JUDGMENT A.R. Tiwari, J. 1. This appeal presented under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, 'the Code') is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31st March, 1978 rendered by 4th Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Indore in COS No. 21-A of 77, thereby directing the appellants to pay sum of Rs. 18,266.67 together with interest @ 6% p.a. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the respondent no. 1 factory was a manufacturer of vegetable non-essential oil and operated six oil expellers and one solvent extraction plant. This factory paid Central Excise Duty under simplified procedure till 1-3-1960. This procedure was called "Standard Procedure". The Government of India vide Notifications No. 33 of 60 and 34 of 60 dated 20-2-1960 introduced certain changes in the existing rules for payment of Central Excise Duty at compounded rates in respect of vegetable non-essential oils for certain categories of manufactures. The factory vide its communication dated 1-3-1960, opted for the revised compounded levy system. This procedure was known as a 'Special procedure'. The Superintendent, Central Excise, Indore granted permission on 7-3-1960 to be operative for six calendar months from March, 1960 to August, 1960 to avail of this 'Special procedure' on the ground that the factory had sealed off four oil expellers. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1/plaintiff availed of the special procedure. On 13-4-1960, the Superintendent, Central Excise, Indore, however, withdraw the permission, without hearing, as was granted earlier on 7-3-1960. The respondent No. 1 closed the working of the oil section of the factory under protest. The inspector, Central Excise on 12-5-1960 called upon the respondent No. 1 to pay excise duty on the basis of standard procedure for the period 8 March, 1960 to 13th April, 1960. The Excise Duty, according to standard procedure was quantified at Rs. 26,433.50. Adjusting the payment of Rs. 8,460.67 and Rs. 3,400/-, as already paid under special procedure. The authority demanded the payment of Rs. 14,766.83 from the respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1's representation against this demand was rejected by the Assistant Collector on 16-12-1960. As a result of this, the respondent No. 1 paid sum of Rs. 14,766.83 as demanded under protest on 21-2-1960 and thereafter, preferred an appeal before the Collector, Nagpur against the order dated 16-12-1960 which was passed by the Assistant Collector. This appeal was dismissed on 15-5-1961. As a result of this, the respondent No. 1 paid sum of Rs. 14,766.83 as demanded under protest on 21-2-1960 and thereafter, preferred an appeal before the Collector, Nagpur against the order dated 16-12-1960 which was passed by the Assistant Collector. This appeal was dismissed on 15-5-1961. The revision also failed on 7-4-1962 at the hands of the Ministry of Finance, Government of India. Review petition also failed on 1-6-1962. Thereafter, the plaintiff served a notice under Section 80 of the Code and claimed the refund of Rs. 18,266.67. The appellants resisted the claim and pleaded that under Section 10 of the Central Excise Act, the appellants had requisite power to withdraw the permission and that the suit was barred by time in view of Section 40(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. On evaluation of evidence, the trial court decreed the suit as above. Aggrieved by this judgment and decree, the appellants have preferred this first appeal. 3. I have heard Shri Surjeet Singh learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Brijesh Pandya learned counsel for official Liquidator, Indore. None appeared for the respondent No. 1. 4. The appellant, Union of India and Collector, Central Excise are aggrieved by the decree directing them to pay the sum of Rs. 18,266.67 together with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. to the respondent/plaintiff. 5. The respondent No. 1 chose to remain absent. In the face of liquidation proceedings, respondent no. 2 the official Liquidator was impleaded in this appeal. 6. As stated above, the respondent No. 1 was a manufacturer of vegetable non-essential oils and possessed six oil expellers and one solvent extraction plant. Till 1-3-1960, it paid Central Excise Duty under a simplified procedure, labelled as standard procedure vide Notification Nos. 33/60 and 34/60 issued by appellant No. 1 on 20-2-1960, certain changes were introduced facilitating payment of duty at compounded rates captioned as Special Procedure. The Superintendent, Central Excise, Indore accorded permission on 7-3-1960 for six calendar months to the respondent No. 1 to avail of the newly introduced procedure on satisfaction that the respondents fell under the requisite category of the manufacturers. On 13-4-1960, the authority, however, withdraw this permission and demanded closure of the plant. The respondent No. 1 complied with this direction, although under protest. On 13-4-1960, the authority, however, withdraw this permission and demanded closure of the plant. The respondent No. 1 complied with this direction, although under protest. The Excise Inspector by letter dated 12-5-1960 called upon the respondent No. 1 to pay the excise duty for the period 8-3-1960 to 13-4-1960 a period