Judgment :- 1. C.R.P. No. 1795 of 1990 arises out of an order of the 8th Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, made in E.P. No. 797 of 1988, dated 7-2-1990, dismissing the said E.P. for the reasons stated in the said order. C.R.P. No. 1946 of 1990 arises out of an Order in SR. No. 2695 of 1990 filed under Order 46, Rule 1 read with Section 151, C.P.C., passed by the same 8th Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, on the same date, dismissing the said SR. No. 2695 of 1990. Pending disposal of the Civil Revision Petition, the sole respondent died and his legal representatives have been brought on record. Any reference hereinafter to the deceased first respondent will include the legal representatives of the deceased first respondent where the context so requires. 2. The facts are common. The parties are common. The arguments advanced are also common. Therefore, these two Revision Petitions are disposed of by this common order. 3. Before giving the facts, I am persuaded to observe that the case has an extraordinary chequered career and, therefore, demands settings out of facts elaborately. 4. The following are the undisputed facts:— The petitioner, as plaintiff, filed O.S. No. 8060 of 1973, on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, for recovery of arrears of rent and for damages for use and occupation of the premises in the occupation of the deceased first respondent. That suit was decreed with costs on 15-2-1977. The deceased first respondent, aggrieved by the decree, preferred A.S. No. 407 of 1977, again on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, which ended in a compromise, and a consent decree was passed on 21-9-1977. (Hereafter, for the sake of convenience, the petitioner will be referred to as ‘decree holder’ and the deceased first respondent will be referred to as ‘judgment-debtor’). As per the terms of the consent decree, the judgment debtor was liable to pay the amount claimed in E.P. No. 797 of 1988, namely, Rs. 11,049-50. P. As the judgment-debtor was not possessed of property in Madras, but possessed properties within the jurisdiction of the Court at Vellore, the decree w as transmitted to the Sub Court, Vellore, for execution, and the E.P. No. 6631 of 1979 filed in the City Civil Court, Madras, was renumbered as E.P. No. 40 of 1980 by the Sub Court, Vellore. After the E.P. was so transferred to the Sub Court at Vellore, the judgment-debtor filed two C.M.Ps. on 19-2-1980 before the 10th Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, one for stay of execution of the decree, and the other one for condoning the delay in making an application for a direction for payment of the decree in instalments. The decree-holder (petitioner herein) filed a counter on 25-3-1980, and the said C.M.Ps. were finally dismissed on 8-7-1980. (It may be noted here at this stage that the dismissal of the two C.M.Ps. was after the coming into force of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act 13 of 1980, namely, 19.4.1980. This information is useful for discussion at the later stage). 5. When the transferred E.P. No. 40 of 1980 was taken up by the learned Sub Judge at Vellore, the respondent (judgment-debtor) preferred E.A. No. 924 of 1980 on 31-7-1980, claiming that he is a debtor under the Debt Relief Act 13 of 1980 and, therefore, the relief under Section 4 of that Act must be given to him. In the application, namely, E.A. 924 of 1980, the judgment-debtor inter alia has stated that he is a ‘debtor’ within the meaning of Act 13 of 1980 as he is not getting an annual income of Rs. 4,800/- as prescribed under the said Act. He has also stated that he is not liable to pay any amount under the decree obtained by the decree-holder and, therefore, the decree cannot be executed in view of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 13 of 1980. The petitioner (decree-holder) filed a counter to the said E.A. 924 of 1980, denying the averments in the application, and in particular, challenging the claim of the judgment-debtor that he is a ‘debtor’ within the meaning of Act 13 of 1980. The decree-holder has stated among other things in the counter that the decree was one for recovery of arrears of rent and for damages for use and occupation, and as such, the respondent (judgment-debtor) cannot seek relief under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 13 of 1980. 