JUDGMENT 1. This is a defendant's second appeal preferred against the judgment and decree of the two courts below for eviction on the ground of illegal sub-letting by the defendant No. 1 in favour of Kerala State Cooperative Coir Marketing Federation Limited (appellant). 2. Admittedly, the property in question had been let out by the plaintiff respondent in favour of R. K. Pillai, defendant No. 1, who had taken the shop in question for Quilon Central Marketing Cooperative Society Limited. The plaintiff respondent claimed that the tenant respondent parted with possession of the shop by handing it over without his permission to the defendant appellant and as such the plaintiff was entitled to get a decree for eviction. The suit was based under Section 13(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, which provides: "13. EVICTION OF TENANTS : (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no court shall pass any decrees or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied : ... ... ...... ... ... (e) that the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without the permission of the landlord." 3. In the instant case, the trial court as well as the lower appellate court has found concurrently that possession of the shop was parted by the defendant respondents by handing it over to the appellant. The lower appellate court also found as fact that no permission had been taken by the defendant respondent from the plaintiff respondent while handing over its possession to the defendant appellant. The finding that the defendant respondents parted with possession of the shop is a finding of fact. 4. The learned counsel for the defendant appellant submitted that as it came into existence of an amalgamation order passed by the joint Director of Cooperative Societies, it was not a new presonality or a new society. It entered into the status of the original tenant and as such the defendant appellant could not be treated as a sub-tenant. 4. The learned counsel for the defendant appellant submitted that as it came into existence of an amalgamation order passed by the joint Director of Cooperative Societies, it was not a new presonality or a new society. It entered into the status of the original tenant and as such the defendant appellant could not be treated as a sub-tenant. Being a sub-tenant the right to come into existence should be a new right other than the one which was acquired by the tenant. 5. The submission of the appellant's counsel is not correct. From the facts stated by the courts below, the appellant has been established to be a new society than that cooperative society to which shop has been originally let out. The original tenant ceased to have any connection with the rights of the appellant. The tenant, to whom the shop had been originally let out, passed on possession of the shop to the defendant appellant. It did not enter into the shoes of the original tenant. It asserted its own rights to remain in possession of the shop having no concern or connection with the original tenant. The amalgamation resulted in coming into existence of a new body. The controversy relating to amalgamation and letting out the premises to a person other than the original tenant was considered by the Supreme Court in M/s. General Radio and Appliances Co. Ltd., and others v. M. A. Khader (dead) by L. Rs., AIR 1986 SC 1218 , that such a transaction between a tenant and a sub-tenant amounted to sub-letting and that the same would be hit by the provisions which restrains the sub-letting without the consent or permission of the land-lord. Sub-letting of the premises of lease hold rights was contrary to the provisions of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 and as such the sub-tenant would be liable for eviction being against public policy. Similar is the view taken by the Supreme Court in Sarswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. C. I. T., Haryana, Himanchal Pradesh, Delhi- III, AIR 1991 SC 70 . 6. In the result, this second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Accepting request of the counsel appearing for the appellant, I grant three months' time to the appellant to vacate the premises and to hand over its vacant possession to the respondent landlord within this period. 6. In the result, this second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Accepting request of the counsel appearing for the appellant, I grant three months' time to the appellant to vacate the premises and to hand over its vacant possession to the respondent landlord within this period. Three months' period will run from today.Appeal dismissed with costs. *******