during which the special procedure was utilised on the basis of standard procedure. On rejection of representations against such a demand, the respondent No. 1 paid the difference Rs. 14,766.83 (Rs. 26,433.50 being payable minus Rs. 11,860.67 already paid plus Rs. 194) under protest on 21-2-1961. An appeal, preferred against this, before the Collector, Central Excise, Nagpur, also failed on 15-5-1961. The revision was also rejected by the Ministry of Finance on 7-4-1962. And review petition also met the same fate on 1-6-1962. The respondent No. 1, thereafter, claimed a refund of Rs. 18,266.67 (Rs. 14,766.83 paid under protest plus Rs. 3499.84 paid under the levy system) mainly on the ground that, having accepted the option to switch over to the special procedure, the authority was not competent to cancel the permission in this arbitrary and mala fide manner. Shelter was taken under Rule 96 of the Central Excise Rules. The eligibility on factual foundation was asserted in emphatic terms. 7. The main ground, pressed injustification of cancellation, was that special procedure was unavailable where solvent Extraction plant was also in operation and not sealed off. The procedure could not be invoked in part of the factory. 8. The trial court on evaluation of the evidence concluded that the solvent Extraction plant has remained idle during the period 8-3-1960 to 13-4-1960 and as such the permission was not liable to be withdrawn in this manner. 9. The decree is forcefully attacked under two grounds - (a) The permission was erroneously and inadvertently granted and as such it was rightly withdrawn under Section 10 of the Act on discovery of true facts and actual state of affairs. (b) The suit was barred by time under Section 40(2) of the Act. 10. As to the first submission, suffice it to say that the withdrawal was made without hearing the respondent. Any benefit extended or conferred, is not liable to be anesthetized without affording reasonable opportunity of being heard, particularly where monetary impact was involved. (b) The suit was barred by time under Section 40(2) of the Act. 10. As to the first submission, suffice it to say that the withdrawal was made without hearing the respondent. Any benefit extended or conferred, is not liable to be anesthetized without affording reasonable opportunity of being heard, particularly where monetary impact was involved. In 1991 SC 309 - (Shrawan Kumar Jha v. State of Bihar), it is held that - "It is well settled that no order to the detriment of the appellants could be passed without complying with the rules of natural justice. We set aside the impugned order of cancellation dated November 3, 1988 on this short ground." The eligibility is rightly found proved. The finding is legal and proper. Hence this attack is non meritorious and deserves to be repelled. There is no misappreciation or misapplication of the provisions of the law. 11. As to the second submission, I find that such an argument is one of despair. The effort was to go under the protective umbrella of Section 40(2) of the Central Excise Act shrinking the period of limitation to six months from the date of accrual of cause of action. The review petition was rejected on 1-6-1962. Further, period of two months is available due to statutory notice under Section 80 of the Code. The suit was filed on 10-6-1963. As held, nothing was done in terms of Section 40(2) of the Act. As such, the suit was rightly held to be within limitation. Moreover, the Division Bench of this Court held in Ramrao's case ( 1990 JLJ 315 - State of M.P. v. Ramrao Krishnarao Palsalkar.) following decision rendered by Apex Court in Madras Port Trust Case ( AIR 1979 SC 1144 - Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International that plea of bar of limitation should not be taken by the state and public Authority to defeat the just claim of citizens. In the instant case, the respondent No. 1 was not heard at the departmental level and in court it cogently proved its eligibility and entitlement for the benefit of the special procedure. It was thus unjust to flagellate the respondent by invoking standard procedure despite permission from retrospective effect more so when finding about eligibility is held to be sustainable and on firm foundation. It was thus unjust to flagellate the respondent by invoking standard procedure despite permission from retrospective effect more so when finding about eligibility is held to be sustainable and on firm foundation. The oppugnation on the linchpin of limitation against the well founded claim, thus, deserved to be spurned and quelled. 12. In the circumstances, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the verdict, I may add that I found it unjust to remit the issue to the department for fresh decision after hearing the respondent No. 1 because post decisional hearing at this distance of time was not considered desirable. It is thus apt to call halt to the litigative urge and save the parties from the continuance of being lugged into litigation with no end in sight. After all, enough is enough. 13. Consequently, this appeal fails and is dismissed. In face of the peculiar facts, parties are, however, left to bear their own costs of this appeal as incurred. Decree be drawn up accordingly. Record of the court below shall be returned.