6. The learned Second Additional Subordinate Judge, after going into the merits, dismissed the Application, namely, E.A. No. 924 of 1980, filed by the judgment-debtor on 7-3-1981, finding that in as much as the annual rental value of the building owned by the judgment debtor was Rs. 6. The learned Second Additional Subordinate Judge, after going into the merits, dismissed the Application, namely, E.A. No. 924 of 1980, filed by the judgment-debtor on 7-3-1981, finding that in as much as the annual rental value of the building owned by the judgment debtor was Rs. 3,600/- as per Ex. B-1, the benefit of Act 13 of 1980 will not be available to him. (It may also be relevant to note here that the learned Subordinate Judge though dismissed E.A. No. 924 of 1980 on merits, did not take into consideration Section 12 of Act 13 of 1980, according to which, the decree against the judgment-debtor was exempted from the purview of the Act. The learned Subordinate Judge disposed of the application on the facts placed before him. He did not also refer to the Amendment introduced to Act 13 of 1980 with retrospective effect by Tamil Nadu Debt Relief (Amendment) Act 1981, which was published in the Tamil Nadu Gazette on 3-3-1981. As per this Amendment, the definition of ‘debtor’ underwent a radical change.). 7. Aggrieved by the dismissal of E.A. No. 924 of 1980, the judgment debtor preferred on 3-4-1981 C.R.P. No. 1135 of 1981, on the file of this Court. Unfortunately, the learned counsel appearing for the decree-holder, for reasons with which we are not concerned now, was not present when the C.R.P. was taken up for final disposal. The learned Judge, after hearing the learned counsel for the judgment debtor, without noticing the Amendment introduced to Tamil Nadu Act 13 of 1980, and without noticing that the decree was one for recovery of arrears of rent as well as for damages, for use and occupation of the premises and, therefore, Section 12 of Act 13 of 1980 was attracted, held that the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that the judgment-debtor was not entitled to the benefits of Act 13 of 1980. The learned judge also found, while allowing the C.R.P., that the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction to issue Ex. B-2 Certificate, was incorrect. Consequently, he allowed the C.R.P. on 18-12-1981. Consequent to the allowing of the C.R.P., the E.P., namely, E.P. No. 40 of 1980 itself was dismissed by the Sub Judge, Vellore on 21-4-1982. 8. It appears that the judgment-debtor had deposited a sum of Rs. B-2 Certificate, was incorrect. Consequently, he allowed the C.R.P. on 18-12-1981. Consequent to the allowing of the C.R.P., the E.P., namely, E.P. No. 40 of 1980 itself was dismissed by the Sub Judge, Vellore on 21-4-1982. 8. It appears that the judgment-debtor had deposited a sum of Rs. 2,000/- as directed by this Court while admitting the C.R.P. and granting stay of further proceedings in the City Civil Court, Madras, to the credit of the suit, namely, O.S. No. 8060 of 1973. When the judgment-debtor filed an Application and served notice, for withdrawal of the above amount consequent to the allowing of the Revision Petition and dismissal of the E.P., the decree-holder came to know about the allowing of the C.R.P. and the dismissal of the E.P. Thereafter, it appears that a petition to review the order in C.R.P. No. 1135 of 1981 was filed and it was dismissed on the ground of delay in filing the petition for review. Thereafter, the decree-holder seems to have filed O.S. No. 6098 of 1985 in the City Civil Court, Madras, a suit for declaration that the decree obtained by him in O.S. No. 8060 of 1973 was still subsisting and executable and for other reliefs. Subsequently, on advice, he withdrew the said suit and filed E.P. No. 797 of 1988, placing reliance on Section 7(1) of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief (Amendment) Act, 1981. After advancing arguments, finding that the learned Judge entertained some doubts, the decree-holder (petitioner herein) moved the Court below for drawing up a statement of the facts of the case and the point on which a doubt was entertained, and to refer such statement with its opinion on the point for decision of this Court under Order 46, Rule 1 of C.P.C. 9. The Court below, while dismissing the E.P. No. 797 of 1988, mainly on the ground that the order in C.R.P. No. 1135 of 1981 stands in the way of the decree-holder from filing another E.P. on the principle of res judicata, also held that he entertained not doubt and dismissed the Application filed under order 46, Rule 1, C.P.C. even without numbering the same. Aggrieved by these two Orders, the present Civil Revision Petitions are filed. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Aggrieved by these two Orders, the present Civil Revision Petitions are filed. