JUDGMENT S. N. Jha, J. This appeal by the contesting defendants and party arises out of a suit for partition. 2. The common ancestor of the parties Ayodhya Singh had four sons - Singhasan Singh, Deonandan Singh, Ramdhan Singh and Maharaj Singh. The plaintiff, defendant 1st party and the defendant 2nd party belong to the branch of Singhasan Singh. The branches of Deonandan Singh and Ramdhari Singh are represented by the defend ant 3rd and 4th parties respectively. Maharaj Singh died issueless. In the present suit, the dispute is confined to the branch of singhasan Singh alone. The defendant 3rd and 4th parties are virtually proforma parties. singhasan Singh had two sons Baijnath Singh, the sole defendant 1st party and Gopaljee Singh, defendant no 8 whose sons and grand sons are defendant nos. 3 to 14 of the 2nd party. The plaintiff is the son of Baijnath Singh. The plaintiff and the contesting defendant 2nd party have pleaded their respective case in great details. The area of controversy in the appeal being rather small limited to only three plots of lands it is not necessary to consider the details of their case, Nevertheless in order to appreciate the point in issue the bare minimum facts may be stated as follows. 3. According to the plaintiff, defendant nos. 28 and 29 Anurag Singh and Bijay kumar Singh of the branch of Ramdhari Singh instituted Partition Suit No. 90 of 1967 in the court of 2nd Subordinate Judge, Chapra, against Maharaj Singh and members of other branches. The suit was compromised and the shape of each branch in respect of joint family properties was determined except some items which were left joint as mentioned in schedule 'Cha' of the compromise decree. The plaintiff was minor at that time. The members of the branch of Singh remained joint. In the state of joint-ness a chaff cutter shop business in the name of Ajoy Kumar Abhoy Kumar, was started at Chapra. Another chaff cutter shop was opened at Siwan. Defendant nos. 3 and 4 started manipulating the accounts of the shops. The plaintiff complained to his father defendant no. 1 but he was so much under the influence of defendant no. 2 that he paid no heed. Since the studies of the plaintiff and his wife, who was than a medical student at Patna. Defendant nos. 3 and 4 started manipulating the accounts of the shops. The plaintiff complained to his father defendant no. 1 but he was so much under the influence of defendant no. 2 that he paid no heed. Since the studies of the plaintiff and his wife, who was than a medical student at Patna. Were being hampered, the plaintiff filed Partition Suit No. 37 of 1968 in the court of 2nd Subordinate Judge, Chapra, on 25.3.68 against defendants 1st and 2nd party herein in respect of the properties which had been allotted to the share of Singhasam Singh in the aforesaid compromise decree, claiming ¼ th share. During pendency of the suit the defendant no. 2 got Title Suit No. 97 of 1968 instituted by the wife of defendant no. 3 i.e. his daughter-in- law against members of the different branches of Ayodhya Singh for partition of the entire ancestral properties of Ayodhya Singh. On account of the intervention of the well wishers of the parties both the suits, namely, Partition suit No. 37 or 1968 and Title Suit No. 97 of 1968 were withdrawn. As per the understanding, the defendants recognized the plaintiff's Claim of his 4 annas share in the properties allotted to the branch of Singhasan Singh. The possession however was to remain joint with other members. According to the plaintiffs, thus, he separated from his father defendant no. 1 and other defendants but remained in joint possession with them without partition by metes and bounds. It is said that some properties were acquired out of the income of the joint family properties even after 1968 in which too the share of the plaintiff is 4 annas. The properties allotted to the branch of Singhasan Singh under the compromise decree in partition Suit No. 90 of 1967 which had all alone remained joint have been included in schedule I while the house properties and the shops opened out of joint family funds have been mentioned in schedules II and III, respectively. Schedule IV comprises of properties which were left joint in Partition Suit No. 90 of 1967 or left out of the schedule of suit lands in that suit. The plaintiff instituted the present suit for partition claiming 1/4th share in schedules I, II and III and 1/12th share in schedule IV properties. 4. Defendant 1st party did not file written statement. The plaintiff instituted the present suit for partition claiming 1/4th share in schedules I, II and III and 1/12th share in schedule IV properties. 4. Defendant 1st party did not file written statement. Some of the defendants of the 3rd and 4th sets filed written statement supporting the plaintiff's case except that, according to them, Maharaj Singh had executed deed of gift with respect to his share in favour of the heirs of Ramdhari Singh and, thus, the properties held by Maharaj Singh had gone to the branch of Ramdhari. Defendant no. 5 of the defendant 2nd set also supported too plaintiff's case. The contest came from defendants 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 of the 2nd party. Besides usual formal objections regarding maintainability and the defect in the frame of the suit their case is as follows: They denied the plaintiffs case that his father defendant no. 1 was in the clutches of defendant no. 2. According to them, institution of Portion Suit No. 37 of 1968 and