for one of the sale deeds which was to be for Rs. Two draft sale deeds were prepared and sent for approval to the defendant, and the same were approved by the defendants counsel and her brother Chakrapani on 30.6.1981. Thereafter, the plaintiff purchased the requisite stamps for one of the sale deeds which was to be for Rs. 45,000/- in July, 1981, and had the sale deed engrossed on the stamp papers. When the said document was forwarded to the defendant, she backed out and refused to sign the same. Hence, the plaintiff filed the suit, out of which this appeal arises, for specific performance. 5. The other suit which was pending in the Court of the District Munsif, Poonamallee, was transferred to the Court of Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu, to be tried along with the suit for specific performance. That was taken on file as O.S. No. 178 of 1983. That suit was dismissed by the trial court by the same Judgment by which the suit for specific performance was disposed of. There is no further appeal against the decree in the other suit and it has become final. 6. In the suit for specific performance, various defences were raised by the defendant. Mainly it was contended that the suit was barred by limitation on three grounds., viz., (1) It was filed after a period of three years from 9.7.1979, the date of original agreement, which was sought to be enforced. (2) The suit was filed beyond a period of three years after the expiry of three-and-a-half months from the date of original agreement, which period was agreed between the parties for performance of the contract. (3) The suit not having been filed before 15.6.1981, which was the date finally agreed to between the parties for execution of the sale deed, it is barred by limitation. It should be mentioned here that the suit was filed on 5.2.1983. 7. Another defence raised was that the plaintiff lost the right to enforce the contract because of her own default in not paying the sum of Rs. 10,000/- as agreed to originally after the scrutiny of title deeds. Yet another defence was that the plaintiff was never ready and willing to perform her part of the contract and, therefore, not entitled to get a decree for specific performance. 8. The trial court, after considering the evidence adduced by the parties, rejected all the three defences referred to above. Yet another defence was that the plaintiff was never ready and willing to perform her part of the contract and, therefore, not entitled to get a decree for specific performance. 8. The trial court, after considering the evidence adduced by the parties, rejected all the three defences referred to above. It was held that it was the defendant who had thwarted the performance of the contract and the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract, and that the suit was not barred by limitation as contended by the defendant. However, the trial court took the view that the plaintiff cannot get the relief of specific performance as she had not impleaded her husband as party to the suit in whose favour the other sale deed was agreed to be executed. The trial court also expressed a grave doubt as to whether the court could pass a decree for execution of two sale deeds on the basis of the plaint filed in the Court. In that view, the trial court refused to grant the relief for specific performance, but held that the plaintiff was entitled to get the alternate relief of charges as prayed in the plaint itself. Consequently, the trial court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 47,020/- with proportionate costs and with interest at the rate of eight per cent from the date of plaint, viz., 5.2.1983 till date of realisation. In other respects, the suit was dismissed. 9. In this appeal, the contention of learned counsel for plaintiff/appellant is that the agreement between the parties to have two sale deeds instead of one sale deed for the purpose of avoiding the necessity of obtaining a clearance certificate from the Income-tax Department will not amount to a new contract or a novation of the old contract. According to learned counsel, it was merely an arrangement between the parties as regards the mode of performance of the original contract which was kept alive. It is contended that the parties never intended to substitute the original contract or give up the same, but only agreed to a particular method of performance of the said contract. According to learned counsel, it was merely an arrangement between the parties as regards the mode of performance of the original contract which was kept alive. It is contended that the parties never intended to substitute the original contract or give up the same, but only agreed to a particular method of performance of the said contract. He has placed reliance on the following passages in ‘Vendor and Purchaser’ by Williams, IV edition:— “On the side of the grantee or grantees under the conveyance, the purchaser himself is, in general, the only necessary party. But as we have seen, the vendors obligation is to execute a conveyance of the land sold to the purchaser, or as he shall direct. The purchaser is therefore, entitled to require the conveyance to be made to some other person than himself, or to himself