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. K. Rajah, in his elaborate and persistent argument, submitted that the court below went wrong in dismissing the Execution Petition as not maintainable on the basis of the dismissal of the earlier Execution Petition No. 40 of 1980 which was consequential to the order in C.R.P. No. 1135 of 1981. According to the learned counsel, the order in C.R.P. No. 1135 of 1981 passed in the absence of the counsel for the decree-holder (respondent before the learned judge) with out noticing Section 12 of Tamil Nadu Act 13 of 1980 and again without noticing the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief (Amendment) Act, 1981, introducing drastic change in the definition of ‘debtor’ and also Section 7 of the Amending Act, must be deemed as non-est in law and has no binding force even between the same parties. He also submitted that the order in the C.R.P. must be deemed as one passed per incuriam and has no binding force. In any event, he also submitted that in the light of a recent judgment of the Supreme Court, the Court has a bounden duty to correct its own error- vide Devidayal Rolling Mills v. Prakash Chimanlal Parikh (1993) 2 S.C.C. 470 . Learned counsel cited number of authorities in support of his contention, and they are:— Amar Nath v. Dy. Custodian General A.I.R. 1963 Punjab 225, Alimiya v. Sayed Mohamed A.I.R. 1968 Gujarat 257, Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2355 = (1970) 3 S.C.R. 830 , Ramu Chettiar v. Spl. Tahsildar (Debt Relief); Trichy (1982)-2-M.L.J. 418=95 L.W. 378; and Syed Mohideen v. Government of Tamil Nadu, by Commissioner & Secretary to Government, R.D. & L.A., Madras. 1985 Writ L.R. 1 = 98 L.W. 17(S.N.). He also submitted that the Review Petition filed against the order in C.R.P. No. 1135 of 1981 was not dismissed on merits, but on the ground of delay in filing the said Review Petition, and that also will not stand in the way of the decree-holder filing Execution Petition in as much as the order in the C.R.P. itself was non-est. 11. 11. As regards C.R.P. No. 1946 of 1990, learned counsel submitted that the court below was totally not justified in rejecting the application under Order 46 Rule 1, C.P.C. without numbering the same, and holding that the court entertained no doubt at all. 12. Learned counsel for the judgment debtor (respondent), contending contra, submitted that no doubt the order in C.R.P. without noticing Section 12 of Tamil Nadu Act 13 of 1980 and also the Amendment introduced in the year 1981 to the definition of ‘debtor’ is an erroneous one, but that does not mean that it is non-est in law or has no binding force between the parties. According to the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor, the erroneous judgment cannot be treated as non-est in law and not binding between the parties, particularly when the aggrieved party has filed a Review Petition unsuccessfully. The proper remedy for the decree-holder in this case is, to take appropriate steps to set aside the order passed in C.R.P. No. 1135 of 1981 before filing a fresh Execution Petition. He also brought to my notice the fact of dismissal of E.P. No. 40 of 1980, on the basis of the order in C.R.P. No. 1135 of 1981. His contention was that the order in C.R.P. 1135 of 1981 operates as res judicate and, therefore, the Court below was right in dismissing the E.P. 797 of 1988. According to the learned counsel for the judgment debtor, the court below was also right in holding that the court entertained no doubt as the Court entertained no doubt and that there was no warrant for referring the matter to this Court as desired by the decree-holder in the Application filed under Order 46, Rule 1, C.P.C. 13. I have considered the rival submissions. 14. Before discussing further, it is necessary to bear in mind the relevant provisions of Act 13 of 1980 as well as Tamil Nadu Debt Relief (Amendment) Act, 1981. Act 13 of 1980 was first published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 19.4.1980. As per the said Act, Section 3(d) which defined “debtor” reads as follows:— “debtor” means any person from whom any debt is due and whose annual household income does not exceed four thousand and eight hundred rupees;” Section 12 (a) and (d) read as follows:— “12. Certain debts and liabilities not to be affected. As per the said Act, Section 3(d) which defined “debtor” reads as follows:— “debtor” means any person from whom any debt is due and whose annual household income does not exceed four thousand and eight hundred rupees;” Section 12 (a) and (d) read as follows:— “12. Certain debts and liabilities not to be affected. — Nothing in this Act shall apply to the following categories of debts and liabilities of a debtor, namely:— (a) any rent due in respect of any property including agricultural land let out to a debtor. (b) and (c) xxx (d) any liability arising out of breach of trust or any tortious liability.” The relevant portion of Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief (Amendment) Act, 1981, reads as follows:— “3. Amendment of Section 3, Tamil Nadu Act 13 of 1989 . — In Section 3 of the principal Act, to clause (d), the following proviso shall be added, namely:— “Provided that a person shall not be deemed to be a debtor, if he or any member of his family — (i) and (ii) xxx xxx xxx (iii) has, in any one or more within the four half years, or in all the four half years, immediately preceding the 