Judgment :- The petitioner in this writ petition is the Beedi Workers' Industrial Co-operative Society (hereinafter referred to as 'the Society') represented by its Secretary. The Society challenges Exts. P1 award passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kozhikode in an appeal filed by the first respondent-employee under S.31(2) of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 (for short'the act) directing the Society to re-instate the employee with continuity of service, and in default the Society shall pay a sum of Rs. 5,000/- in lump sum in lieu of re-instatement. It is an admitted case that the employee has not been re-instated nor has he been paid the compensation in lieu of re-instatement. 2. The facts of the cause can be capsulated thus: The first respondent was employed by the Society as a 'beedi worker' for a period of two years and he was denied employment with effect from 4-3-1986. It was alleged that the Society was working against the terms of the bye-laws of the Central Society in so far as the wage calculation and therefore the first respondent filed a petition against the Society before the Labour Court, Kasargode on 31-10-1985. When the first respondent approached for wages on 1-2-1986 it was denied by the Society without sufficient reasons. The first respondent was working under the Society from 1-2-1986 to 3-3-1986 without wages. Therefore the employee filed an appeal before the second respondent on 12-4-1986 alleging that the appellant denied him employment. That appeal was resisted by the Society and denied the allegations. It was contended that the first respondent had absented from duty and therefore a show cause notice was issued to him asking why. his name should not be removed from the workers roll. The reply given by the employee was found to be unsatisfactory. Thereafter he did not report for duty subsequent to 3-3-1986. Thus, according to the Society, first respondent had voluntarily abandoned his employment and therefore his name was removed from the workers roll. After conducting the enquiry the second respondent came to the conclusion that the case of the Society that the employee had abandoned his employment had not been proved. Thereafter he did not report for duty subsequent to 3-3-1986. Thus, according to the Society, first respondent had voluntarily abandoned his employment and therefore his name was removed from the workers roll. After conducting the enquiry the second respondent came to the conclusion that the case of the Society that the employee had abandoned his employment had not been proved. However the second respondent found that the first respondent was not entitled to any back wages for the period during which he was out of employment inasmuch as he was at liberty to claim the arrears of wages, if any, due to him before the appropriate authority. Finally the second respondent, as per Ext. P1 award ordered re-instatement of the first respondent in default of which the Society should pay a lump sum amount of Rs. 5,000/- in lieu of reinstatement. 3. Sub-section (1) of S.31 of the Act mandates that no employer shall dispense with the services of an employee who has been employed for a period of six months or more except for a reasonable cause and without giving such employee at least one month's notice or wages in lieu of such notice. Sub-section (2)(a) provides the right of appeal to the employee who has been discharged, dismissed or retrenched from service to the prescribed authority. Clause (b) thereof further provides that the appellate authority after giving notice to the employer and employee, may dismiss the appeal or direct re-instatement of the employee with or without wages for the period during which he was kept out of employment or direct payment of compensation without re-' instatement or grant such other relief as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case. It was in exercise of this power that the second respondent had passed Ext. P1 award. It could not therefore be said that Ext. P1 was passed without jurisdiction or the first respondent had exceeded his powers in passing the said order. 4. The contention capitally projected by the petitioner is that the appeal filed by the employee under S.31(2) is not maintainable and therefore Ext. P3 award passed by the second respondent is 'invalid'. It could not therefore be said that Ext. P1 was passed without jurisdiction or the first respondent had exceeded his powers in passing the said order. 4. The contention capitally projected by the petitioner is that the appeal filed by the employee under S.31(2) is not maintainable and therefore Ext. P3 award passed by the second respondent is 'invalid'. The argument in this regard is two fold: (1) The employee should have filed an appeal under S.18 of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960 and (2) The present case being abandonment of employment, the appeal will not lie even under sub-section (2) of S.31 of the Act. 5. It was pointed out that by reason of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of S.38, the employee should have filed an appeal as required under sub-section (2) of S.18 of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. It is true that the said provision allows an employee whose service is dispensed with, to file an appeal to the prescribed authority. The case of the Society is that it being a 'commercial establishment', it was governed by the said Act which was in force from 1-3-1962. In other words the point is that even though'the Act' (Central Act 32/1968) came into force with effect from 15-8-1968, the provisions contained in the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act regarding the filing of the appeal would apply in the case of the Society in view of sub-section (2) of S.38 which is extracted hereunder. "Nothing contained in any law relating to the regulation of the conditions of work of workers in shops or commercial establishments shall apply to any establishment to which this Act applies". The argument, it appears to me, is misconceived. When the provisions contained in the Act' are applicable to the petitioner-Society, the resultant position is that the law relating to the conditions of work of workers in the establishments as provided in the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act will not apply to it. It seems to me that the petitioner was under an erroneous assumption that its establishment was unaffected as it was governed by the provisions of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. The provisions contained in sub-section (1) of S.40 of 'the Act' is poignantly relevant here. It seems to me that the petitioner was under an erroneous assumption that its establishment was unaffected as it was governed by the provisions of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. The provisions contained in sub-section (1) of S.40 of 'the Act' is poignantly relevant here. This sub-section mandates that the provisions of 'the Act' shall have effect notwithstanding any thing inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. Thus the provisions contained in 'the Act' will prevail over the-provisions in the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act which are inconsistent therewith. It is therefore difficult for this court to countenance the argument that the employee should have filed the appeal under S.18 of the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, even assuming that the provisions relating to the filing of an appeal also will come within "any law relating to the regulation of conditions of work of workers in Shops and Commercial Establishment". Therefore the contention as to non-maintainability of the appeal filed by the employee is repelled. The appeal filed under sub-section (2) of S.31 of 'the Act' is sufficiently competent. 