D. G. KARIA, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition is directed against the decision dated February 16, 1983 rendered in Revision Application No. TEN. B. R. 113 of 1982 by the Gujarat Revenue tribunal. By the impugned decision, the learned Member of the Gujarat Revenue tribunal rejected the revision application of the petitioners herein and confirmed the judgment dated August 3, 1982 passed by the Deputy Collector, Porbandar, in Land ceiling Appeal No. 6/82. The Deputy Collector, Porbandar, by his said judgment, confirmed the judgment and order of the Mamlatdar and A. L. T. , Mangrol, passed on april 22, 1982 in ceiling Case No. 2/77 holding that the petitioners are in possession of 79 acres-27 Gunthas of land in excess of the ceiling area and ordering to vest the same in the state Government under section 21 of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 (for short, "the Land Ceiling Act" ). ( 2 ) THE petitioners have been holding agricultural lands to the extent of 114 Acres 27 gunthas in village Divraha Shil of Mangrol Taluka of Junagadh District It is the case of the petitioners that the erstwhile Nawab of Junagadh princely State allotted the land-Survey Nos. 59 to 133, admeasuring 114 Acres-27 Gunthas to the entire Shil village for the purpose of grazing the cattle of the village. It is also the case of the petitioners that grass has been growing naturally in the aforesaid land and the same is being utilized by the people of village Shil. ( 3 ) THE learned Mamlatdar and Agricultutal Lands Tribunal, Mangrol, after issuing necessary notices to concerned parties and after hearing them, by his judgment and order dated April 22, 1982, came to the conclusion that the petitioners held the agricultural land to the extent of 79 Acres-27 Gunthas in excess of the ceiling area. The Mamlatdar, therefore, odered to vest the said land in the State under section 21 of the Land Ceiling act. The petitioners being aggrieved by the said decision of the Mamlatdar, preferred appeal, being Land Ceiling Appeal No. 6/82 before the Deputy Collector at Porbandar. The Deputy Collector, Porbandar, by his judgment dated August 3, 1982, dismissed the appeal, upholding the judgment of the Mamlatdar and A. L. T. The petitioners thereupon preferred Revision Application No. TEN. The petitioners being aggrieved by the said decision of the Mamlatdar, preferred appeal, being Land Ceiling Appeal No. 6/82 before the Deputy Collector at Porbandar. The Deputy Collector, Porbandar, by his judgment dated August 3, 1982, dismissed the appeal, upholding the judgment of the Mamlatdar and A. L. T. The petitioners thereupon preferred Revision Application No. TEN. B. R. 133 of 1982 before the Gujarat Revenue tribunal against the above judgment of the Deputy Collector. The learned member of the gujarat Revenue Tribunal, by his impugned decision, dismissed the revision application and confirmed the judgments of the Courts below. It is against this judgment that the petitioners have approached this Court by way of the present petition. 1. 9. 1993 mr. G. R. Udwani, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners Advocate Mr. N. D. Nanavati, has raised the following points: (1) Erstwhile Junagadh State granted the land in question to the entire village by way of covenant and this grant being the act of sovereign power cannot be withdrawn, unless a legislation to that effect is enacted. (2) The Tribunal ought to have held that provisions of section 6 of the Land ceiling Act would not be applicable to the lands in question, inasmuch as the word "person" will not include the entire village and as such the act cannot be made applicable to the lands in question, (3) Having regard to the objects and reasons of the Land Ceiling Act, the entire village is using the land and as such the object of the Act can be said to have been achieved. I shall deal with and dispose of the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Udwani"seriatim. ( 4 ) MR. Udwani firstly contends that the erstwhile Junagadh State had granted the land in question to the entire village by way of covenant The petitioners have, however, not placed a copy of any such covenant on record whereby the land in question is alleged to have been granted to the entire village, The petitioners are also not aware of the terms and conditions of the covenant, if any. The petitioners did not raise this point before the courts below. In absence of the covenant, if any, being on record, it is very difficult to deal with the submission made by Mr. Udwani. The petitioners did not raise this point before the courts below. In absence of the covenant, if any, being on record, it is very difficult to deal with the submission made by Mr. Udwani. He has fairly conceded that there is nothing on the record to show as to what were the terms and conditions of such covenant. He urges that the covenant may be an oral one. Admittedly, this point having not been raised before the Courts below, the other side had no opportunity to deal with or reply to it. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act could not be made applicable, as the petitioners in possession of the land in question as a result of the covenant having been granted by the former Ruler of Junagadh. Article 363 of the constitution of India provides bar to interference by courts in disputes arising out of certain treaties, agreements, etc. It reads as under:-"363. Bar to interference by courts in disputes arising out of certain treaties, agreements, etc.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of Article 143, neither the Supreme Court nor any other Court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any ruler of an Indian State and to which the Government of the Dominion of india or any of its predecessor Governments was a party and which has or has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument. ( 6 ) IN view of the aforesaid provisions of Article 363 and particularly when there is nothing on the record to show that the alleged covenant continued in force after the commencement of the Constitution, the submission on behalf of the petitioners that the land cannot be held to be surplus on account of the covenant and in absence of a legislation revoking the covenant cannot be accepted. Mr. Mr. Udwani placed reliance upon the case of Bholanath J. Thaker vs. The State of saurashtra, AIR 1954 SC 680 , in support of his aforesaid contention. In that case, the appellant who was appointed officiating Samyayadhish in the former Wadhwan State with effect from 2nd August, 1936, was compulsorily retired by the former State of saurashtra. The erstwhile Ruler of Wadhwan State appointed in 1946 a Committee to frame rules of service and for pensions and other matters regarding the services. Accordingly, the Committee had made its report on November 22, 1947 and on the recommendations of the Committee, the erstwhile Ruler of Wadhwan State promulgated on 3rd February, 1948 Dhara (Act) No. 29 of St. 2004 which came into force with effect from the 1 st January 1948. Section 5 of the said Dhara fixed the superannuation age of the state civil servants at 60 and the appellant had thus become entitled to remain in service till he completed the age of 60 years. The Rulers of the Kathiawar States including the wadhwan State entered into covenant for the formation of the United States of Kathiawar on the 24th January 1948. Under Art 6 (1) of the Covenant, the Ruler of each covenanting state agreed as soon as may be practicable and in any event not later than the 15th April 1948 to make over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh and thereupon all the rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler pertaining or incidental to the government of the Covenanting State were to vest in the United States of Kathiawar and all similar duties and obligations of the Ruler were to devolve on the United State of kathiawar and were to be discharged by it. ( 7 ) THE appellant being compulsorily retired by the State of Saurashtra on June 29, 1948 on the ground that he had passed the age of superannuation which was taken at 55 years, filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge (S. D.), Surendranagar, against the former saurashtra State claiming a sum of Rs. 20,000/-, being the amount to which he was entitiled to as compensation by reason of his premature compulsory retirement. The appellant contended that by virtue of the aforesaid covenant, he was entitiled to be in service till he attained the age of 60. 20,000/-, being the amount to which he was entitiled to as compensation by reason of his premature compulsory retirement. The appellant contended that by virtue of the aforesaid covenant, he was entitiled to be in service till he attained the age of 60. The claim of the appellant was contested mainly on the ground that after the Ruler of the Wadhwan State had entered into the covenant on the 24th January 1948 it was not competent to him to enact any law, rule or regulation which would bind the Saurashtra State. It was also contended that no suit lay against the saurashtra State in the Municipal Courts, inasmuch as the action of the Saurashtra government amounted to an act of State. The trial Court decreed the suit of the appellant, on appeal, the High Court reversed the decree and dismissed the appellants suit. The matter was carried to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, upholding the claim of the appellant on the ground (1) that the Ruler of Wadhwan was competent to enact Dhara 29 of S. Y. 2004, (2) that the former Wadhwan State had merged with Saurashtra State and all the existing laws continued until repealed. It followed that the appellants right under Dhara No. 29 of S. Y. 2004 were still good and could have been enforced in the Municipal courts until either repealed or repudiated as an act of State, (3) that the covenant could be looked at to see whether the new sovereign had waived his rights to ignore right given under the laws of the former sovereign, and (4) that there was no dispute arising out of the covenant and what the appellant was doing was