its withdrawal on 31.3.70 was a show put up by the plaintiff and defendant no. 1 in order to make out a case of separation between them. They asserted that there was no unity of title and possession between the parties inasmuch as the entire joint family properties of the plaintiff and the defendant 1st and 2nd set had been partitioned under private partition on 4.1.71 in respect of which a memorandum signed by defendant nos. 1 and 2 was prepared on 5.1.71. This was done with the consent of the plaintiff. A registered deed of partition incorporating the terms of the partition was executed by defendant nos. 1 and 2 representing the interest of the respective branch on 21.2.74 which was binding on them. As regards plot nos. 428 and 435 of Khata no. 35 situated at Nai Bazar and plot no. 595 of Khata no. 156 situated at Salempur Mahadeva within Siwan town specific plea was taken that they are self-acquired properties of defendant no. 3 who had purchased the lands in his name from his own funds. Similarly, the land of plot no. 595 was said to have already been sold to one Maksudan Shahi, who was in possession thereof. Thus, according to defendants, lands of plot nos. 3 who had purchased the lands in his name from his own funds. Similarly, the land of plot no. 595 was said to have already been sold to one Maksudan Shahi, who was in possession thereof. Thus, according to defendants, lands of plot nos. 428, 435 and 595 mentioned in schedule II of the plaint are no, properties of the joint family and therefore not liable to partition, As regard the properties mentioned in schedule IV they stated that the same, in fact, belonged to Maharaj Singh, which had been allotted to hill share in Partition Suit No. 90 of 1967 but by reason of deed of gift executed by Maharaj Singh in favour of descendant of Ramdhari Singh, the same too cannot be the subject of partition because neither the plaintiff nor other defendants have got any share in it. 5. On the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed as many as 11 issues, the material issue being (a) Whether the deed of partition (dated 21.2.14) executed by defendant nos. 1 and 2 is binding on the plaintiff? (b) Whether there is unity of title and possession between the parties in respect of the suit properties? and (c) Whether the properties as described in schedule IV of the plaint and the properties of Khata nos. 35 and 156 and the shop at Chapra are liable to partition ? 6. The parties led evidence - Oral and documentary in proof of their respective case. On consideration of the evidence the trial court disbelieved the defendants case that the relationship between the plaintiff and his father defendant no. 1 was cordial and that Partition Suit No. 37 of 1968 was a collusive suit. On the other hand, it accepted the plaintiff's case that defendant no. 1 had cordial relationship with his brother defendant no. 2 and members of his branch. The court held that Partition Suit No. 37 of 1968 had brought bout complete severance between the plaintiff and defendant no. 1 and thus, being separate from each other defendant no. 1 had no authority to sign and execute the memorandum of partition dated 5.1.71 and the registered deed of partition dated 21.2.74 (Exhibits B and C). Thus, the said partition could not be binding on the plaintiff. 1 and thus, being separate from each other defendant no. 1 had no authority to sign and execute the memorandum of partition dated 5.1.71 and the registered deed of partition dated 21.2.74 (Exhibits B and C). Thus, the said partition could not be binding on the plaintiff. The court also held that there was unity of title and possession between the parties and no partition by metes and bounds has been effected between them. The court, however, disbelieved the plaintiff's claim of share in the properties comprising Chapra Machinery Mart’ in the town of Chapra. It may be stated here that although the defendants had disputed the plaintiff's claim as regards schedule IV properties, during course of final argument in the trial court they conceded the claim. The plaintiff also withdraw his claim with respect to land of plot no. 595 of schedule II by deleting it from the plaint. Thus, there is no dispute now with respect to the property 'Chapra Machinery Mart' as well as the land of plot no. 595 or schedule IV properties. During course of bearing of this appeal no attempt was made on behalf of the appellants to challenge the finding regarding unity of title and possession between the parties except as regards plot nos. 428 and 435 of Khata no. 35 situate at Siwan. The entire argument of the counsel for the parties centered round the question of share of the plaintiff in this particular item of house property bearing plot nos. 428 and 435 having an area of four kathas. The trial court has held that the said property was acquired out of the joint family fund and, therefore, liable to partition. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants has referred to the oral evidence of D.Ws. 3, 6, 15, 17, 25, 34, 35, 37 and 39. D. W 3 Dudhnath Singh and D.W.6 Baijnath Prasad said to be employee of defendant no. 3 and tenant of the premises respectively stated that the property belongs to defendant no. 3 D.W.15 Ram Janam Singh, maternal uncle of defendant no. 3 stated that he had lent Rs. 3000/- to defendant no. 3. Similarly, D.W.17 Bachcha Singh, brother-in-law (wife's brother) of defendant no. 3 stated that his uncle had advanced a sum of Rs. 3000/- for the purchase of the land. 3 D.W.15 Ram Janam Singh, maternal uncle of defendant no. 3 stated that he had lent Rs. 3000/- to defendant no. 3. Similarly, D.W.17 Bachcha Singh, brother-in-law (wife's brother) of defendant no. 3 stated that his uncle had advanced a sum of Rs. 3000/- for the purchase of the land. D. W. 25 Chandraketu Narain Singh, a lawyer, stated about the purchase of other lands by defendant no. 3 to show that he had funds from which he was purchasing lands. D. W. 35 Sidheshwar Pd. Singh, an employee of the Central Bank, stated about the deposit of the title deeds with respect to the lands in question in mortgage for taking loan from the bank. D.W.37 Dhrub Narain Singh a teacher, is a witness on the purchase of the lands. D. W. 34 Gopaljee. Singh is the father of defendant no. 3 while D. W. 39 is the defendant no. 3 himself. 8. There is no evidence much less documentary evidence suggesting that defendant no. 3 was ever engaged in separate business from before, besides the joint family business at Chapra and Siwan. According to the defendants the property was purchased by defendant no. 3 for Rs. 8000/- on 26.3.58. through registered sale deed (Exhibit G/2). The consideration money was arranged by taking loans from his maternal uncle and uncle-in-law. The trial court has disbelieved their evidence as being highly interested in defendant no. 3. D.Ws. 15 and 17 are no doubt, close relative, of defendant no. 3. On that ground, of course, their evidence cannot be rejected. But at the same time it should be kept in mind that it is very casy for any person to say that he had advanced loans to so-and so. The statement coming from the mouth of close relatives has, therefore, to be examined very closely. Just posed with the other evidence, many of which being documentary, referred to hereinafter, in my opinion, it is not possible to rely on their statements. 9. The plea that the property is self acquired property of defendant no. 3 stands falsified by the documentary evidence on record. While narrating the case of the party reference has been made to Partition Suit No. 90 of 1967 which was instituted in respect of the entire joint family properties of Ayodhya Singh, which was decreed in terms of compromise. The plea that the property is self acquired property of defendant no. 3 stands falsified by the documentary evidence on record. While narrating the case of the party reference has been made to Partition Suit No. 90 of 1967 which was instituted in respect of the entire joint family properties of Ayodhya Singh, which was decreed in terms of compromise. Perusal of the compromise petition and the final decree (Exhibits 5/1 and 1) passed in the said suit shows that the land was allotted to the defendant 2nd party. This is a cogent evidence of the joint character of the lands. In Partition Suit No. 37 of 1968 instituted by the plaintiff, while the receivership matter was being considered, the defendants volunteered to part with 1/4th share in the land in favour of the plaintiff which is evident from the petition (Exhibit 4/c) and the order dated 15.11.68 (Exhibit 6/1) of the said suit. As a matter fact, in the memorandum of partition (Exhibit B) and the registered partition deed (Exhibit C) also this item of property finds place. Counsel for the appellants submitted that defendant no. 3 was not party to the memorandum of partition or the deed of partition (Exhibits B and C) and, therefore, they are not binding on him. This argument has been noticed only to be rejected, firstly as being contrary to the pleadings and secondly because the said documents have been produced by none else than the defendants themselves. Defendant no. 3 did not plead any case different from the other contesting defendants. The said partition deeds have no doubt been held to be not binding on the plaintiff but coming as it does from the defendants, they are certainly bound by their contents and the plaintiff is entitled to take advantage thereof. If the property were the separate, self acquired property of defendant no. 3 and did not form part of the joint family property there was no occasion to include it in the schedule of partition of 1971 or the partition deed of 1974. The trial court has concluded on the basis of these documents that the property belongs to the joint family and I see no reason to take a different view. 10. Learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent submitted that even if the property is held to be self acquired property of defendant no. The trial court has concluded on the basis of these documents that the property belongs to the joint family and I see no reason to take a different view. 10. Learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent submitted that even if the property is held to be self acquired property of defendant no. 3, by reason of its inclusion in the schedule of lands of the joint family it must be held to have been treated as joint family property by doctrine of blending. Counsel placed reliance on Coli Eswariah v. Commissioner of Income Tax (AIR 1970 Supreme Court, 1722) wherein it has been stated :- “The separate properties of Hindu coparcener ceases to be so and acquires the characteristic of a joint family or ancestral property not by say physical mixing with his joint family or ancestral property but by his own volition and intention by his waiving and surrendering his separate rights in it as separate property. The act is a unilateral act. No longer he declares his intention the property resumes the character of joint family property. The doctrine is peculiar to Mitakshara School of Hindu Law.” The doctrine of blending was explained by the Judicial Committee in Rajnikani Pal v. Jaganwhon Pal (AIR 1923 Privy Council, 57) in these words :- “Where a member of a joint Hindu family blends his self acquired property with property of the joint family, either by bring his self acquired property into a joint family account, or by bringing joint family property into his separate account, the effect is that all the property so blended becomes a joint family property.” The aforesaid passage was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai v. Desai Mallappa @ Mallesappa (AIR 1961 Supreme Court, J968). 