AKBARKHAN MAHMADKHAN MALEK v. STATE — 1993 DIGILAW 410 (GUJ)

D. G. KARIA, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the decision dated October 14 1982 rendered in Revision Application No TEN. B. A. 970 of 1981 by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal By the impugned decision the learned Member of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal confirmed the judgment dated 09-09- 1991 passed by the Assistant Collector Dhrangadhra being Civil Revision No 217 of 1981. The Assistant Collector Dhrangadhra in exercise of his jurisdiction under section 37 of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act 1960 (for short Land Ceiling Act) reversed the judgment of the Additional Mamlatdar and A. L. T Patadi in Land Ceiling Case No. 233 of 1976-77 dated 2542-1991 and there by the Assistant Collector Dhrangadhra held that Anjuman-e-Eslam Masjido of Dasada to held excess and surplus land to the extent of A. 71 - 31 Gs. ( 2 ) THE Mamlatdar and A. L. T. Patadi proceeded to prepare the list of persons holding surplus land as contemplated by Section 13 of the Land Ceiling Act wherein the name of the petitioner - trust was included as having holding surplus land. The Anjuman-e-Eslam Masjido is a public trust duly registered under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 Its registration number is B/55 Surendranagar. It appears that the said Trust has been managing several properties including the lands in question. The petitioner trust filled in necessary Form showing its holding of land on the appointed day as per the provision of Sec. 10 of the Land Ceiling Act. The Mamlatdar and A. L. T having issued show-cause notice to the concerned party and having initiated inquiry in respect of holding of the land by the petitioner trust. The Mamlatdar and A. L. T. Patadi by his judgment dated 20-02-1981 held that the trust did not hold surplus land. The Mamlatdar and A. L. T. Patadi observed that the petitioner trust hold in all land admeasuring A-25 -31 Gs. Ceiling limit prescribed under section 5 of the Land Ceiling Act is 54 Acres for the area in which the lands in question were situated. The Mamlatdar and A. L. T. observed that the lands of Survey Nos. 261 269 271 and 145/2 admeasuring A. 26-32 Gs. Ceiling limit prescribed under section 5 of the Land Ceiling Act is 54 Acres for the area in which the lands in question were situated. The Mamlatdar and A. L. T. observed that the lands of Survey Nos. 261 269 271 and 145/2 admeasuring A. 26-32 Gs. by A/k. No. 658 were transferred to Madresa and Islam Working Committee in contravention of Sec. 8 of the Land Ceiling Act and therefore the said land was not required to be computed for the purpose of proper holding of the trust Section 8 of the Land Ceiling Act provides that transfers or petitions of Agricultural Land made or effected after 24th January 1971 or before the specified date i. e. 1st April 1976 by way or sale gift mortgage with possession exchange lease surrender or otherwise or partitioned any land held by any person should be deemed to have been transferred in anticipation in order to defeat the object of this Act unless it is proved to contrary. Therefore the view of the Mamlatdar was erroneous in excluding the land in question from the total holding and was contrary to the provision of Section 8 of the Land Ceiling Act. The Mamlatdar also held that the petitioner trust should be deemed to be a family within the meaning of Section 6 of the Land Ceiling Act and as such was entitled to three units. The reasoning adopted and conclusion arrived by the Mamlatdar were perse erroneous and inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act. The Deputy Collector Dhrangadhra in exercise of power under section 37 of the Land Ceiling Act suo motu called for record of the inquiry and the proceedings of the Mamlatdar in respect of the aforesaid Ceiling Case No. 232/76-77. The Deputy Collector Dhrangadhra issued notice dated 7th July 1981 to the petitioner trust to show cause why the aforesaid judgment of the Mamlatdar and A. L. T. should not be reversed. Thus the Manager or Administrator of the trust was given opportunity to appear and being heard. Several adjournments on behalf of the Public Trust were sought and the matter was adjourned on July 29 1981 20 and 7-8-81. The petitioner also sought adjournment on 27-8-81 which was refused by the Assistant Collector. The petitioner trust did not file any reply or objection to the notice issued under section 37 of the Land Ceiling Act. Several adjournments on behalf of the Public Trust were sought and the matter was adjourned on July 29 1981 20 and 7-8-81. The petitioner also sought adjournment on 27-8-81 which was refused by the Assistant Collector. The petitioner trust did not file any reply or objection to the notice issued under section 37 of the Land Ceiling Act. The Assistant Collector Dhrangadhra by his judgment and order dated 7-9-81 reversed the judgment of the Mamlatdar and held that the petitioner trust possessed surplus Land to the extent of 71 A-31 Gs. and directed the Mamlatdar to acquire the surplus land under section 21 of the Land Ceiling Act. ( 3 ) THE petitioner trust being aggrieved by the aforesaid decision of the Assistant Collector Dhrangadhra preferred Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 970 of 1981 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal as observed above the learned Member of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal dismissed the Revision Application and confirmed the judgment of the Assistant Collector Dhrangadhra. It is against this judgment that the petitioner trust has approached High Court by way of present petition. ( 4 ) THE petitioner trust also filed Review Application No. TEN. C. 31 of 1982 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal with a request to review the decision rendered in the aforesaid Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 970 of 1981. The Learned Member of the Tribunal by assigning sound and cogent reasons rejected the said Review Application. The petitioner trust also challenged legality and validity of the decision dated 31 rendered in the said Review Application. ( 5 ) MR. G. N. Desai learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner trust cannot be said to hold the surplus land inasmuch as two Masjids one Jumma Masjid and other Juni Masjid are holding and managing the land in question. Some of the lands are also held by Madressa which is run by the petitioner trust Mr. Desai also relied on occupancy certificate for the purpose. I see no substance in the submission of Mr. Desai. The Occupancy Certificate issued to the public trust under the provisions of Barkhali Abolition Act when perused does show that the Certificate is not issued to two different Units of the petitioner. It is issued in the name of the petitioner trust only. I see no substance in the submission of Mr. Desai. The Occupancy Certificate issued to the public trust under the provisions