S. C. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) ACCUSED in proceedings in the court of the Special Judge, Bhubaneswar, for his trial along with two others under S. 13 (2) read with S. 13 (1) (c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and under Ss. 120-B, 409, 467 and 471 of Indian Penal Code, is petitioner against the order refusing to discharge the accused on account of inordinate delay by the investigating agency to file the charge-sheet. ( 2 ) DURING the period between 11-6-1970 and 30-4-1971, petitioner was an Executive Engineer. On receipt of information that during that period petitioner along with others received bank drafts and cash and transacted with them without proper scrutiny and recorded the same in the cash book maintained in the Division Office intentionally conspiring to commit the offences alleged, vigilance staff investigated into the incident. Charge-sheets having been submitted, cognizance was taken by the learned Special Judge. Petitioner approached this Court for exercise of power under S. 482, Cr. P. C. to quash the cognizance and issue of processes against him after long lapse of time. Without interfering this Court gave liberty to petitioner to raise the contentions before the learned Special Judge. Thereafter, petitioner filed applications before the learned Sessions Judge before charge was framed against him making a grievance that point raised by the petitioner has not been appreciated by the learned Special Judge, which were rejected. These two revisions have been filed to set aside the orders and quash the prosecutions against him. ( 3 ) MR. P. K. Mahapatra, learned counsel for petitioner, submitted that the petitioner would be harassed to face trial in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed in the year 1970-71 and may not be able to defend himself properly. His fundamental right of speedy investigation and trial is affected and, accordingly, the proceeding for his trial ought to be quashed. ( 4 ) MR. Mohapatra relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in, AIR 1992 SC 1701 : (1992 Cri LJ 2717) (Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R. S. Nayak and submitted that delay at each stage for trial of an accused violates the fundamental right of the petitioner. ( 4 ) MR. Mohapatra relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in, AIR 1992 SC 1701 : (1992 Cri LJ 2717) (Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R. S. Nayak and submitted that delay at each stage for trial of an accused violates the fundamental right of the petitioner. This decision has been considered by this Court in (1993) 6 OCR 66 (Ghanashyam Mohanty v. State of Orissa) where quashing of a proceeding on account of delay was taken into consideration. Therein, it has been observed :"the question of quashing of criminal prosecution on the ground of delay has last received consideration of the Supreme Court in a five Judge decision reported in 1992 (1) Crimes 193 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : (1992 Cri LJ 2717) (Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R. S. Nayak ). The broad features which their Lordships have pointed out as being necessary to be considered on the question of quashing criminal prosecutions are in the background of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India that speedy trial is also in the public interest and serves social interest. It was classified that right to speedy trial flowing from Art. 21 encompasses all the stages of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. While determining whether undue delay has occurred, the factors necessary to be considered are all the attendant circumstances, including the nature of offences, the number of accused and the witnesses, the workload of the Court concerned, the prevailing local. conditions and so on. Though it is the obligation of the State to ensure speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, yet a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one and ultimately the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors and determine in such case as to whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. In considering the question of delay, the concerns which the Court views from the point of view of the accused are, inter alia, the worry, anxiety, expenses and disturbance to his vocation and peace resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial which should be the minimal. Notice was also taken that undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise. Notice was also taken that undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise. In this background, the facts of the present case are to be considered. "mr. Mohapatra relied upon a decision of this Court reported in (1987) 1 Orissa LR 119 : (1987 Cri LJ 2022) (K. Achuta Rao v. State of Orissa) where the question of delay in trial of a proceeding for quashing of prosecution against the petitioner therein was also considered taking into consideration the observations made in AIR 1955 SC 792 : (1955 Cri LJ 1644) (Machander v. State of Hyderabad), AIR 1981 SC 641 : (1981 Cri LJ 159) (State of Bihar v. Uma Shankar Kotriwal), AIR 1971 SC 1367 : (1971 Cri LJ 1096) (Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam), AIR 1986 SC 289 : (1986 Cri LJ 255) (S. Guin v. Orindlays Bank Ltd.), AIR 1977 SC 1489 : (1977 Cri LJ 1125) (State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1981) 52 Cut LT 473 : (1982 Cri LJ NOC 17) (Sri Harekrushna Mahatab v. Republic of India) and AIR 1986 Patna 324 : (1986 Cri LJ 1771) (FB) (Madheshwardhari Singh v. State of Bihar) and it was held :"in view of the authoritative pronouncements referred to supra, and applying the same to the facts and circumstances of the present case, I cannot but come to any other conclusion than that allowing the criminal proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of Court and the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. . . "it was further observed therein :"suffice it to note that the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State could not assign a single reason for the inordinate protraction of the investigation and the inordinate delay even in the commencement of the prosecution. " ( 5 ) PRINCIPLES laid down by the Supreme Court and in the earlier decisions of this Court are binding on me. Application of the same to the facts and circumstances of a case would not bind me since facts and circumstances of each case would vary from the other. In that view of the matter, in (1993) 6 OCR 66 it has clearly been laid down that various factors as indicated therein are to be taken into consideration. Application of the same to the facts and circumstances of a case would not bind me since facts and circumstances of each case would vary from the other. In that view of the matter, in (1993) 6 OCR 66 it has clearly been laid down that various factors as indicated therein are to be taken into consideration. As has been indicated in AIR 1955 SC 792 : (1955 Cri LJ 1644) (supra), it is incumbent on a court to see that guilty persons do not escape. It is even more necessary to see that person accused of crime are not indefinitely harassed. They must be given a fair and impartial trial and while every reasonable latitude must be given to those concerned with the detections of crime and entrusted with the administration of justice, limits must be placed on the lengths to which they may go. ( 6 ) WHEN it is the duty of the court to see that a guilty person does not escape and reasonable latitude must be given to those concerned with the detections of crime, abnormal circumstances are to be brought on to record in order to thwart trial of an accused when a prosecution is initiated. Crime is a wrong to the society and in order to protect the society individuals who are found guilty, are to be punished. Due regard must be given to the liberty of an individual and where there is infraction of such liberty not provided under the statute, the infraction is to be eradicated. Where eradication of an infraction of a statute would not be sufficient to protect the fundamental right of a person, the prosecution must be quashed. Otherwise, courts would not be inclined to arrest or wipe out a prosecution which is detrimental to the maintenance of an orderly society which is the main object of our Constitution. ( 7 ) IN (1987) 1 Orissa LR 119 : (1987 Cri LJ 2022) (supra), the facts indicate that there were six accused persons, four of whom were absconders and petitioners appeared. Allegations against them were that the two accused persons, who appeared, along with others misappropriated a huge sum of about Rs. 4,00,000/- between the periods from 6-1-1971 and 26-6-1972 and from 29-4-1970 to 3-4-1972. Report was lodged during 1979 and investigation continued till 1984 when the charge-sheet was submitted on 3-9-1984. Allegations against them were that the two accused persons, who appeared, along with others misappropriated a huge sum of about Rs. 4,00,000/- between the periods from 6-1-1971 and 26-6-1972 and from 29-4-1970 to 3-4-1972. Report was lodged during 1979 and investigation continued till 1984 when the charge-sheet was submitted on 3-9-1984. That day learned Magistrate took cognizance of an offence under S. 408/34, IPC. By order dated 21-1-1986, charge was framed against the accused persons under S. 408, IPC. Against that order, two out of the six accused persons approached this Court for quashing the prosecution. As has rightly been indicated, learned Public Prosecutor appearing in that case could not bring out any circumstance why there was delay in protraction of the investigation and inordinate delay even in the commencement of the prosecution. Had the learned Public Prosecutor pointed out to the Court that the investigating agency had no periodical approach to the various offices where money transactions were made and on receipt of information only the investigation was initiated, possibly the same would have weighed with the Court. When the incident is of a period which was five years before, it is quite natural that there would be some delay in investigation. Parliament has taken note of that and provided in S. 167 (2) Proviso, Cr. P. C. that upon arrest of an accused person, if the charge-sheet is not filed against him within the period provided therein, he would be entitled to bail if prayed for. Where Parliament has taken note of the prejudice on account of the delay in investigation, Courts should also respect the same, as has been observed in AIR 1977 SC 1489 : (1977 Cri LJ 1125) (supra) where it has been observed (para 7) : ". . . . . . . The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. . . . . " mere administration of law though not sufficient, object of the Legislature would always be kept in mind. . . . . . . The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. . . . . " mere administration of law though not sufficient, object of the Legislature would always be kept in mind. Where Legislature formed of representatives of people, in its intelligence felt that the prejudice of detention can be eradicated by releasing the accused on bail if no charge-sheet is filed within the period stipulated, Courts should respect them to Come to a conclusion that an accused is to face a trial, Facing of trial is not a prejudice by itself. For an orderly society, trial is necessary where it is alleged that a wrong has been committed to the society by commission of an offence. Learned Public Prosecutor could have also brought to the notice of the Court that four of the accused persons remained as absconders. Where some of the accused persons were absconders and they were to