6. While upholding the constitutional validity of 'the Act', the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. Union of India (1974 (4) SCC 43) observed: "The Act is for welfare of labour. It is not an Act for industries. The true nature and character of the legislation shows that it is for enforcing better conditions of labour amongst those who are engaged in the manufacture of beedis and cigars". Thus the Act being a beneficial legislation, even assuming there is any ambiguity or doubt in any of its provisions, it can only be interpreted in favour of the workers for whose welfare the Act is introduced. Whatever that be, I do not see any ambiguity or doubt in so far as sub-section (2) of S.38 of 'the Act' is concerned. 7. The next limb of the argument centres round the question whether there was abandonment of employment in this case. This question necessarily demands the exploration of the issue conjunctively with the case of the employee that there was denial of employment. Abandonment of employment is a conscious unilateral renunciation of right of employment by the employee. Likewise the denial of employment is a conscious unilateral repudiation of right of employment by the employer. This question necessarily demands the exploration of the issue conjunctively with the case of the employee that there was denial of employment. Abandonment of employment is a conscious unilateral renunciation of right of employment by the employee. Likewise the denial of employment is a conscious unilateral repudiation of right of employment by the employer. In both cases the right of employment of the employee is affected. A conscious unilateral act either by the employee or by the employer is also involved. It is true that under sub-section (2) of S.31 an employee whose service has been discharged, dismissed or retrenched alone is entitled to file an appeal. The appeal could be filed by the employee on the ground that there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services or that he had not been guilty of misconduct as held by the employer or that such punishment of discharge or dismissal was severe. That the denial of employment is implicit in every discharge, dismissal or retrenchment on the grounds reflected in sub-section (2) of S.31. When the discharge, dismissal or retrenchment is proved, it can be said to be a natural corollary that the denial of employment is also proved. This would evidence repudiation of employment by the employer and not the renunciation of the employment by the employee. In the latter case, the employee cannot invoke the provision of appeal contained in sub-section (2) of S.31. 8. It is now found necessary to make an assay of facts of this case to determine whether it involves denial of employment by the employer or abandonment by the employee. After scrutinizing the evidence, the second respondent found that the Society had failed to prove its contention that the employee had abandoned his employment by wilful absence. This conclusion is unquestionable inasmuch as it is based on appraisal of evidence available in this case. The case of the employee is that the Society had denied his wages without sufficient reason and he had demanded his wages excluding the wages for 26-1-1986 in relation to which there was a dispute which was pending before the appropriate authority. On 4-3-1986 when the employee went for daily work, the Society denied him work and he was then suspended. No charge sheet was issued to him; nor was there any enquiry even after suspension. On 4-3-1986 when the employee went for daily work, the Society denied him work and he was then suspended. No charge sheet was issued to him; nor was there any enquiry even after suspension. Thus the employee who was having ten years of continuous service was suspended without assigning any reason. That there was no enquiry with regard to suspension was admitted by the Society. The employee had not been given an opportunity to face the domestic enquiry and there was violation of principles of natural justice. If there was wilful absence of the employee it should necessarily re fleet in the Muster Roll and Register of Hours of work in form No. V. So much so if there was refusal to accept the wages, that would have been found in the Wages Register of the Society. However, during the enquiry the Society had not produced these vital documents before the second respondent to prove that there was abandonment of employment by the employee. These circumstances drive this court to affirm that what is involved in this case is only denial of employment which is clear, definite and explicit. 9. The Society with all vigour had participated in the proceedings before the second respondent under sub-section (2) of S.31 of the Act. Ext. P1 order shows that the Society had filed written statement. However, in the course of hearing the society did not raise any objection as to the jurisdiction of the second respondent to try the appeal the Society had any such objection it should have been raised at the earliest stage before the second respondent itself. The Supreme Court in PrasunRoy v. Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (1987) (4) SCC 217) held: "The principle is that a party shall not be allowed to blow hot and cold simultaneously. Long participation and acquiescence in the proceeding preclude such a party from contending that the proceedings were without jurisdiction." That being so, the Society cannot be allowed to contend that second respondent had no jurisdiction to deal with the appeal filed by the employee under S.31(2) of the Act. Inevitably the contention of the Society has fallen flat. The objections raised against Ext. P1 order are therefore negatived. It is legal and valid. 10. Before I conclude, I am distressed to see that though Ext. Inevitably the contention of the Society has fallen flat. The objections raised against Ext. P1 order are therefore negatived. It is legal and valid. 10. Before I conclude, I am distressed to see that though Ext. P1 order was passed as early as on 24-11-1988, the fruits of the order are denied to the employee. Admittedly the employee was not re-instated yet; nor was he paid compensation in lieu of reinstatement. Therefore it is for the authorities concerned to take immediate action for implementation of Ext. P1 order. The Original Petition is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without any order as to costs.