Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal is by the plaintiff Trust which is called Vanjoor Madhar Sahib Trust, Nagore. The said Trust filed the suit O.S. No. 189 of 1980 on the file of the District Munsifs Court, Nagapattinam fort possession and future profit. The suit was valued under S. 43(2) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). In other words, the suit was based on the alleged relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff Trust and the defendant 1st resp ondent. No doubt, the 1st respondent Pachayappan died pending second appeal and his daughter B. Indira had come on record as his legal representative pursuant to the order in her own petition in CMP. No. 2671 of 1991. 2. The suit was decreed. But, the lower appellate Court, in the appeal preferred by the defendant in A.S. No. 53 of 1981 on the file of sub court, Nagapattinam, has dismissed the suit and allowed the appeal on the ground that the plaintiff has not proved the above referred to landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. 3. According to the defence taken by the defendant, the suit building does not belong to the plaintiff-Trust, but it belongs to one other Trust by name V.A. Sikendar Trust, Nagore and the defendant has been in possession as tenant only under the said Sikandar Trust and not under the plaintiff Vanjoor Madhar Sahib Trust. 4. No doubt, according to the plaintiff, for both the abovesaid Trust, the same M. Mohammed Ghouse, who represents the plaintiff-Trust in the present proceeding, was the trustee. The plaintiff also filed A3 and A4, the former being the Trust deed relating to the plaintiff-Trust dated 27.6.1914 and the latter being the trust deed relating to the abovesaid Sikandar Trust dated 16.12.1904. Thus A4 is anterior to Ex. A3. The plaintiff also issued a suit notice, Ex. A1 dated 28.4.1980 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, terminating the alleged tenancy of the defendant and demanding vacant possession Ex. A2 is the postal acknowledgement therein. Admittedly, the defendant did not send any reply to Ex. A1. According to D.W. 1 the defendant, he did not send a reply, because notice was issued by a wrong person and not by his landlord, viz., Sikandar Trust. 5. A2 is the postal acknowledgement therein. Admittedly, the defendant did not send any reply to Ex. A1. According to D.W. 1 the defendant, he did not send a reply, because notice was issued by a wrong person and not by his landlord, viz., Sikandar Trust. 5. No doubt, both the courts below have also held that the plaintiff-Trust is a public Trust and that hence the suit would lie in the civil court. However, regarding the finding of the lower appellate court that the plaintiff has not proved the landlord relationship between plaintiff and the defendant, the learned counsel for the appellant did not make any serious argument. On the other hand, he concentrated his argument only on another aspect, viz., that both the courts having held that as per Ex. A3 the suit building is only that of the plaintiff-Trust, the lower appellate court also should have granted possession decree prayed for, based on the title of the plaintiff to the suit building as borne out by Ex. A3. 6. In this regard, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that even though the suit had been valued under Section 43(2) of the Act and the suit is based on the landlord-tenant relationship, since the court has found title in the plaintiff Trust, there is no bar for the court passing a decree for possession based on the title. In this regard, she relied on Ponnia Pillai v. Sivanu Pandia Thevar (A.I.R. 1947 Madras 282 = 60 L.W. 16) Bhagati v. Chandramaul (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 735) and Raghubar Dayal Prasad v. Ramak Bal Sarg Bhagwat (A.I.R. 1986 Patna 78 (D.B). On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, on the abovesaid aspect relied on by judgment dated 18.6.1993 in S. Narayanadoss v. Annameri and another (S.A. No. 1127 of 1982). He also pointed out that there is actually no issue regarding the title and the courts below have only casually or incidentally observed that the suit building belonged to the plaintiff as per Ex. A3 and that there was no full discussion regarding the title question by the courts below. So according to him, the above referred to decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant would not apply to the present case. 7. A3 and that there was no full discussion regarding the title question by the courts below. So according to him, the above referred to decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant would not apply to the present case. 7. Further, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent also submits that the second appeal itself has abated long back since after the death of the 1st respondent, only one legal representative, viz., his daughter Indira was brought on record, when she herself filed A.M.P. No. 2671 of 1991 and there are also other legal representatives, who have not been brought on record. With reference to this last submission, the learned counsel for the applicant submits that after the 1st respondent died on 25.1.1991 within time, that is on 19.3.1991 CMP No. 4171 of 1991 was filed for bringing on record all the legal representatives including the above said Indira on record and notice also was ordered in the said petition. Anyway she also submits that even if one legal representative is there on record, there will be no abatement. In this connection, she relies on Custodian of Branches of Banco National Ultramarino v. Nalini Bai Naigun (A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1589 = 1989-2-L.W. 134) and Dolai Maliko v. Krishha Chandra Patnaik (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 49) 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent in this regard, relying on B.S. Singh v. B.D. Singh (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 204) submits that since the suit is for possession, all the legal representatives must come on record. 