1st October, 1979 been assessed to property or house tax in respect of buildings or lands other than agricultural lands, under Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 (Tamil Nadu Act V of 1920), the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 (Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1919), the Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971 (Tamil Nadu Act 15 of 1971), the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 (Tamil Nadu Act 35 of 1958), the Cantonments Act, 1924 (Central Act 2 of 1924) or any law governing municipal or local bodies in this State or in any other State or Union territory in India, provided that the aggregate annual rental value of such buildings and lands whether let out or in the occupation of the owner is not less than rupees one thousand and two hundred. Explanation . Explanation . —The annual rental value of any building or land for the purposes of proviso (iii) shall— (1) where the assessment is based on the annual rental value, be deemed to be such value; (2) where the assessment is based on the capital value, be deemed to be five per cent of the capital value; and (3) in any other case, be deemed to be the value ascertained in the prescribed manner; or (iv) has, in any one or more within the four half years, or in all the four half years, immediately preceding the 1st October, 1979, been assessed to profession tax on a half-yearly income of more than one thousand and two hundred rupees derived from a profession other than agriculture under the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 (Tamil Nadu Act V of 1920), the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 Tamil Nadu Act (4 of 1919), the Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971, (Tamil Nadu Act 15 of 1971), the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 (Tamil Nadu Act 35 of 1958), the Cantonments Act, 1924 (Central Act 2 of 1924) or any law governing Municipal or local bodies in this State or in any other State or Union territory in India. Explanation — Proviso (iv) shall apply only to a person whose annual household income exceeds four thousand and eight hundred rupees and such person shall not be deemed to be a debtor for the purposes of this Act,.” Section 7 of the Amending Act reads as follows:— “7. Removal of doubts. Explanation — Proviso (iv) shall apply only to a person whose annual household income exceeds four thousand and eight hundred rupees and such person shall not be deemed to be a debtor for the purposes of this Act,.” Section 7 of the Amending Act reads as follows:— “7. Removal of doubts. —(1) Where any person who was a debtor as defined in Section 3(a) of the principal Act as in force immediately before the 20th November, 1980, has ceased to be a debtor on and after that date by virtue of the amendments made by this Act to the principal Act, any debt due from such person shall be deemed never to have been discharged, every suit or other proceeding (including appeal, revision, attachment or execution proceeding) in relation to such debt pending at the commencement of the principal Act against the debtor for the recovery of any such debt (including interest, if any) shall be deemed never to have been abated, every movable property pledged by the debtor in respect of such debt in favour of the Creditor shall be deemed never to have been released in favour of such debtor, and every mortgage executed by the debtor in respect of such debt in favour of the creditor shall be deemed never to have been redeemed and the mortgaged property shall be deemed never to have been released in favour of such debtor under Section 4 of the principal Act, and any suit for the recovery of any amount liable in respect of such debt from the debtor and any application for the execution of a decree passed in any such suit may be instituted, or made, as if the principal Act as amended by this Act was in force at the relevant time. (2) Every proceeding instituted under the provisions of the principal Act, in respect of such debt as is referred to in sub-section (1) and pending before the Tahsildar or other authority on the 20th November, 1980 shall abate. (3) Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to invalidate any proceeding in which the order passed has been executed or satisfied in full before the 20th November, 1980.” 15. Bearing these provisions in mind, the respective contentions have to be appreciated. 16. (3) Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to invalidate any proceeding in which the order passed has been executed or satisfied in full before the 20th November, 1980.” 15. Bearing these provisions in mind, the respective contentions have to be appreciated. 