be tried jointly, there is bound to be delay in investigation unless it is shown that the accused persons have been shown as absconders to cover up the laches in investigation. Trial cannot proceed without the absconders. It is true that there is provision under the Criminal Procedure Code that where some of the accused persons are absconders, the trial can be bifurcated and those who appeared can be tried in absence of the absconding accused persons. Court's interference becomes necessary because the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code are honoured more than in its breach. Learned Public Prosecutor ought to have brought to the notice of the court that there being six accused persons, if the prosecution is quashed against two, the other four would have to face the trial and they could not escape, by the order. Accordingly, court should give a direction for expeditious trial than quashing the prosecution itself when the accused persons have appeared. That would protect. the fundamental right of liberty of accused persons also. Balance was to be struck between the requirements of a society and the fundamental right of an individual. Where both can stand together by an order, that order is to be passed. Since the aforesaid aspects, which. That would protect. the fundamental right of liberty of accused persons also. Balance was to be struck between the requirements of a society and the fundamental right of an individual. Where both can stand together by an order, that order is to be passed. Since the aforesaid aspects, which. ought to have been brought to the notice of the Court by the learned Public Prosecutor, had not been brought to the notice of the Court, the decision in (1987) 1 Orissa. LR 119 : (1987 Cri LJ 2022) (supra) is correct on the facts of that case and. would not be binding on me as there is no quarrel over the principles laid down and followed in that decision. ( 8 ) IN the present case, there are three accused persons out of whom one has approached this Court whereas the other two are prepared to face the trial. There can be no distinction as regards the harassment of the three accused persons. When the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act and other offences under the Indian Penal Code came to the knowledge of the prosecuting agency, investigation was initiated. After getting the information, there is no delay in investigation. If the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court would be made applicable to investigation and trial of offences which came to the notice of the prosecuting agency much after and the prosecution would be quashed, all offenders would make an endeavour to cover their offences for a long time and escape trial. That would not be for the benefit of the society. Keeping note of the same, Parliament has provided in Ss. 467 to 473 under Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 fixing a period of limitation for cognizance. Even in such cases also, where the cognizance would be barred on account of expiry of the period fixed, Parliament has given power to court under S. 473 for extension of the period of limitation. All the decisions cited before me and relied upon in the other decisions have not taken into consideration these provisions in the Cr. P. C. to consider whether cognizance could be quashed on account of delay. All the decisions cited before me and relied upon in the other decisions have not taken into consideration these provisions in the Cr. P. C. to consider whether cognizance could be quashed on account of delay. Where Parliament has felt in its intelligence that in graver offences there would be no period of limitation, court should not normally quash a prosecution on account of delay, when Parliament has taken care of delay in protecting liberty of an individual by making provision under S. 167 (2) proviso that he would be granted bail, wide power has also been vested in courts to grant bail under S. 439, Cr. P. C. to protect the liberty of an accused who has not been yet proved to be guilty. ( 9 ) TAKING note of the facts and circumstances of this vase as indicated, I find no laches on the part of the prosecution. Offence attributed to the petitioner is a grave one being of corruption which is to be prevented under law for which a special law had to be enacted. Even in Orissa, with that object the Special Courts Act has been enacted with the anxiety of prevention of corruption from the society. Interference by the court in quashing the prosecution against those alleged to be guilty of embezzlement or other types of corruption, would not be judicial exercise of discretion, where great injustice is not caused to the accused persons and the abuse of the process is such that it cannot be eradicted by directing speedy trial which is a fundamental right of the accused. Advoidance of trial is not a right of the accused; far less to speak of being a fundamental right. ( 10 ) ENDS of justice in this case would be best served in case I direct that the learned Special Judge shall give due importance to the prosecution and shall not post it for trial in a routine manner. A period should be fixed after hearing the accused persons and the learned Public Prosecutor within which all the witnesses shall be produced by the prosecution and the trial shall be concluded continuously from the beginning till end without any break. That would prevent the abuse of the correct on the facts in the present case. Learned trial judge shall do well in completing the trial during 1993 itself without further protraction. That would prevent the abuse of the correct on the facts in the present case. Learned trial judge shall do well in completing the trial during 1993 itself without further protraction. ( 11 ) WITH the observations aforesaid, both the Criminal Revisions are dismissed. Revisions dismissed.