Judgment A. K. MATHUR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner by this writ petition has prayed that the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal dated 1-3-1993 setting aside the Resolution of the Regional Transport Authority, Bikaner dated 9-2-1987 granting two non-temporary stage carriage permits in favour of the petitioner on the route Hanumangarh Mogha and in place of that granting one non-temporary stage carriage permit in favour of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation on the route Hanumangarh to Mogha curtailed from Hanumangarh to Rajpura may be quashed. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is a registered Cooperative Society registered under the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965. The total number of its members are in all 15 out of which 13 are licensed drivers. A draft agreement duly entered between the State of Rajasthan and State of Punjab has been published in the Rajasthan Rajpatra dated 29-8-1975 in which both the States propose to open an inter-state route Hanumangarh to Mogha via Abhore. In pursuance of the aforesaid agreement, the petitioner as well as the respondent No. 3 Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (referred to hereinafter as the Corporation) alongwith others applied for grant of non-temporary stage carriage permits on the aforesaid route. The Regional Transport Authority, Bikaner (hereinafter called the R. T. A. ") in its meeting held on 3-2-1981 after hearing all the parties granted two non-temporary stage carriage permits under the scope of 2 for a period of 3 years one each in favour of the Corporation. Rest of the applications including that of the petitioner were rejected. Aggrieved against this action of the R. T. A. the petitioner and some other persons preferred appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (referred to hereinafter as the Tribunal) and the Tribunal by its order dated 3-5-1985 allowed all the 5 appeals and set aside the resolution of the R. T. A. and remanded the case back to the R. T. A. for fresh consideration of the applications in accordance with law. The R. T. A. considered the matter on remand and passed a resolution on 9-2-1987 granting one permit each in favour of the Corporation as well as the petitioner for a period of 5 years after curtailing the portion of this route covered by the Draft Scheme duly published under S. 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 from Hanumangarh to Rajpura. The petitioner was issued permit on 11-2-1987 valid upto 10-2-1992. The Corporation also availed the permit in pursuance of the aforesaid resolution on 18-2-1987 valid upto 17-2-1992. However, aggrieved against this order of the R. T. A. dated 9-2-1987, 6 appeals were filed including that of the Corporation against the grant of one permit in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner also preferred an appeal before the Tribunal only to the extent of curtailing the grant of permit on Hanumangarh Mogha , route from Hamunagarh to Rajpura (Rajasthan Border) alongwith stay application. The Tribunal accepted, the stay petition and stayed the resolution of the R. T. A. only to the extent of curtailing the grant of permit from Hanumangarh to Rajpura. In pursuance of the said order, the, Secretary, R. T. A. made an endorsement in he permit. However, the Corporation did not prefer any appeal against the order of the R. T. A. imposing restrictive condition. Instead of filing an appeal the Corporation moved an application for extending its route from Rajpura to Hanumangarh a distance of nearly 48 kms. against grant of permit to the petitioner. The Tribunal granted the extension prayed for vide order dated 3-11-1989. It is alleged that notwithstanding the fact that the Corporation was granted permit and subsequently the same was set aside by the Tribunal still the Corporation plied its vehicles on this route. The Tribunal vide its order dated 1-9-1988 accepted the appeals preferred by Bhawani Yatayat Sahakari Samiti Ltd. , M/s. Jarnindara Motor Transport Co-operative Society Ltd. , Bhola Ram and Mani Ram in toto and the appeals preferred by the Corporation and the petitioner were allowed in part. The impugned order of the R. T. A. dated 9-2-1987 was set aside with the obervations that the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and the petitioner would continue to ply on the route in question till the R. T. A. decides the remanded, case finally. Being aggrieved against this order of the Tribunal dated 1-9-1988, the petitioner filed a writ petition before this Court and an interim order was granted on 6-2-1989 staying the operation of the order, of the Tribunal dated 1-9-1988. Being aggrieved against this order of the Tribunal dated 1-9-1988, the petitioner filed a writ petition before this Court and an interim order was granted on 6-2-1989 staying the operation of the order, of the Tribunal dated 1-9-1988. Meanwhile the period of permit of the petitioner expired on 10-2-1992, therefore the petitioner moved a renewal application and no objections were preferred by the Corporation and the R. T. A. renewed the permit of the petitioner for a period of 5 years vide its resolution dated 27-2-1992 for the entire route. It is alleged that since the Tribunal by its order dated 1-9-1988 set aside the grant made in favour of the petitioner as well as the Corporation but the petitioner preferred the writ petition and the Corporation did not prefer any petition against the setting aside of