16. We have noticed earlier that after the coming into force of Act 13 of 1980, the judgment-debtor got his C.M.P. for permission to pay the decree debt in instalments dismissed on 8-7-1980 without claiming the benefit of Act 13 of 1980. Likewise, we have noticed earlier that when the C.R.P. No. 1135 of 1981 was finally disposed of on 18-12-1981, the counsel for the decree-holder was not present and the attention of the Court was not drawn to Section 12(a) and (d) of Act 13 of 1980 and also the provisions of the Amending Act introducing drastic change in the definition of “debtor” and also Section 7 of the Amending Act. From the above admitted fact, it can be said that the order in C.R.P. was pronounced without noticing the provisions of the Act and also the order was contrary to the statutory provisions. The question for our consideration now is, whether the order pronounced in such circumstance is enforceable and has binding force on the parties, or whether it is, non-est in law and, therefore, has no binding effect on the parties. 17. At this stage, the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner can be usefully referred to. 18. In A.I.R. 1963 Punjab 225 (supra), a Division Bench of that Court has held that there can be no estoppel against a Statute, nor can the principle of res judicata be invoked when there is a change of law. 19. In A.I.R. 1968 Gujarat 257 (supra), a learned single judge, while considering the scope of Section 11, C.P.C., has held as follows:— “If the effect of the law has been differently interpreted by judicial decisions or altered by statute, the previous decision between the same parties cannot have the binding effect for all time and it cannot, therefore, operate as res judicata with regard to the same question in a subsequent proceeding. In other words, in order to attract the doctrine of res judicata, the law applicable to the subject-matter at both the times must be the same. In other words, in order to attract the doctrine of res judicata, the law applicable to the subject-matter at both the times must be the same. Not only that, but even different causes of action by reason of change of circumstances can remove any such bar of a previous decision or a finding of the Court, in a subsequent proceeding. It follows, therefore, that there must exist the same subject-matter or that they are litigating under the same title, and for that the same effect of law must prevail at both the times, before the bar of doctrine of res judicata can arise in law that governs the subsequent proceeding. If therefore, mere is any change in the effect of law governing the matter, the effect of any such bar of res judicata has to be broadly considered before it can be allowed to stand for all time to come.” 20. In A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2355 = 1970 (3) S.C.R. 830 (supra), it has been held as follows:— “But the doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of procedure; it cannot be exalted to the status of a legislative direction between the parties so as to determine the question relating to the interpretation of enactment affecting the jurisdiction of a Court finally between them, even though no question of fact or mixed question of law and fact and relating to the right in dispute between the parties has been determined thereby. A decision of a competent Court on a matter in issue may be res judicata in another proceeding between the same parties: the “matter in issue” may be an issue of fact, an issue of law, or one of mixed law and fact. An issue of fact decided by a competent court is finally not determined between the parties and cannot be reopened between them in another proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue alone is res judicata : the reasons for the decision are not res judicata . A matter in issue between the parties is the right claimed by one party and denied by the other, and the claim of right from its very nature depends upon proof of tacts and application of the relevant law thereto. A pure question of law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. A pure question of law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. When it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it is meant that the right claimed has been adjudicated upon and cannot again be placed in contest between the same parties. A previous decision of a competent court on facts which are the foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable to the determination of the transaction which is the foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable to the determination of the transactions which is the source of the right is res judicata. A previous decision on a matter in is sue is a composite decision: the decision of law cannot be dissociated from the decision on facts on which the right is founded. A decision on an issue of law will be as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties, if the cause of action of the subsequent proceeding be the same as in the previous proceeding, but not when