merely to enforce his right under the existing laws which continued in force until they were repealed by appropriate legislation and hence bar under Art 363 of the Constitution could not be invoked. ( 8 ) IN the facts pf the present case, there is no enactment with regard to the grant of the land in favour of the petitioners. As aforesaid, no covenant is placed on record by the petitioners. , It is the claim of the petitioners that on account of the covenant they are entitled to continue in possession of the land and the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act could not be made applicable to the lands in question. As aforesaid, no covenant is placed on record by the petitioners. , It is the claim of the petitioners that on account of the covenant they are entitled to continue in possession of the land and the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act could not be made applicable to the lands in question. Therefore, the dispute would arise out of the terms of the covenant and as such the provisions of Art 363 of the Constitution would be attracted. In this view of the matter, the ratio laid down in the case of Bholanath (supra) cannot be applicable in the facts of the present case. ( 9 ) MR. Udwani next submitted that the "person" occurring in section 6 of the Ceiling act will not include the entire village and as such the Act cannot be said to be applicable to the lands in question. Section 6 of the Land Ceiling Act provides ceiling on holding land. Sec. 6, inter alia, contemplates that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any agreement, usage or decree or order of a court with effect, from the appointed day, no person shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3), (3a) and (3b) be entitled to hold whether as owner or tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant land in excess of the ceiling area. Section 2 (21) defines "person" as one that includes a joint family. Section 2 (16) defines "joint family" to mean an undivided Hindu family and in the case of other persons a group or unit the members of which by custom or usages joint in estate or residence. The definition of "person" in the land Ceiling Act is not exhaustive. The word "person" has been defined in sub-sec. (35) of sec. 3 in Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, as under: " (35) "person" shall include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. " ( 10 ) IN view of the aforesaid definition of "person" in Bombay General Clauses Act, the persons of the petitioners village can be said to be "person" within the meaning of sec. 6 of the Land Ceiling Act Mr. Udwani submitted that the definition of "person" in the Bombay General Clauses Act cannot be resorted to when the Gujarat Agricultural lands Ceiling Act, has defined the term "person. 6 of the Land Ceiling Act Mr. Udwani submitted that the definition of "person" in the Bombay General Clauses Act cannot be resorted to when the Gujarat Agricultural lands Ceiling Act, has defined the term "person. " I find no force in this submission. I therefore, reject it. ( 11 ) MR. Udwani lastly submitted that in view of the objects and reasons of the Gujarat agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960, the object of the Act can be said to have been achieved as the entire petitioner-village is using the land. The grass is growing naturally in the land. According to the petitioners, the land is being utilized by the people of village shil for grazing their cattle. The Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act has been enacted to fix a ceiling on holding agricultural land and to provide for the acquisition and disposal of surplus agricultural land. In the objects and reasons of the Act, it is provided that it is expedient in the public interest to make uniform provision for the whole of State of gujarat in respect of restriction upon any excess of certain limits and it is also expedient for so securing the distribution of agricultural land as best to subserve the common good to provide for the acquisition of surplus agricultural land for the allotment thereof to persons who are in need of lands for agriculture (including co-oparative farming societies, landless persons, agricultural labourers and small holders ). Thus, having regard to the object of the Act, there is no merit in the contention that since the people of the entire village have been using the land in question, the object of the Act can be said to have been achieved. This contention of the petitioners thus cannot be accepted. ( 12 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the Concurrent findings and the conclusions reached by the courts below, including the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, cannot be said to be perverse and as such cannot be interfered with in exercise of the powers of this court under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. In the result, the petition fails. The petition is rejected. Rule discharged. Interim relief stands vacated. No costs. Inter alia, contemplate. .