and others, and the vendor is bound to assure the lands sold accordingly. It appears that in such case the vendor may, in general, demand that the purchaser, with whom alone he has contracted, shall be made a party to the conveyance in order to testify that he has directed the conveyance to be made to a stranger to the contract and that the vendor has duly performed his part of the contract by complying with this direction.” (pages 641 & 642). “The purchaser, shall thereupon, prepare at his own expense a proper conveyance of the property to the purchaser or as he shall direct, and shall tender the same to the vendor for execution, at the same time tendering the whole amount due in payment of the purchase-money; and the vendor shall thereupon accept such payment and execute the conveyance at his own expense and shall put the purchaser into possession on receipt of the rents and profits of the property (According as the contract provides); and the purchaser shall take such conveyance accordingly.” (Pages 54 and 55, Para 5(2)). 10. Our attention is also drawn to the observations found in Earl of Rumont v. Smith (6 Chancery Division 469). That was a suit by a vendor for specific performance. 10. Our attention is also drawn to the observations found in Earl of Rumont v. Smith (6 Chancery Division 469). That was a suit by a vendor for specific performance. Even the agreement was with the object of the purchaser reselling the property in lots and therefore it contained a stipulation that the purchaser shall be at liberty to require the vendor convey the property to him or as he shall direct, and by such proper conveyance as he shall think fit. Jessel, M.R. observed in page 474 as follows: “An ordinary contract of sale is not only to convey to the purchaser, but to convey as the purchasers shall direct. Whether or not he could be asked to keep his legal estate for a long period, and convey it in portions at various times is a question perhaps deserving of more consideration. But, this condition does not exceed the ordinary law; it gives the vendors the additional expense, it gives them the whole purchase money, and is not to operate as a waiver or abandonment of any of their rights.” 11. Reliance is also placed on a judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Shashi Bhusan v. Rai Chand ( AIR 1950 Cal. 333 ), wherein it is held that under S. 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of property Act, the seller is bound to give possession to the buyer or ‘such other person as he directs’ and hence a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell and to hand over possession to such person can be brought by the buyer along with such person. 12. Learned counsel also refers to S. 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act under which a seller is bound to give, on being so required, the buyer, or such person as he directs, such possession of the property as its nature admits. It is argued that in the present case, the plaintiff who is the buyer had only directed the seller to execute two sale deeds; one of them being in her favour and the other in favour of her husband, with respect to portions of the same property which she had agreed to buy. It is argued that in the present case, the plaintiff who is the buyer had only directed the seller to execute two sale deeds; one of them being in her favour and the other in favour of her husband, with respect to portions of the same property which she had agreed to buy. According to learned counsel, such direction was possible as the defendant had agreed to the same and it would fall within the scope of S. 55(1)(f) of the said Act as well as the rulings referred to earlier and the passages extracted from ‘Vendor and Purchaser’ by Williams. 13. We do not agree with these contentions. Ex. A1, the suit agreement, is only between the plaintiff on the one hand and the defendant on the other. There is no reference whatever to any nominee or assignee of the plaintiff in the document. There is no clause in the document which will enable the plaintiff to nominate any other person and direct the defendant to execute the sale deed in favour of such nominee. Secondly, the document relates to a property in Door No. 3/5, Yadaval Street, Adambakkam, Saidapet Taluk, which is within specified boundaries. The total extent of the property is said to be about two grounds with a building thereon. After the defendant expressed his inability to get the Income-tax Clearance Certificate, admittedly, the parties agreed to have two sale deeds with reference to two different portions of the property and in favour of two different persons. The parties also prepared a plan, which is part of Ex. A9, and it shows that one portion which was intended to be sold in favour of the plaintiff was for Rs. 45,000/- and the other portion intended to be sold to the plaintiffs husband was for Rs. 32,500/- The draft sale deeds prepared by the plaintiff and sent to the defendant also contain different schedules. One Schedule relates to the property of an extent of about 2672 sq. ft. with measurements of 83? 6? east west and 32? north south. Similarly, the other sale deed is with reference to an extent of about 2352 sq. ft. with measurements of 73? 