the cause of action is different, nor when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority, nor when the decision relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceeding, nor when the earlier decision declares valid a transaction which is prohibited by law. The authorities on the question whether a decision on a question of a law operates as res judicata disclose widely differing views. In some cases it was decided that a decision on a question of law can never be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties: Parthasardhi Ayyangar v. Chinnakrishna Ayyangar ; Chamanlal v. Bapudhai ; and Kanta Devi v. Kalawati. On the other hand, Aikman, J., in Chandi Prasad v. Maharaja Mahendra Mahendra Singh held that a decision on a question of law is always res judicata. But as observed by Rankin, C.J., in Tarini Charan Bhattacharjee v. Kedar Nath Haider: “Questions of law are of all kinds and cannot be dealt with as though they were all the same Questions of procedure, questions affecting jurisdiction, questions of limitation, may all be questions of law. But as observed by Rankin, C.J., in Tarini Charan Bhattacharjee v. Kedar Nath Haider: “Questions of law are of all kinds and cannot be dealt with as though they were all the same Questions of procedure, questions affecting jurisdiction, questions of limitation, may all be questions of law. In such questions the rights of parties are not the only matter for consideration.” We may analyse the illustrative cases relating to questions of law, decisions on which may be deemed res judicata in subsequent proceeding. In Bindeshwari Charan Singh v. Bageshwari Charan Singh , the Judicial Committee held that a decision of a court in a previous suit between the same parties that S. 12A of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act 6 of 1978 which renders void a transaction to which it applies was inapplicable, was res judicata. In that case the owner of an imputable estate, after his estate was released from management, executed a maintenance grant in favour of his minor son B, but without the sanction of the Commissioner as required by S. 12A of the Act. B on attaining majority sued his father and brothers for a maintenance grant at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per annum. The claim was decreed, and the plaintiff was awarded a decree for a grant of Rs.4,000/- inclusive of the previous grant of 1909, and the Court held that the grant of 1909 was valid in law. The father implemented the decree and made an additional maintenance grant upto the value of the decreed sum. In an action by the sons of Bs brothers challenging the two grants on the plea that the grants were illegal and not binding upon them, the Judicial Committee held that the plea was barred as res judicata in respect of both the grants—in respect of the first because there was an express decision on the validity of the first grant in the earlier suit, and in respect of the second the decision in the first suit was res judicata as to the validity of the second grant which was made in fulfillment of the obligation under the Courts decision. The Judicial Committee held that in respect of the first grant, the decision that S. 12A did not apply to the grant, was res judicata, and in respect of the second grant the construction between the same parties of under S. 12A was res judicata . Validity of the second grant was never adjudicated upon in any previous suit; the second grant was held valid because between the parties it was decided that to the grant of maintenance of an impartible zamindari, S. 12A of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act had no application. This part of the judgment of the Judicial Committee is open to doubt. Where the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata between the same parties: Tarini Charan Bhattacharjees case. It is obvious that the matter in issue in a subsequent proceeding is not the same as in the previous proceeding, because the law interpreted is different. In a case relating to levy of tax a decision valuing property or determining liability to tax in a different taxable period or event is binding only in that period or event, and is not binding in the subsequent years, and therefore the rule of res judicata has no application; see Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd. v. Municipal Council of Broken Hill. A question of jurisdiction of the Court, or of procedure, or a pure, question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. Rankin, C.J., observed in Tarini Charan Bhattacharjees case: “The object of the doctrine of res judicata is not to fasten upon parties special principles of law as applicable to them inter se, but to ascertain their rights and the facts upon which these rights directly and substantially depend; and to prevent this ascertainment from becoming nugatory by precluding the parties from reopening or recontesting that which has been finally decided.” A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not, in our judgment, operate as res judicata. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not, in our judgment, operate as res judicata. Similarly by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise. It is true that in determining the application of the rule of res judicata the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question of law, i.e., the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for, the expression “the matter in issue” in S. 11 Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between the parties, i.e., the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to t he rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata, for, a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land.” 21. In 1982 (2) M.L.J. 418 = 95 L.W. 378 (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, while considering the scope of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Act 13 of 1980, has held as follows:— “A conjoint reading of sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act seems to indicate that the view taken by the learned judge flows from the language used in section 4 as compared to Sections 5 and 6 of the Act. When Sections 5 and 6 specifically confer upon the Tahsildar the power to give a certificate of discharge as regards a pledge debt as well as a mortgage debt, no such power has been given to the Tahsildar in respect of money claims which are pending before a civil court. Therefore, we are in entire agreement with the view taken by Ratnam, J., in the above case. Therefore, the third respondent in this case, who is the respondent in the Execution petition in E.P. No. 525 of 1979 has to agitate the question as to whether he is entitled to the benefits of Section 4 of Act XIII of 1980 before the executing Court, and he cannot approach the Tahsildar or the Appellate Authority for getting a certificate of discharge of money claims which are pending before the civil Court.” 22. In 1985 Writ L.R. 1 = 98 L.W. 17, (supra), a Full Bench of this Court explained the effect of a judgment rendered in ignorance of the provisions of a Statute, as follows:— “While referring to the exception to the rule of stare decisis, it is observed in ‘Precedent in English Law’ by Rupert Cross, 1961 Edition, at page 130, as follows:— “No doubt any court would decline to follow a case decided by itself or any other court (even one of superior jurisdiction), if the judgment erroneously assumed the existence or non-existence of a statute, and that assumption formed the basis of the decision. This exception to the rule of Stare decisis is probably best regarded as an aspect of a broader qualification of the rule, namely, that courts are not bound to follow decisions reached per incuriam.” The proposition that a decision per incuriam need not be followed as a binding precedent is well established. If authority is needed for this proposition, we may refer to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. where Lord Greane, M.R. observed as follows:— “Where the court has construed a statute or a rule having the force of a statute, its decision stands on the same footing as any other decision on a question of law. But where the court is satisfied that an earlier decision was given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or a rule having the force of a statute, the position is very different. But where the court is satisfied that an earlier decision was given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or a rule having the force of a statute, the position is very different. It cannot in our opinion, be right to say that in such a case the court is entitled to disregard the statutory provision and is bound to follow a decision of its own given when that provision was not present to its mind. Cases of this description are examples in decisions given per incuriam.” The Supreme Court in Jeisri v. Rajdewan has also quoted with approval the observations in Halsburys Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 22, paragraph 1687, pages 799-800, which are as follows:— “The Court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if given per incuriam. A decision is given per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of a co-ordinate jurisdiction, which covered the case before it, or when it has acted in ignorance of a decision of the House of Lords. In the former case it must decide which decision to follow, and in the latter, it is bound by the decision of the House of Lords”. To the type of cases referred to in the passage from the Halsburys Laws of England cited above, must also be added decisions which are rendered without noticing the crucial and relevant statutory provisions or the provisions of rules governing the relevant controversy.” 