JUDGMENT - SALDANHA M.F., J.:---Both these writ petitions impugn an order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal dated 12-2-1981. They raise an issue of some interest, namely, the scope of review as contemplated by section 322 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. Whereas it is the general principle of law that a review would normally be permissible only in cases where something new either by way of material that goes to the root of the matter or by way of a judicial decision or provisions of law which would most certainly and substantially alter the verdict is subsequently produced and that it would not be justified if the argument is that the Court itself was in error and has committed a mistake of overlooking some substantial part of the record, the provisions of law, etc. That question that arises is as to whether the age-old contention that the corrective action must essentially be sought from the higher Court of Appeal alone advances the interests of justice or whether if such corrective action is asked for within the prescribed time and it appears just and reasonable that the very Court itself should review and set right its order. This short issue has been canvassed before me by learned Counsel on a set of facts that are virtually not in dispute. 2. Certain tenancy proceedings came to be decided by the Tahsildar, Deogad, after which an appeal was filed against his order. The matter went right upto the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, in the first instance, and came to be remanded to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Ratnagiri Division, Ratnagiri, as the evidence had not been correctly appreciated. On the second round, when the matter came up to the MRT in revision, as the Sub-Divisional Officer has declared the opposite party to a protected tenant, the revision came to be allowed and the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Ratnagiri Division, dated 6-7-1977 was set aside and the order of the Tahsildar, Deogad dated 31-12-1975 was restored. Within a period of hardly three days, the tenant filed a review application dated 3-8-1978 and the basic contention was that the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal had virtually overlooked a certain important fact in the evidence that the document on which reliance had been placed had virtually been misconstrued in this context and that, consequently, a grave error had resulted. Within a period of hardly three days, the tenant filed a review application dated 3-8-1978 and the basic contention was that the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal had virtually overlooked a certain important fact in the evidence that the document on which reliance had been placed had virtually been misconstrued in this context and that, consequently, a grave error had resulted. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal entertained the application and the very same Member, by his order dated 12-2-1981, reversed his earlier decision. He had that certain material evidence had been overlooked, that on a proper and correct appraisal of the same the earlier decision of allowing the revision application was incorrect and, therefore, set aside the earlier order dated 31-7-1978 and remanded the proceedings to the Sub-Divisional Officer for a de novo hearing. It is against this order that the present two writ petitions have been filed. The tenant has challenged it on the ground that once the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the revision application should not have been allowed, that there was no need to disturb the earlier order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and, consequently, on the ground that the litigation having gone on for such a long period of time that there was really no scope for any new or further evidence in respect of a fact as has to date back to 1973 and that, consequently, the remand was unjustified. The opposite party has also assailed the order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on an entirely different ground, namely, that there was no scope in law for the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal to have entertained a review petition and even if this had been done, that it does not contemplate reappreciation of evidence and the arriving at of a decision that is diametrically opposed to the earlier one. In substance, it was contended that the entire procedure was legally perverse in so far as the forum has virtually set in appeal over its earlier judgment. 3. Shri Datar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the original owner in Writ Petition No. 1319 of 1981 has taken me through the earlier order of the Tribunal dated 31-7-1988 and contended that this order is perfectly correct and justified. 3. Shri Datar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the original owner in Writ Petition No. 1319 of 1981 has taken me through the earlier order of the Tribunal dated 31-7-1988 and contended that this order is perfectly correct and justified. He stated that the parties were represented by lawyers and furthermore that all relevant issues had not only been argued but that they had been decided and that under these circumstances the application, which was in substance one for reappreciation of evidence, was legally unjustified and, in fact, totally barred. Shri Datar enunciated the principles that are now well-settled with regard to the powers of review that are embodied in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and he stated that even where new material or new grounds, provisions of law or judicial decisions are sought to be made the grounds for review that the condition precedent is that it is necessary to satisfy the Court that inspite of due diligence it was not possible for the party to adduce this before the Court in the first instance. Essentially he emphasised the principle that the system of getting wise after the event or moving the Court by way of review petition is an afterthought is not contemplated as there is a degree of finality to decisions which cannot be re-opened merely because one is ingenious enough to cull out a seemingly profound ground. He placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (A.T. Sharma v. A.P. Sharma)1, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1047, wherein the Supreme Court disapproved of a review that had been permitted by the High Court. While holding that in appropriate cases, it was certainly competent for the High Court to exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to correct its own order if the circumstances justify and if it came within the scope of Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the grounds on which the review had been permitted in that case, namely, that one petition should have been filed, etc., were clearly unjustified. Shri Datar submitted that in sum and substance if one were to scrutinize the subsequent order dated 12-3-1981 even though it is passed by the very same Member that it constitutes a simple reappreciation of evidence which can only be done by an Appellate Authority. Shri Datar submitted that in sum and substance if one were to scrutinize the subsequent order dated 12-3-1981 even though it is passed by the very same Member that it constitutes a simple reappreciation of evidence which can only be done by an Appellate Authority. In these circumstances, he maintained that the order in question is liable to be quashed. 