9. I have considered the rival submissions. First of all, I shall dispose of the above referred to abatement question. Since one legal representative has come on record as mentioned above pursuant to the order in C.M.P. No 2671 of 1991 it cannot be said that the appeal states even though other legal representatives might not have been brought on record. A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1589 (Supra) and A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 49 (Supra) support the abovesaid conclusion. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 204 (Supra) has no application to the present case. 10. A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1589 (Supra) and A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 49 (Supra) support the abovesaid conclusion. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 204 (Supra) has no application to the present case. 10. Coming to the submission relating to the merits, admittedly, the present suit is only based on the landlord-tenant relationship and valued under section 43(2) of the Act It is settled law that in such a suit, the court need not go into the question of title (vide Balasidhantam v. Perumal Chetti (A.I.R. 1915 Madras 654) and Gopalu v. Venkatesan (A.I.R. 1953 Madras 513). No doubt in A.I.R. 1947 Madras 282 = 60 L.W. 16 (supra), it has been held that where in a suit filed on the basis of tenancy, which is not properly proved, even though no issue is framed regarding title, if the defendant denies the title of the plaintiff and sets up adverse possession and evidence is taken fully on both sides on question of title a decree based on the plaintiffs title can be given. No doubt, a similar observation is also there in the other Supreme Court decision, viz. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 735 (supra) though Court fee question was not gone into therein. But, it must be noted that in the present case, it cannot be said that evidence was taken fully on the question of title. Further, as I already mentioned there was no issue regarding title at all in the present suit. Both the courts below only incidentally referred that as per Ex. A.3 the title is with the plaintiff-Trust. The relevant observation of the trait court is only as follows: “The suit property comprises only in Ex. A3 trust and therefore it is a property of the plaintiff-trust”. Likewise, there is also one similar observation in paragraph 7 of the lower appellate courts judgment thus: “The suit property is found in Ex. A3”. In the case of the trail court, the abovesaid observation was made while considering the issue No. 2 viz. whether the defendant is the tenant for the plaintiff trust? In the case of the above referred to observation of the lower appellate court, it was mentioned while dealing with the point for consideration, whether the respondent is entitled to recover possession of the suit building as prayed for from the appellant. whether the defendant is the tenant for the plaintiff trust? In the case of the above referred to observation of the lower appellate court, it was mentioned while dealing with the point for consideration, whether the respondent is entitled to recover possession of the suit building as prayed for from the appellant. So, in the above circumstances it cannot be said that the court below went into the question of title fully and has given a finding after full discussion. In the above circumstances, I do not think that the above referred to A.I.R. 1947 Madras 202 or A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 735 would apply to the present case. 11. That apart, sitting is Second Appeal I have only to see whether the case involves any substantial question of law. It cannot be said that the lower appellate court erred in any way, in having not given any relief of possession based on title, because the suit was only based on landlord-tenant relationship and was valued under section 43(2) of the Act in such a suit if the lower appellate court thought it unnecessary to go into the question of title and grant relief based on title. I cannot say, sitting in Second Appeal, that the lower appellate court went wrong. It cannot also be said that any substantial question of law is involved in the case in the light of the abovesaid judgment of the lower appellate court. It has been held in Chunilal v. Neeta (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1314): “The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is probably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.” In the light of the abovesaid observation, I do not think that the present case, arising out of the lower appellate courts judgment, involves any substantial question of law. As I have already indicated, if the lower appellate court is justified in not going into the question of title and giving relief based on title. I cannot say, sitting in second appeal, that the court below went wrong, Or the case involves any substantial question of law. The plaintiff can very well file another suit based on title and recover possession. It cannot be said that if such relief is not given in the present suit, it directly and substantially affects the rights of the appellant. Further, there is also no question in the present case, which has not been finally settled by the Supreme Court or which is not free from difficulty or which calls for alternative views. Therefore, I cannot interfere with the judgment of the lower appellate court in this Second Appeal. 12. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.