its permit, therefore, the setting aside of the permit of the Corporation remained in force but still the Corporation was granted renewal. of its permit vide order dated 17-2-1992. The writ petition filed by the petitioner before this Court came to be allowed by the order dated 14-1-1992 and the order passed by the Tribunal dated 1-9-1988 was set aside and the case was remanded back to the Tribunal for fresh decision. The other writ petitions filed by the petitioner to the extent of cancelling his permit by the Tribunal was accepted and the matter was remanded back to the R. T. A. for fresh decision. It is alleged that the petitioner filed certain applications and affidavits in appeal filed by the Corporation before the Tribunal that the Corporation is not entitled to preference under S. 47 (1-H) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Apart from this certain more documents were also filed by the petitioner. It is alleged that the corporation also filed a reply alongwith affidavit denying the allegations. The Tribunal after hearing the parties concerned by its order dated 1-3-1993 accepted the appeal filed by the Corporation and set aside the resolution of the R. T. A. dated 9-2-1987 granting one permit in favour of the petitioner and in place of that the Corporation has been granted one non-temporary stage carriage permit on the route Hanumangarh to Mogha via Abhore curtailed from Hanumangarh to Rajpura. It is alleged that the petitioners permit was renewed for entire route Hanumangarh to Mogha via Abhore but the Tribunal cancelled that permit and in place of that granted one non-temporary stage carriage permit in favour of the Corporation for the portion of the route Hanumangarh to Mogha from Rajpura to Hanumangarh. Aggrieved against this order of the Tribunal dated 1-3-1993 cancelling the permit granted in favour of the petitioner and renewed in favour of the petitioner for the route Hanumangarh to Mogha via Abhore and in place of that granting one nontemporary stage carriage permit in favour of the Corporation, the petitioner preferred the present writ petition. Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Corporation is not entitled to preference under S. 47 (1-H) as it has failed to discharge its burden in support thereof. He has invited my attention to Kansingh etc. v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1988 SC 18 . It is further alleged that the Corporation is defaulter and it has plied the vehicles on the route illegally when the Corporations permit was set aside. The Corporation would have been granted one more permit without cancelling the petitioners permit and lastly it is alleged that the appeal of the Corporation should have been decided in accordance with the old law. ( 3 ) AS against this, Mr. Munshi, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the Corporation is entitled to the benefit of preference under S. 47 (1-H) of the Act of 1939 and the burden has already been discharged by the Corporation by filing an affidavit of one Shri Abid Ali. It is also alleged that the Tribunal has considered all the material and after considering those material and the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court bearing on the subject the Tribunal has rightly decided the matter and granted one more permit in favour of the Corporation. ( 4 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. A similar question came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Zamindara Motor Transport Co-operative Society Ltd. v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan (S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 927 of 1993, decided on 23-3-1993) and this question was examined at length and the decision of the Honble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Sher Singh v. Union of India. AIR 1994 SC 200 was taken into consideration and reference was also made to the Rajasthan amendment which reads as under:-"provided further that other conditions being equal, an application for a stage carriage permit by a State Transport undertaking, as defined in S. 68a, shall be given preference over applications from individual owners and co-operative societies. " ( 5 ) RELYING on that it was found that if everything being equal the Corporation is entitled to have a permit in preference to the private operators and co-operative societies. In the present case, the Tribunal has considered the question at length and after examining the merits of both the parties that both have a fleet of vehicles, both have sector experience and both have ready workshop and considering all these factors the Tribunal preferred the Corporation. Abid Ali in his affidavit has said that no vehicle from other sector will be withdrawn. Therefore, this question of fact has been examined at length by the Tribunal and I do not see any reason to take a different view from the one taken by the Tribunal. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to Kansinghs case (supra) This was a case in which the whole controversy centerd round the fact that the R. T. A. did not provide the material which was placed before it by the Corporation to the applicant so as to meet the case of the Corporation. Therefore, on that basis it was found that there is a breach of the principles of natural justice. However, their Lordships of the Supreme Court further observed as under:-"it is not correct to say that while considering applications for permit for inter-State route, the satisfaction that the R. T. A. has to reach that the State Road Transport Corporation would be able to operate the interstate route for which permit is sought without detriment to the efficiency and adequacy of the nationalised services it is already running in the State is a matter on which the R. T. A. has to reach a subjective satisfaction in the light of such material as it may be able to gather and that it is not necessary that it should be arrived at after giving an opportunity to all the persons appearing before the Authority. " ( 7 ) THEREFORE, the ratio is that it has to be the satisfaction of the R. T. A. Though the R. T. A. granted one permit in favour of the petitioner but the Tribunal after considering over the matter has found that the Corporation has discharged its burden and is in a position to provide the necessary trnasport service without disturbing its fleet plying on the routes. Therefore, this satisfaction of the Tribunal on the question of fact cannot be interferred with at this stage in the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Moreover, recently their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Bihar State Road Transport Corporation v. Sushil Kumar Vohra (1993) 3 SCC 91 have again occasion to examine the matter and their Lordships of the Supreme Court in this case have observed as under"apart from the above circumstances, even if other conditions being equal, preference has to be given to applications for permits from State Transport Undertakings in comparison to the private operators. A reference in this connection may be made to proviso to clause (b) of sub-section (3) of S. 74 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which reads as under:- 74. (3) (b) Where the number of contract carriages are fixed under clause (a), the Regional Transport Authority shall, in considering an application for the grant of permit in respect of any such contract carriage, have regard to the following matters, namely : (i) financial stability of the applicant; (ii) satisfactory performance as a contract carriage operator including payment of tax if the applicant is or has been an operator of contract carriages; and (iii) such other matters as may be prescribed by the State Government provided that, other conditions being equal, preference shall be given to the applications for permits from - (i) to (iii) (iv) State transport undertakings; (v) and (vi)9. Thus, taking into consideration the above statutory provision as well as the other circumstances placed on record, we hold that the High Court was not correct in remanding the matter a second time to the Authority. The route in question from Hazaribagh to Calcutta is a long inter-State route and in case the State Transport Authority has granted permit in favour of the Corporation, there was no justification to interfere in such order by the High Court. The route in question from Hazaribagh to Calcutta is a long inter-State route and in case the State Transport Authority has granted permit in favour of the Corporation, there was no justification to interfere in such order by the High Court. " ( 8 ) SINCE this case was under the New Act, therefore, reference was made to S. 74 which is analogous to old S. 47 (1-H) of the Act of 1939. However, in that provision also the preference is being given to the State transport undertakings if everything is equal. Likewise under S. 47 (1-H) of the Act of 1939 the preference is given to the State transport undertakings. Therefore, in view of the latest judgment of their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court everything being equal the State Transport undertaking has to be given preference on inter-State routes. ( 9 ) NEXT, learned counsel submitted that the Corporation was defaulter and the Corporation could have granted a fresh permit. These questions have no relevance for the just decision of this case as I am deciding the question on principle and if the Corporation was a defaulter then it was open for the R. T. A. to have taken a proper action against it for illegally plying the vehicles on the route. But this question of fact does not change the position of law. ( 10 ) LEARNED counsel has also invited my attention to various cases on the subject but suffice it to say that each case which has been referred has been decided on facts. So far as the legal position is concerned it is crystal clear in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court as quoted above. Therefore, no useful purpose would be served by referring to those judgments in which the Corporation has been found defaulter. But in view of the decision of the Honble Supreme Court the legal position has been crystalised that if everything being equal the Corporation has to be preferred in the matter of grant of permit on inter-State routes and the Tribunal on facts after examining the matter in greater detail has found that everything being equal qua the other applicants, granted a permit in favour of the Corporation then such questions of facts cannot be made a ground for interference by this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction. ( 11 ) LASTLY, it was contended by the learned counsel that the Tribunal should have dealt with the appeal according to the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Nothing turns on this issue as practically on this subject there is no substantial change in law in the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. ( 12 ) IN the result, the writ petition is dismissed and the parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.