of Barkhali Abolition Act when perused does show that the Certificate is not issued to two different Units of the petitioner. It is issued in the name of the petitioner trust only. The Form under section 10 of the Land Ceiling Act was filled in by the petitioner trust alone. If the lands in question were held by two distinct identities namely Jumma Masjid and Juni Masjid then the particulars or details of the Land and owner thereof should have been submitted accordingly at the initial stage which has not been done. If the petitioner trust has transferred some of the lands in favour of Madressa after January 24 1971 such transfer is clearly in contravention of Sec. 8 of the Land Ceiling Act for the petitioner did not file any application under section 8 (2) of the Land Ceiling Act to declare that the transfer of the land was not with a view to defeat the object of the Land Ceiling Act. Therefore the lands which are transferred by the petitioner trust in favour of its other institution namely Madressa (school) it cannot be excluded from the holding of the petitioner trust. ( 6 ) AS regards the Occupancy Certificate issued under the provision of the Barkhali Abolition Act such certificate has been issued in favour of the petitioner trust alone. If the lands in question were held by two institutions as submitted by Mr. Desai two occupancy certificates in favour of these two distinct institutions would have been issued. In this connection the Tribunal has correctly observed in its judgment as under :the said occupancy certificate issued under the Barkhali Abolition Act to the applicant masjids which has been prouced at page 23 of the Mamlatdars file and the copy of the application made by the applicant on that behalf in that regard which is at page 53 of the said file which clearly shows that the application which was made in that behalf was one and the Certificate issued by the Mamlatdar was also one and not two. THE petitioner trust is registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act 1950. The Dy. THE petitioner trust is registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act 1950. The Dy. Charity Commissioner Rajkot has issued necessary Certificate of registration in this behalf and the name of the trust which is registered as Anjuman-e-Islam Masjido Dasada having registration No. B/55. Surendranagar If there are two trusts one of Jumma Masjid and other of Juni Masjid and each is holding separate land as it is canvased on behalf of the petitioner there would be two separate registration Certificates issued under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trust Act. In facts of the case it is not proved that there existed two trusts of the petitioner trust holding separate lands. ( 7 ) MR. Desai next submitted that the impugned decision of the Assistant Collector and that of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal are vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice. As per the submission of Mr. Desai all the trustees of the petitioner trust should have been issued notices and were required to be heard before passing the impugned order. I see no substance in this submission While filling in the form as required under section 10 of the Land Ceiling Act the names of the trustees who are now sought to be heard were not mentioned. The Mamlatdar and A. L. T had issued notice to the main Trustee of the trust and in response thereto the President of the petitioner trust Malek Akbarkhan Mahmadkhan had filed his affidavit on 29-6-1976 to the effect that the trust did not hold any other land except the land as mentioned in the Application Form in the State of Gujarat or outside the State. The President did not advise names of other trustees to whom the notice was necessary to be served. The Mamlatdar and A. L. T. also recorded the evidence as adduced on behalf of the petitioner trust. It was never contended during the said proceedings that there were other trustees of the petitioner trust who were necessary or proper parties to be heard in the matter. The authorities below have issued the notices as contemplated under section 20 of the Land Ceiling Act. It is clear from the record that the authorities followed the requisite procedure under the Land Ceiling Act and afforded hearing the President of the petitioner trust or main trustee of the petitioner trust. The authorities below have issued the notices as contemplated under section 20 of the Land Ceiling Act. It is clear from the record that the authorities followed the requisite procedure under the Land Ceiling Act and afforded hearing the President of the petitioner trust or main trustee of the petitioner trust. In facts of the case it cannot be said that the petitioner was denied the opportunity of hearing inasmuch as as observed hereinabove the petitioner trust had sought several adjournments in the proceeding before the Assistant Collector Dhrangadhra and yet did not file its reply or objection to the show-cause notice issued under section 37 of the Land Ceiling Act Thus there is no breach of principle of natural justice. ( 8 ) IT is well settled that the applicability of the principle of natural justice is not a rule of thumb or a straight jacket formula as an abstract proposition of law. It depends on the facts of the case nature of the inquiry and the effect of the order/decision on the rights of the person and attendant circumstances. In the present case in view of the evidence produced on behalf of the petitioner trust and the affidavit filed by the main trustee of the petitioner trust it cannot be said that there was breach of principle of natural justice. In the facts of the case I am not impressed by the technical plea or the trust petitioner that all the trustees of the petitioner trust should have been issued notice by the authority inasmuch as no such case was pleaded before the authority I therefore see no merit in this contention. 8 (A) Mr. Desai then submitted that the lands in question were held by three different trustees which are managed by the petitioner trust and therefore it cannot be concluded that the land in question belonged to the petitioner trust. The petitioner trust has not produced any oral or documentary evidence to prove that the lands in question were of the ownership of other trusts inasmuch as there is no such registration of other trustee under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act nor any such plea was raised before the authorities below before whom evidence was recorded. In the facts of the case contention of the petitioner requires to be rejected. In the facts of the case contention of the petitioner requires to be rejected. No error apparent on the facts of the record or any jurisdictional error has been pointed out on behalf of the petitioner trust so as to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India ( 9 ) IN the result the petitions fails and it is dismissed. The rule is discharged with costs. Interim relief stands vacated. Petition Dismissed. .