23. In 1993 (2) Supreme Court Cases 470 (supra), the Supreme Court has observed as follows:— “It is no doubt true that on account of the order dated April 2, 1990 both the parties have been put to an enormous cost but this cannot be a justification for entertaining a controversy which did not arise even remotely in the main Special Leave Petition and which could only be decided by way of regular substantive proceedings in the lowest court of competent jurisdiction. This Court cannot entertain and decide the question of title in respect of an immovable property raised for the first time before t his Court by way of an interim application in a dismissed Special Leave Petition There is no question of any acquiescence, waiver or estoppel against a party where the error is committed by the Court itself. This Court cannot entertain and decide the question of title in respect of an immovable property raised for the first time before t his Court by way of an interim application in a dismissed Special Leave Petition There is no question of any acquiescence, waiver or estoppel against a party where the error is committed by the Court itself. This Court is under a bounden duty to correct its own mistake. So far as the case of Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India is concerned the same has no relevance and can be of no assistance at all to the applicant-company in the facts and circumstances of the present case The principle laid down in Satyadhyan case and Y.B. Patil is to the effect that the principle of res judicata can be invoked not only in separate subsequent proceedings but they can also get attracted in subsequent stage of the same proceedings. There cannot be any difference of opinion in the said view. However, this question would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and the nature of the order passed at an earlier stage of the proceedings. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar it was observed as under: “Where the principle of res judicata is invoked in the case of the different stages of proceedings in the same suit, the nature of the proceedings, the scope of the proceedings, the scope of the enquiry which the adjectival law provides for the decision being reached, as well as the specific provisions made on matters touching such decision are some of the material and relevant factors to be considered before the principle is held applicable.” 24. I have already set out in detail the facts and the circumstances leading to the filing of these Civil Revision Petition. By applying the ratios laid down in the various judgments referred to above, to the facts of the present case, I have no difficulty in accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned judge who disposed of C.R.P. 1135 of 1981, has failed to notice Section 12(a) and (d) of Act 13 of 1980 and also the Amendment introduced to the definition of “debtor” by the Amending Act, 1981. Section 7 of the Amending Act is also helpful to the decree-holder. Section 7 of the Amending Act is also helpful to the decree-holder. We have noticed that the decree in the case on hand was one for rent and damages for use and occupation. That category of decree is taken out of the purview of Act 13 of 1980 as per Section 12(a) of the principal Act. Even otherwise, as per the amended definition of “debtor”, on the admitted fact that the judgment-debtor was receiving an annual rent of Rs. 3,600/- as found by the learned judge who decided C.R.P. No. 1135 of 1981, the benefits of Act 13 of 1980 as amended, are not available to the judgment-debtor. From the above , it is clear that the order in C.R.P. No. 1135 of 1981 was one given not only without noticing the provisions of Act 13 of 1980 as well as Amendment Act 1981, but also one given contrary to the provisions contained in those Acts and, therefore, it is non-est in law. Further, in the recent judgment of the Supreme Court ( 1993(2) S.C.C. 470 ) (supra), their Lordships have held that the Court has a bounden duty to correct its own error. In this case, the error is apparent, and when it has been brought to the notice of the Court, it cannot be allowed to remain. For all these reasons, I allow C.R.P. No. 1795 of 1990 and restore E.P. No. 797 of 1988 to the file of the Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, for proceeding further in accordance with law. In view of the relief granted in C.R.P. No. 1795 of 1990, no detailed order is necessary in C.R.P. No. 1946 of 1990, except to observe that the court below could have numbered the Application filed under Order 46, Rule 1, C.P.C. and considered the arguments advanced by the counsel for the applicant before it, instead of dismissing the application without numbering the same, by observing that the Court entertained no doubt. 25. In the result, C.R.P. No. 1795 of 1990 is allowed. No order is necessary in C.R.P. 1946 of 1990.