4. Appearing in support of the second petition and opposing the first one, Shri Kamble, learned Counsel who represents the tenant, pointed out to me that, in the first instance, the review petition was filed within hardly three days immediately on his coming to know of the earlier decision. He stated that the learned Member had arrived at a decision which could never be supported by the record in question because the Member had misread a letter and at the same time totally bypassed important admissions in the oral evidence. It was his contention that the parties had argued the matter and while deciding it the learned Member had clearly committed a mistake. It is his submission that a perusal of section 322 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, which is identically worded to Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, does make provision for a case where a review is competent if a mistake has been committed. It is Shri Kamble's case that his client is in no way responsible for this error in so far as the record was before the Tribunal and it is while indicating its decision that the authority had gone wrong. In these circumstances, he argues that the principles with regard to the new material, which is the general ground on which a review is sought, are virtually foreign to the present case. Shri Kamble also contended that he did not ask for any reappreciation of evidence, but that his application in fact, requested the Court to take cognizance of all the material that was already on record, that he had produced nothing new and that, in these circumstances, the authority had acted fairly and correctly in having allowed the revision application. Shri Kamble also contended that he did not ask for any reappreciation of evidence, but that his application in fact, requested the Court to take cognizance of all the material that was already on record, that he had produced nothing new and that, in these circumstances, the authority had acted fairly and correctly in having allowed the revision application. Shri Kamble did point out to me that the Court must take into account the economic conditions of the parties, particularly that of his client, while deciding as to whether at all a second remand ought to be permitted because, in his submission, the Tribunal was perfectly competent to decide the entire matter, which it has done, and if there is any error whatsoever in the Tribunal's order that the same can be corrected by this Court and, consequently, that it would be harsh as far as his client is concerned to re-open the litigation and send it back to the Sub-Divisional Officer. He, therefore, supported the Tribunal's order and argued that the review was unnecessary. 5. The facts of this case are rather unusual. It is true, as pointed out by Shri Kamble, that when a review was asked for that no new material was relied upon by him for this purpose. On the other hand, as has been pointed out to me by Shri Datar, there is most certainly a legal bar to a Court or an authority being asked in exercise of power of review to reappreciate the evidence. What is unique about this case is that the application made for review also did not pray for any such procedure. What had in fact been done was restricted to pointing out to the learned Member of the Tribunal that the basis of his order was unjustified because it overlooked some material that was already on record and which was very necessary to be considered. It is for this reason that the review is sought to be justified on the ground that it comes within the restricted ambit of the correction of a mistake. As far as civil law is concerned, unlike the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the legislature has made provision for good reason for a Court to correct an error that may have occurred while deciding a case. As far as civil law is concerned, unlike the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the legislature has made provision for good reason for a Court to correct an error that may have occurred while deciding a case. There is specific provision in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is bodily reproduced in section 322 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, for the correction of an error. It is equally true that there are certain preconditions, namely, that the error must be substantial, fundamental or that it should go to the root of the matter and, more importantly, that the procedure of review that is asked for must be just and proper. It only follows that if an error has been committed that the earlier decision will require reconsideration. It is for this purpose that I have scrutinized the subsequent order that has been passed by the Tribunal, namely, the one which is impugned in this petition for purposes of ascertaining as to whether the Tribunal has confined itself to the provisions of section 322 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code or whether under the guise of review it has virtually sat in appeal by redeciding the case and re-appreciating the evidence. I do find that the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that certain parts of the record had not been brought to its notice and that a mistake in law has resulted thereby. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal has set aside its order and since it appeared only fair that both the parties should be given an equal opportunity to project their cases completely and to have the same adjudicated de novo that the Tribunal remanded the matter, the important reason for this being that admittedly the parties are poor agriculturists, their literacy levels are obviously very low and if at all there was any relevant or other evidence which had not been adduced that they should be afforded an opportunity of producing the same. It is in these circumstances that the remand was directed. I am in total agreement with what has been pointed out by Shri Kamble, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant, that continuation of the litigation is harsh to his client, but the consequences are equally oppressive to the other side. It is in these circumstances that the remand was directed. I am in total agreement with what has been pointed out by Shri Kamble, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant, that continuation of the litigation is harsh to his client, but the consequences are equally oppressive to the other side. It was his client who asked for the review and who succeeded therein and the rules of fair play would, therefore, require that not only his client but the other side also should have an equal opportunity of rehearing of the matter so that it could be decided fairly and correctly once for all. 6. It is in these circumstances that I am not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, which was legally justified. The order in question is accordingly confirmed. Writ Petition No. 3779 of 1981 accordingly fails. The writ petition is dismissed. The rule is discharged. The interim stay granted therein is vacated. As far as Writ Petition No. 1319 of 1981 is concerned, in so far as it is confined only to the part of the order whereby the proceedings are remanded, the writ petition fails and stands dismissed. The rule is accordingly discharged. The interim stay is vacated. It is, however, clarified that since the petition is restricted only to the aspect of remand that the order passed on this petition will not in any way affect any part of the impugned order dated 12-2-1981. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs in either of the writ petitions. 7. It is clarified that the Sub-Divisional Officer, having regard to the age of this case, will hear the parties and dispose of the proceedings within an outer limit of six months from today. Writ petitions dismissed. -----