6? east west and 32? north south. The sale deed engrossed on stamp papers and marked as Ex. A5, contains the description referred to above. 14. ft. with measurements of 83? 6? east west and 32? north south. Similarly, the other sale deed is with reference to an extent of about 2352 sq. ft. with measurements of 73? 6? east west and 32? north south. The sale deed engrossed on stamp papers and marked as Ex. A5, contains the description referred to above. 14. In those circumstances, the contention that the agreement between the parties was only with reference to the mode of performance of the old contract cannot be accepted. Once the parties have agreed to have different sale deeds in favour of different persons and with reference to different portions, there is no question of the old contract continuing to be alive or intending to be kept alive. Hence, the plaintiff cannot ask for specific performance of the original contract with reference to the entirety of the property in her favour. In the plaint, after referring to the facts of the case, she straightway proceeded to pray for a decree for specific performance with respect to the property which was the subject matter of Ex. A1 and for a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff alone. 15. The view taken by the court below that the court was not in a position to grant a decree for execution of two sale deeds is correct and we do not find any flaw in the same. 16. There is no substance in the contention that S. 55(1)(f) enables the plaintiff to direct the defendant to execute a sale deed in favour of any person as the plaintiff may direct. S. 55(1)(d) provides that the seller is bound on payment or tender of the amount due in respect of the price, to execute a proper conveyance of the property when the buyer tenders it to him for execution at a proper time and place. Sub-clause (d) does not make reference whatsoever of any person other than the buyer. The difference in the language in clauses (d) and (f) clearly shows that the Legislature did not contemplate the buyer to direct the seller to execute a sale deed in favour of some person other than himself. While clause (f) refers to the buyer or such person as he directs, clause (d) refers to buyer alone. Hence, there cannot be a direction to execute the sale deed by the buyer in favour of another person. 17. While clause (f) refers to the buyer or such person as he directs, clause (d) refers to buyer alone. Hence, there cannot be a direction to execute the sale deed by the buyer in favour of another person. 17. We are not agreeing with the decision of Calcutta High Court in Sashi Bhusan v. Raichand (A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 333) in so far as it seeks to apply S. 55(1)(f) even for execution of sale deeds. That case related only to the question of handing over possession and not conveyance of title. 18. The ruling of English Court in Earl of Eomont v. Smith (6 Chancery Division 469) or the observations in ‘Vendor and Purchaser’ by Williams would not apply to the facts of this case, particularly when we are governed by specific provisions in the statute, viz. Transfer of Property Act. S. 15 of the Specific Relief Act enables only a party to the contract or a representative in interest of the party and the other persons expressly referred to in the Section to claim specific performance of the contract. A nominee is not a person set out in S. 15. Hence, it cannot be contended that even a nominee can file a suit for specific performance of a contract. 19. S. 62 of the Contract Act is to the effect that if the parties to the contract agree to substitute a new contract or to rescind or alter it, the original contract need not be performed. In the present case, we have taken the view on the facts that the parties have agreed to substitute a new contract for the original contract. The original contract was with reference to a particular property and it was for execution of a sale deed for the property in favour of the plaintiff. The new contract is with reference to two different portions of the property and the sale deeds are to be executed to two different persons. Hence, the new contract has substituted the old contract and there is no question of enforcing the original contract. In the present case, the plaintiff has sought for specific performance of the old contract with reference to the entire property by a direction to execute the sale deed in her favour alone. Such a direction cannot be granted. 20. Hence, the new contract has substituted the old contract and there is no question of enforcing the original contract. In the present case, the plaintiff has sought for specific performance of the old contract with reference to the entire property by a direction to execute the sale deed in her favour alone. Such a direction cannot be granted. 20. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the plaintiff is not entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance. We find no justification for exercising our discretion in favour of the plaintiff, particularly when the plaintiff has been granted the alternate relief of damages by the trial Court. Consequently, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.