11. The defendants produced rent receipts (Exhibit F series) in respect of the property in the name of defendant no, 3 to show its separate character. In my opinion nothing turns on this, particularly in view of the documents referred to above. If tae sale deed (Exhibit G 2) in respect of the property stands in the name of defendant no. 3 it is natural that the rent receipts too would be in his name. 12. Suits of the present nature are to be decided on preponderance of evidence. If tae sale deed (Exhibit G 2) in respect of the property stands in the name of defendant no. 3 it is natural that the rent receipts too would be in his name. 12. Suits of the present nature are to be decided on preponderance of evidence. It is easy for a person to say that a particular property is his self acquired property or joint family property. It is easy to find witness who would be only too willing to pledge their oath in support of one plea or the other. The joint family property of Ayodhya Singh admittedly remained joint upto 1968 when Partition Suit No. 90 of 1967 was disposed of in terms of the compromise. The property in question was acquired in 1958. There is no dispute about sufficiency of joint family nucleus. In that view, heavy onus lay on the defendants to prove that the property was separate self acquired property of defendant no. 3. In my opinion, the defendants have failed to discharge the onus. The documentary evidence referred to above, not to speak of the opal evidence led on behalf of the plaintiff is Sufficient to hold that the property in question was joint family property and/or always treated as such by the parties. The finding of the trial court that the property is joint family property and the consequential decree granting 1/4th share therein to the plaintiff, thus, cannot be said to be erroneous. 13. Before I conclude, I may mention in this Court at the stage of hearing of the injunction matter a question arose as to whether the plaintiff is in possession or portion of the aforesaid property or not. According to the appellants, the plaintiff respondent was attempting to alter the nature and character of plot nos. 428 and 435. As would appear from the order dated 10.1.83 disposing of the injunction matter stand was taken by the plaintiff that after passing of the decree he had parted with possession of two pucca houses at Chapra, comprising holding no. 105” as a consideration for the plaintiff retaining possession over plot nos. 428 and 435” at Siwan and since the plaintiff had put the defendants in possession over the said two pucca houses at Chapra, he could not be restrained from making construction over the aforesaid plots of land. 105” as a consideration for the plaintiff retaining possession over plot nos. 428 and 435” at Siwan and since the plaintiff had put the defendants in possession over the said two pucca houses at Chapra, he could not be restrained from making construction over the aforesaid plots of land. Counsel for the plaintiff respondent referred to the terms of the compromise from the compromise petition dated 12.5.82 filed in this Court in the present appeal which eventually was rejected on 9.12.82 at the instance of the appellants lawyer, and stated that the properties had changed hands at that very stage, Counsel for the appellants submitted that recitals in the compromise petition cannot be looked into and used as admission of the claim of the plaintiff. This, no doubt is the correct legal position. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the plaintiff's assertion in this regard were not controverted by the appellants at the time of hearing of the injunction matter. This Court considered the matter and having regard to the fact that the assertion of the plaintiff had not been denied by the appellants and also having regard to the fact that the plaintiff had made substantial construction over the lands, rejected the prayer for injunction on 10.1.83 observing that equity does not lie in their (appellants') fovour. Mr. Ramchandra Jha, learned counsel for the plaintiff stated that the plaintiff would have no objection in foregoing his share in the property in question (Plot nos. 428 and 435) although the plaintiff has constructed a building and running a hotel business therein if he is compensated suitably by giving him due share in the houses property as Chapra. The counsel for the appellants, however, did not agree to this. 14. The finding regarding unity of title and possession between the parties not having been challenged in the course of hearing this appeal, and the property in question having been held to be a joint family property, there in no scope for interfering with the judgment and decrees of the trial court. 15. This appeal has no merit and the same is accordingly, dismissed with cost. Appeal dismissed with cost.